Case Number(s): 02-O-15594; [04-O-11385] – JMR; Inv. 06-O-10706
In the Matter of: Christine Louise Garcia, Bar # 209701, A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Sherrie B. McLetchie, Bar # 85447
Counsel for Respondent: Jonathan Arons, Bar # 111257
Submitted to: Settlement Judge State Bar Court Clerk’s Office San Francisco
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted December 1, 2000.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 14 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
<<not>> checked. until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 284, Rules of Procedure.
checked. costs to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: 2007 & 2008. (hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 284, Rules of Procedure
<<not>> checked. costs waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. costs entirely waived.
Medical Condition
Respondent has been treated for depression in the past and will continue to obtain counseling. See "Medical Conditions," page 7.
Investigation Case Number 06-O-10706
After contact from the State Bar, respondent contacted Swords to Plowshares, an entity dedicated to helping veterans, seeking post-release treatment placement for Daves. Swords to Plowshares has confirmed Daves’ apparent eligibility for admission into a program, but cannot guarantee placement. Swords to Plowshares does state that it will refer Dares for screening and eventual placement upon his release.
State Bar Trust Accounting School
Respondent has already attended State Bar Trust Accounting School and passed the examination given at the end of the session. Respondent may receive Minimum Continuing Legal Education credit for voluntarily attending State Bar Trust Accounting School.
Case Number(s): 02-O-15594; [04-O-11385] – JMR; Inv. 06-O-10706
In the Matter of: Christine Louise Garcia
<<not>> checked. a. Unless Respondent has been terminated from the Lawyer Assistance Program (“LAP”) prior to respondent’s successful completion of the LAP, respondent must comply with all provisions and conditions of respondent’s Participation Agreement with the LAP and must provide an appropriate waiver authorizing the LAP to provide the Office of Probation and this court with information regarding the terms and conditions of respondent’s participation in the LAP and respondent’s compliance or non-compliance with LAP requirements. Revocation of the written waiver for release of LAP information is a violation of this condition. However, if respondent has successfully completed the LAP, respondent need not comply with this condition.
checked. b. Respondent must obtain psychiatric or psychological help/treatment from a duly licensed psychiatrist, psychologist, or clinical social worker at respondent’s own expense a minimum of times per month and must furnish evidence to the Office of Probation that respondent is so complying with each quarterly report. Help/treatment should commence immediately. Treatment must continue for the period of probation.
If the treating psychiatrist, psychologist, or clinical social worker
determines that there has been a substantial change in respondent’s condition,
respondent or Office of the Chief Trial Counsel may file a motion for
modification of this condition with the Hearing Department of the State Bar
Court, pursuant to rule 550 of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar. The
motion must be supported by a written statement from the psychiatrist,
psychologist, or clinical social worker, by affidavit or under penalty of
perjury, in support of the proposed modification.
checked. c. Upon the request of the Office of Probation, respondent must provide the Office of Probation with medical waivers and access to all of respondent’s medical records. Revocation of any medical waiver is a violation of this condition. Any medical records obtained by the Office of Probation are confidential and no information concerning them or their contents will be given to anyone except members of the Office of Probation, Office of the Chief Trial Counsel, and the State Bar Court, who are directly involved with maintaining, enforcing or adjudicating this condition.
Other:
IN THE MATTER OF: Christine L. Garcia
CASE NUMBER(S): 02-0-15594 [04-O-11385] and Investigation 06-0-10706
DISMISSALS
1) That portion of 02-0-15594, Count One (B), paragraphs 6 through 8, alleging that respondent used her CTA for personal purposes by issuing checks 96, 97, 1002, 1003, 1011, and 1024.
2) Charge that respondent violated Business and Professions Code section 6068(a) as charged in 04-O-11385, Count Two (D).
3) Charge that respondent violated Business and Professions Code section 6068(g) as charged in 04-O-11385, Count Two (E).
4) Charge that respondent violated Business and Professions Code section 6106 as charged in 04-O-11385, Count Two (F).
5) Charge that respondent violated Business and Professions Code section 6068(b) as charged in 04-O-11385, Count Two (G).
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Count One (A) - 02-0-15594
Facts:
At all times mentioned, respondent maintained an attorney-client trust account at Bay View Bank Account No. 60064289655 ("her CTA").
