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04-4-	Par Court of Coliforn	
State Bar Court of California Hearing Department Los Angeles DISBARMENT		
Counsel for the State Bar	Case Number(s):	For Court use only
Eli D. Morgenstern, Bar No. 190560 Senior Trial Counsel 845 So. Figueroa Street Los Angeles, CA 90017-2515 (213) 765-1334 Caitlin Elen, Bar No. 272163 Deputy Trial Counsel 845 So. Figueroa Street Los Angeles, CA 90017-2515 (213) 765-1653	kwiktag * 241 073 045	FILED APR 18 2019 STATE BAR COURT CLERK'S OFFICE LOS ANGELES
Bar #	PUBLICI	MATTER
Counsel For Respondent		
Merri A. Baldwin, Bar No. 141957 Rogers Joseph O'Donnell, P.C. 311 California St., 10 <sup>th</sup> Floor San Francisco, CA 94104 (415) 956-2828	OCTC No.: 06-C-10695 Submitted to: Settlement Ju	dae
Louis R. Miller, Bar No. 54141 Miller Barondess, LLP 1999 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1000 Los Angeles, CA 90067 (310) 552-4400		ONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND APPROVING; ORDER OF
Bar#		N REJECTED
In the Matter of: TERRY NEAL CHRISTENSEN		
Bar # <b>37846</b>		
A Member of the State Bar of California (Respondent)		

Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.

# A. Parties' Acknowledgments:

(1) Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted January 5, 1966.

- (2) The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
- (3) All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of **11** pages, not including the order.
- (4) A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
- (5) Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law."
- (6) The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
- (7) No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
- (8) Payment of Disciplinary Costs—Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. It is recommended that (check one option only):
  - Costs be awarded to the State Bar in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6086.10, and are enforceable both as provided in Business and Professions Code section 6140.7 and as a money judgment. Unless the time for payment of discipline costs is extended pursuant to subdivision (c) of section 6086.10, costs assessed against a member who is actually suspended or disbarred must be paid as a condition of reinstatement or return to active status.
  - Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs."
  - Costs are entirely waived.
- (9) ORDER OF INACTIVE ENROLLMENT: The parties are aware that if this stipulation is approved, the judge will issue an order of inactive enrollment under Business and Professions Code section 6007, subdivision (c)(4), and Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, rule 5.111(D)(1).
- B. Aggravating Circumstances [Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct, standards 1.2(h) & 1.5]. Facts supporting aggravating circumstances are required.
- (1) Prior record of discipline:
  - (a) State Bar Court case # of prior case:
  - (b) Date prior discipline effective:
  - (c) Rules of Professional Conduct/ State Bar Act violations:
  - (d) Degree of prior discipline:
  - (e) If Respondent has two or more incidents of prior discipline, use space provided below:

- (2) Intentional/Bad Faith/Dishonesty: Respondent's misconduct was dishonest, intentional, or surrounded by, or followed by bad faith.
- (3) Misrepresentation: Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by, or followed by misrepresentation.
- (4) Concealment: Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by, or followed by concealment.
- (5) Overreaching: Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by, or followed by overreaching.
- (6) Uncharged Violations: Respondent's conduct involves uncharged violations of the Business and Professions Code or the Rules of Professional Conduct.
- (7) Trust Violation: Trust funds or property were involved and Respondent refused or was unable to account to the client or person who was the object of the misconduct for improper conduct toward said funds or property.
- (8) Harm: Respondent's misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public, or the administration of justice. See pages 7-8.
- (9) Indifference: Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for the consequences of Respondent's misconduct.
- (10) Lack of Candor/Cooperation: Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims of Respondent's misconduct, or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigations or proceedings.
- (11) Multiple Acts: Respondent's current misconduct evidences multiple acts of wrongdoing. See page 7.
- (12) **Pattern:** Respondent's current misconduct demonstrates a pattern of misconduct.
- (13) **Restitution:** Respondent failed to make restitution.
- (14) Ullinerable Victim: The victim(s) of Respondent's misconduct was/were highly vulnerable.
- (15) **No aggravating circumstances** are involved.

Additional aggravating circumstances:

# C. Mitigating Circumstances [Standards 1.2(i) & 1.6]. Facts supporting mitigating circumstances are required.

- (1) No Prior Discipline: Respondent has no prior record of discipline over many years of practice coupled with present misconduct which is not likely to recur.
- (2) **No Harm:** Respondent did not harm the client, the public, or the administration of justice.
- (3) Candor/Cooperation: Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and cooperation with the victims of Respondent's misconduct or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigations and proceedings.
- (4) Remorse: Respondent promptly took objective steps demonstrating spontaneous remorse and recognition of the wrongdoing, which steps were designed to timely atone for any consequences of Respondent's misconduct.

