Case Number(s): 06-O-11681;06-O-12854;06-O-12943;06-O-13154;06-O-13283; 06-O-14930;07-O-12514;07-O-13181; 07-O-14558
In the Matter of: Christopher R. Rector, Bar # 212244, A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Treva R. Stewart, Bar # 239829,
Counsel for Respondent: Jerome Fishkin, Bar # 47798,
Submitted to: Settlement Judge – State Bar Court Clerk’s Office San Francisco.
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted January 10, 2001.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 20 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
<<not>> checked. Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 5.130, Rules of Procedure.
checked. Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: each year following the effective date of the Supreme Court Order in this matter. (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.)
<<not>> checked. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs are entirely waived.
IN THE MATTER OF: CHRISTOPHER RECTOR, State Bar No. 212244
STATE BAR COURT CASE NUMBER: 06-O-11681;06-O-12854;06-O-12943;06-O-13154;06-O-13283; 06-O-14930;07-O-12514;07-O-13181; 07-O-14558
Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that he is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct.
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Steven Griffiths 06-O-13154
FACTS:
1. On December 7, 2001, Steven Griffiths employed attorney Richard Dangler to pursue a claim to address Griffiths’ concerns about his medical condition. Dangler’s fee agreement stated that a flat fee of $5,500 would include "... all work on a writ of habeas corpus concerning conditions of confinement up to and through the California Supreme Court, if necessary."
2. On December 31, 2003, Dangler filed a writ of habeas corpus with the California Court of Appeal, which was denied on April 21, 2004.
3. On June 1 l, 2004, Dangler informed Griffiths that Dangler intended to resign from the practice of law and Respondent would complete Griffiths’ representation at no additional charge.
4. On June 21, 2004, Griffiths executed the substitution and returned it to Respondent.
5. On June 21, 2004, Respondent commenced representation of Griffiths regarding the issues raised in the habeas corpus petition.
6. On September 1, 2004, Respondent sent Griffiths a letter in compliance with Rule 1-311 informing Griffiths that Respondent was employing Dangler.
7. On September 3, 2004, Dangler resigned from the practice of law with disciplinary charges pending.
8. On January 24, 2005, March 10, 2005, April 12, 2005, July 16, 2005 and October 27, 2005, Griffiths wrote to Respondent requesting that Respondent provide him with a status update on his matter.
9. The October 27, 2005 letter informed Respondent that Respondent had failed to respond to Griffiths’ previous letters, failed to complete Respondent’s representation of Griffiths and refused to accept Griffiths’ telephone calls.
10. Soon after January 24, 2005, March 10, 2005, April 12, 2005, July 16, 2005 and October 27, 2005, Respondent received Griffiths’ letters.
11. Respondent failed to respond to Griffith’s letters and failed to perform any services for Griffiths after sending the Rule 1-311 letter on September 1, 2004.
CONCLUSION OF LAW:
12. By failing to respond to Griffiths’ letters, Respondent failed to respond promptly to reasonable status inquiries of a client in a matter in which Respondent had agreed to provide legal services in violation of Business and Professions ("B&") code section 6068(m).
Wayne Swank 06-O-11681
FACTS:
13. In 1994, prison inmate Wayne Swank filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court.
14. On May 22, 1997, the district court denied Swank’s petition and dismissed his matter with prejudice.
15. On April 23, 2002, Swank employed attorney Richard Dangler to file a habeas corpus petition with the California Supreme Court.
16. On November 23, 2003, Dangler filed a habeas corpus petition with the California Supreme Court on behalf of Swank.
17. On June 11, 2004, Dangler sent Swank a letter informing Swank that Dangler was resigning from the practice of law and Respondent was willing to take over Swank’s matter for no additional charge.
18. On June 21, 2004, Respondent filed a substitution of attorney with the California Supreme Court. Respondent was provided with Swank’s file, which filled two banker’s boxes and included evidence of the 1994 federal habeas petition.
19. On July 14, 2004, the California Supreme Court denied Swank’s petition. 20. On July 21, 2004, Respondent wrote Swank a letter informing Swank that the California Supreme Court denied Swank’s petition. The letter also offered to represent Swank in a federal district court matter.
21. On July 27, 2004, Swank responded to Respondent’s July 21, 2004 letter and indicated that he would be interested in filing a writ in federal district court.
