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STATE BAR COURT CLERKS OFFICE LOS ANGELES

PUBLIC MATTER

STATE BAR COURT

HEARING DEPARTMENT - LOS ANGELES

In the Matter of

RICHARD DAVID COMESS,
No. 198665

A Member of the State Bar.

Case No. 01-O-02777 AIN
DECISION

A Member of the State Bar.

INTRODUCTION

In this default proceeding, Respondent Richard David Comess is charged with multiple acts of misconduct in two client matters and with failure to cooperate with the State Bar's disciplinary investigations of those matters.

For the reasons stated below, this Court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent is culpable of most of the charged acts of misconduct and will recommend that Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years, that execution of that suspension be stayed and that Respondent be actually suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months and until (a) Respondent makes restitution to his client, Ray E. Gover, in the amount of \$1,300; and (b) the State Bar Court grants a motion to terminate his actual suspension pursuant to rule 205 of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar ("Rules of Procedure").

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PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This proceeding was initiated by the filing of a ten-count Notice of Disciplinary Charges ("NDC") by the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel of the State Bar of California ("State Bar") on March 18, 2003. The NDC was properly served upon Respondent on the same date, by certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to Respondent's official membership address ("official address") pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6002.1, subdivision (c) and rule 60 of the Rules of Procedure. The NDC was not returned to the State Bar by the U.S. Postal Service, but it is unclear from the record whether the State Bar subsequently received the return receipt evidencing actual delivery of the NDC.

The State Bar also served a courtesy copy of the NDC on Respondent at an alternate address, i.e., 345 Homewood Road, Los Angeles, California 90049-2711. The State Bar obtained this address from the U.S. Postal Service when a previous letter the State Bar had mailed to Respondent was returned and referenced the Homewood address as a forwarding address. There is no evidence indicating whether or not the courtesy copy of the NDC was subsequently returned to the State Bar by the U.S. Postal Service.

Respondent did not file an answer to the NDC. On April 25, 2003, the State Bar filed a Notice of Motion and Motion for Entry of Default. These documents were served upon Respondent on the same date, by certified mail, return receipt requested, at both his official address and at the alternate address on Homewood Road in Los Angeles.

The Court entered Respondent's default on May 19, 2003, after Respondent failed to file an answer to the NDC within ten days after service of the Motion for Entry of Default. (See Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 200(c).) Notice of Entry of Default was properly served upon Respondent on the same date by certified mail addressed to him at his official address.

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¹ At all times since December 9, 1998, Respondent's official address has been 944 Princeton Drive, Marina Del Rey, California 90292-5411.

The State Bar was represented in this proceeding by Deputy Trial Counsel Lee Ann Kern.

Respondent did not participate at any stage of this proceeding, either personally or through counsel.

On May 29, 2003, the State Bar filed its Brief Regarding Level of Discipline in Lieu of Default Hearing. In that brief, the State Bar waived its right to a default hearing. This matter was taken under submission on May 29, 2003.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in California on December 9, 1998, and has been a member of the State Bar of California since that time.

A. Counts One through Five (The Gover Matter)

On October 19, 2000, Respondent met with Ray E. Gover to discuss Gover's intent to appeal a ruling of the trial court in an action entitled *Ray E. Gover v. Technicolor, Inc.*, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. BC 189024. At the conclusion of their meeting, Gover left the reporter's transcript and four volumes of his files with Respondent. Respondent subsequently met with Gover on November 13, 2000, to assist him in the filing of a motion to extend time for the filing of Gover's opening brief on appeal. The extension request was filed by Gover, acting *in propria persona*, on November 13, 2000 and was granted by the court of appeal on November 16, 2000.

On December 14, 2000, Gover and Respondent entered into an agreement whereby Gover agreed to pay Respondent the sum of \$1,300 for the preparation and filing of the appellant's opening prief on Gover's behalf. Gover paid the \$1,300 to Respondent in cash on December 14, 2000.

On December 15, 2000, Respondent filed a motion to extend the time within which to file the opening brief in Gover's appeal. Respondent signed the motion as "Richard D. Comess, Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant, in pro per." The court of appeal granted Respondent's extension request on December 18, 2000, but advised Respondent that, if the opening brief was not filed within 15 days, Gover's appeal would be dismissed.