Between October 18, 2001, and September 20, 2002, respondent issued five checks on her CTA when she knew or reasonably should have known that there were insufficient funds in her CTA to satisfy the charges against her CTA. As result, five checks were either returned by the bank or were paid against insufficient funds or were paid against uncollected deposits - three on October 18, 2001. Four of the five checks were payable to the clerk of a court for filing fees.
Conclusion of Law:
Respondent violated Business and Professions Code section 6106 by repeatedly issuing checks against insufficient funds.
Count One (B) - 02-0-15594
Facts:
Respondent deposited non-client funds into her CTA, thereby commingling these funds into her trust account, as follows:
Date of Deposit 02-06-02; Amount $100; Payor Christine Garcia;
Date of Deposit 04-02-02; Amount $75; Payor Christine Garcia;
Date of Deposit 04-10-02; Amount $700; Payor Citibank MasterCard Cash Advance - C. Garcia;
Date of Deposit 09-19-02; Amount $200; Payor Christine Garcia;
Conclusion of Law:
Respondent wilfully violated role 4-100(A), Rules of Professional Conduct, by depositing funds belonging to her into her CTA.
04-0-11385
Facts:
On August 13, 2002, respondent filed a lawsuit, Lissa Jacobson v. Robert Cram, San Francisco Superior case number CGC 02-411443 (’°Jacobson v. Cram") on behalf of her client, Lissa Jacobson ("Jacobson"), alleging that the defendant, Robert Cram ("Cram") "abducted at least two of Ms. Jacobson’s cat companions by trapping, altering and permanently taking or destroying them." Respondent pursued Jacobson v. Cram through jury trial and until it was dismissed at the conclusion of the prosecution case. Thereafter, respondent filed and partially prosecuted an appeal of the dismissal.
Although respondent knew that Jacobson and Cram had engaged in a dispute prior to the disappearance of the cats, that the dispute concerned the cutting of some trees along the border of their respective properties, that Jacobson had obtained a settlement from Cram, and that Jacobson detested Cram, respondent undertook limited investigation, including not interviewing any witnesses other than her own client, before respondent personally verified the initial complaint in Jacobson v. Cram.
Because respondent personally verified the initial complaint opposing counsel had the right to depose respondent and opposing counsel did depose respondent.
Respondent continued to prosecute the matter through trial despite paucity of evidence that Cram engaged in wrongful conduct with respect to the cats in question. The evidence indicated that Cram had acted lawfully by trapping cats, having them spayed and tested for disease at the SPCA, and releasing them. Respondent was present at depositions and received discovery by which she became aware of this evidence.
Respondent engaged in the following conduct:
(A) Respondent attempted to take the defendant’s default in the amount of $876,264.30 without prior notice to defense counsel and without properly serving Cram.
(B) On July 23, 2003, respondent mailed letters to Cram’s former neighbors alleging that Cram "has trapped and abducted at least two (2) of my client’s cats" and engaged in "malicious actions against my client’s cats." The letters also invited Cram’s former neighbors to supply respondent with information that had to do with animal disappearances, animal cruelty, or problems with Cram.
(C) On September 22, 2003, respondent signed a proof of service under penalty of perjury stating that she had personally served a deposition subpoena on a witness named Mary Ann Buxton ("Buxton"). Respondent then sent a copy of the subpoena and proof of service to defense counsel, ha truth and in fact, respondent had not personally served the subpoena on Buxton on the date stated on the proof of service, but had served it on Buxton by facsimile, and, on the following day, by personal service. Respondent subsequently proceeded with Buxton’s deposition despite (1) opposing counsel’s known objection to the improper service; and (2) the fact that a court-mandated settlement conference had been scheduled for the same date.
(D) Respondent failed to participate in the court mandated early settlement program, resulting in respondent being sanctioned $250.
On December 5, 2003, the superior court issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in Jacobson v. Cram. Also on December 5, 2003, based on the Findings of Fact, the superior court issued a judgment imposing sanctions jointly and severally against respondent and Jacobson in the amount of $77,720 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure 128.7. At all times thereafter, the Findings of Fact and the sanction judgment remained in full force and effect. On or shortly after December 5, 2003, respondent learned about the sanction judgment. After learning of the sanction judgment, respondent never reported the sanction order to the State Bar of California.
