State Bar Court of California Hearing Department San Francisco

San Francisco Counsel For The State Bar Case Number (s) (for Court's use) 06-O-12824 Donald R. Steedman **PUBLIC MATTER Supervising Trial Counsel** 180 Howard Street San Francisco, CA 95105 (415) 538-2345 MAY 3 1 2007 Bar # 104927 Counsel For Respondent STATE BAR COURT CLERK'S OFFICE Jonathan Arons SAN FRANCISCO Attorney at Law 101 Howard Street #310 San Francisco, CA Submitted to: Settlement Judge Bar # 111257 STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND In the Matter Of: DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING Corecia Woo **ACTUAL SUSPENSION** Bar # 214544 ☐ PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED A Member of the State Bar of California (Respondent)

Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.

A. Parties' Acknowledgments:

- (1) Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted **September 4, 2001**.
- (2) The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
- (3) All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 12 pages, not including the order.
- (4) A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
- (5) Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
- (6) The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."

(Stipulation form approved by SBC Executive Committee 10/16/00. Revised 12/16/2004; 12/13/2006.)

Actual Suspension

(7)	No per	more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any iding investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.		
(8)	Pay 614	yment of Disciplinary Costs—Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 40.7. (Check one option only):		
		until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 284, Rules of Procedure. costs to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: (hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 284, Rules of Procedure) costs waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs" costs entirely waived		
F	Prof	ravating Circumstances [for definition, see Standards for Attorney Sanctions for essional Misconduct, standard 1.2(b)]. Facts supporting aggravating circumstances equired.		
(1)		Prior record of discipline [see standard 1.2(f)]		
	(a)	State Bar Court case # of prior case		
	(b)	☐ Date prior discipline effective		
	(c)	Rules of Professional Conduct/ State Bar Act violations:		
	(d)	Degree of prior discipline		
	(e)	☐ If Respondent has two or more incidents of prior discipline, use space provided below.		
(2)		Dishonesty: Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by or followed by bad faith, dishonesty, concealment, overreaching or other violations of the State Bar Act or Rules of Professional Conduct.		
(3)		Trust Violation: Trust funds or property were involved and Respondent refused or was unable to account to the client or person who was the object of the misconduct for improper conduct toward said funds or property.		
(4)		Harm: Respondent's misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public or the administration of justice.		
(5)		Indifference: Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for the consequences of his or her misconduct.		
(6)		Lack of Cooperation: Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims of his/her misconduct or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation or proceedings.		
(7)		Multiple/Pattern of Misconduct: Respondent's current misconduct evidences multiple acts of wrongdoing or demonstrates a pattern of misconduct.		
(8)	\boxtimes	No aggravating circumstances are involved.		

(Do not write above this line.)

(Do not write above this line.)						
Additional aggravating circumstances:						
C. Mitigating Circumstances [see standard 1.2(e)]. Facts supporting mitigating						
circumstances are required.						
(1) No Prior Discipline: Respondent has no prior record of discipline over many years of practice coupled with present misconduct which is not deemed serious. Respondent has no prior record of discipline but was only admitted to practice law for four years before the misconduct began. For this reason, the mitigating circumstance does not apply.						
(2) No Harm: Respondent did not harm the client or person who was the object of the misconduct.						
(3) Candor/Cooperation: Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and cooperation with the victims of his/her misconduct and to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation and proceedings.						
(4) Remorse: Respondent promptly took objective steps spontaneously demonstrating remorse and recognition of the wrongdoing, which steps were designed to timely atone for any consequences of his/her misconduct.						
(5) Restitution: Respondent paid \$ on in restitution to without the threat or force of disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings.						
(6) Delay: These disciplinary proceedings were excessively delayed. The delay is not attributable to Respondent and the delay prejudiced him/her.						
(7) Good Faith: Respondent acted in good faith.						
(8) Emotional/Physical Difficulties: At the time of the stipulated act or acts of professional misconduct Respondent suffered extreme emotional difficulties or physical disabilities which expert testimony would establish was directly responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities were not the product of any illegal conduct by the member, such as illegal drug or substance abuse, and Respondent no longer suffers from such difficulties or disabilities.						
(9) Severe Financial Stress: At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered from severe financial stress which resulted from circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond his/her control and which were directly responsible for the misconduct.						
(10) Family Problems: At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered extreme difficulties in his/her personal life which were other than emotional or physical in nature.						
(11) Good Character: Respondent's good character is attested to by a wide range of references in the legal and general communities who are aware of the full extent of his/her misconduct.						
(12) Rehabilitation: Considerable time has passed since the acts of professional misconduct occurred followed by convincing proof of subsequent rehabilitation.						
(13) No mitigating circumstances are involved.						