Thereafter, on December 20, 2000, the court of appeal notified Gover that it had received the extension request signed by Respondent but that it would not consider the motion until Respondent substituted into the matter on Gover's behalf. Respondent subsequently substituted into the appeal as Gover's attorney of record on December 26, 2000.

On December 26, 2000, Respondent filed Gover's second motion for an extension of time o file the opening brief on Gover's behalf. The court of appeal granted Respondent's request on December 27, 2000, extending the time for filing the opening brief until January 19, 2001.

Respondent did not file the opening brief on appeal by January 19, 2001. Instead, on January 17, 2001, he filed a third extension request. The court of appeal granted this request on January 19, 10 2001, and extended the time for filing the brief for an additional 15 days.

Respondent did not file the opening brief on appeal by the new due date. On February 23, 2001, Respondent filed a fourth motion for extension of time to file the opening brief on appeal. By brder filed February 26, 2001, the court of appeal granted Respondent an additional 15 days within which to file the brief, but warned Respondent that Gover's appeal would be dismissed if Respondent failed to file the opening brief.

Beginning in mid-March 2001, Gover called Respondent repeatedly and left messages with Respondent's wife, son and daughter asking that Respondent contact Gover. Respondent failed to return any of Gover's calls and failed to file the opening brief in Gover's appeal.

On April 3, 2001, the court of appeal dismissed Gover's appeal as a result of his failure to file the opening brief on appeal.

On April 17, 2001, Gover mailed a letter to Respondent by certified mail complaining that he had been unable to contact Respondent. Gover also faxed a copy of the letter to Respondent. Gover informed Respondent that his appeal had been dismissed and that he wanted Respondent to refund all or part of the \$1,300 that Gover had paid to Respondent for preparation of the opening brief on appeal. Respondent neither replied to Gover's letter nor refunded to him any portion of the 26 \$1,300 fee.

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Gover sent a second certified letter to Respondent on April 25, 2001, in which he asked Respondent to sign a substitution of attorneys. Gover also asked Respondent for all of the transcripts and evidence Gover had provided to him and for a full refund of the \$1,300 that Gover had paid to Respondent for preparation of the opening brief on appeal. Respondent did not reply to Gover's letter and neither signed the substitution of attorneys, returned Gover's files and documents nor refunded any portion of the \$1,300 fee.

On May 2, 2001, Gover personally filed a substitution of attorney and a motion to vacate the court's dismissal of his appeal. The court of appeal granted Gover's motions on May 2, 2001, and gave him until May 17, 2001, to file his opening brief on appeal.

Respondent returned Gover's transcripts and evidence to him on May 15, 2001. On May 17, 2001, Gover filed a request for an extension of time to file his opening brief on appeal and informed the court of appeal that he had only received his transcript and evidence from Respondent on May 15, 2001. Nevertheless, by order filed May 18, 2001, the court of appeal denied Gover's extension request and, by subsequent order filed June 1, 2001, dismissed Gover's appeal for the failure to file his appellant's opening brief.

On November 6, 2002, the State Bar opened an investigation of Respondent's conduct in the Gover matter pursuant to a complaint filed by Ray E. Gover. On that date, State Bar Investigator Keith Jones wrote to Respondent regarding the Gover matter. Investigator Jones' letter asked Respondent to reply in writing to specified allegations of misconduct being investigated by the State Bar in the Gover matter. The letter was properly mailed to Respondent by first-class mail, addressed to him at his official address.

The U.S. Postal Service returned Investigator Jones' letter as undeliverable with a printed label indicating that a forwarding order had expired and listing a forwarding address for Respondent of 345 Homewood Road, Los Angeles, California 90049-2711.

On November 14, 2002, Investigator Jones wrote a second letter to Respondent asking him o respond to specified allegations of misconduct in the Gover matter. Investigator Jones mailed this second letter to Respondent by first-class mail addressed to him at the Homewood Road address. The U.S. Postal Service did not return this letter to the State Bar as undeliverable.

1. Count One (Rule 3-110(A), Rules of Professional Conduct)

Respondent is charged in Count One of the NDC with a wilful violation of rule 3-110(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides that a member of the State Bar shall not ntentionally, recklessly or repeatedly fail to perform legal services with competence.