- (5) Restitution: Respondent paid \$ on in restitution to without the threat or force of disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings.
- (6) Delay: These disciplinary proceedings were excessively delayed. The delay is not attributable to Respondent and the delay prejudiced Respondent.
- (7) Good Faith: Respondent acted with a good faith belief that was honestly held and objectively reasonable.
- (8) Emotional/Physical Difficulties: At the time of the stipulated act or acts of professional misconduct, Respondent suffered extreme emotional difficulties or physical or mental disabilities which expert testimony would establish was directly responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities were not the product of any illegal conduct by Respondent, such as illegal drug or substance abuse, and the difficulties or disabilities no longer pose a risk that Respondent will commit misconduct.
- (9) Severe Financial Stress: At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered from severe financial stress which resulted from circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond Respondent's control and which were directly responsible for the misconduct.
- (10) **Family Problems:** At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered extreme difficulties in Respondent's personal life which were other than emotional or physical in nature.
- (11) Good Character: Respondent's extraordinarily good character is attested to by a wide range of references in the legal and general communities who are aware of the full extent of Respondent's misconduct.
- (12) Rehabilitation: Considerable time has passed since the acts of professional misconduct occurred followed by subsequent rehabilitation.
- (13) **No mitigating circumstances** are involved.

Additional mitigating circumstances:

No prior record of discipline. See page 8. Good character. See page 8. Prefiling Stipulation. See page 8.

## D. Recommended Discipline:

#### Disbarment

Respondent is disbarred from the practice of law in California and Respondent's name is stricken from the roll of attorneys.

## **E. Additional Requirements:**

(1) California Rules of Court, Rule 9.20: Respondent must comply with the requirements of California Rules of Court, rule 9.20, and perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court order imposing discipline in this matter. Failure to do so may result in disbarment or suspension.

For purposes of compliance with rule 9.20(a), the operative date for identification of "clients being represented in pending matters" and others to be notified is the filing date of the Supreme Court order, not any later "effective" date of the order. (*Athearn v. State Bar* (1982) 32 Cal.3d 38, 45.) Further, Respondent is required to

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file a rule 9.20(c) affidavit even if Respondent has no clients to notify on the date the Supreme Court filed its order in this proceeding. (*Powers v. State Bar* (1988) 44 Cal.3d 337, 341.) In addition to being punished as a crime or contempt, an attorney's failure to comply with rule 9.20 is, inter alia, cause for disbarment, suspension, revocation of any pending disciplinary probation, and denial of an application for reinstatement after disbarment. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.20(d).)

- (2) Restitution (Single Payee): Respondent must make restitution in the amount of \$, plus 10 percent interest per year from , to (or reimburse the Client Security Fund to the extent of any payment from the Fund to such payee in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6140.5).
- (3) Restitution (Multiple Payees): Respondent must make restitution to each of the following payees (or reimburse the Client Security Fund to the extent of any payment from the Fund to such payee in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6140.5):

Payee	Principal Amount	t Interest Accrues From
······································		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·

(4) Other Requirements: It is further recommended that Respondent be ordered to comply with the following additional requirements:

## ATTACHMENT TO

## STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION

IN THE MATTER OF: TERRY NEAL CHRISTENSEN

CASE NUMBER: 06-C-10695

### FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that the facts and circumstances surrounding the offenses for which he was convicted involved moral turpitude.

#### Case No. 06-C-10695 (Conviction Proceedings)

#### PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND IN CONVICTION PROCEEDING:

1. This is a proceeding pursuant to sections 6101 and 6102 of the Business and Professions Code and rule 9.10 of the California Rules of Court.

2. On December 6, 2007, in the matter titled *United States of America v. Anthony Pellicano, et al.*, United States District Court, For The Central District of California, Case No. CR 05-1046(E) –DSF ("criminal matter"), a grand jury returned a Fifth Superseding Indictment charging respondent with conspiracy and interception of wire communications in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a), respectively.

3. On August 29, 2008, following a five-week jury trial in the criminal matter, respondent was convicted of conspiracy and interception of wire communications in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a), respectively.

4. On October 22, 2008, the Review Department of the State Bar Court ("Review Department") ordered respondent to be placed on interim suspension effective November 24, 2008. Respondent has remained on interim suspension since that time.

