PUBLIC MATTER
FILED

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STATE BAR COURT CLERK'S OFFICE SAN FRANCISCO

## THE STATE BAR COURT HEARING DEPARTMENT - SAN FRANCISCO

In the Matter of

Case Nos. 02-O-15879; 03-H-02781-JMR

RICARDA LEE LIM,

Member No. 137700,

**DECISION** 

A Member of the State Bar.

#### I. INTRODUCTION

The above-entitled matter was submitted for decision as of November 3, 2003, after the State Bar of California, Office of the Chief Trial Counsel (State Bar) filed a brief in the above-entitled matter regarding the issue of discipline. The State Bar was represented in this matter by Deputy Trial Counsel Wonder J. Liang ("DTC Liang"). Respondent Ricarda Lee Lim ("respondent") failed to participate in this matter either in-person or through counsel and allowed her default to be entered in this matter.

In light of respondent's culpability in this proceeding, and after considering any and all aggravating and mitigating circumstances surrounding respondent's misconduct, the court recommends, inter alia, that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years, that execution of said suspension be stayed, and that respondent be actually suspended from the practice of law for 90 days and until the State Bar Court grants a motion to terminate respondent's actual suspension at its conclusion or upon such later date ordered by the court. (Rules Proc. of State Bar,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>The State Bar had earlier been represented in this proceeding by Deputy Trial Counsel Mark Hartman ("DTC Hartman").



rule 205(a)-(c).) It is also recommended that respondent be ordered to comply with rule 955 of the California Rules of Court.

#### II. PERTINENT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This proceeding was initiated by the State Bar's filing of a Notice of Disciplinary Charges ("NDC") against respondent on August 28, 2003.

A copy of the NDC was properly served upon respondent on August 28, 2003, by certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to respondent at her official membership records address (official address) maintained by respondent pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6002.1, subdivision (a).<sup>2</sup> As of September 24, 2003, the State Bar had not received the return receipt. However, there is no evidence as to whether or not the copy of the NDC was returned to the State Bar by the U.S. Postal Service.

On September 3, 2003, a Noticé of Assignment and Notice of Initial Status Conference was filed, setting an in-person status conference for October 14, 2003. A copy of said notice was properly served upon respondent by first-class mail, postage fully prepaid, on September 3, 2003, addressed to respondent at her official address. The copy of said notice was not returned to the State Bar Court by the U.S. Postal Service as undeliverable or for any other reason.

On September 16, 2003, DTC Hartman attempted to telephone respondent at her official membership records telephone number. An automatic answering service informed DTC Hartman that her official membership records telephone number was disconnected or no longer in service.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>On July 15, 2003, DTC Hartman sent respondent a letter asking her to contact him by August 11, 2003, regarding these matters (20-day letter). The 20-day letter was sent to respondent at her official membership records address by first-class mail, postage prepaid, and was not returned as undeliverable by the U.S. Postal Service. Respondent, however, did not contact DTC Hartman about the cases.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>The State Bar undertook several efforts to locate an alternate address or telephone number for respondent. These efforts included searching the Parker Directory of Attorneys (83d ed. 2002), the Daily Journal Directory of Attorneys: California Lawyers (July 2002), contacting the State Bar's Office of Probation, telephoning directory assistance for the 916 area code, and searching two internet cites: <a href="www.anywho.com">www.anywho.com</a> and <a href="www.anywho.com">www.smartpages.com</a>. However, each effort was unsuccessful.

As respondent did not file a response to the NDC as required by rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California (hereafter "Rules of Procedure"), on September 24, 2003, the State Bar filed a motion for the entry of respondent's default.<sup>4</sup> The motion also contained a request that the court take judicial notice, pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(h), of respondent's address history maintained by the State Bar's Membership Records Department,<sup>5</sup> the declaration of DTC Hartman, and Exhibit 1. A copy of said motion was properly served upon respondent on September 24, 2003, by certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to respondent at her official address. There is no evidence as to whether or not the copy of said motion was returned to the State Bar by the U.S. Postal Service.