The Court finds Respondent culpable, by clear and convincing evidence, of the charged violation of rule 3-110(A). Pursuant to the provisions of rule 202(d)(1) of the Rules of Procedure, upon the entry of Respondent's default in this proceeding, the well-pleaded factual allegations set forth in the Notice of Disciplinary Charges are deemed admitted. (In the Matter of Heiner (Review 13 Dept. 1990) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 301, 318.) The admitted factual allegations of the NDC establish that Respondent was retained by Gover to prepare and file an opening brief in his appeal in the Gover v. Technicolor, Inc. action. Despite his agreement to perform those legal services, his receipt of \$1,300 in advanced fees, his substitution into the appeal and his preparation of at least hree requests for extensions of time, Respondent subsequently failed to prepare and file the appellant's opening brief. Respondent's failure to competently perform these agreed-upon legal services was either intentional or reckless and constitutes a wilful violation of rule 3-110(A).

2. Count Two (Business and Professions Code Section 6068, Subdivision (m))

Respondent is charged in Count Two of the NDC with a violation of Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (m), which provides that it is the duty of a member of the State Bar to promptly respond to the reasonable status inquiries of clients and to keep clients easonably informed of significant developments in their legal matters.

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The Court finds Respondent culpable, by clear and convincing evidence, of failing to promptly respond to his client's reasonable status inquiries in violation of section 6068, subdivision (m). The admitted allegations of the NDC establish that, beginning in mid-March 2001, Gover made repeated telephone calls to Respondent and left messages with Respondent's wife and children asking Respondent to return his calls. In addition, Gover mailed at least two certified letters to Respondent and faxed one of the letters to him. Despite Gover's repeated efforts to contact him, Respondent neither replied to Gover's letters nor responded to his telephone calls. Respondent's failure to respond to these letters and telephone calls constitutes a failure to promptly respond to client inquiries in violation of Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (m).

3. Count Three (Rule 3-700(D)(2), Rules of Professional Conduct)

Respondent is charged in Count Three of the NDC with a wilful violation of rule 3-700(D)(2) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides that a member whose employment has terminated shall promptly refund any part of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned.

The Court finds Respondent culpable, by clear and convincing evidence, of a wilful violation of rule 3-700(D)(2). The admitted allegations of the NDC establish that Gover paid Respondent the sum of \$1,300 in cash to prepare and file an appellant's opening brief on his behalf in the appeal of the Gover v. Technicolor, Inc. action. Respondent failed to file the appellant's opening brief, resulting in the dismissal of Gover's appeal. The only legal services performed by Respondent that are evident from the record of this proceeding are the three requests for extensions of time for the filing of the brief. However, since Respondent ultimately failed to file the appellant's opening brief, a failure which resulted in the dismissal of Gover's appeal, it is clear that these extensions of time were merely preliminary to the preparation of the opening brief itself and these limited legal services, without the subsequent filing of the brief, were of no value to Gover. Therefore, the Court concludes that Respondent did not earn any portion of the \$1,300 in advance fees paid by Gover.

Gover effectively terminated Respondent's employment in his letter dated April 17, 2001, in which Gover informed Respondent that the court of appeal had dismissed his appeal as a result of Respondent's failure to file the appellant's opening brief and in which Gover demanded a refund of the \$1,300 fee. Respondent's failure to promptly refund the \$1,300 unearned fee to Gover following the termination of his employment constitutes a wilful violation of rule 3-700(D)(2) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

4. Count Four (Rule 3-700(A)(2), Rules of Professional Conduct)

Respondent is charged in Count Four of the NDC with a wilful violation of rule 3-700(A)(2) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides that a member of the State Bar shall not withdraw from employment until the member has taken reasonable steps to avoid reasonably foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his client.

The Court finds Respondent culpable, by clear and convincing evidence, of the charged violation of rule 3-700(A)(2). The admitted factual allegations of the NDC establish that Respondent stopped performing legal services on Gover's behalf after filing the motion for a fourth extension on time to file the opening brief in Gover's appeal on February 23, 2001. Thereafter, Respondent failed to file the opening brief, failed to seek a further extension of time, failed to respond to Gover's repeated messages and failed to take any action on Gover's behalf after the court of appeal dismissed the appeal as a result of Respondent's failure to file the opening brief. This conduct evidences Respondent's intent to unilaterally withdraw from his employment by Gover. (Cf., Baker v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 804, 816-817 (fn. 5).) Respondent failed to take any steps to protect Gover from the prejudice that would reasonably result from his withdrawal from employment, i.e., the dismissal of Gover's appeal. As a result, Respondent wilfully violated rule 3-700(A)(2) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

5. Count Five (Business and Professions Code Section 6068, Subdivision (i))

Respondent is charged in Count Five with a violation of Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (i), which provides that it is the duty of a member of the State Bar to

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cooperate with and participate in any disciplinary investigation conducted by the State Bar.

