Case Number(s): 05-O-02584, 08-O-12590, 08-O-13696
In the Matter of: Fariba K. Rahimi Bar # a Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel for the State Bar: AGUSTIN HERNANDEZ, Deputy Trial Counsel, Office of the Chief Trial Counsel, 1149 South Hill Street, Los Angeles, CA, 90015-2299, (213) 765-1713, Bar# 161625
Counsel for Respondent: ARTHUR L. MARGOLIS, Margolis & Margolis, 2000 Riverside Drive, Los Angeles, CA 90039-3758, (323) 953-8996, Bar # 57703
Submitted to: Settlement Judge, State Bar Court Clerk’s Office Los Angeles
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted February 2, 1999.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 14 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
checked. Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 5.130, Rules of Procedure.
<<not>> checked. Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: . (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
<<not>> checked. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs are entirely waived.
WAIVER OF VARIANCE BETWEEN NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY CHARGES AND STIPULATED FACTS AND CULPABILITY
The parties waive any variance between the Notice of Disciplinary Charges filed on January 8, 2010, and the facts and/or conclusions of law contained in this stipulation. Additionally, the parties waive the issuance of an amended Notice of Disciplinary Charges. The parties further waive the right to the filing of a Notice of Disciplinary Charges and to a formal hearing on any charge not included in the pending Notice of Disciplinary Charges.
Case No. 05-O-02584
FACTS:
1. In 2001, the Los Angeles County District Attomey Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter D.A.) conducted an undercover investigation regarding insurance fraud. The investigation involved Respondent as well as several other defendants, including but not limited to capper Masood Yazarlou (hereinafter Yazarlou) and Parviz Berjis, M.D. (hereinafter Dr. Berjis).
2. On May 21, 2001, D.A. Investigator Jimmy Garcia, working undercover as Jimmy Gonzales (hereinafter Gonzales), told Yazarlou that he had been involved in an automobile accident. Yazar!ou told Gonzales that he could handle Gonzales’s uninsured motorist claim against his insurance company. On this date, Yazarlou told Gonzales to go to Dr. Berjis’s office on May 22, 2001. Yazarlou told Gonzales that he would only have to see Dr. Berjis on one occasion and that Dr. Berjis would submit a bill for medical services to Gonzales’s insurance company.
3. As directed by Yazarlou, on May 22, 2001, Gonzales went to Dr. Berjis’s office and was examined by one of Dr. Berjis’s employees. Other than this first visit to Dr. Berjis’ office on May 22, 2001, Gonzales never went to Dr. Berjis’s office or received any other treatment from his office.
4. Thereafter, Yazarlou referred this case to Respondent for legal representation.
5. On September 19, 2001, Dr. Berjis created a false bill for $3,799 and a medical report reflecting medical treatment allegedly rendered to Gonzales during eighteen (18) visits on different dates for physical therapy and examinations from May 22, 2001 through July 17, 2001. On this date, Dr. Berjis sent this bill and a medical report to Respondent’s office. Respondent received the bill and report.
6. On April 18, 2002, Respondent sent a demand letter to Gonzales’s insurance company and attached a copy of Dr. Berjis’s false medical bill and report.
7. On August 14, 2002, Respondent met with Gonzales at his insurance company’s office to prepare Gonzales for an examination under oath. During this conversation, Gonzales told Respondent that he had only gone to Dr. Berjis’s office one time but that he had previously lied to the insurance company and told them that he had gone to Dr. Berjis approximately fifteen times. Respondent told Gonzales that she would be cancelling the examination because he would be lying under oath and she could not represent him if she knew he was lying. Gonzales then told Respondent that he would lie again and testify consistent with the (Stipulation form approved by SBC Executive Committee 10/16/00. Revised 12/16/2004; 12/13/2006.) false medical bill. Respondent told Gonzales that he should not commit perjury but if he did not testify consistent with the medical bill, Gonzales would not have a case.
8. After Respondent was informed by Gonzales that the medical bill was false and that Gonzales intended to provide false testimony, Respondent represented Gonzales during the examination. Gonzales gave false testimony under oath in the presence of Respondent.
9. Respondent knew, or was grossly negligent in not knowing, that Dr. Berjis’s medical billing for Gonzales was false. At no time did Respondent withdraw the false medical billing as support for Gonzales’s claim to the insurance company.