5. On November 24, 2008, the Court in the criminal matter sentenced respondent to 36 months of imprisonment for each of the two counts, to be served concurrently, and on release from imprisonment, the Court ordered respondent placed on supervised release for a term of three years.

6. On August 25, 2015, the United States Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit filed an Opinion, amended on July 8, 2016, affirming respondent's conviction and sentence in the criminal matter.

7. On July 28, 2017, the Review Department issued an order referring this matter to the Hearing Department for a hearing and decision recommending the discipline to be imposed in the event that the Hearing Department finds that the facts and circumstances surrounding the offenses for which respondent was convicted involved moral turpitude or other misconduct warranting discipline.

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#### FACTS:

8. On January 4, 2002, attorneys for Lisa Bonder ("Bonder") filed a child support modification lawsuit against Kirk Kerkorian ("Kerkorian"), respondent's client, in which Bonder sought to have Kerkorian's monthly child support payments for her four year old daughter increased from \$50,000 to \$320,000 (the "family law matter").

9. On January 18, 2002, respondent filed a civil complaint on behalf of Kerkorian against Bonder in Los Angeles County Superior Court (the "civil matter"). The complaint in the civil matter alleged, among other things, that the filing of the lawsuit in the family law matter violated the confidentiality provisions of various agreements that had been entered into between Kerkorian and Bonder.

10. On March 18, 2002, respondent hired Anthony Pellicano ("Pellicano"), a private investigator, in order to discover the biological father of Bonder's child, which respondent and Kerkorian viewed as a significant issue in the ongoing litigation.

11. The jury in the criminal matter found that thereafter respondent and Pellicano reached an agreement that Pellicano would wiretap Bonder's home telephones.

12. From on or about March 18, 2002, through May 16, 2002, Pellicano, pursuant to the agreement, provided respondent with information that Pellicano was learning from the wiretap regarding: (i) the paternity of Bonder's daughter; (ii) Bonder's litigation strategy and settlement position in the ongoing litigation; and (iii) the details of Bonder's private and intimate telephone conversations with her attorneys, her doctor, her family, and friends. Based on testimony at the criminal trial about Bonder's telephone habits, the number of telephone calls that Pellicano intercepted was at least in the hundreds.

13. On May 16, 2002, after the issue of Bonder's daughter's paternity was resolved without any assistance from Pellicano, respondent terminated Pellicano. Respondent paid a total of \$100,000 to Pellicano.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

14. The facts and circumstances surrounding respondent's convictions involved moral turpitude.

#### AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

Multiple Acts of Wrongdoing (Std. 1.5(b)): The duration of the wiretap, the number of calls intercepted, and the number of victims whose privacy was violated are significant aggravating factors. (*In the Matter of Song* (Review Dept. 2013) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rtpr. 273, 279 [multiple acts of aggravation for 65 improper trust account withdrawals charged as one count of moral turpitude].)

Significant Harm to Client, Public or Administration of Justice (Std. 1.5(j)): The sacrosanct confidential relationship between a lawyer and a client has been called one of the bastions of ordered liberty. (See Edna Selan Epstein, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work-Product Doctrine 2 (3rd ed. 1997). Respondent's conduct enabled him to invade the attorney-client privilege and obtain information protected by it. Respondent's conduct subverted the legal system and violated fundamental principles of fairness and equal treatment under the law. Respondent's actions marred the legal community and the justice system. Bonder submitted a letter to the Court in the criminal matter about the significant emotional pain and profound deprivation of privacy that she experienced as a result of

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respondent's conduct. Respondent's other victims, including Bonder's attorneys, testified and wrote that they experienced a profound sense of violation, humiliation, and emotional harm resulting from respondent's conduct, as well as an ongoing inability to trust in the confidentiality of their telephone conversations, which, for attorneys, directly impacts their ability to practice their profession.

## MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

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No Prior Discipline: Respondent has been a member of the State Bar since January 5, 1966. At the time that respondent committed the criminal conduct herein, he had practiced law for over 36 years without a prior record of discipline. (See *In Re Brown* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 205, 222 [Supreme Court finding that an attorney's 20 years of discipline-free practice an important mitigating circumstance]; *In the Matter of McCarthy* (Review Dept. 2002) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 364, 383[attorney's 40 years of discipline-free practice a strong mitigating factor].)