The Court does not find Respondent culpable of the charged violation of section 6068, subdivision (i). In order to be found culpable of failing to cooperate with the State Bar's disciplinary investigation, there must be evidence that Respondent was aware of the investigation. (See In the Matter of Taylor (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 563, 578-579.) The State Bar investigator's first letter to Respondent was sent to him at his official address but was returned as undeliverable by the U.S. Postal Service. Thus, this letter is insufficient to establish that Respondent was aware of the State Bar's investigation. The State Bar investigator's second letter was sent to Respondent at a forwarding address provided by the U.S. Postal Service when it returned the State Bar's first letter. Although the investigator's second letter was not returned by the U.S. Postal Service, it is insufficient to constitute clear and convincing evidence that the address to which the letter was mailed was actually Respondent's forwarding address or that he received the letter. (See In the Matter of Bailey (Review Dept. 2001) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 220, 225.) While there may be sufficient evidence that Respondent failed to maintain his current address on the membership records of the State Bar, as required by Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (j), Respondent was not charged with a violation of that section.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court does not find Respondent culpable of the charged violation of Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (i).

B. Counts Six through Ten (The ASA, Inc. Matter)

On April 11, 2001, Respondent was retained by Advanced Scientific Applications, Inc. "ASA, Inc.") to represent its interests in a lawsuit against Pacific Bell Telephone Company ("Pacific Bell"). On that date, Respondent and Shahram Manighalam, the President of ASA, Inc., signed a written retainer agreement relating to Respondent's representation.

On July 18, 2001, Respondent filed a lawsuit against Pacific Bell on behalf of ASA, Inc., entitled *Advanced Scientific Applications, Inc.* v. *Pacific Bell Telephone Company*, Orange County Superior Court Case No. 01CC00337.

A status conference in the ASA, Inc. v. Pacific Bell action was held on September 14, 2001, but Respondent failed to appear at the conference. In October 2001, Respondent told Manighalam that he had not yet served the summons and complaint upon Pacific Bell.

On November 9, 2001, Manighalam went to the court to review the file in the ASA, Inc. v. Pacific Bell action. From his review of the court file, Manighalam learned that Respondent had failed to appear for status conferences on both September 14, 2001 and October 16, 2001, and that the court had scheduled an Order to Show Cause re Dismissal ("OSC") for November 21, 2001 due to Respondent's failure to appear at the status conferences. The court had served Respondent with a copy of the OSC.

Manighalam appeared on behalf of ASA, Inc. at the OSC hearing on November 21, 2001, but Respondent did not appear at the hearing. Manighalam told the court that he had been unable to contact Respondent. The court continued the OSC hearing until January 24, 2002, and served Respondent with notice of the new hearing date.

Manighalam telephoned Respondent following the November 21, 2001, hearing and terminated his legal services. From November 21, 2001, until at least the date upon which the NDC in this case was filed (i.e., March 18, 2003), Manighalam has repeatedly telephoned Respondent in order to obtain the return of his documents and records relating to ASA, Inc.'s case against Pacific Bell. Respondent has not responded to Manighalam's requests.

On December 7, 2001, Manighalam sent a letter by to Respondent by Federal Express addressed to him at both his office and at 345 Homewood Road, Los Angeles, California 90049-2711. In the letter, Manighalam requested that Respondent immediately return all of the documents and records in his possession relating to the ASA, Inc. v. Pacific Bell action. Respondent did not reply to Manighalam's request for the documents.

On January 23, 2002, the State Bar opened an investigation of Respondent's conduct in the ASA, Inc. matter pursuant to a complaint filed by Shahram Manighalam. On that date, State Bar Investigator Michael Wolverton wrote a letter to Respondent regarding Manighalam's complaint.