22. On August 2, 2004, Respondent sent Swank a letter in which Respondent stated that he believed "federal courts may pay much stricter attention to [Swank’s] constitutional issues and that [Swank] will have a greater chance of obtaining relief in the federal courts." Enclosed with the letter was a fee agreement that asked Swank to pay $9,750 for representation in federal court.
23. Respondent failed to review Swank’s file prior to writing the letters to Swank, to determine whether Swank had a basis for filing a second federal habeas petition.
24. Swank signed the fee agreement, however, he did not pay Respondent any money for the representation.
25. Thereafter, Swank engaged another attorney who reviewed his file and told Swank that he had no basis for filing a federal habeas corpus petition.
26. Respondent did not file any pleadings on behalf of Swank.
CONCLUSION OF LAW:
27. By failing to review Swank’s file prior to offering to represent him in a federal habeas matter, Respondent recklessly failed to perform legal services with competence in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct ("rule"), rule 3-110(A).
Carl Bibbs, Sr. 06-O-13283
FACTS:
28. Prior to June 2004, brothers, Carl Bibbs, Jr. and Gregory Bibbs were California Department of Corrections inmates.
29. Prior to June 2004, their father, Carl Bibbs, Sr. ("Bibbs Sr.") employed Dangler to represent them in post conviction appeals, but terminated him due to dissatisfaction with his services.
30. Prior to Dangler’s resignation with charges pending on September 3, 2004, Respondent shared office space with Dangler. Following the resignation, Respondent temporarily employed Dangler to assist on certain cases that Respondent took over from Dangler’s law practice.
31. On October 12, 2004, Bibbs Sr. travelled to California from Arkansas to employ Respondent to represent his sons regarding post conviction appeals. Bibbs Sr. recognized Respondent office as the same office space previously occupied by Dangler.
32. Prior to employing Respondent, Bibbs Sr. inquired regarding Respondent’s professional relationship to Dangler.
33. Respondent provided Bibbs Sr. with an explanation, however Bibbs Sr. did not understand the extent of Respondent’s relationship to Dangler and did not know that Danger had recently been in Respondent’s employ.
34. Respondent charged and collected from Bibbs Sr. a total of $17,500 to represent both Carl Bibbs Jr. and Gregory Bibbs.
35. Respondent did not provide Carl Bibbs Jr. or Gregory Bibbs with a disclosure regarding relevant circumstances and reasonably foreseeable consequences of accepting payment from Bibbs Sr. 36. Respondent did not obtain Carl Bibbs Jr. and Gregory Bibbs informed written consent prior to accepting compensation Bibbs Sr. for their representation.
CONCLUSION OF LAW:
37. By accepting compensation for representing a client from one other than the client without complying with the requirement(s) that Respondent obtain the client’s informed written consent, Respondent wilfully violated rule 3-310(F).
Michael Holtsinger 06-O-12943
FACTS
38. Prior to June 2004, Michael Holtsinger was a California Department of Corrections inmate.
39. On June 22, 2004, Respondent agreed to represent Michael Holtsinger in a habeas corpus matter for a flat fee of $2,000. Holtsinger had previously been represented by Dangler.
40. On July 9, 2004, Respondent obtained the signature of Agnes Holtsinger, Michael Holtsinger’s mother, on the attorney client fee agreement.
41. On July 16, 2004, Respondent accepted $1,000 in fees from Agnes Holtsinger.
42. On August 11, 2004, Respondent accepted $250 in fees from Agnes Holtsinger.
43. Respondent charged and collected from Agnes Holtsinger a total of $1,250 to represent Michael Holtsinger.
44. Respondent never provided Michael Holtsinger with any disclosure regarding the relevant circumstances and the actual and reasonably foreseeable consequences of Respondent’s acceptance of payment from Agnes Holtsinger.
45. Respondent accepted compensation from one other than the client for the representation of Michael Holtsinger without Michael Holtsinger’s informed written consent.
CONCLUSION OF LAW:
46. By accepting compensation for representing a client from one other than the client without complying with the requirement(s) that Respondent obtained the client’s informed written consent Respondent willfully violated rule 3-310(F).
Jameel Coles 06-O-14930
FACTS:
47. Prior to September 17, 2004, Jameel Coles was a California Department of Corrections inmate.
48. On September 27, 2004, Respondent agreed to represent Jameel Coles in a habeas corpus matter.
49. On August 24, 2004, September 16, 2004 and September 17, 2004 Jameel Coles, Joyce Coles (Jameel Coles’ mother) and Respondent, respectively, executed an attorney client fee agreement providing that Respondent would charge flat fee of $9,750 to prepare and file a writ on Jameel Coles’ behalf.