10. On August 29, 2002, Respondent had settlement negotiations with a representative of Gonzales’s insurance company based in part upon the false medical billing. During this conversation, Respondent settled Gonzales’s personal injury claim with his insurance company for $8,500 based in part on the false medical billing:
11. On October 10, 2002, Gonzales’ insurance company issued and sent to Respondent a settlement check for $8,500 made payable to Respondent and Gonzales. Respondent received the settlement check. On October 17, 2002, Respondent negotiated and disbursed the settlement proceeds.
12. In August 2001, Gonzales told Yazarlou that his friend Belinda Martinez had been involved in an auto accident. Yazarlou told Gonzales to take her to Dr. Berjiss office on August .13, 2001.
13. On August 13, 2001, D.A. Investigator Belen Jeske, working undercover as Belinda Martinez (hereinafter Martinez), went to Dr. Berjis’s office and provided information about her alleged injuries. Other than this first visit to Dr. Berjis’s office on August 13, 2001, Martinez never went to Dr. Berjis’s office or received any other treatment from his office.
14. Thereafter, Yazarlou referred this case to Respondent for legal representation.
15. On January 7, 2002, Dr. Berjis created a false bill for $5,405 and a medical report reflecting medical treatment allegedly rendered to Martinez on thirty-four (34) visits on different dates for physical therapy and examinations from August 13, 2001 through November 11, 2001. On this date, Dr. Berjis sent this bill and a medical report to Respondent’s office. Respondent received the bill and report.
16. On September 9, 2002, Respondent sent a demand letter to the insurance company that insured the other vehicle involved in the accident with Martinez. This demand letter was based in part upon Dr. Berjis’s false medical billing.
17. On October 15, 2002, Respondent met with Martinez at Respondent’s office to prepare Martinez for the insurance company to take Martinez’s recorded statement under oath. At that time, Martinez told Respondent that she did not go to Dr. Berjis’ office as many times as the bill reflected and that Yazarlou told her that she only had to go to Dr. Berjis’ office one time. Respondent told Martinez that, as her attorney, Respondent could only advise Martinez to tell the truth, but if she stated that she had not been to the doctor, she would not have a case.
18. After Respondent was informed by Martinez that the medical bill was false and that Martinez intended to provide false testimony, Respondent represented Martinez during the examination. Martinez gave false testimony under oath in the presence of Respondent.
19. Respondent knew, or was grossly negligent in not knowing, that Dr. Berjis’s medical report for Martinez was false. At no time did Respondent withdraw the false medical billing as support for Martinez’s claim to the insurance company.
20. On January 23, 2003, Respondent settled Martinez’s personal injury claim with the insurance company for $7,500 based in part on the false medical billing.
21. Thereafter, the insurance company issued and sent to Respondent a settlement check for $7,500 made payable to Respondent and Martinez. Respondent received the settlement check. Thereafter, Respondent negotiated and disbursed the settlement proceeds.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
22. By continuing to represent Gonzales at his examination under oath after Gonzales told her that he intended to testify falsely, Respondent failed to withdraw from employment when Respondent knew or should have known that continued employment would result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or of the State Bar Act, in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(B)(2).
23. By negotiating and settling Gonzales’s claim based in part upon a false medical billing when she knew or was grossly negligent in not knowing that the medical billing was false, Respondent committed acts involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.
24. By continuing to represent Martinez at her examination when Martinez testified falsely, Respondent failed to withdraw from employment when Respondent knew or should have known that continued employment would result in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct or of the State Bar Act, in
willful violation of rule Rules of Professional Conduct, 3-700(B)(2).
25. By negotiating and settling Martinez’s claim based in part upon a false medical billing when she knew or was grossly negligent in not knowing that the medical billing was false, Respondent committed acts involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.
Case No. 08-O-13696
FACTS:
26. At all times relevant to the events alleged herein, Respondent maintained a client trust account at First Bank, account number xxxxxx 1759 ("CTA").
27. In June 2008, Respondent represented Evelyn Barillas in a legal matter. On June 11, 2008, Respondent received a settlement check in the amount of $710.63 on behalf of Evelyn Barillas. On June 13, (Stipulation form approved by SBC Executive Committee 10116/00. Revised 12/16/2004.) 2008, Respondent. deposited Evelyn Barillas’s settlement check into Respondent’s business account instead
of her CTA.