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Investigator Wolverton's letter asked Respondent to reply in writing to specified acts of misconduct being investigated by the State Bar in the ASA, Inc. matter. The letter was properly mailed to Respondent by first-class mail, addressed to Respondent at his official membership address. The U.S. Postal Service did not return Investigator Wolverton's letter to the State Bar as undeliverable. Respondent did not respond to Investigator Wolverton's letter and did not otherwise communicate with him regarding the ASA, Inc. matter.

1. Count Six (Rule 3-110(A), Rules of Professional Conduct)

Respondent is charged in Count Six of the NDC with a wilful violation of rule 3-110(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The Court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent is culpable of the charged violation.

The admitted factual allegations of the NDC establish that Respondent was retained to represent ASA, Inc.'s interests in litigation against Pacific Bell. Although Respondent filed an action on behalf of ASA, Inc., he failed to taken any further action on ASA, Inc.'s behalf. Respondent failed to serve the summons and complaint, failed to appear at two status conferences and failed to appear at a hearing noticed by the court on its Order to Show Cause re Dismissal. As a result, this Court concludes that Respondent intentionally or recklessly failed to competently perform the legal services for which he was retained in wilful violation of rule 3-110(A).

2. Count Seven (Business and Professions Code Section 6068, Subdivision (m))

Respondent is charged in Count Seven of the NDC with a violation of Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (m). The State Bar charges that Respondent violated section 6068, subdivision (m) in two ways, i.e., by failing to keep his client, Manighalam, informed of significant developments in the ASA, Inc. v. Pacific Bell action and by failing to promptly respond to Manighalam's reasonable status inquiries.

The Court finds Respondent culpable, by clear and convincing evidence, of a violation of section 6068, subdivision (m) as a result of his failure to notify Manighalam of significant developments in the ASA, Inc. v. Pacific Bell action, but does not find him culpable of failing to

respond to Manighalam's status inquiries.

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As to Respondent's failure to notify Manighalam of significant developments in the ASA, Inc. v. Pacific Bell action, the admitted allegations of the NDC establish that Respondent told Manighalam in October 2001 that he had not yet served the summons and complaint upon Pacific Bell. The admitted allegations of the NDC also establish that Manighalam "learned" from a review of the court file that Respondent had failed to appear at status conferences on September 14, 2001 and October 16, 2001 and that the court had issued an OSC re Dismissal. The Court interprets these admitted facts to mean that Manighalam had not previously been informed of these events by Respondent. Clearly, Respondent's failure to appear at the status conferences and the court's 10 subsequent issuance of an OSC re Dismissal were significant developments in the ASA, Inc. v. Pacific Bell action. Respondent's failure to notify Manighalam of these developments constitutes a violation of Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (m).

However, the Court does not find Respondent culpable of a violation of section 6068, subdivision (m) as a result of his alleged failure to promptly respond to Manighalam's status inquiries. There is insufficient evidence to clearly and convincingly establish that Manighalam attempted to contact Respondent to inquire about the status of the ASA, Inc. v. Pacific Bell action br that Respondent failed to promptly respond to any inquiries. Manighalam told the court at the OSC hearing on November 21, 2001, that he had been unable to contact Respondent, but there is no evidence to establish the nature and extent, if any, of Manighalam's efforts to contact Respondent. Similarly, while the evidence establishes that Respondent did not respond to Maninghalam's telephone calls and letters on and after November 21, 2001, Manighalam terminated Respondent's employment on that date. As a result, Manighalam was no longer a client. Moreover, at that point, Manighalam was not seeking a status report regarding the ASA, Inc. v. Pacific Bell action but, rather, was attempting to recover his documents and records relating to the action. The evidence is simply insufficient to establish a violation of Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (m) for Respondent's alleged failure to respond to Manighalam's status inquiries.

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3. Count Eight (Rule 3-700(A)(2), Rules of Professional Conduct)

Respondent is charged in Count Eight of the NDC with a wilful violation of rule 3-700(A)(2) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The Court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent is culpable of the charged violation.

Respondent's failure to appear at the status conferences on September 14, 2001 and October 16, 2001, and his failure to either respond to the OSC re Dismissal or to appear at the hearing on the OSC on November 21, 2001, coupled with his failure to affirmatively communicate with Manighalam to inform him about significant developments in the ASA, Inc. v. Pacific Bell action, evidences Respondent's intent to withdraw from his employment by ASA, Inc. Respondent failed to take any action to avoid the reasonably foreseeable prejudice that would result from his withdrawal from employment. If Manighalam had not gone to the court to review the file, he would not have learned of the November 21, 2001, hearing on the OSC re Dismissal. Had Manighalam failed to appear at the OSC, the ASA, Inc. v. Pacific Bell action would undoubtedly have been dismissed. Respondent's withdrawal from employment without taking reasonable steps to avoid prejudice to the rights of his client constitutes a wilful violation of rule 3-700(A)(2).