On October 14, 2003, the court held a status conference in this matter. Respondent did not appear at the status conference either personally or through counsel. Thereafter, on October 14, 2003, the court filed a Status Conference Order noting that respondent's official telephone number has been disconnected, and that pursuant to the State Bar's motion, respondent's default shall be entered. A copy of said order was properly served upon respondent by first-class mail, postage fully prepaid, on October 14, 2003, addressed to respondent at her official address. The copy of said order was returned to the State Bar Court by the U.S. Postal Service bearing a label which read, "MOVED LEFT NO ADDRESS[;] UNABLE TO FORWARD[;] RETURN TO SENDER."

When respondent failed to file a written response within 10 days after service of the motion for the entry of her default, on October 14, 2003, the court filed an Order of Entry of Default (Rule 200 - Failure to File Timely Response), Order Enrolling Inactive and Further Orders. A copy of said order was properly served upon respondent on October 14, 2003, by certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to respondent at her official address. The copy of said order was returned to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>As of September 24, 2003, the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel had not had any contact with respondent regarding these matters.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>The court grants the State Bar's request and takes judicial notice of respondent's address history to the date of the filing of this decision.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>Respondent's involuntary inactive enrollment pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6007(e) was effective three days after the service of this order by mail.

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the State Bar Court by the U.S. Postal Service stamped "UNCLAIMED."

On November 3, 2003, the State Bar filed a brief regarding the issue of discipline. A copy of said brief was properly served upon respondent on November 3, 2003, by regular mail, addressed to respondent at her official address. There is no evidence as to whether or not the copy of said brief was returned to the State Bar by the U.S. Postal Service.

The State Bar did not request a hearing in this matter and confirmed its desire to waive the hearing in this matter in its brief regarding the issue of discipline. As such, this matter was submitted for decision on November 3, 2003, following the filing of the State Bar's brief regarding the issue of discipline.<sup>7</sup>

#### III. FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

#### A. Jurisdiction

Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in the State of California on December 7, 1988, was a member of the State Bar at all times pertinent to these charges, and is currently a member of the State Bar.

#### B. Counts One Through Three - Case No. 02-O-15879 - The Monjaras Matter

In or about early November 1996, Ms. Consuelo Monjaras (Monjaras) hired respondent to represent Monjaras in a worker's compensation case against her employer (employer).

From early November 1996 to September 2002, respondent did not take any substantive steps to resolve Monjaras's case.

In or about September 2002, Monjaras spoke with respondent by telephone. In the telephone conversation, respondent promised Monjaras that respondent would send a demand letter on Monjaras's behalf to the employer's counsel.

The law corporation of Cuneo, Black, Ward & Missler (Cuneo law corporation) represented the employer. Respondent did not send any demand letter on Monjaras's behalf to the Cuneo law corporation regarding Monjaras's case.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>Exhibit 1 attached to the State Bar's motion for the entry of respondent's default, and Exhibit 1 attached to the State Bar's brief regarding the issue of discipline, are admitted into evidence.

Mr. Chad E. Coleman (Coleman), an associate at the Cuneo law corporation, handled the employer's defense. Coleman scheduled Monjaras's deposition for December 3, 2002. Coleman timely served respondent by mail with a notice of Monjaras's deposition scheduled for December 3, 2002. Coleman sent the notice of Monjaras's deposition scheduled for December 3, 2002, by first-class mail, postage prepaid, to respondent at 7311 Greenhaven Drive, Suite 180, Sacramento, California 95831 - respondent's official address. The U.S. Postal Service did not return the notice of Monjaras's deposition scheduled for December 3, 2002, as undeliverable.

On December 3, 2002, Monjaras appeared for the deposition by Coleman. On December 3, 2002, respondent did not appear for Monjaras's deposition. Respondent did not arrange for another attorney to cover Monjaras's deposition for her on December 3, 2002.

