Case Number(s): 06-O-10610; 06-O-10872; 06-O-10877; 06-O-11219
In the Matter of: William B. Sullivan, Bar # 171637, A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Eli D. Morgenstern, The Slate Bar of California
Office of the Chief Trial Counsel
1149 S. Hill Street
Los Angeles, CA 90015
Tel: (213) 765-1334
Bar # 190560,
Counsel for Respondent: Arthur L. Margolis, Margolis & Margolis, LLP
2000 Riverside Dr.
Los Angeles, CA 90039
Tel: (323) 953-8496
Bar #, 57703
Submitted to: Settlement Judge – State Bar Court Clerk’s Office Los Angeles.
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted September 7, 1994.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 17 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
<<not>> checked. Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 5.130, Rules of Procedure.
checked. Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: See page 13 for further discussion re: Costs. (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
<<not>> checked. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs are entirely waived.
Case Number(s): 06-O-10610; 06-O-10872; 06-O-10877; 06-O-11219
In the Matter of: William B. Sullivan
a. Restitution
<<not>> checked. Respondent must pay restitution (including the principal amount, plus interest of 10% per annum) to the payee(s) listed below. If the Client Security Fund (“CSF”) has reimbursed one or more of the payee(s) for all or any portion of the principal amount(s) listed below, Respondent must also pay restitution to CSF in the amount(s) paid, plus applicable interest and costs.
1. Payee:
Principal Amount:
Interest Accrues From:
2. Payee:
Principal Amount:
Interest Accrues From:
3. Payee:
Principal Amount:
Interest Accrues From:
4. Payee:
Principal Amount:
Interest Accrues From:
<<not>> checked. Respondent must pay above-referenced restitution and provide satisfactory proof of payment to the Office of Probation not later than .
<<not>> checked. Respondent must pay the above-referenced restitution on the payment schedule set forth below. Respondent must provide satisfactory proof of payment to the Office of Probation with each quarterly probation report, or as otherwise directed by the Office of Probation. No later than 30 days prior to the expiration of the period of probation (or period of reproval), Respondent must make any necessary final payment(s) in order to complete the payment of restitution, including interest, in full.
1. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
Payment Frequency
2. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
Payment Frequency
3. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
Payment Frequency
4. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
Payment Frequency
<<not>> checked. If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
<<not>> checked.
1. If Respondent possesses client funds at any time during the period covered by a required quarterly report, Respondent must file with each required report a certificate from Respondent and/or a certified public accountant or other financial professional approved by the Office of Probation, certifying that:
a. Respondent has maintained a bank account in a bank authorized to do business in the State of California, at a branch located within the State of California, and that such account is designated as a “Trust Account” or “Clients’ Funds Account”;
b. Respondent has kept and maintained the following:
i. A written ledger for each client on whose behalf funds are held that sets forth:
1. the name of such client;
2. the date, amount and source of all funds received on behalf of such client;
3. the date, amount, payee and purpose of each disbursement made on behalf of such client; and,
4. the current balance for such client.
ii. a written journal for each client trust fund account that sets forth:
1. the name of such account;
2. the date, amount and client affected by each debit and credit; and,
3. the current balance in such account.
iii. all bank statements and cancelled checks for each client trust account; and,
iv. each monthly reconciliation (balancing) of (i), (ii), and (iii), above, and if there are any differences between the monthly total balances reflected in (i), (ii), and (iii), above, the reasons for the differences.
c. Respondent has maintained a written journal of securities or other properties held for clients that specifies:
i. each item of security and property held;
ii. the person on whose behalf the security or property is held;
iii. the date of receipt of the security or property;
iv. the date of distribution of the security or property; and,
v. the person to whom the security or property was distributed.
2. If Respondent does not possess any client funds, property or securities during the entire period covered by a report, Respondent must so state under penalty of perjury in the report filed with the Office of Probation for that reporting period. In this circumstance, Respondent need not file the accountant’s certificate described above.
3. The requirements of this condition are in addition to those set forth in rule 4-100, Rules of Professional Conduct.
checked. Within one (1) year of the effective date of the discipline herein, Respondent must supply to the Office of Probation satisfactory proof of attendance at a session of the Ethics School Client Trust Accounting School, within the same period of time, and passage of the test given at the end of that session.
IN THE MATTER OF: WILLIAM BRANSFIELD SULLIVAN, State Bar No. 171637
STATE BAR COURT CASE NUMBER: 06-O-10610; 06-O-10872; 06-O-10877; AND 06-O-11219
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that he is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct.