4. Count Nine (Rule 3-700(D)(1), Rules of Professional Conduct)

Respondent is charged in Count Nine of the NDC with a wilful violation of rule 3-700(D)(1) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides that a member of the State Bar whose employment has terminated shall promptly release to the client, at the client's request, all client papers and property.

The Court finds Respondent culpable, by clear and convincing evidence, of the charged violation of rule 3-700(D)(1). In his telephone call to Respondent following the court hearing on November 21, 2001, Manighalam terminated Respondent's employment. Since that date, Manighalam has repeatedly demanded, both in writing and by telephone, the prompt return of his documents and records relating to the ASA, Inc. v. Pacific Bell action. Despite these repeated requests and demands, Respondent has failed to respond to Manighalam's requests and has failed

o return the documents and records. Respondent's failure to return these records constitutes a wilful violation of rule 3-700(D)(1) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

5. Count Ten (Business and Professions Code Section 6068, Subdivision (i))

Respondent is charged in Count Ten of the NDC with a violation of Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (i). The Court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent is culpable of this violation.

Investigator Wolverton sent a letter to Respondent's official membership address on January 23, 2002, asking him to reply in writing to the allegations of misconduct made by Shahram Manighalam in his complaint to the State Bar. Although the letter was not returned to the State Bar as undeliverable, Respondent failed to respond to Investigator Wolverton's letter and failed to otherwise communicate with him regarding the ASA, Inc. matter. The Court finds that Respondent received Investigator Wolverton's January 23, 2002, letter and concludes that his failure to reply to that letter constitutes a violation of Business and Professions Code section 6068, subdivision (i).

LEVEL OF DISCIPLINE

Factors in Mitigation

There are no mitigating factors presented by the record in this proceeding.

Factors in Aggravation

Respondent has a record of prior discipline in one matter. (Standard 1.2(b)(i), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.) By Decision filed May 7, 2003 in State Bar Court Case No. 01-O-04689), this Court found Respondent culpable of multiple acts of misconduct in one client matter and recommended to the Supreme Court that Respondent be suspended from practice for a period of two years, that execution of the suspension be stayed and that Respondent be actually suspended for a period of 90 days and until the State Bar Court grants a motion to terminate his actual suspension pursuant to rule 205 of the Rules of Procedure. Respondent's misconduct in this prior default proceeding occurred between August and November 2001, and included (a) failure to competently perform legal services [rule 3-110(A)]; (b) failure to communicate with the client [Bus.

& Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (m)]; (c) improper withdrawal from employment [rule 3-700(A)(2)]; d) failure to promptly return a client file [rule 3-700(D)(1)]; (e) failure to obey a court order [Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6103]; (f) engaging in the unauthorized practice of law while suspended for 3 honcompliance with Mandatory Continuing Legal Education requirements [Bus. & Prof. Code, §§ 5 5068, subd. (a), 6125 & 6126]; (g) commission of an act of dishonesty by holding himself out as entitled to practice law [Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6106]; and (h) failure to cooperate with the State Bar's disciplinary investigation [Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6068, subd. (i)].²

The current misconduct evidences multiple acts of wrongdoing in two separate client matters as well as Respondent's failure to cooperate with the State Bar's disciplinary investigations of one of those matters. (Standard 1.2(b)(ii).)

Respondent's misconduct significantly harmed his client in the Gover matter. Despite his failure to perform the legal services for which he was retained, Respondent did not refund any portion of the \$1,300 in advanced fees paid by Gover. Additionally, because of Respondent's delay in returning Gover's files and documents to him, Gover was unable to file a timely opening brief on 15 appeal, resulting in the court of appeals' denial of Gover's extension request and the ultimate 16 dismissal of his appeal. In the ASA, Inc. matter, Respondent has never returned Manighalam's records and documents to him. However, no clear and convincing evidence was introduced to establish that either Manighalam or ASA, Inc. was harmed by Respondent's failure to return these files and documents. (Standard 1.2(b)(iv).)

Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for the consequences of his misconduct. Despite the dismissal of Gover's appeal due to Respondent's failure to file an opening brief on his behalf, Respondent delayed returning Gover's files and

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² Although the Supreme Court has not yet acted upon this Court's disciplinary recommendation in Respondent's prior proceeding, it may still be considered as a record of prior discipline in this proceeding. (Rule 216(c), Rules Proc. of State Bar.) However, since Respondent's misconduct in the prior proceeding is essentially contemporaneous and similar in nature with his misconduct in the current proceeding, this prior disciplinary record has not affected this Court's disciplinary recommendation in he current proceeding.

locuments to him, thereby preventing him from effectively preparing and filing an opening brief on his own behalf. Likewise, in the ASA, Inc. matter, after Manighalam terminated Respondent's employment as a result of his failure to appear at two status conferences and at the OSC hearing, Respondent ignored Manighalam's repeated requests and demands that Respondent return Manighalam's files and records to him. (Standard 1.2(b)(v).)

Discussion

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The Standards applicable to this proceeding are 2.4(b), 2.6 and 2.10.

Standard 2.4(b) provides that culpability of a member of wilfully failing to perform services In an individual matter or matters not demonstrating a pattern of misconduct or culpability of a member of wilfully failing to communicate with a client shall result in reproval or suspension 11 depending upon the extent of the misconduct and the degree of harm to the client. In the present case, Respondent has been found culpable of failing to perform legal services with competence in wo client matters and of failing to communicate adequately with clients in those matters. The Court has found that Respondent's misconduct significantly harmed his client in the Gover matter since the client's appeal was dismissed and Respondent failed to refund any portion of the fees that Gover had paid.

Standard 2.6 provides that culpability of a member of a violation of, among other things, Business and Professions Code section 6068, shall result in disbarment or suspension depending on the gravity of the offense or the harm, if any, to the victim. The Court has found Respondent culpable of failing to cooperate with the State Bar's disciplinary investigation of the ASA, Inc. matter, a violation of section 6068, subdivision (i). Respondent's failure to cooperate with the State Bar's disciplinary investigation harmed the administration of justice.

Finally, Standard 2.10 provides, in pertinent part, that culpability of a member of a wilful violation of any Rule of Professional Conduct not specified in the Standards shall result in reproval br suspension according to the gravity of the offense or the harm, if any, to the victim. In this proceeding, Respondent has been found culpable of (a) improperly withdrawing from employment

In two client matters in wilful violation of rule 3-700(A)(2); (b) failing to refund unearned fees in the Gover matter in wilful violation of rule 3-700(D)(2); and (c) failing to return client files and papers in the ASA, Inc. matter in violation of rule 3-700(D)(1). The Court finds these failures by Respondent significantly harmed his clients.

The State Bar recommends that Respondent be actually suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year. In support of its recommendation, the State Bar cites *Lister* v. *State Bar* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1117, *In the Matter of Greenwood* (Review Dept. 1998) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 831, and *Bledsoe* v. *State Bar* (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1074.

In *Lister*, the Supreme Court found the attorney culpable of misconduct in three client matters. The misconduct included (a) failure to competently perform legal services in two matters; (b) improper withdrawal from employment in two matters; (c) failure to promptly return client files in one matter; (d) failure to promptly refund unearned fees in one matter; and (e) failure to deposit funds in a client trust account, to maintain adequate records of those funds and to render appropriate accounts in one matter. The attorney had a record of prior discipline in one matter that the Supreme Court found was minor and remote in time. The Supreme Court actually suspended the attorney for a period of one year.

In In the Matter of Greenwood, the Review Department found the respondent attorney culpable of misconduct in two client matters. In the first client matter, the attorney was found culpable of failure to competently perform legal services and improper withdrawal from employment. In the second client matter, the attorney was found culpable of failure to competently perform legal services, failure to communicate, violation of a court order and failure to promptly return the client's files and papers. In both client matters, the client's action was dismissed as a result of the attorney's failure to perform services. The attorney was also found culpable of failing to cooperate with the State Bar's disciplinary investigations of those client matters. The Review Department recommended that the attorney be actually suspended for a period of 90 days.