28. In November 2008, Respondent represented Luis Madera in a legal matter. On November 14, 2008, Respondent received a check in the amount of $86.57 on behalf of Luis Madera. On November 26, 2008, Respondent deposited Luis Madera’s check into Respondent’s business account instead of her CTA.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
29. By failing to deposit checks that were received on behalf of clients in her CTA, Respondent failed to deposit client funds in trust, in willful violation of Rules of professional Conduct, role 4-100(A).
DISMISSALS:
Count Five of the Notice of Disciplinary Charges is dismissed. Count Five pertains to Case Nos. 08-012590 and 08-O-13696.
Count Six of the Notice of Disciplinary Charges is dismissed. Count Six pertains to Case No. 08-O-12590.
By dismissing Counts Five and Six, Case No. 08-O-12590 is dismissed in its entirety.
SUPPORTING AUTHORITY:
The discipline imposed on attorneys who commit acts of moral turpitude by making misrepresentations varies significantly. Although there are various factual distinctions between the cases cited below, they all support the imposition of actual suspension on Respondent.
Standards:
Standard 1.3, Title IV, Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct, provides that the primary purposes of the disciplinary system are: "the protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; the maintenance of high professional standards by attorneys and the preservation of public confidence in the legal profession."
Recently, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the standards and held that great weight should be given to the application of the standards in determining the appropriate level of discipline. The Court indicated that unless it has "grave doubts as to the propriety of the recommended discipline," it will uphold the application of the standards, In re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal. 4th 81, 91-92.
Standard 2.2(b) states that culpability of a member of commingling of entrusted funds or property with personal property or the commission of another violation of role 4-100, Rules of Professional Conduct, none of which offenses result in the willful misappropriation of entrusted funds or property shall result in at least a three month actual suspension from the practice of law, irrespective of mitigating circumstances."
Standard 2.3 provides that culpability of a member of an act of moral turpitude, fraud, or intentional dishonesty toward a court, client or another person or of concealment of a material fact to the court, client or another person shall result in actual suspension or disbarment depending upon the extent to which the victim of the misconduct is harmed or misled and depending upon the magnitude of the act of misconduct and the degree to which it relates to the member’s acts within the practice of law."
Cases:
In Garlow v. State Bar, the Supreme Court imposed a six month actual suspension on an attorney for signing declarations on behalf of clients in a motion to set aside a default. During a hearing on a motion to strike the declarations, the respondent admitted to signing one of the declarations with the client’s consent but did not admit to having signed the other declarations. The respondent also tried to have one of the clients falsely testify that the client had signed the declaration. The respondent was found culpable of wrongfully signing the declarations and that he willfully is represented to the court the authenticity of the declarations. Garlow had two prior private reprovals and one public reproval. Garlow v. State Bar (1982) 30 Cal,3d 912.
In re Farrell, a respondent was actually suspended for six months for making a misrepresentation to the superior court. The respondent told the trial judge that he had subpoenaed a witness to testify at trial when he had not. In mitigation, the respondent believed that the witness had been served with the subpoena. The respondent also failed to cooperate with the State Bar during the investigation. In aggravation, the
respondent had a prior record of discipline. In re Farrell (Review Dept. 1991) 1 State Bar Ct. Rptr. 490.
Mitigating Circumstances Supporting Deviation from the Standards:
Although Respondent’s misconduct is quite serious and involves moral turpitude, there are some mitigating circumstances that justify deviating from the standards. The standards seem to require at least three months of actual suspension, irrespective of mitigating circumstances. (Standards 2.2(b) and 2.3.)
Respondent was not involved in the orchestration of the fraudulent medical bills prepared on behalf of Gonzales and Martinez. Yazarlou and Dr. Berjis were responsible for causing the fraudulent medical bills to be created before Respondent came to represent Gonzales and Martinez.
Respondent first learned that the medical bills may be fraudulent immediately before Gonzales’s and Martinez’s examination under oath and recorded statement under oath, respectively, were about to commence. Respondent’s initial response to Gonzales was to cancel his examination and. to notify him that she could not represent him if he lied under oath. Respondent then advised Gonzales of the repercussions of perjury and ultimately, the examination proceeded. Similarly, Respondent advised Martinez that she had to tell the truth.
With respect to the CTA violations, Respondent did not misappropriate any client funds. Respondent’s misconduct was caused by her inadequate record keeping which amounted to gross negligence. Her inability to manage her CTA lead to CTA checks being issued against insufficient funds.
PENDING PROCEEDINGS:
The disclosure date referred to on page 2, section A.(7) was on August 10, 2010.