Background
Respondent and his law partner (hereinafter, the "partner") entered into a law partnership in which the partner assumed responsibility for the administration of the business aspects of the practice, including the handling of trust account matters, while Respondent’s primary focus was in litigating and trying cases.
The partner had no past experience in handling trust accounts or managing a law office. Nevertheless, Respondent never established procedures for the operation of the firm’s trust accounts, and gave the partner full control of those accounts. Respondent took no steps to oversee the trust accounts and did not confirm that adequate records were being kept or that the trust accounts were being reviewed monthly. Respondent did not review monthly statements for the trust accounts or any ledgers during the year 2005.
Case No. 06-0-10610
Facts
1. In November 2005, Respondent’s law firm (the "firm") maintained a client trust account at Union Bank of California, account no. xxxxx50684 (the "Union Bank CTA")1 At all relevant times to the stipulated facts in this case, Respondent and his partner were signatories on the Union Bank CTA. [Footnote 1: The complete account number has been omitted due to privacy concerns.]
2. Between on or about November 8, 2005, and on or about November 23, 2005, the partner, in her role of handling the financial aspects of the firm, paid funds from the Union Bank CTA for her and Respondent’s personal expenses including, but not limited to, the following:
DATE OF PAYMENT: 11/17/05;
PAYEE: Cash (memo: “cashier check to Statewide house payment”);
AMOUNT ($):$7,000.00;
DATE OF PAYMENT: 11/21/05;
PAYEE: Cash (memo: “WBS …car rental deposit”);
AMOUNT ($):$400.00;
DATE OF PAYMENT: 11/21/05;
PAYEE: Cash (memo: “2nd house payment Capistrano”);
AMOUNT ($):$7,000.00;
DATE OF PAYMENT: 11/21/05;
PAYEE: Cash (memo: “3rd house payment Capistrano”);
AMOUNT ($):$7,000.00;
DATE OF PAYMENT: 11/21/05;
PAYEE: Cash (memo: “cashier check-house payment Capistrano MS Mayer”);
AMOUNT ($):$7,000.00;
Conclusion of Law
By failing to involve himself in even a minimal oversight of the handling of the Union Bank CTA, Respondent, with gross negligence, permitted the partner to pay personal expenses from the Union Bank CTA, in wilful violation of rule 4-100(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Case No. 06-0-10872
Facts
1. Between February 2005 and August 2005, Respondent’s law firm (the "firm") maintained a client trust account at San Diego National Bank, account no. xxxxxx7270 ("San Diego National Bank CTA").2 At all relevant times to the stipulated facts in this case, Respondent and the partner were signatories on the San Diego Bank CTA. [Footnote 2: The complete account number has been omitted due to privacy concerns.]
2. Between February 22, 2005, and August 20, 2005, the partner paid, or caused to be paid, funds from the San Diego National Bank CTA to pay for her and/or Respondent’s personal expenses including, but not limited to, the following:
DATE OF PAYMENT: 02/22/05;
PAYEE: Mark Meyer (memo: “repayment beach house”);
AMOUNT ($):$50,000;
DATE OF PAYMENT: 08/22/05;
PAYEE: Cash (memo: “Robert Krogen/ Statewide payment”);
AMOUNT ($): $5,000;
3. In March 2002, Stephanie Pollaro ("Pollaro") employed the firm to represent her in a personal injury action against Great American Balloon Co. arising out of a hot air balloon accident that occurred on February 23, 2002.
4. In or about January 2005, Respondent settled the matter against Great American Balloon Co. in the sum of $85,000. In or about January 2005, the firm received the $85,000 settlement check. At that time, the firm maintained only one trust account: the San Diego National Bank CTA.
5. The firm failed to deposit the $85,000 settlement check from American Balloon Co. in the San Diego National Bank CTA. Instead, on January 21, 2005, the partner deposited, or caused to be deposited, the settlement check in the firm’s general account at San Diego National Bank, account number xxxxxxx099 (the "San Diego National Bank general account").3 [Footnote 3: The complete account number has been omitted due to privacy concerns.]
6. Respondent did not involve himself in even a minimal oversight of the partner’s handling of the San Diego National Bank CTA. By no later than the first few months of 2006, Respondent knew that the partner had not handled Pollaro’s funds properly. Nevertheless, Respondent did not take any action to determine what had happened to Pollaro’s funds or make restitution to Pollaro for the missing funds of at least $63,750 (after deducting the firm’s fees of $21,250) that the partner had misappropriated.
