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State Bar Court of California Hearing Department Los Angeles

Counsel For The State Bar

Gordon L. Grenier Deputy Trial Counsel 1149 S. Hill Street Los Angeles, CA 90015 (213) 765-1000 Case Number (s) 04-O-10397

PUBLIC MATTER

(for Court's use)

FILED

NOV 02 2006

STATE BAR COURT CLERK'S OFFICE LOS ANGELES

Bar # 225430

Counsel For Respondent

Arthur L. Margolis 2000 Riverside Drive Los Angeles, CA 90039 (323) 953-8996

Submitted to: Settlement Judge

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING

Bar # 57703

In the Matter Of:

ROBERT J. SKOUSEN

Bar # 135104

A Member of the State Bar of California (Respondent)

ACTUAL SUSPENSION

☐ PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED

Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.

A. Parties' Acknowledgments:

- (1) Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted June 24, 1988.
- (2) The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
- (3) All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 14 pages, not including the order.
- (4) A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
- (5) Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
- (6) The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."

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(7)			e than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.	
(8)	(8) Payment of Disciplinary Costs— 6140.7. (Check one option only):		nt of Disciplinary Costs—Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & (Check one option only):	
		re Co m (ha Co	intil costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unlesselief is obtained per rule 284, Rules of Procedure. osts to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: two (2) nembership year billing cycles following the effective date of the Supreme Court order. pardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 284, Rules of Procedure) osts waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs" osts entirely waived	
	Pro		ting Circumstances [for definition, see Standards for Attorney Sanctions for onal Misconduct, standard 1.2(b)]. Facts supporting aggravating circumstances red.	
(1)		Prio	r record of discipline [see standard 1.2(f)]	
	(a)		State Bar Court case # of prior case	
	(b)		Date prior discipline effective	
	(c)		Rules of Professional Conduct/ State Bar Act violations:	
	(d)		Degree of prior discipline	
	(e)		If Respondent has two or more incidents of prior discipline, use space provided below.	
(2)		Dishe	onesty: Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by or followed by bad faith, dishonesty, ealment, overreaching or other violations of the State Bar Act or Rules of Professional Conduct.	
(3)			t Violation : Trust funds or property were involved and Respondent refused or was unable to account client or person who was the object of the misconduct for improper conduct toward said funds or erty.	
(4)		Harm	: Respondent's misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public or the administration of justice.	
(5)			erence: Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for the quences of his or her misconduct.	
(6)			of Cooperation: Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims of his/her nduct or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation or proceedings.	
7)			ple/Pattern of Misconduct: Respondent's current misconduct evidences multiple acts of wrongdoing nonstrates a pattern of misconduct.	
8)	\boxtimes	No ag	gravating circumstances are involved.	
Addit	iona	l aggra	avating circumstances:	

Additional mitigating circumstances

- 1. Respondent has no prior record of discipline over eighteen years of practice.
- 2. Respondent has contributed service to community projects. (See page 11)

D. Discipline:

- (1) Staved Suspension:
 - (a) Respondent must be suspended from the practice of law for a period of 2 years.

(Do r	ot writ	e abov	e this li	ле.)
		I.		and until Respondent shows proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of rehabilitation and present fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the law pursuant to standard 1.4(c)(ii) Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.
		ii.		and until Respondent pays restitution as set forth in the Financial Conditions form attached to this stipulation.
		iii.		and until Respondent does the following:
	(b)	\boxtimes	The	above-referenced suspension is stayed.
(2)	\boxtimes	Prol	batior	n:
				nust be placed on probation for a period of 2 years , which will commence upon the effective date e Court order in this matter. (See rule 953, Calif. Rules of Ct.)
(3)		Actu	uai Su	spension:
	(a)	\boxtimes		condent must be actually suspended from the practice of law in the State of California for a period 20 days.
		i.		and until Respondent shows proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of rehabilitation and present fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the law pursuant to standard 1.4(c)(ii), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct
		ii.		and until Respondent pays restitution as set forth in the Financial Conditions form attached to this stipulation.
		iii.		and until Respondent does the following:
E. A	ddi	tiona	ıl Co	nditions of Probation:
(1)	\boxtimes	he/s	he pro	dent is actually suspended for two years or more, he/she must remain actually suspended until loves to the State Bar Court his/her rehabilitation, fitness to practice, and learning and ability in w, pursuant to standard 1.4(c)(ii), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.
(2)	\boxtimes	During the probation period, Respondent must comply with the provisions of the State Bar Act and Rules of Professional Conduct.		
(3)	×	State inform	Bar a	(10) days of any change, Respondent must report to the Membership Records Office of the and to the Office of Probation of the State Bar of California ("Office of Probation"), all changes of n, including current office address and telephone number, or other address for State Bar as prescribed by section 6002.1 of the Business and Professions Code.
(4)		and s cond proba	sched litions ation o	ty (30) days from the effective date of discipline, Respondent must contact the Office of Probation ule a meeting with Respondent's assigned probation deputy to discuss these terms and of probation. Upon the direction of the Office of Probation, Respondent must meet with the deputy either in-person or by telephone. During the period of probation, Respondent must neet with the probation deputy as directed and upon request.
(5)	\boxtimes	July	10, an	nt must submit written quarterly reports to the Office of Probation on each January 10, April 10, and October 10 of the period of probation. Under penalty of perjury, Respondent must state espondent has complied with the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and all