**Good Character:** Respondent has provided the State Bar with 70 character reference letters, including: (i) two federal court judges; (ii) a retired Army General and former Secretary of State; (iii) 22 attorneys; (iv) 19 staff members from his former firm; (v) 24 friends and members of the business community; and (vi) two family members. Testimony from attorneys and judges are given significant consideration due to their "strong interest in maintaining the honest administration of justice." (*In the Matter of Brown* (Review Dept. 1993) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 309, 319.) All of the references describe respondent's good character, tenacity, integrity, professionalism, sincerity, diligence, thoughtfulness, and dedication. (See *In the Matter of Davis* (Review Dept. 2003) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 576, 591–592 [significant weight given to testimony of character witnesses who had long-standing familiarity with attorney and broad knowledge of his good character, work habits, and professional skill].)

**Pretrial Stipulation:** By entering into this stipulation, respondent has acknowledged misconduct and is entitled to mitigation for recognition of wrongdoing and saving the State Bar Court significant resources and time. (*Silva-Vidor v. State Bar* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1071, 1079 [where mitigative credit was given for entering into a stipulation as to facts and culpability]; *In the Matter of Spaith* (Review Dept. 1996) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 511, 521 [where the attorney's stipulation to facts and culpability was held to be a mitigating circumstance].)

# **AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.**

The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct "set forth a means for determining the appropriate disciplinary sanction in a particular case and to ensure consistency across cases dealing with similar misconduct and surrounding circumstances." (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, std. 1.1. All further references to standards are to this source.) The standards help fulfill the primary purposes of discipline, which include: protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; maintenance of the highest professional standards; and preservation of public confidence in the legal profession. (See std. 1.1; *In re Morse* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 184, 205.)

Although not binding, the standards are entitled to "great weight" and should be followed "whenever possible" in determining level of discipline. (*In re Silverton* (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 92, quoting *In re Brown* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 205, 220 and *In re Young* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 267, fn. 11.) Adherence to the standards in the great majority of cases serves the valuable purpose of eliminating disparity and assuring consistency, that is, the imposition of similar attorney discipline for instances of similar attorney misconduct. (*In re Naney* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 190.) If a recommendation is at the high end or low

end of a standard, an explanation must be given as to how the recommendation was reached. (Std. 1.1.) "Any disciplinary recommendation that deviates from the Standards must include clear reasons for the departure." (Std. 1.1; *Blair v. State Bar* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 762, 776, fn. 5.)

In determining whether to impose a sanction greater or less than that specified in a given standard, in addition to the factors set forth in the specific standard, consideration is to be given to the primary purposes of discipline; the balancing of all aggravating and mitigating circumstances; the type of misconduct at issue; whether the client, public, legal system or profession was harmed; and the member's willingness and ability to conform to ethical responsibilities in the future. (Stds. 1.7(b) and (c).)

Respondent's culpability is conclusively established by his conviction. Additionally, respondent is conclusively presumed, by the record of his conviction in this proceeding, to have committed all of the elements of the crimes of which he was convicted. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6101, subd. (a); *In re Crooks* (1990) 51 Ca. 3d 1090, 1097; *In the Matter of Respondent O* (Review Dept. 1993) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 581, 588.)

Respondent's crimes are serious and involve moral turpitude. Moral turpitude has been defined as "a deficiency in any character trait necessary for the practice of law (such as trustworthiness, honesty, fairness, candor, and fidelity to fiduciary duties)" or conduct that "involves such a serious breach of a duty owed to another or to society, or such a flagrant disrespect for the law or for societal norms, that knowledge of the attorney's conduct would be likely to undermine public confidence in and respect for the legal profession." (*In re Lesansky* (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 11, 16.)

Standard 2.15(b) provides that "[d]isbarment is the presumed sanction for final conviction of a felony in which the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense involve moral turpitude, unless the most compelling mitigating circumstance clearly predominate, in which case actual suspension of at least two years is appropriate."

Respondent's criminal activities were directly intertwined with, and inextricable, from his work as an attorney. It was in respondent's capacity as an attorney that he hired Pellicano to investigate Bonder, and knew how to put the information illegally obtained by Pellicano – including Bonder's litigation strategy and communications with her own counsel – to the most effective use in the litigation. Thus, it was in his capacity as an attorney that respondent not only facilitated the commission of his criminal offenses – the offenses would never have occurred but for his status as an attorney. Respondent's criminal offenses involved multiple acts of misconduct, invaded the attorney-client privilege and the personal privacy of numerous people, and harmed the legal community and the justice system. In light of the seriousness of respondent's convictions, and the facts and aggravating circumstances surrounding them, respondent's 36 years of discipline-free practice, good character references, and agreement to enter into this stipulation are significant, but not the most compelling, mitigating factors. Thus, respondent's mitigation does not clearly predominate. Accordingly, respondent's disbarment is warranted in order to serve the purposes of attorney discipline.