7. On or about August 18, 2005, Respondent spoke with Pollaro and agreed that the firm would accept a fee of $21,250, or 25% of the $85,000 settlement. Respondent also informed Pollaro that the amount due to her was $38,000. On or about August 26, 2005, Respondent provided Pollaro with two checks totaling $38,000 which were issued from the San Diego National Bank general account. The two checks had been pre-signed by Sullivan and were prepared at the direction of Respondent. The remaining balance of $25,750 was to be used to pay costs and the outstanding medical liens.
8. In or about September and October 2010, Sullivan paid the outstanding medical liens. In or about November 2010, Sullivan issued two checks to Pollaro totaling $8,517.76, which represented the remaining balance of Pollaro’s funds plus interest.
Conclusion of Law
By failing to involve himself in even a minimal oversight of the handling of the San Diego National Bank CTA, Respondent, with gross negligence, permitted the partner to pay, or cause to be paid, personal expenses from the San Diego Bank CTA, in wilful violation of rule 4-100(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
By failing to involve himself in even a minimal oversight of the handling of the San Diego National Bank trust account, Respondent, with gross negligence, permitted the partner to deposit, or cause to be deposited, the settlement check from American Balloon Co. in the San Diego National Bank general account, in wilful violation of rule 4-100(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
By failing to involve himself in even a minimal oversight of the handling of the San Diego National Bank trust account, Respondent, with gross negligence, permitted the partner to misappropriating at least $63,750 of Pollaro’s funds, and thereby committed an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption in wilful violation of Business and Professions Code section 6106.
Case No. 06-0-10877
1. In 2004, Jolie Ibrahim ("Ibrahim") employed Respondent’s law firm (the "firm") to pursue a sexual harassment and wage and hour claim against Nextel Communications ("Nextel"), her employer.
2. On August 1, 2005, Respondent represented Ibrahim at a mediation, and Ibrahim agreed to settle her claims against Nextel for $69,000.
3. In or about October 2005, the firm received a settlement check from Nextel in the sum of $69,000. At this time, the firm maintained only one client trust account. The firm maintained a client trust account at San Diego National Bank, account number xxxxxx7270, (the "San Diego National Bank CTA").4 [Footnote 2: The complete account number has been omitted due to privacy concerns.]
4. The partner failed to deposit the $69,000 settlement check from Nextel into the San Diego National Bank CTA. At no time did the partner deposit the settlement check from Nextel into a bank account labeled "Trust Account," "Client’s Funds Account" or words of similar import.
5. Respondent did not involve himself in even a minimal oversight of the handling of the San Diego National Bank CTA. Respondent, with gross negligence, permitted the partner to misappropriate $69,000 from Ibrahim.
6. In or about November 2005, the partner paid Ibrahim $44,833.03 by a cashier’s check in the sum of $35,000, and a second payment in the sum of $9,833.03.
Conclusions of Law
By failing to involve himself in even a minimal oversight of the handling of the San Diego National Bank trust account, Respondent, with gross negligence, permitted Christiani’s failure to deposit the settlement check from Nextel in a bank account labeled "Trust Account," "Client’s Funds Account" or words of similar import, in. wilful violation of rule 4-100(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
By failing to involve himself in even a minimal oversight of the handling of the San Diego National Bank trust account, Respondent, with gross negligence, permitted the partner to misappropriate $69,000 of Ibrahim’s funds, and thereby committed an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, in wilful violation of Business and Professions Code section 6106.
Case No. 06-0-11219
Facts
1. In March 2005, Richard Joyce ("Joyce") employed Respondent’s law firm (the "firm") to represent him in a wage and hour and retaliation claim against Patriot Plumbing, Inc. ("Patriot Plumbing"), Joyce’s employer.
2. On January 13, 2006, Respondent represented Joyce at a Mandatory Settlement Conference ("MSC"), and Joyce agreed to settle his claims against Patriot Plumbing for $50,000. At the MSC, Joyce and Respondent agreed that the firm would be paid a fee of $12,000.
3. In January 2006, the firm received a check issued by Patriot Plumbing in the sum of $5,000. The check represented the first of two installment payments in satisfaction of the settlement of Joyce’s case.
4. On February 3, 2006, the $5,000 check was deposited in the firm’s client trust account at Wells Fargo Bank, account number xxx-xxx4454 (the "Wells Fargo Bank CTA").5 At that time, Respondent was a signatory on the Wells Fargo Bank CTA, but the partner was not. On February 8, 2006, the partner became a signatory on the Wells Fargo Bank CTA along with Respondent. [Footnote 5: The complete account number has been omitted due to privacy concerns.]