(Do r	<u>iot writ</u>	te abov	e this line.)					
		are a	any proceedings pending against hin	n or her in th rst report wo	r quarter. Respondent must also state whether there e State Bar Court and if so, the case number and ould cover less than 30 days, that report must be tended period.			
		In activer	ddition to all quarterly reports, a final ity (20) days before the last day of th	report, conta e period of p	aining the same information, is due no earlier than probation and no later than the last day of probation.			
(6)		cond Durii in ac	Respondent must be assigned a probation monitor. Respondent must promptly review the terms and conditions of probation with the probation monitor to establish a manner and schedule of compliance. During the period of probation, Respondent must furnish to the monitor such reports as may be requested in addition to the quarterly reports required to be submitted to the Office of Probation. Respondent must cooperate fully with the probation monitor.					
(7)	\boxtimes	inqui direc	Subject to assertion of applicable privileges, Respondent must answer fully, promptly and truthfully any inquiries of the Office of Probation and any probation monitor assigned under these conditions which are directed to Respondent personally or in writing relating to whether Respondent is complying or has complied with the probation conditions.					
(8)	\boxtimes	Prob	in one (1) year of the effective date o ation satisfactory proof of attendance e end of that session.	of the discipli e at a sessio	ne herein, Respondent must provide to the Office of n of the Ethics School, and passage of the test given			
			No Ethics School recommended. F	Reason:	•			
(9)		must			ion imposed in the underlying criminal matter and in with any quarterly report to be filed with the Office			
(10)		The f	following conditions are attached her	eto and inco	rporated:			
			Substance Abuse Conditions		Law Office Management Conditions			
			Medical Conditions		Financial Conditions			
F. C	the	r Cor	nditions Negotiated by the Pa	arties:				
(1)		the Cor one furt	Multistate Professional Responsibilit iference of Bar Examiners, to the Off year, whichever period is longer. Fa	y Examination fice of Proba ailure to pas	on: Respondent must provide proof of passage of on ("MPRE"), administered by the National tion during the period of actual suspension or within ss the MPRE results in actual suspension without), California Rules of Court, and rule 321(a)(1) &			
			No MPRE recommended. Reason:					
(2)		Cali	ifornia Rules of Court, and perform th	ne acts spec	must comply with the requirements of rule 955, ified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 e date of the Supreme Court's Order in this matter.			
(3)		day perf	s or more, he/she must comply with t	the requirem s (a) and (c)	If Respondent remains actually suspended for 90 tents of rule 955, California Rules of Court, and of that rule within 120 and 130 calendar days, Court's Order in this matter			

!)		Credit for Interim Suspe period of his/her interim so commencement of interim	nsion [conviction referra uspension toward the stipu suspension:	Il cases only]: Res lated period of actu	pondent will be cre at suspension. Date	dited for the
5)	\boxtimes	Other Conditions:				
					·	
		•				
			·			

ln	the	Mat	ter	of
RC	BEF	₹T J.	SK	OUSEN

Case number(s): **04-0-10397**

A Member of the State Bar

NOLO CONTENDERE PLEA TO STIPULATION AS TO FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION

Bus. & Prof. Code § 6085.5 Disciplinary Charges; Pleas to Allegations

There are three kinds of pleas to the allegations of a Notice of Disciplinary Charges or other pleading which initiates a disciplinary proceeding against a member:

- (a) Admission of culpability.
- (b) Denial of culpability.
- (c) Nolo contendere, subject to the approval of the State Bar Court. The court shall ascertain whether the member completely understands that a plea of nolo contendere shall be considered the same as an admission of culpability and that, upon a plea of nolo contendere, the court shall find the member culpable. The legal effect of such a plea shall be the same as that of an admission of culpability for all purposes, except that the plea and any admission required by the court during any inquiry it makes as to the voluntariness of, or the factual basis for, the pleas, may not be used against the member as an admission in any civil suit based upon or growing out of the act upon which the disciplinary proceeding is based. (Added by Stats. 1996, ch. 1104.) (emphasis supplied)

Rule 133, Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California STIPULATION AS TO FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION

- (a) A proposed stipulation as to facts, conclusions of law, and disposition must set forth each of the following:
 - (5) a statement that Respondent either
 - (i) admits the facts set forth in the stipulation are true and that he or she is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct or
 - (ii) pleads noto contendere to those facts and violations. If the Respondent pleads noto contendere, the stipulation shall include each of the following:
 - (a) an acknowledgement that the Respondent completely understands that the plea of nolo contendere shall be considered the same as an admission of the stipulated facts and of his or her culpability of the statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct specified in the stipulation; and
 - (b) if requested by the Court, a statement by the Deputy Trial Counsel that the factual stipulations are supported by evidence obtained in the State Bar investigation of the matter (emphasis supplied)

I, the Respondent in this matter, have read the applicable provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code § 6085.5 and rule 133(a)(5) of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California. I plead noto contendere to the charges set forth in this stipulation and I completely understand that my plea must be considered the same as an admission of culpability except as state in Business and Professions Code section 6085.5(c).

Date 10-31-2006

ignature

Print Name Robert 3

<u>skousew</u>

ATTACHMENT TO

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION

IN THE MATTER OF:

ROBERT J. SKOUSEN

CASE NUMBER(S):

04-O-10397

FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

Respondent pleads nolo contendere. Respondent acknowledges that he completely understands that the plea of nolo contendere shall be considered the same as an admission of the stipulated facts and of his culpability of the statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct specified in the stipulation.

WAIVER OF VARIANCE BETWEEN NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY CHARGES AND STIPULATED FACTS AND CULPABILITY

The parties waive any variance between the Notice of Disciplinary Charges filed on April 7, 2006, and the facts and/or conclusions of law contained in this stipulation. Additionally, the parties waive the issuance of an amended NDC.

Statement of Facts:

Alfred and Guadalupe Del Castillo (father and mother, respectively), had four surviving adult children: Albert, Alice, Ralph and Robert. Robert, the youngest, was developmentally disabled and suffered from cerebral palsy.

Father and mother created a revocable inter vivos trust, into which they placed the bulk of their property. They managed the marital trust for their own benefit while both lived. At the father's death, mother continued to administer the trust for her benefit.

Robert lived at home and was cared for by his parents, and then by his mother, until the mother's death. Upon the death of the mother, the trust named Robert as the sole successor beneficiary.

Mother died in 1999. She left two wills dated 1991 and 1996. Both wills were set up to pour the majority of the assets of the Del Castillo estate into Robert's trust, but they differed in that they named different executors. The 1991 Will listed Alice as the executor, while the 1996 Will listed Robert as the first executor and Albert as the alternative executor.

On September 28, 1999, Alice, Robert, and Albert met with Respondent. An attorney-client relationship was established, between Respondent, Alice, and Albert, in which Respondent was to assist in the probating of the probating of the Del Castillo estate. They requested that Respondent probate the 1991 will.¹

Given the circumstances of the meeting on September 28, 1999, Robert reasonably believed that he, as well as Alice and Albert, was being represented by Respondent. Respondent did not take adequate care to make clear to Robert that Respondent was not representing him. Therefore, Respondent, due to the circumstances, established an attorney-client relationship with Robert.²

On November 3, 1999, Respondent's office prepared and filed a petition to probate Alice's mother's 1991 will. Alice was the executor of this will. On that same day, Respondent also filed a "Disclaimer" which was signed by Robert and dated September 28, 1999. The disclaimer document disclaimed Robert's total interest in the Del Castillo estate.