50. On September 17, 2004, Respondent accepted $3,000 from Joyce Coles to represent Jameel Coles.
51. On September 21, 2004, Respondent accepted a $3,000 payment from Joyce Coles to represent Jameel Coles.
52. Respondent accepted a total of $6,000 in attorney fee payments from Joyce Coles.
53. Respondent never provided Jameel Coles with any disclosure regarding the relevant circumstances and the actual and reasonably foreseeable consequences of Respondent’s acceptance of payment from Joyce Coles.
54. Respondent accepted compensation from one other than the client for the representation of Jameel Coles without Jameel Coles’ informed written consent.
CONCLUSION OF LAW:
55. By accepting compensation for representing a client from one other than the client without complying with the requirement(s) that Respondent obtained the client’s informed written consent Respondent willfully violated Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-310(F).
Gary, Hughes 06-O-12954
FACTS:
56. Prior to November 16, 2004, Gary Hughes was a California Department of Corrections inmate.
57. On November 16, 2004, Respondent agreed to represent Gary Hughes in an on-going habeas corpus matter. Mr. Hughes was formerly represented by Dangler.
58. On November 16, 2004, Respondent and Gary Hughes executed an attorney client fee agreement providing that Respondent would charge Gary Hughes a flat fee of $1,900 to complete work on Gary Hughes’ habeas corpus matter.
59. In November and December 2004, Respondent accepted $1,900 as payment of fees from Barbara Hughes, Gary Hughes’ sister.
60. Respondent never provided Gary Hughes with any disclosure regarding the relevant circumstances and the actual and reasonably foreseeable consequences of Respondent’s acceptance of payment from Barbara Hughes.
61. Respondent accepted compensation from one other than the client for the representation of Gary Hughes without Gary Hughes’ informed written consent.
CONCLUSION OF LAW:
62. By accepting compensation for representing a client from one other than the client without complying with the requirement(s) that Respondent obtained the client’s informed written consent Respondent willfully violated Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-310(F).
Beverly DeMonte 07-O-12514
FACTS:
63. On August 11, 2005, Beverly DeMonte employed Respondent to represent her in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding.
64. On August 15, 2005, Respondent filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 in the matter In re: Beverly DeMonte, United States Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of California, Case Number 0530055-D-13L.
65. Between May 2006 and July 2006, DeMonte telephoned Respondent several times to obtain a status update on her matter. Each time she telephoned, she left a message with Respondent’s receptionist requesting that Respondent return her telephone call and provide her with a status update on her matter.
66. On May 6, 2006, DeMonte sent Respondent a letter inquiring about how to handle an IRS debt.
67. Between October 2006 and November 2006, DeMonte telephoned Respondent several times to obtain a status update on her matter. Each time she telephoned, she left a message with Respondent’s receptionist requesting that Respondent return her telephone call and provide her with a status update on her matter.
68. On November 22, 2006, DeMonte sent Respondent a letter requesting that Respondent correct the amount of her monthly plan payments and update her bankruptcy plan.
69. On April 25, 2007, DeMonte sent Respondent’s associate, Kristen Koo, a letter because DeMonte understood that her case had been reassigned to Koo. The letter requested that Respondent’s office file a motion to modify DeMonte’s plan payments.
70. On April 25, 2007, DeMonte sent Respondent a copy of the April 25, 2007 letter.
71. On May 11, 2007, DeMonte sent a letter to the bankruptcy court stating that she wanted to modify her plan payments, but had been unable to do so because Respondent had failed to return her voicemail messages or respond to her letters.
72. On May 11, 2007, DeMonte sent Respondent a copy of the May 11, 2007 letter.
73. On July 7, 2007, DeMonte requested that her bankruptcy matter be dismissed. In the request, DeMonte stated that Respondent failed to respond to her telephone calls and letters regarding her request to modify her plan.
74. Between May 2006 and May 2007, Respondent received DeMonte’s messages and correspondence and failed to respond and failed to provide DeMonte with a status update on her matter.
CONCLUSION OF LAW:
75. Respondent wilfully violated Business and Professions Code, section 6068(m), by failing to respond promptly to reasonable status inquiries of a client, in a matter in which Respondent had agreed to provide legal services.
Charlotte Quarles 07-O-14558
FACTS:
76. On June 13, 2006, Charlotte Quarles ("Quarles") filed a petition for bankruptcy in pro per under Chapter 13.
77. Prior to July 25, 2006, the bankruptcy court ordered Quarles to pay the statutory filing fee of $274 in five monthly installments, beginning in July 2006.