Coleman did not depose Monjaras on December 3, 2002.

On or about January 28, 2003, Coleman sent respondent a letter offering to settle Monjaras's case for \$12,000 (written settlement offer). Coleman sent the written settlement offer by first-class mail, postage prepaid, to respondent's official address. The U.S. Postal Service did not return the written settlement offer as undeliverable.

Respondent did not reply to the written settlement offer. Respondent did not inform Monjaras of the written settlement offer.

On or about February 3, 2003, Monjaras sent respondent a written request for an update on the status of her case (status update request). Monjaras sent the status update request by first-class mail, postage prepaid, to respondent's official address. The U.S. Postal Service did not return the status update request as undeliverable.

Respondent did not reply to Monjaras's status update request.

Monjaras fired respondent and settled her own case for \$20,000.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>Although the NDC provides that the membership records of the State Bar show that from May 31, 2001, to the present, respondent's "business address" has been 7311 Greenhaven Drive, Suite 180, Sacramento, California 95831, the court shall continue to refer to this as respondent's "official address" pursuant to section 6002.1, subdivision (a).

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#### Count One - Rule 3-110(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct9

The State Bar proved by clear and convincing evidence that respondent wilfully violated rule 3-110(A). Rule 3-110(A) provides that "[a] member shall not intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly fail to perform legal services with competence." By failing to: (1) take any substantive steps to resolve Monjaras's case from early November 1996 to September 2002; (2) send a demand letter on Monjaras's behalf to the Cuneo law corporation; (3) appear for Monjaras's properly noticed deposition or to arrange for another attorney to cover Monjaras's deposition; and (4) reply to Coleman's written settlement offer, respondent recklessly and repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence in wilful violation of rule 3-110(A).

#### **Count Two - Rule 3-510(A)(2)**

The State Bar proved by clear and convincing evidence that respondent wilfully violated rule 3-510(A)(2). Rule 3-510(A)(2) requires an attorney to promptly communicate to a client "[a]ll amounts, terms, and conditions of any written offer of settlement made to the client" in all non-criminal matters. Respondent wilfully violated rule 3-510(A)(2) by failing to inform Monjaras of Coleman's \$12,000 written settlement offer in her worker's compensation matter.

#### Count Three - Business and Professions Code Section 6068(m)<sup>10</sup>

The State Bar proved by clear and convincing evidence that respondent wilfully violated section 6068(m). Section 6068(m) provides that it is an attorney's duty "[t]o respond promptly to reasonable status inquiries of clients and to keep clients reasonably informed of significant developments in matters with regard to which the attorney has agreed to provide legal services." Respondent wilfully violated section 6068(m) by failing to reply to Monjaras's status update request.

## C. Count Four - Case No. 02-O-15879 - Failure to Cooperate in a State Bar Disciplinary Investigation

On or about December 2, 2002, Monjaras's daughter, Ms. Lupe Cortes, filed a complaint

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>Unless otherwise indicated, all further references to "rule" refer to the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>Unless otherwise indicated, all further references to "section" refer to provisions of the California Business and Professions Code.

about respondent on Monjaras's behalf with the State Bar.

On or about January 14, 2003, State Bar investigator Michael Maacks (Maacks) sent respondent an initial letter inquiring about respondent's handling of Monjaras's case (first inquiry letter). Maacks sent the first inquiry letter by first-class mail, postage prepaid, to 7311 Greenhaven Drive, Suite 180, Sacramento, California 95831 - respondent's official address. The U.S. Postal Service did not return the first inquiry letter as undeliverable. Respondent did not reply to the first inquiry letter.

On or about January 23, 2003, Maacks sent respondent a second letter inquiring about respondent's handling of Monjaras's case (second inquiry letter). Maacks sent the second inquiry letter by first-class mail, postage prepaid, to respondent's official address. The U.S. Postal Service did not return the second inquiry letter as undeliverable.