In November 1999, Alice conducted an estate sale for the Del Castillo estate and sold personal property belonging to the estate. On December 20, 1999, Respondent purchased furniture for himself from the Del Castillo estate.

In or about June 2000, Albert became unhappy with Alice's action or inaction on behalf of the Del Castillo estate and directed Respondent to file the 1996 Will, and petition to appoint Albert as the personal representative/executor of the Del Castillo estate. Respondent substituted out as attorney of record for Alice who was executor of the 1991 Will on or about June 12, 2000.

On or about June 14, 2000, Respondent, representing Albert, then filed an ex parte petition to suspend Alice's powers as executor of the Del Castillo estate. Albert also petitioned to probate the 1996 Will and for appointment as the personal representative (executor) under the 1996 Will.

In moving to probate the 1996 Will, Respondent attached an copy of the same Disclaimer that was signed by Robert and dated September 28, 1999. Respondent did not advise Robert to seek the advice of independent counsel before signing the statement and appending it to the 1991

¹ While some evidence indicates that Respondent was made aware of the 1996 will at the time of this meeting, this evidence is contested and does not rise to the level of clear and convincing.

² See Butler v. State Bar (1986) 42 Cal.3d 323, 329.

or 1996 Wills. Independent counsel was not employed by either Alice or Albert to advise Robert regarding the Disclaimer.

Alice was subsequently removed by the probate court as executor and ordered to post a bond of \$132,000 pending determination by the court of Albert's petition to remove Alice as executor.

Respondent, representing Albert and the 1996 Will, subsequently filed an action on the bond posted by Alice seeking recovery of Del Castillo estate assets and penalties authorized pursuant to the Probate Code.

The probate court ultimately removed both Alice and Albert as personal representatives of their mother's estate and removed Albert as trustee of the trust. The Superior court appointed an independent trustee and personal representative, and ordered Albert to deliver all the trust and estate assets to her, and ordered Albert to file a further accounting.

On March 28, 2005, in a letter to the State Bar responding to the allegations of misconduct levied against him regarding the purchase of the property at the Del Castillo estate probate sale, Respondent denied that he or anyone from his firm had attended or participated in the Del Castillo estate probate sale, or that Respondent had purchased any of the property from the Del Castillo estate. That statement was false.

Conclusion of Law:

By representing Alice and Albert who had adverse interests in the Del Castillo estate, by bringing a civil action on behalf of Albert against Respondent's former client Alice, and by attaching Robert's disclaimer to the 1996 Will when it was prepared as an attachment for the 1991 Will, Respondent intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence, in wilful violation of rule 3-110(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct..

By failing to have Alice give her informed written consent to representation individually by the Respondent as personal representative of the 1991 Will, while Respondent represented Albert as personal representative of the 1996 Will, Respondent represented a client in a matter and at the same time accepted as a client a person or entity whose interest in the first matter was adverse to the client in the first matter, in wilful violation of rule 3-310(C)(3) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

By failing to have Albert give his informed written consent to representation individually by the Respondent as personal representative of the 1996 Will while Respondent represented Alice as personal representative of the 1991 Will, Respondent represented a client in a matter and at the same time in a separate matter accepted as a client a person or entity whose

interest in the first matter was adverse to the client in the first matter, without the informed written consent of each client, in wilful violation of rule 3-310(C)(3) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

By failing to provide written disclosure to Robert describing his professional relationships with Albert and Alice, Respondent willfully violated rule 3-310(B)(3) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

By purchasing property from Alice at a probate sale where he was acting as a lawyer for the estate she represented, Respondent directly purchased property at an estate sale where Respondent was acting as a lawyer for the executor of a probate, in wilful violation of rule 4-300(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

By intentionally and dishonestly denying his involvement in the purchase of estate property at the Del Castillo estate probate sale conducted by Alice on or about December 20, 1999, Respondent committed an act or acts involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption in wilful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

No Prior Record of Discipline

Respondent has no prior record of discipline in nearly eighteen years of practice.