In *Bledsoe*, the Supreme Court found the attorney culpable of failure to perform services, failure to communicate and improper withdrawal from employment in four client matters. In at least one of the matters, the client's case was dismissed for lack of prosecution. In another case, the client was unable to pursue her claim. The attorney was also found to have made misrepresentations to his clients regarding the status of their matters and, additionally, was found culpable of failure to cooperate with the State Bar's disciplinary investigation of two of the client matters. The attorney had no record of prior discipline in about ten years of practice prior to the commencement of his misconduct but had defaulted in the disciplinary proceeding. The Supreme Court imposed an actual suspension of two years.

Although not cited by the State Bar, the Court has also considered the Supreme Court's opinion in King v. State Bar (1990) 52 Cal.3d 307. In that case, the attorney was found culpable of failing to competently perform legal services and improper withdrawal from employment in two client matters. He was also found culpable of failing to promptly return client files and records in one of the matters. In one of the matters, an \$84,000 default judgment was entered against the client as a result of the attorney's failure to perform legal services. The attorney had no record of prior discipline in approximately 14 years of practice prior to the commencement of his misconduct. The Supreme Court imposed an actual suspension of 90 days.

After reviewing the above-referenced cases, the Court concludes that an actual suspension of six months is warranted. Respondent has engaged in serious misconduct in two client matters, including failure to competently perform legal services, failure to adequately communicate with clients, improper withdrawal from employment, failure to return client files and failure to refund meanned fees. He has also failed to cooperate with a disciplinary investigation.

The Court finds that Respondent's misconduct is similar in severity to the misconduct found in *Greenwood* and *King*. However, unlike *King*, Respondent has a record of prior discipline in one recent matter. Moreover, Respondent's failure to participate in this proceeding makes it impossible to determine the cause of his misconduct and the ongoing danger he may pose to the public. On

balance, the Court concludes that an actual suspension of six months and until the Court grants a motion to terminate his actual suspension pursuant to rule 205 of the Rules of Procedure will adequately protect the public.

RECOMMENDED DISCIPLINE

This Court recommends that Respondent RICHARD DAVID COMESS be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years, that execution of such suspension be stayed and that Respondent be actually suspended from the practice of law in the State of California for a period of six months and until (a) he makes restitution to Ray E. Gover (or to the Client Security Fund, if it has paid) in the amount of \$1,300, plus ten percent (10%) interest per annum from April 17, 2001, and provides proof of such restitution to the Office of Probation; and (b) the State Bar Court grants a motion pursuant to rule 205 of the Rules of Procedure to terminate his actual suspension at the conclusion of the specified period of actual suspension or upon such later date ordered by the State Bar Court. The Court also recommends that Respondent be ordered to take and pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination ("MPRE") administered by the National Conference of Bar Examiners within one year of the effective date of the Supreme Court's final disciplinary order in this proceeding or within the period of Respondent's actual suspension, whichever is longer, and that Respondent provide proof of passage of the MPRE to the Office of Probation within that period.

If the period of Respondent's actual suspension exceeds two years, the Court recommends that Respondent remain actually suspended from the practice of law until he demonstrates to the satisfaction of the State Bar Court his rehabilitation, present fitness to practice law and present learning and ability in the general law pursuant to Standard 1.4(c)(ii) of the Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct

It is also recommended that Respondent be ordered to comply with any probation conditions that may be hereinafter imposed by the State Bar Court as a condition of terminating Respondent's actual suspension. (Rule 205(g), Rules Proc. of State Bar.)

The Court recommends that the Supreme Court order Respondent to comply with rule 955(a) of the California Rules of Court within 30 calendar days of the effective date of the Supreme Court order in this matter and to file the compliance affidavit required by rule 955(c) within 40 days of the effective date of the Court's order.

COSTS

It is further recommended that costs be awarded to the State Bar pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6086.10, and that such costs be made payable in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6140.7.

4 Dated: August 18, 2003

Judge of the State Bar Court

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

[Rule 62(b), Rules Proc.; Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on August 19, 2003, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):

DECISION, filed August 19, 2003

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:

[X] by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:

RICHARD D COMESS 944 PRINCETON DR MARINA DEL REY CA 90292 5411 RICHARD D COMESS 2826 DUNLEER PLACE LOS ANGELES CA 90064

[X] by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

MICHAEL GLASS, ESQ., Enforcement, Los Angeles

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on August 19, 2003.

Angela Owens-Carpenter

Case Administrator State Bar Court