Respondent did not reply to the second inquiry letter.

#### Count Four - Section 6068(i)

The State Bar proved by clear and convincing evidence that respondent wilfully violated section 6068(i). Section 6068(i) requires an attorney to cooperate with and participate in a State Bar disciplinary investigation or proceeding. Respondent wilfully violated section 6068(i) by failing to reply to the first or second inquiry letter.

#### D. Count Five - Case No. 03-H-02781 - Failure to Comply with Conditions of Reproval

On or about November 6, 2002, respondent signed a stipulation in State Bar Court Case No. 02-O-11064 regarding facts, conclusions of law, and disposition (stipulation).

In the stipulation, respondent agreed to a public reproval with conditions, including the requirement to file quarterly reports for one year with the State Bar.

On or about December 5, 2002, the State Bar Court issued an order publicly reproving respondent in State Bar Court Case No. 02-O-11064 (order).<sup>11</sup>

The order approved respondent's stipulation and required respondent to file quarterly reports

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>Pursuant to Evidence Code section 452(d), the court takes judicial notice of Respondent's prior record of discipline. The reproval was effective on December 27, 2002.

for one year with the State Bar.

On or about December 5, 2002, the State Bar Court served respondent with the order by first-class mail, postage prepaid, to respondent's official address.

The U.S. Postal Service did not return the order as undeliverable.

On or about December 27, 2002, the Probation Unit of the State Bar sent respondent a letter reminding her of her duty to comply with the order ("reminder letter"), including the requirement to file quarterly reports for one year with the State Bar. The reminder letter correctly stated that respondent's first quarterly report would be due on April 10, 2003. The Probation Unit sent the reminder letter by first-class mail, postage prepaid, to respondent's official address.

The U.S. Postal Service did not return the reminder letter as undeliverable.

Respondent did not timely file the quarterly report due on April 10, 2003.

As of August 28, 2003, respondent still has not filed the quarterly report due on April 10, 2003.

The second quarterly report was due on July 10, 2003.

Respondent did not timely file the quarterly report due on July 10, 2003.

As of August 28, 2003, respondent still has not filed the quarterly report due on July 10, 2003.

#### Count Five - Rule 1-110

The State Bar proved by clear and convincing evidence that respondent wilfully violated rule 1-110. Rule 1-110 provides that an attorney must comply with conditions attached to private or public reprovals or other discipline administered by the State Bar. Respondent wilfully violated rule 1-110 by failing to timely file the quarterly reports due on April 10 and July 10, 2003.

#### IV. MITIGATING/AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

As respondent's default was entered in this matter, respondent failed to introduce any mitigating evidence on her behalf, and none can be gleaned from the record in this proceeding.

In aggravation, respondent has a prior record of discipline. (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, standard 1.2(b)(i) (hereafter "standard").) Effective December 27, 2002, respondent was publicly reproved by the State Bar Court with conditions for

one year in Case No. 02-O-11064. Discipline was imposed in that matter based upon respondent's misconduct in one client matter involving an intentional, repeated and reckless failure to perform legal services with competence; failure to keep a client reasonably informed of significant developments in a matter in which she had agreed to provide legal services and failing to respond promptly to reasonable client status inquiries; and failure, upon termination of employment, to take reasonable steps to avoid reasonably foreseeable prejudice to her client. In addition, respondent also failed to cooperate and participate in the disciplinary investigation of the client matter. Respondent's acts of misconduct began in the Spring of 2000 and continued to at least mid-2002.

The fact that respondent engaged in multiple acts of misconduct in this matter is also an aggravating circumstance. (Standard 1.2(b)(ii).)

Respondent's failure to participate in this disciplinary proceeding prior to the entry of her default is a further aggravating circumstance. (Standard 1.2(b)(vi).)<sup>13</sup>

#### V. DISCUSSION

In determining the appropriate discipline to recommend in this matter, the court looks at the purposes of disciplinary proceedings and sanctions. Standard 1.3 sets forth the purposes of disciplinary proceedings and sanctions as "the protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; the maintenance of high professional standards by attorneys and the preservation of public confidence in the legal profession."