78. On July 13, 2006, Quarles paid the first monthly installment payment of $68.
79. On July 25, 2006, the United States trustee filed a motion to dismiss the petition due to Quarles’ failure to file a Chapter 13 plan and required schedules.
80. On August 1, 2006, Quarles employed Respondent to represent her in her bankruptcy matter.
81. At the time that Quarles employed Respondent, she paid him $750 as an advanced fee and $206.00 in advanced costs to be applied to the remaining four monthly installment payments for the Chapter 13 filing fee ("filing fee").
82. Thereafter, Respondent failed to deposit and maintain the $206 in an attorney client trust account.
83. On August 3, 2006, Respondent filed a substitution of attorney in the bankruptcy matter.
84. On August 14, 2006, Respondent was obligated to pay the second installment payment of $68 for the filing fee.
85. On August 14, 2006, Respondent failed to pay the second installment payment for the filing fee.
86. On August 17, 2006, the Court issued an order to show cause ("OSC") regarding the failure to pay the second installment payment for the filing fee and set the hearing for September 12, 2006.
87. On September 11, 2006, Respondent was obligated to pay the third installment payment for the filing fee.
88. On September 11, 2006, Respondent failed to pay the third installment payment for the filing fee.
89. On September 12, 2006, Respondent paid the second installment payment for the filing fee that was due on August 14, 2006.
90. Thereafter, Respondent should have continued to maintain $138 in an attorney client trust account for Quarles
91. Respondent failed to maintain $138 in an attorney client trust account for Quarles.
92. On October 6, 2006, the bankruptcy trustee filed a motion to dismiss due to Quarles’ failure to make the September 25, 2006 payment due under the Chapter 13 payment plan. The motion was set for October 25, 2006.
93. On October 17, 2006, the Court heard the OSC and dismissed Quarles’ petition due to the failure to pay the third installment payment for the filing fee.
94. On November 2, 2006, Quarles employed Respondent to file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
95. On November 6, 2006, Quarles provided Respondent with a cashier’s check in the amount of $299.00 to be applied to the Chapter 7 petition filing fee.
96. Thereafter, Respondent failed to deposit and maintain the $299 in an attorney client trust account.
97. Thereafter, Respondent failed to file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition and failed to perform any further services for Quarles.
98. In total, Respondent received $437 from Quarles which he failed to deposit and maintain in a client trust account for the benefit of Quarles.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
99. By failing to file a Chapter 7 petition on Quarles’ behalf, Respondent recklessly failed to perform legal services with competence in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct ("rule"), rule 3-110(A).
100. By failing to deposit and maintain the balance of funds received for Quarles in a bank account labeled "Trust Account," "Client’s Funds Account" or words of similar import, Respondent willfully violated rule 4-100(A).
Enrique Alvarez 07-O-13181
FACTS:
101. On June 5, 2007, Enrique Alvarez consulted with Respondent’s associate regarding whether he should file for bankruptcy.
102. On June 5, 2007, Alvarez paid Respondent $300 for a credit report and credit counseling.
103. At the conclusion of the counseling session, Respondent’s associate provided Alvarez with a fee agreement and quoted Alvarez a fee of $1,500 to represent Alvarez in a bankruptcy matter.
104. Respondent also provided Alvarez with documentation Alvarez needed to complete to begin the bankruptcy process.
105. At the conclusion of the consultation, Alvarez believed that Respondent represented him.
106. On June 11, June 14, June 15, and July 10, 2007, Alvarez telephoned Respondent or sent Respondent a letter requesting that Respondent contact him because Alvarez needed assistance completing the documentation Respondent provided him.
107. Respondent received the telephone messages and letter(s), however he failed to contact Alvarez.
108. Thereafter, Respondent failed to inform Alvarez that he did not intend to represent Alvarez until Alvarez returned the signed fee agreement and paid the requested attorney fees.
109. Respondent knew or should have known that Alvarez believed that Respondent represented him regarding the bankruptcy.
CONCLUSION OF LAW:
110. By failing to respond to Alvarez’ telephone calls and letter(s) and failing to inform Alvarez that Respondent did not intend to represent Alvarez until he returned the signed fee agreement and paid the requested attorney fees, Respondent failed to inform a client of significant matter in which client believed that Respondent represented him in violation of B&P code 6068(m).
PENDING PROCEEDINGS.
