Case Number(s): 06-O-11685
In the Matter of: Bruce Alexander Thabit, Bar # 138864, A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent)
Counsel For The State Bar Brandon K. Tady, Bar # 83045
Counsel for Respondent: Philip A. Segal, Bar # 137633
Submitted to: Assigned Judge State Bar Court Clerk’s Office Los Angeles
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted December 22, 1988.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 12 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
checked. until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 284, Rules of Procedure.
<<not>>checked. costs to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: (hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 284, Rules of Procedure.)
<<not>> checked. costs waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. costs entirely waived.
IN THE MATTER OF: Bruce Alexander Thabit
CASE NUMBER(S): 06-O-11685-RAP
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Respondent admits the following facts are true and he is culpable of the violations of the specified statutes.
FACTS
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California. From March 15, 2005 to November 30, 2005, Respondent’s official State Bar membership records address was P.O. Box 42722, Las Vegas, Nevada, 89116 ("Las Vegas Address").
2. From March 2005 to the present, Respondent identified himself as the principal attorney working for DogBite, a Professional Corporation ("DogBite") located at the Las Vegas Address. DogBite also operated a website that advertised on the Internet and offered to provide legal representation to persons who were victims of dog bites. DogBite’s website advertised in states outside of California including the states of Nevada and Kentucky.
3. Respondent is not and has never been an attorney licensed to practice in the state of Nevada.
4. In March and April, 2005, only a person admitted to the Nevada Bar was entitled to practice law and represent clients in Nevada. Under Nevada law, a person who represented clients in Nevada and who was not a member of the Nevada Bar would be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
5. Respondent is not and has never been an attorney licensed to practice law in Kentucky.
6. In March and April, 2005, Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 189 provided that only a person admitted to the Kentucky Bar was entitled to practice law and to represent clients in Kentucky. Under Kentucky law, a person who represented clients in Kentucky and who was not a member of the Kentucky Bar would be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
7. From March 2005 to May, 2005, Jack Thompson ("Thompson") wrote, signed and mailed at least one letter on behalf of DogBite. In this letter, Thompson represented that he was writing on behalf of DogBite. Thompson is not an attorney and he has never been licensed to practice law in California, Nevada, or Kentucky.
8. In March, 2005, Sandra Kruszewski ("Kruszewski"), a Lexington, Kentucky resident, learned of Respondent through Dogbite’s website advertisement.
9. In March, 2005, Kruszewski orally agreed to hire Respondent to represent her in a claim for damages against Henry and Anna Finley ("Finley") for damages allegedly sustained when the Finley’s dog attacked and killed her dog and injured her minor child. The alleged dog attack occurred in Lexington, Kentucky.
10. On March 28, 2005, Respondent wrote, signed, and mailed a letter to Hew Finley on Dog Bite’s letterhead with the Las Vegas Address. In that letter, Respondent wrote that he represented Kruszewski as her attorney concerning a dog bite injury that occurred at or near the Finley’s property in Lexington, Kentucky.
11. On April 6, 2005, Finley wrote to Respondent and told him that he and Anna Finley were represented by attorney Carolyn Carroway ("Carroway) concerning Kruszewski’s dog bite claim and that Respondent should communicate with her. Attorney Carroway is an attorney licensed to practice in Kentucky.
12. On April 14, 2005, Thompson wrote, signed and mailed a letter to Finley on DogBite’s letterhead with the Las Vegas address. In that letter, Thompson wrote that DogBite would continue to communicate directly with Finley, rather than with Carroway, because the Finleys were not represented by counsel until DogBite received a letter of representation from Carroway. Thompson also wrote: "Your failure to cooperate in reporting the claim is now causing you to be sued. We are now coming for the family home."
13. On April 21, 2005, Carroway wrote, signed, and mailed a letter to Respondent and Thompson concerning Kruszewski’s claim against Finley. In that letter, Carroway asked Respondent to provide her with documents showing that Respondent was authorized to practice law in Kentucky.
14, On April 22, 2005, Respondent wrote, signed, and, mailed a letter to Carroway stating that DogBite, Respondent, and Dogbite’s associates in the Lexington, Kentucky area were not representing Kruszewski. Ms. Kruszewski did not return to Respondent a signed fee agreement.
15. On May 12, 2005, Carroway filed a complaint with the State Bar of Nevada on behalf of the Finleys against Respondent and Thompson.
16. On October 21, 2005, the State Bar of Nevada ordered that Respondent be disciplined. The State Bar of Nevada found that Respondent engaged in professional misconduct by misleading the public that Respondent was licensed to practice law in Nevada when his licensure was limited to California, that Respondent had engaged in the unlicensed practice of law in Nevada by routinely engaging in pre-litigation conduct including writing the letter of representation on behalf of Kruszewski, and that Respondent had aided and abetted the unlicensed practice of law by Thompson.