Case Number(s): 05-O-02584, 08-O-12590, 08-O-13696
In the Matter of: Fariba K. Rahimi
a. Restitution
<<not>> checked. Respondent must pay restitution (including the principal amount, plus interest of 10% per annum) to the payee(s) listed below. If the Client Security Fund (“CSF”) has reimbursed one or more of the payee(s) for all or any portion of the principal amount(s) listed below, Respondent must also pay restitution to CSF in the amount(s) paid, plus applicable interest and costs.
1. Payee:
Principal Amount:
Interest Accrues From:
2. Payee:
Principal Amount:
Interest Accrues From:
3. Payee:
Principal Amount:
Interest Accrues From:
4. Payee:
Principal Amount:
Interest Accrues From:
<<not>> checked. Respondent must pay above-referenced restitution and provide satisfactory proof of payment to the Office of Probation not later than .
<<not>> checked. Respondent must pay the above-referenced restitution on the payment schedule set forth below. Respondent must provide satisfactory proof of payment to the Office of Probation with each quarterly probation report, or as otherwise directed by the Office of Probation. No later than 30 days prior to the expiration of the period of probation (or period of reproval), Respondent must make any necessary final payment(s) in order to complete the payment of restitution, including interest, in full.
1. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
Payment Frequency
2. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
Payment Frequency
3. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
Payment Frequency
4. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
Payment Frequency
<<not>> checked. If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
<<not>> checked.
1. If Respondent possesses client funds at any time during the period covered by a required quarterly report, Respondent must file with each required report a certificate from Respondent and/or a certified public accountant or other financial professional approved by the Office of Probation, certifying that:
a. Respondent has maintained a bank account in a bank authorized to do business in the State of California, at a branch located within the State of California, and that such account is designated as a “Trust Account” or “Clients’ Funds Account”;
b. Respondent has kept and maintained the following:
i. A written ledger for each client on whose behalf funds are held that sets forth:
1. the name of such client;
2. the date, amount and source of all funds received on behalf of such client;
3. the date, amount, payee and purpose of each disbursement made on behalf of such client; and,
4. the current balance for such client.
ii. a written journal for each client trust fund account that sets forth:
1. the name of such account;
2. the date, amount and client affected by each debit and credit; and,
3. the current balance in such account.
iii. all bank statements and cancelled checks for each client trust account; and,
iv. each monthly reconciliation (balancing) of (i), (ii), and (iii), above, and if there are any differences between the monthly total balances reflected in (i), (ii), and (iii), above, the reasons for the differences.
c. Respondent has maintained a written journal of securities or other properties held for clients that specifies:
i. each item of security and property held;
ii. the person on whose behalf the security or property is held;
iii. the date of receipt of the security or property;
iv. the date of distribution of the security or property; and,
v. the person to whom the security or property was distributed.
2. If Respondent does not possess any client funds, property or securities during the entire period covered by a report, Respondent must so state under penalty of perjury in the report filed with the Office of Probation for that reporting period. In this circumstance, Respondent need not file the accountant’s certificate described above.
3. The requirements of this condition are in addition to those set forth in rule 4-100, Rules of Professional Conduct.
checked. Within one (1) year of the effective date of the discipline herein, Respondent must supply to the Office of Probation satisfactory proof of attendance at a session of the Ethics School Client Trust Accounting School, within the same period of time, and passage of the test given at the end of that session.
Case Number(s): 05-O-02584, 08-O-12590, 08-O-13696
In the Matter of: Fariba K. Rahimi
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: Fariba K. Rahimi
Date: July 27, 2010
Respondent’s Counsel: Arthur Margolis
Date: August 11, 2010
Deputy Trial Counsel: Agustin Hernandez
Date: August 16, 2010
Case Number(s): 05-O-02584, 08-O-12590, 08-O-13696
In the Matter of: Fariba K. Rahimi
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58 (E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Pat McElroy
Date: August 19, 2010
Actual Suspension Order
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of San Francisco on August 19, 2010, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at San Francisco, California, addressed as follows:
ARTHUR LEWIS MARGOLIS
MARGOLIS & MARGOLIS LLP
2000 RIVERSIDE DR
LOS ANGELES, CA 90039
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
Agustin Hernandez, Enforcement, Los Angeles
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on August 19, 2010.
Signed by:
George Hue
Case Administrator
State Bar Court