On December 23, 2003, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal on behalf of Jacobson. Specifically, respondent appealed various orders and judgments, including the sanction judgment imposed against Jacobson. Thereafter, respondent represented Jacobson in the appeal until it was dismissed in or about July 2004 by agreement of the parties. Respondent had a personal professional interest in the appeal (because she was potentially subject to discipline for the misconduct recited in the December 5, 2003 Findings of Fact). Respondent had a personal financial interest in the execution of judgment (because Cram would not need to execute upon respondent’s assets if he obtained satisfaction of judgment from Jacobson’s assets). However, in or about March 2004, without providing Jacobson with written disclosure of these financial and professional conflicts of interest, respondent represented Jacobson in connection with attempts (ultimately successful attempts) by Cram’s counsel to execute upon Jacobson’s assets to satisfy the sanction judgment. On March 26, 2004, respondent filed an amendment to the Notice of Appeal, purporting to add herself as an additional appellant challenging the sanction judgment. Respondent had a personal financial interest in the subject matter of the appeal (since she was jointly and severally liable for payment of the sanction judgment being appealed).
After Cram executed upon Jacobson’s assets and thereby satisfied the sanction order, Jacobson wished to withdraw the appeal, obtain a release from Cram and thereby end the litigation. Jacobson, who was now represented by independent counsel, feared that she could be required to pay additional costs and/or sanctions arising out of the appeal that respondent had filed and pursued; Cram, acting through counsel, declined to release Jacobson unless respondent also withdrew her personal appeal and released Cram. Respondent refused to do so unless Jacobson released respondent. Under this pressure, Jacobson signed a document releasing respondent. The end result of this transaction was that Jacobson was required to satisfy the entire judgment for sanctions and respondent has contributed nothing toward satisfying the judgment and, in fact, obtained a release from her joint and several obligation to pay the sanction judgment.
Both opposing counsel and Jacobson submitted complaints against respondent to the State Bar.
Conclusions of Law:
1) By filing Jacobson v. Cram with limited investigation or research to determine whether there was evidentiary or legal basis for the matter (although she personally verified the initial complaint), and continuing to prosecute the matter in the face of discovery which indicated the paucity of evidence and in the harassing manner described above (the letter to Cram’s neighbors, and setting/taking Buxton’s deposition over the objection of opposing counsel on the date of the previously scheduled settlement conference), respondent maintained an unjust action in violation of Business mad Professions Code section 6068(c). (Count Two (A))
2) By never reporting the sanction judgment against her to the State Bar respondent violated Business and Professions Code section 6068(0)(3). (Count Two (B))
3) By filing a notice of appeal in Jacobson v. Cram despite her joint and several liability for the sanction judgment, and thereafter representing Jacobson against enforcement of the judgment without providing Jacobson with written disclosure of her financial and professional conflict of interests, respondent wilfully violated role 3-310(B)(4), Rules of Professional Conduct. (Count Two (C))
4) By signing a proof of service under penalty of perjury stating that she had personally served a deposition subpoena on witness Buxton and sending a copy of the subpoena and proof of service to defense counsel when in fact respondent had not personally served the subpoena on Buxton on the date specified in the proof of service, respondent committed an act of dishonesty in violation of Business and Professions Code section 6106. (Count Two (F))
5) By filing Jacobsen v. Cram with limited investigation or research to determine whether there was evidentiary or legal basis for the matter, continuing to prosecute the matter in the face of discovery which indicated the paucity of evidence, personally signing the verification of the original complaint thereby giving opposing counsel the opportunity to depose respondent, attempting to take Cram’s default without properly serving him, and failing to participate in the court mandated early settlement program, respondent recklessly failed to perform legal services competently in wilful violation of rule 3-110(A), Rules of Professional Conduct. (Count Two (H))
Investigation Case Number 06-O-I 0706
Facts:
On or about August 17, 2005, respondent, who contracts with the California Parole Advocacy Program to provide legal representation to parolees, was assigned to represent Randall Daves ("Daves") in a parole revocation proceeding. Daves told respondent that he would accept twelve months incarceration a special condition that he would thereafter be guaranteed placement in a drug treatment program. Thereafter, without permission from Daves, respondent purported to accept an 11 - month incarceration on behalf of Daves, but without guaranteed program placement for Daves. Respondent signed a "Parolee - Attorney Decision Form" on behalf of Daves, which is a State of California Board of Prison Terms form, indicating "verbal consent" in the place on the form for his signature. The form includes a box for "Inmate/Parolee refused to sign/appear (circle one or both)" and a signature line for a witness, but respondent did not utilize that option.
On or about January 2006, the State Bar received a complaint from Daves regarding respondent.