In addition, standard 1.6(b) provides that the specific discipline for the particular violation found must be balanced with any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, with due regard for the purposes of imposing disciplinary sanctions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>Respondent executed a Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition in Case No. 02-O-11064 on November 6, 2002.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>The State Bar contends that respondent's misconduct harmed the administration of justice (standard 1.2(b)(iv)), and that respondent demonstrated indifference toward atonement for or rectification of the consequences of her misconduct (standard 1.2(b)(v)). However, the court declines to consider these as aggravating circumstances in this matter, as the acts which form the basis for these aggravating circumstances form the basis for the culpability findings in this matter. (*In the Matter of Farrell* (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 490, 497.)

In this case, the standards provide for the imposition of sanctions ranging from reproval to disbarment. (Standards 2.4(b), 2.6, 2.9 and 2.10.) In addition, standard 1.6(a) states, in pertinent part, "If two or more acts of professional misconduct are found or acknowledged in a single disciplinary proceeding, and different sanctions are prescribed by these standards for said acts, the sanction imposed shall be the more or most severe of the different applicable sanctions." The most severe sanction applicable herein is standard 2.6 which provides, in pertinent part, that the violation of section 6068(i) "shall result in disbarment or suspension depending on the gravity of the offense or the harm, if any, to the victim, with due regard to the purposes of imposing discipline set forth in standard 1.3."

Furthermore, standard 1.7(a) provides that if a member is found culpable of misconduct in any proceeding and the member has a record of one prior imposition of discipline, the degree of discipline imposed in the current proceeding shall be greater than that imposed in the prior proceeding unless the prior discipline was remote in time and the offense was minimal in severity.

The standards, however, are only guidelines and do not mandate the discipline to be imposed. (In the Matter of Moriarty (Review Dept. 1990) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 245, 250-251.) "[E]ach case must be resolved on its own particular facts and not by application of rigid standards." (Id. at p. 251.)

The State Bar recommends, in pertinent part, that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years, that execution of said suspension be stayed, and that respondent be actually suspended for 90 days. In support of its discipline recommendation, the State Bar cites to *In the Matter of Meyer* (Review Dept. 1997) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 697, *Franklin v. State Bar* (1986) 41 Cal.3d 700, and *Conroy v. State Bar* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 799.

In her prior disciplinary matter, respondent intentionally, repeatedly and recklessly failed to perform legal services with competence; failed to keep a client reasonably informed of significant developments in a matter in which she had agreed to provide legal services; failed to respond promptly to reasonable client status inquiries; and failed, upon termination of employment, to take reasonable steps to avoid reasonably foreseeable prejudice to her client. In addition, respondent also failed to cooperate and participate in the disciplinary investigation of the client matter. Respondent's

acts of misconduct began in the Spring of 2000 and continued to at least mid-2002.

In the present proceeding, respondent has been found culpable of misconduct similar in nature to the misconduct found in her prior disciplinary matter. Among other things, respondent has been found culpable in this matter of recklessly and repeatedly failing to perform legal services with competence, failing to communicate a written settlement offer to her client, failing to respond to a reasonable status inquiry, and failing to cooperate in a State Bar investigation.

However, Respondent's misconduct in this matter began in 1996, several years before the misconduct began in her prior disciplinary matter. Normally, in considering a disciplinary recommendation when there is a prior record of discipline based on acts contemporaneous with the acts of misconduct in the current disciplinary proceeding, the aggravating effect of the prior discipline is diminished, and discipline is determined by considering both cases together (i.e., what would the recommended discipline have been if both the prior and current disciplinary proceedings had been brought in one matter.) (*In the Matter of Sklar* (Review Dept. 1993) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 602, 619.) However, in this matter, the court notes that despite entering into a stipulated disposition in her prior disciplinary matter in November 2002, respondent continued to engage in misconduct well into February 2003.