17. Upon his receiving notice from the Nevada State Bar that attorney Carroway filed a Nevada state bar complaint against him, Respondent corrected his law office letterhead to show that he is licensed to practice law only in the State of California and he terminated Jack Thompson’s services.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
18. By representing Kruszewski in her dog bite claim against the Finleys, Respondent wilfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in another jurisdiction, Kentucky, in violation of California Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-300 (B).
19. By representing Kruszewski in her dog bite claim against the Finleys, Respondent wilfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in another jurisdiction, Nevada, in violation of California Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-300 (B).
20. By allowing Thompson to write, sign, and mail at least one letter on behalf of DogBite where Thompson gave a legal opinion about whether the Finleys were represented by Carroway and by threatening to file a lawsuit that would seek to take the Finley’s home, Respondent aided a person in the unauthorized practice of law in both Nevada and Kentucky in wilful violation of California Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-300 (A).
WAIVER OF VARIANCE BETWEEN NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY CHARGES AND STIPULATED FACTS AND CULPABILITY
The parties waive any variance between the Notice of Disciplinary Charges filed on June 18, 2008 and the facts contained in the Stipulation. Additionally, the parties waive the issuance of an amended Notice of Disciplinary Charges. The parties further waive the right to a formal hearing on any charge not included in the Notice of Disciplinary Charges.
PENDING PROCEEDINGS.
The disclosure date referred to, on page one, paragraph A.(7), was October 17, 2008.
DISMISSALS.
The parties respectfully request the Court to dismiss the following alleged violations in the interest of justice:
Case No. 06-O-11685; Count Three; Alleged Violation Moral Turpitude
COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.
Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has informed Respondent that as of October 15, 2008, the costs in this matter are $2296.00. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.
DISCUSSION RE STIPULATED DISCIPLINE
Standard 1.3 of the Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct identifies the primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings as the protection of the public, the courts, and the legal profession; the maintenance of high professional standards by attorneys and the preservation of public confidence in the legal profession.
Standard 2.10 applies to violations of the rules of the California Rules of Professional Conduct which are not specified in any other Standard. The range of discipline in Standard 2.10 is reproval or suspension according to the gravity of the offense or the harm, if any, to the victim with due regard to the purposes of imposing discipline set forth in Standard 1.3.
In In re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal. 4th 81, 92, 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 766, the California Supreme Court affirmed the Standards are entitled to great weight and should be applied unless Respondent demonstrates the existence of extraordinary circumstances justifying a lesser sanction than that required by the Standards.
In In re Ivan O. B. Morse (1995) 11 Cal. 4th 184, 206, 44 Cal. Rptr. 620 ("In re Morse"), the Supreme Court identified the proper analysis for determining the appropriate level of discipline:
“In deciding appropriate discipline, we consider the underlying misconduct and aggravating and mitigating circumstances .... To determine the appropriate level of discipline, we, like the review department, must look to the Standards for guidance. ’These guidelines are not binding on us, but they promote the consistent and uniform application of disciplinary measures. Hence we have said that "we will not reject a recommendation arising from the application of the Standards unless we have grave doubts as to the propriety of the recommended discipline (Citations omitted)." (In re Morse, supra, 11 Cal. 4th 184, 206).
Respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in Nevada and Kentucky in the Kruszewski matter. Respondent also aided Thompson in the unauthorized practice of law in Nevada and Kentucky. Standard 2.10 provides a range of discipline from reproval to suspension. The stipulated discipline of one year stayed suspension with thirty days actual suspension and two years probation is within the range of discipline in Standard 2.10.
There is not clear and convincing evidence of extraordinary circumstances justifying a lesser sanction than that required by Standard 2.10. (In the Matter of Van Sickle (Review Dept. 2006) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 980).
SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES
Case Number(s): 06-O-11685
In the Matter of: Bruce Alexander Thabit
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: Bruce Thabit
Date: 12-2-08
Respondent’s Counsel: Philip A. Segal
Date: 12-1-08
Deputy Trial Counsel: Brandon K. Tady
Date: 12/12/08
Case Number(s): 06-O-11685
In the Matter of: Bruce Alexander Thabit
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 135(b), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Richard A. Platel
Date: 12-15-08
[Rule 62(b) Rules Proc.; Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on December 17, 2008, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:
PHILIP A. SEGAL
KERN NODA DEVINE & SEGAL
1388 SUTTER ST #600
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94109
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
BRANDON TADY, Enforcement, Los Angeles
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on December 17, 2008.
Signed by:
Johnnie Lee Smith
Case Administrator
State Bar Court