Thereafter Daves filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in propria persona in the Superior Court for the City and County of San Francisco, which was denied by order filed March 23, 2006, on the stated grounds that: 1) Daves failed to provide the correct case number; and 2) failed to submit to the court with his petition a copy of a letter he claimed respondent sent him.
Conclusions of Law:
1) By not reporting to Daves the rejection of his proposal of guaranteed treatment program placement, respondent failed to keep a client reasonably informed of a significant development in a matter in which respondent had agreed to provide legal services in violation of Business and Professions Code section 6068(m). ’
2) By entering into a settlement on behalf of Daves which resulted in less incarceration time than he initially accepted, but without the treatment program guarantee on which he had conditioned his acceptance, respondent recklessly failed to perform legal services with competence in wilful violation of rule 3-110(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
PENDING PROCEEDINGS
The disclosure date referred to, on page one, paragraph A.(7), was May 18, 2006.
COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.
Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has informed respondent that as of May 18, 2006, the estimated prosecution costs in this matter are approximately $4,993.08. Respondent acknowledges that this figure is an estimate only. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.
Standards 2.2(b) ["at least a three month actual suspension"]; 2.3 ["actual suspension or disbarment"]; 2.6 ["disbarment or suspension"]; and 2.10 ["reproval or suspension"] of the Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct apply.
FACTS SUPPORTING AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Multiple Acts of Wrongdoing
By issuing multiple checks against insufficient funds in her CTA, by on multiple occasions depositing her own funds into her CTA, and by virtue of the two client complaints based on the facts stated above, the current misconduct constitutes multiple acts of wrongdoing.
Harm
Jacobsen was significantly harmed because she paid 100% of the sanction imposed jointly against she and respondent in Jacobson v. Cram.
FINANCIAL CONDITIONS, RESTITUTION.
Within 30 days from the effective date of discipline in this matter, respondent must commence making restitution payments to Lissa Jacobsen in the amount of $100 per month during the first year of her probation unless respondent obtains bankruptcy relief from some or all of her current financial obligations in which case respondent’s monthly restitution payments shall increase from $100 to $500. During the second year of her probation period, respondent shall pay Ms. Jacobson $500 per month unless and until the State Bar Court grants a motion to modify this condition of probation by reducing or increasing respondent’s monthly restitution payments to Ms. Jacobson based on evidence of change of circumstances regarding respondent’s finances which could not be reasonably foreseen at the time this stipulation was entered into. For the purposes of any such future motion, the State Bar agrees that such a modification would be “minor" as that term is used in subdivision (c) of rule 951, California Rules of Court. Respondent shall include in each quarterly report required herein satisfactory evidence of all restitution payments made by her during that reporting period.
SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES
Case Number(s): 02-0-15594; [04-O-11385]-JMR; Inv. 06-0-10706
In the Matter of: Christine Louise Garcia
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: Christine Louise Garcia
Date: 5/26/06
Respondent’s Counsel: Jonathan Arons
Date: May 26, 2006
Deputy Trial Counsel: Sherrie B. McLetchie
Date: May 26, 2006
Case Number(s): 02-0-15594; [04-O-11385]-JMR; Inv. 06-0-10706
In the Matter of: Christina Louise Garcia
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
<<not>>checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
1. On page 1, section A(3),--the stipulation consists of 15 pages instead of 14 pages.
2. On page 6, Section F-Other Conditions Negotiated by the parties must be inserted and included in section F under 1 is the following condition:
Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination: Respondent must provide proof of passage of the Multistate Professional Responsibility ("MPRE"), administered by the National Conference of Bar Examiners, to the Office of Probation during the period of actual suspension or within one year, whichever period is longer, Failure to pass the MPRE results in actual suspension without further hearing until passage. But see rule 951 (b), California Rules of Court, and rule 321(a)(1 ) &(c), Rules of Procedure.
3. On page 5, section E(10)-an “x” must be inserted in front of the box financial conditions.
4. On page 14, Under Financial Conditions, Restitution-Respondent does not have to make any restitution after her probation of two years expires.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 135(b), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 953 (a), California Rules of Court.)
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Pat McElroy
Date: June 21
[Rule 62(b), Rules Proc.; Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of San Francisco, on June 22, 2006, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at San Francisco, California, addressed as follows:
JONATHAN IRWIN ARONS
LAW OFC JONATHAN I ARONS
101 HOWARD ST #310
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94105
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
SHERRIE MCLETCHIE, Enforcement, San Francisco
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on June 22, 2006.
Signed by:
Bernadette C.O. Molina
Case Administrator
State Bar Court