5. On February 10, 2006, Wells Fargo Bank paid a $5,000 check issued by the partner against the Wells Fargo Bank CTA and payable to the firm, reducing the balance in the Wells Fargo Bank CTA to $3,093. On February 15, 2010, $3,000 was transferred from the Wells Fargo Bank CTA to a non-trust account maintained in the name of the firm, reducing the balance in the Wells Fargo Bank CTA to $93. On February 17, 2006, the partner withdrew $90 from the Wells Fargo Bank CTA, reducing the balance to $3. Prior to that time, no disbursement had been made from the Wells Fargo Bank CTA to, or on behalf of Joyce.
6. On March 2, 2006, Respondent caused the partner to be deleted as a signatory on the Wells Fargo Bank CTA. However, while the partner was a signatory on the Wells Fargo Bank CTA, Respondent did not involve himself in even a minimal oversight of the Wells Fargo Bank CTA. Respondent, with gross negligence, permitted the partner to misappropriate $4,997 of Joyce’s funds.
7. On February 21, 2006, Respondent paid Joyce the $5,000 from the firm’s general account at Wells Fargo Bank.
Conclusions of Law
By failing to involve himself in even a minimal oversight of the handling of the Wells Fargo Bank trust account, Respondent, with gross negligence, allowed the partner’s failure to maintain $5,000 in the Wells Fargo trust account, in wilful violation of rule 4-100(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
By failing to involve himself in even a minimal oversight of the handling of the Wells Fargo Bank trust account, Respondent, with gross negligence, permitted the partner to misappropriate approximately $4,997 which the firm received on behalf of Joyce, and thereby committed an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption in wilful violation of Business and Professions Code section 6106.
PENDING PROCEEDINGS.
The disclosure date referred to, on page 1, paragraph A(7), was November 2, 2010.
COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.
Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has informed him that as of November 2, 2010, the prosecution costs in this matter are $4,035.90. The costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following three billing cycles following the effective date of the Supreme Court Order.
If Respondent fails to pay any installment within the time provided herein or as may be modified by the State Bar Court pursuant to section 6086.10, subdivision (c), the remaining balance of the costs is due and payable immediately and enforceable both as provided in Business and Professions Code section 6140.7 and as a money judgment unless relief has been granted under the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California. (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 286.)
Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
1. Multiple Acts of Misconduct
Respondent committed trust account violations in three client matters and one State Bar initiated matter. Multiple acts of misconduct are an aggravating circumstance. (Std. 1.2(b)(ii).)
2. Harm
By failing to pay Stephanie Pollaro’s (Case No. 06-0-10872) lienholders for over almost five years, Respondent potentially harmed Pollaro’s credit. In addition, Pollaro was harmed because she was forced to wait five years before she received her correct share of her settlement proceeds.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
1. No Prior Record
At the time of the misconduct, Respondent had approximately 11 years of discipline-free practice. This is a significant factor in mitigation. (Hawes v. State Bar (1990) 51 Cal.3d 587, 596 (10 years discipline-free practice); Std. 1.2(e)(i).
2. Candor and Cooperation
Respondent is entitled to mitigation for entering into this stipulation. (Std. 1.2(e)(v).
OTHER FACTORS IN CONSIDERATION.
The State Bar received evidence that Respondent’s former law partner assumed responsibility for the administration of the firm’s client trust accounts. Among the pieces of evidence is a letter signed by the partner that she wrote in response to a State Bar investigator’s letter, in which the partner expressly stated that she was in control of the firm’s trust accounts.
Respondent acknowledges that he has a nondelegable duty to monitor his trust account(s), that he failed to take reasonable steps to comply with his personal, nondelegable duty to monitor his trust account(s), and that under the circumstances present here, he is culpable of trust account violations notwithstanding his reliance on his partner to manage such accounts.
By March 2006, Respondent removed the partner as a signatory on the firm’s trust account. Respondent acknowledges that he had reason to believe that the partner was mishandling client funds and administering improperly the firm’s client trust accounts at an earlier time, and that his failure to take earlier action constituted gross negligence.
In or about 2007, Respondent prohibited his partner from performing any further work for the firm. Since then, the partner has been on medical disability leave. Respondent is arranging to terminate the partnership.
Respondent has expressed remorse for his misconduct, and was candid with the State Bar in stipulating to the misconduct.
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE
1. Standards
Standard 1.3 of the Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct ("Standards") provides in pertinent part that, "IT]he primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings.., are the protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; the maintenance of high professional standards by attorneys and the preservation of public confidence in the legal profession." (Std 1.3.)
Standards 2.2(a), 2.2(b), and 2.6 of the Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct ("Standards") apply to this proceeding.