Community Service

Respondent has contributed service to community projects including:

- Serving as a member of the board of directors of Camp Coca Cola
- Serving as a member of the board of directors of the Southern California Arthritis Foundation
- Serving as a member of the board of directors of the International Visitors Council of Los Angeles
- Previously serving as a member of the board of directors of Friends of Child Advocates

AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE

Standards for Attorney Sanctions For Professional Misconduct

Standard 2.3 states that the culpability of a member of an act of moral turpitude, fraud, or intentional dishonesty toward a court, client or another person or of concealment of a material

fact to a court, client or another person shall result in actual suspension or disbarment depending upon the extent to which the victim of the misconduct is harmed or misled and depending upon the magnitude of the act of misconduct and the degree to which it relates to the member's acts within the practice of law.

Case Law

The Court should also look at case authority in determining the appropriate level of discipline to determine whether the discipline is consistent or disproportional to prior decisions on the same set of facts. *Snyder v. State Bar* (1990) 49 Cal.3d 1302.

In In the Matter of Fonte (Review Dept. 1994) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 752, the respondent was found culpable on two client matters. In the first, he failed to provide an accounting for all fees paid, including an advanced retainer fee, and he failed to adequately disclose and advise in writing of the opportunity to seek advise of counsel when he obtained an adverse interest in property through a trust agreement he drafted for the clients. In the second matter, he failed to advise and obtain consent from two clients regarding the conflicts which could arise from his representation of adverse parties. In mitigation, the respondent was in practice for 25 years without prior discipline and had extensive public service. In aggravation, the court found uncharged misconduct including improper solicitation of a client, misleading the probate court, and overreaching. Additionally, the respondent was found to be indifferent toward atonement. The respondent received a sixty-day actual suspension.

In Levin v. State Bar (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1140, the respondent, while attempting to settle a lawsuit, made false statements of fact to opposing counsel and communicated with a party he knew to be represented by counsel. He also settled a personal injury matter without his client's consent and failed to deliver the settlement funds. The respondent attempted to conceal his dishonest acts and offered a false document as though it were genuine. The respondent also attempted to submit perjured documents to a court. In mitigation, the respondent was candid and cooperative. Additionally, the respondent had been a member of the Bar for 18 years without prior discipline. The respondent received a three year suspension, stayed, with six months actual.

In Olguin v. State Bar (1980) 28 Cal.3d 195, the respondent failed to communicate with his client and his client's new lawyer. He was delinquent in sending the file to the client's new attorney after a demand that he do so. While he was still attorney of record, the client's case was dismissed after the respondent failed to take any steps to oppose the dismissal. In another matter, the respondent admitted submitting fabricated evidence to the State Bar in order to avoid a finding of culpability in the disciplinary proceedings. In aggravation, the respondent had a prior discipline for a criminal conviction for making a false claim of citizenship. The respondent received an 18-month suspension, stayed, with six months actual.

In the instant case, the facts surrounding the charge of moral turpitude are less egregious than that of Levin and Olguin, but Respondent's conduct is more severe than Fonte. In mitigation, Respondent has been practicing law for nearly eighteen years without any prior discipline. Therefore, a two-year suspension, stayed, with a 120-days actual suspension, is the appropriate level of discipline.

DISMISSALS

The counts 2, 3, 8, 9, and 10 are dismissed in the interests of justice.

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In the Matter of	Case number(s):
ROBERT J. SKOUSEN	04-O-10397

SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES

By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitations and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Fact, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.

10-26-06	howit du	ROBERT J. SKOUSEN
Date	Respondent's Signature	Print Name
10/27/06	Cather I. Margalia	ARTHUR L. MARGOLIS
Date /	Respondent's Counsel Signature	Print Name
10-27-06	Ha Hi	GORDON L. GRENIER
Date	Deputy Trial Counsel's Signature	Print Name

(Do not write above this line.)

	In the Matter of	Case number(s):
i	ROBERT J. SKOUSEN	04-0-10397
	·	

ORDER

Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any, is GRANTED without prejudice, and:

×	The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
	The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
	All Hearing dates are vacated.

The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 135(b), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after file date. (See rule 953(a), California Rules of Court.)

10/31/0b

Judge of the State Bar Court

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

[Rule 62(b), Rules Proc.; Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on November 2, 2006, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:

[X] by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:

ARTHUR L MARGOLIS MARGOLIS & MARGOLIS LLP 2000 RIVERSIDE DR LOS ANGELES CA 90039

[X] by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

GORDON GRENIER, Enforcement, Los Angeles

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on November 2, 2006.

Johnnie Lee Smith Case Administrator

State Bar Court