In addition, Respondent also failed to comply with reproval conditions to which she had previously stipulated by failing to file two quarterly reports. As the Review Department of the State Bar Court has noted, the "filing of quarterly . . . reports is an important step towards the attorney's rehabilitation." (*In the Matter of Weiner* (Review Dept. 1997) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 759, 763.) The court therefore finds that respondent's failure to comply with conditions attached to her public reproval further demonstrates her lack of rehabilitation. Respondent's prior discipline therefore had no rehabilitative effect. Clearly, it appears that respondent is unable to "conform [her] conduct to ethical norms" and applying standard 1.7 is therefore appropriate. (*In the Matter of Hunter* (Review Dept. 1994) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 63, 80.)

Finally, the court is particularly concerned about Respondent's failure to participate in this disciplinary proceeding. Respondent's failure to participate in this proceeding leaves the court without any understanding as to the underlying cause or causes for Respondent's misconduct or from

learning of any mitigating circumstances which would justify this court's departure from the discipline recommended by the standards.

Thus, after considering the nature of Respondent's misconduct, the aggravating circumstances found by the court, the lack of any mitigating factors, and the cases cited by the State Bar in support of its discipline recommendation, the court finds the 90-day period of actual suspension recommended by the State Bar is appropriate in this matter.

#### VI. RECOMMENDED DISCIPLINE

Accordingly, the court hereby recommends that respondent Ricarda Lee Lim be suspended from the practice of law for two years, that execution of said suspension be stayed, and that respondent be actually suspended from the practice of law for 90 days and until the State Bar Court grants a motion to terminate respondent's actual suspension at its conclusion or upon such later date ordered by the court. (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 205(a)-(c).)

If the period of actual suspension reaches or exceeds two years, it is further recommended that respondent remain actually suspended until she has shown proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of her rehabilitation, fitness to practice and learning and ability in the general law pursuant to standard 1.4(c)(ii). (See also, Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 205(b).)

It is also recommended that respondent be ordered to comply with any probation conditions reasonably related to this matter than may hereinafter be imposed by the State Bar Court as a condition for terminating respondent's actual suspension. (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 205(g).)

It is also recommended that respondent be ordered to take and pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination given by the National Conference of Bar Examiners within one year after the effective date of the discipline imposed herein or during the period of her actual suspension, whichever is later, and furnish satisfactory proof of such to the State Bar's Office of Probation within said period, unless she has already taken, passed and furnished satisfactory proof of such passage to the Office of Probation as required by the conditions of her public reproval imposed in State Bar Court Case No. 02-O-11064.

It is further recommended that respondent be ordered to comply with the requirements of rule 955 of the California Rules of Court within 30 calendar days of the effective date of the Supreme

Court order in this matter, and file the affidavit provided for in paragraph (c) within 40 days of the effective date of the order showing her compliance with said order.<sup>14</sup>

#### VII. COSTS

It is further recommended that costs be awarded to the State Bar pursuant to section 6086.10, and that such costs be payable in accordance with section 6140.7.

Dated: January 29, 2004

JOANN M. REMKE/

Judge of the State Bar Court

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>Failure to comply with rule 955 of the California Rules of Court could result in disbarment. (*Bercovich v. State Bar* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 116, 131.) Respondent is required to file a rule 955(c) affidavit even if she has no clients to notify. (*Powers v. State Bar* (1988) 44 Cal.3d 337, 341.)

#### **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

[Rule 62(b), Rules Proc.; Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of San Francisco, on January 29, 2004, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):

#### **DECISION**

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:

[X] by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at San Francisco, California, addressed as follows:

RICARDA L. LIM
7311 GREENHAVEN DR #180
SACRAMENTO CA 95831

[X] by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

#### WONDER LIANG, Enforcement, San Francisco

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on January 29, 2004.

Bernadette C. O. Molina

Case Administrator State Bar Court