The disclosure date referred to, on page 2, paragraph A(6), was October 6, 2009.
COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.
Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has informed respondent that as of September 3, 2009, the estimate prosecution costs in this matter are $9,784.26. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.
Standards
Std. 2.2(b)
Std. 2.4(b)
Std. 2.6(a)
Std. 2.10
Cases
Wells v. State Bar (1975) 15 Cal 3d 367
Aronin v. State Bar (1990) 52 Cal. 3d 276
In the Matter of Burkhardt (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 343
Doyle v. State Bar (1976) 15 Cal. 3d 973
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
Multiple Acts of Misconduct.
Std. 1.2(b)(ii).
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
None.
STATE BAR ETHICS SCHOOL.
Because respondent has agreed to attend State Bar Ethics School as part of this stipulation, respondent may receive Minimum Continuing Legal Education credit upon the satisfactory completion of State Bar Ethics School.
RESTRICTIONS WHILE ON ACTUAL SUSPENSION.
During the period of actual suspension, respondent shall not:
Render legal consultation or advice to a client;
Appear on behalf of a client in any hearing or proceeding or before any judicial officer, arbitrator, mediator, court, public agency, referee, magistrate, commissioner, or hearing officer;
Appear as a representative of a client at a deposition or other discovery matter;
Negotiate or transact any matter for or on behalf of a client with third parties;
Receive, disburse, or otherwise handle a client’s funds; or
Engage in activities which constitute the practice of law.
Respondent shall declare under penalty of perjury that he or she has complied with this provision in any quarterly report required to be filed with the Office of Probation, pertaining to periods in which the respondent was actually suspended from the practice of law.
SUSPENSION NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.
1. Within the first thirty days following commencement of probation, respondent shall provide written notifications concerning the suspension by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, to:
a. all clients being represented in pending matters;
b. any co-counsel;
c. any opposing counsel or unrepresented opposing parties; and
d. the court, agency or tribunal in which any active litigation is pending.
2. The notification shall state the following:
a. that the respondent has been suspended from the practice of law;
b. the effective date of the suspension;
c. the length of the suspension;
d. the respondent’s consequent ineligibility to render legal services during the period of the suspension; and
e. in notifications to clients, any urgency in seeking the substitution of other legal counsel.
3. Within the first forty days following commencement of probation, respondent shall file an affidavit (or declaration in conformity with the requirements of California Code of Civil Procedure section 2015.5) with the Office of Probation showing that respondent has fully complied with these provisions.
4. Respondent shall maintain complete records of the notifications and the certified or registered mailings and shall provide such records upon the request of the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel.
SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES
Case Number(s): 06-O-11681;06-O-12854;06-O-12943;06-O-13154;06-O-13283; 06-O-14930;07-O-12514;07-O-13181; 07-O-14558
In the Matter of: Christopher R. Rector
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: Christopher R. Rector
Date: October 1, 2009
Respondent’s Counsel: Jerome Fishkin
Date: October 2, 2009
Deputy Trial Counsel: Treva R. Stewart
Date: October 6, 2009
Case Number(s): 06-O-11681;06-O-12854;06-O-12943;06-O-13154;06-O-13283; 06-O-14930;07-O-12514;07-O-13181; 07-O-14558
In the Matter of: Christopher R. Rector
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
In paragraph A.(8) on page 2 of the stipulation, in the sub-paragraph that begins with the words, "costs to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years," the words, "each year following the effective date of the Supreme Court Order in this matter" are deleted, and the following text is inserted in its place.
"2011, 2012, and 2013."
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 135(b), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Lucy Armendariz
Date: October 26, 2009
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of San Francisco, on October 26, 2009, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at San Francisco, California, addressed as follows:
JEROME FISHKIN
FISHKIN & SLATTER LLP
1111 CIVIC DR STE 215
WALNUT CREEK, CA 94596
<<not>> checked. by certified mail, No. , with return receipt requested, through the United States Postal Service at , California, addressed as follows:
<<not>> checked. by overnight mail at , California, addressed as follows:
<<not>> checked. by fax transmission, at fax number . No error was reported by the fax machine that I used.
<<not>> checked. By personal service by leaving the documents in a sealed envelope or package clearly labeled to identify the attorney being served with a receptionist or a person having charge of the attorney’s office, addressed as follows:
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
Treva R. Stewart, Enforcement, San Francisco
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on October 26, 2009.
Signed by:
George Hue
Case Administrator
State Bar Court