Standard 2.2(a) provides that misappropriation of entrusted funds shall result in disbarment. Only if the amount of funds or property misappropriated is insignificantly small or if the most compelling mitigating circumstances clearly predominate, shall disbarment not be imposed. In these latter cases, the discipline shall not be less than a one-year actual suspension, irrespective of mitigating circumstances.
However, as discussed in Edwards v. State Bar (1990) 52 Cal.3d 28, 37-39, the Supreme Court has recognized extenuating circumstances relating to the facts of the misappropriation and ordered discipline lower than the minimum one-year actual suspension mandated by Standard 2.2(a). (See also, In the Matter of Blum (Review Dept. 2002) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 403.)
Standard 2.2(b) provides that a violation of rule 4-100(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct shall result in at least a three month actual suspension.
However, on occasion, the Supreme Court has ordered lesser discipline for attorneys who have failed to maintain client funds in trust. For example, in Sternleib v. State Bar (1990) 52 Cal. 3d 317, 333, the Supreme Court ordered an attorney suspended for thirty days for failing to maintain over $4,000 in trust that belonged to his client and her husband, the opposing party in a divorce that the attorney was handling. The Supreme Court found that the evidence did not support a finding of moral turpitude. The attorney had no prior record of discipline, and the State Bar Court had found that the misconduct was not likely to recur. (Id. at pp. 331-332.)
Standard 2.3 provides that culpability of an attorney of an act of moral turpitude shall result in actual suspension or disbarment depending upon the extent to which the victim of the misconduct is harmed and depending upon the magnitude of the act of misconduct and the degree to which it relates to the member’s acts within the practice of law.
In consideration of the facts and circumstances surrounding Respondent’s misconduct, the aggravating and mitigating circumstances that are present, and case law, the parties submit that the intent and goals of the Standards are met in these matters by the imposition of a two year stayed suspension, and two years probation with conditions including a 60-day actual suspension
2. Case Law
In In the Matter of Blum (Review Dept. 2002) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 403, the attorney was culpable of trust account violations. The attorney relied on her husband, who was also an attorney, to manage the trust account. The attorney acted with gross negligence in relying on her husband. The attorney’s husband grossly mismanaged the financial aspects of the office. Some deposits were made to the incorrect account, some disbursements were made from the wrong account, bookkeeping was chaotic, and some client funds were improperly used for funding unrelated cases, resulting in trust fund deficiencies.
The attorney ignored clients’ complaints and she continued to allow her husband’s misuse of the account even after she discovered her husband’s malfeasance. The attorney collected an illegal fee from a client in a medical malpractice case and paid the client $5,600 less than the client was entitled from the settlement. The client was not made whole until eleven months after the case was settled. In another client matter, the trust account fell below the amount that was supposed to be maintained on behalf of the client on at least three occasions, and the client did not receive settlement funds for six months because of insufficient funds. The husband’s mismanagement of the office’s finances left the attorney a debt of $500,000. The mitigation included 14 years of practice with no prior record of discipline, extreme emotional difficulties, her husband’s abusive behavior, her full acknowledgment of wrongdoing, and evidence that the attorney had taken remedial measures. The Review Department recommended a 30-day actual suspension as part of a two-year probation.
STATE BAR ETHICS AND TRUST ACCOUNT SCHOOLS.
Because Respondent has agreed to attend the State Bar Ethics and Trust Account Schools as part of this stipulation, he may receive Minimum Continuing Legal Education credit upon the satisfactory completion the courses.
Case Number(s): 06-O-10610; 06-O-10872; 06-O-10877; 06-O-11219
In the Matter of: William B. Sullivan
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: William B. Sullivan
Date: November 11, 2010
Respondent’s Counsel: Arthur L. Margolis
Date: November 13, 2010
Deputy Trial Counsel: Eli D. Morgenstern
Date: November 16, 2010
Case Number(s): 06-O-10610; 06-O-10872; 06-O-10877; 06-O-11219
In the Matter of: William B. Sullivan
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
PAGE 4 – PARAGRAPH D(3)(a), DELETE -“SIXTY DAYS”; ADD –“Sixty (60) DAYS”
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 135(b), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Richard A. Platel
Date: November 23, 2010
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and
County of Los Angeles, on November 23, 2010, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:
ARTHUR LEWIS MARGOLIS
MARGOLIS & MARGOLIS LLP
2000 RIVERSIDE DR
LOS ANGELES, CA 90039
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
Eli D. Morgenstern, Enforcement, Los Angeles
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on November 23, 2010.
Signed by:
Johnnie Lee Smith
Case Administrator
State Bar Court