The case law supports the recommended level of discipline. The Supreme Court has stated that "[u]nder sections 6101 and 6102 of the Business and Professions Code, disbarments, and not suspensions, have been the rule rather than the exception in cases of serious crimes involving moral turpitude . . ." (*In re Bogart* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 743, 748.) The Supreme Court has frequently disbarred attorneys upon such convictions. (See, e.g., *In re Crooks* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1090 [conspiracy to defraud United States based on tax-shelter investment scheme]; *In re Ford* (1988) 44 Cal.3d 810 [embezzlement]; *In re Severo* 

(1986) 41 Cal.3d 493 [bribery; theft of federal funds]; *In re Possino* (1984) 37 Cal.3d 163 [possession of marijuana for sale]; *In re Schwartz* (1982) 31 Cal.3d 395 [use of U.S. Postal Service to defraud]; *In re Calaway* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 165 [conspiracy to commit illegal gambling]; *In re Bloom* (1977) 19 Cal.3d 175 [soliciting a bribe]; *In re Weber* (1976) 16 Cal.3d 578 [soliciting another to offer a bribe]; *In re Wright* (1973) 10 Cal.3d 374 [grand theft]; *In re Bogart* (1973) 9 Cal.3d 743, 748 [grand theft; forgery].)

## COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.

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Respondent acknowledges that the Office of Chief Trial Counsel has informed him that as of March 28, 2019, the discipline costs in this matter are \$2,669. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.

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In the Matter of: TERRY NEAL CHRISTENSEN	Case Number(s):
	OCTC No. 06-C-10695

# SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES

By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitations and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Disposition.

3/28/2019	Jen CES	Terry Neal Christensen
Date	Respondent's Signature	Print Name
<u>4/1/2019</u> Date	Respondent's Counsel Signature	<u>Merri A. Baldwin</u> Print Name
	A	Louis R. Miller
Date	Respondentis Coursel Signature	Print Name
<u> </u>	Deputy-Trial Counsel's Signature	Eli D. Morgenstern
	14Th And I	
4/3/2019	MATHIM	Caitlin Elen
Date	Deputy Trial Counsel's Signature	Print Name

In the Matter of: TERRY NEAL CHRISTENSEN	Case Number(s):	
	OCTC No. 06-C-10695	

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By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitations and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Disposition.

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		Terry Neal Christensen
Date	Respondent's Signature	Print Name
		Merri A. Baldwin
Date	Respondent's Counsel Signature	Print Name
09/3/19	fRZ_	Louis R. Miller
Date	Respondent's Counsel Signature	Print Name
		Eli D. Morgenstern
Date	Deputy Trial Counsel's Signature	Print Name
		Caitlin Elen
Date	Deputy Trial Counsel's Signature	Print Name

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In the Matter of: TERRY NEAL CHRISTENSEN	Case Number(s): 06-C-10695	

# **DISBARMENT ORDER**

Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any, is GRANTED without prejudice, and:

- The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
- The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
- All Hearing dates are vacated.

On page 2 of the Stipulation, at paragraph A.(3), line 3, "11" is deleted, and in its place is inserted "12".

The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 5.58(E) & (F).) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the filed date of the Supreme Court order. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.18(a).)

Respondent Terry Neal Christensen is ordered transferred to involuntary inactive status pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6007, subdivision (c)(4). Respondent's inactive enrollment will be effective three (3) calendar days after this order is served by mail and will terminate upon the effective date of the Supreme Court's order imposing discipline herein, or as provided for by rule 5.111(D)(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California, or as otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court pursuant to its plenary jurisdiction.

April 18, 2019 Date

REBECCA MEYER ROSENBERG, JUDGE PRO TEM

Judge-of the State Bar Court

## **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Court Specialist of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on April 18, 2019, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:

by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:

LOUISE R. MILLER MILLER BARONDESS, LLP STE 1000 1999 AVENUE OF THE STARS LOS ANGELES, CA 90067 MERRI ANNE BALDWIN ROGERS JOSEPH O'DONNELL 311 CALIFORNIA ST., 10<sup>TH</sup> FLOOR SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94104

by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

ELI D. MORGENSTERN, Enforcement, Los Angeles

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on April 18, 2019.

arpenter

Angela Corpenter Court Specialist State Bar Court