Additional mitigating circumstances

(Do	(Do not write above this line.)				
D.	D. Discipline:				
(1)	\boxtimes	⊠ Stayed Suspension:			
	(a)	\boxtimes	Resp	condent must be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.	
		1.		and until Respondent shows proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of rehabilitation and present fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the law pursuant to standard 1.4(c)(ii) Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.	
		ii.		and until Respondent pays restitution as set forth in the Financial Conditions form attached to this stipulation.	
		iii.		and until Respondent does the following:	
	(b)	\boxtimes	The	above-referenced suspension is stayed.	
(2)	\boxtimes	Prol	bation	:	
	Respondent must be placed on probation for a period of two years , which will commence upon the effective date of the Supreme Court order in this matter. (See rule 9.18, California Rules of Court)			ust be placed on probation for a period of two years , which will commence upon the effective preme Court order in this matter. (See rule 9.18, California Rules of Court)	
(3)	\boxtimes	Acti	ual Su	spension:	
	(a)			pondent must be actually suspended from the practice of law in the State of California for a period days.	
		i.		and until Respondent shows proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of rehabilitation and present fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the law pursuant to standard 1.4(c)(ii), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct	
		ii,		and until Respondent pays restitution as set forth in the Financial Conditions form attached to this stipulation.	
		iii.		and until Respondent does the following:	
E	Addi	tiona	al Co	nditions of Probation:	
(1)		he/s	he pro	lent is actually suspended for two years or more, he/she must remain actually suspended until wes to the State Bar Court his/her rehabilitation, fitness to practice, and learning and ability in w, pursuant to standard 1.4(c)(ii), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.	
(2)	\boxtimes	Durii Profe	ng the ession	probation period, Respondent must comply with the provisions of the State Bar Act and Rules of al Conduct.	
(3)	\boxtimes	State infor	e Bar a matior	(10) days of any change, Respondent must report to the Membership Records Office of the and to the Office of Probation of the State Bar of California ("Office of Probation"), all changes of n, including current office address and telephone number, or other address for State Bar as prescribed by section 6002.1 of the Business and Professions Code.	
(4)		and:	sched	y (30) days from the effective date of discipline, Respondent must contact the Office of Probation ule a meeting with Respondent's assigned probation deputy to discuss these terms and of probation. Upon the direction of the Office of Probation, Respondent must meet with the	

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		probation deputy either in-person or by telephone. During the period of probation, Respondent must promptly meet with the probation deputy as directed and upon request.				
(5)		Respondent must submit written quarterly reports to the Office of Probation on each January 10, April 10, July 10, and October 10 of the period of probation. Under penalty of perjury, Respondent must state whether Respondent has complied with the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and all conditions of probation during the preceding calendar quarter. Respondent must also state whether there are any proceedings pending against him or her in the State Bar Court and if so, the case number and current status of that proceeding. If the first report would cover less than 30 days, that report must be submitted on the next quarter date, and cover the extended period.				
		In addition to all quarterly reports, a final report, containing the same information, is due no earlier than twenty (20) days before the last day of the period of probation and no later than the last day of probation.				
(6)		Respondent must be assigned a probation monitor. Respondent must promptly review the terms and conditions of probation with the probation monitor to establish a manner and schedule of compliance. During the period of probation, Respondent must furnish to the monitor such reports as may be requested, in addition to the quarterly reports required to be submitted to the Office of Probation. Respondent must cooperate fully with the probation monitor.				
(7)		Subject to assertion of applicable privileges, Respondent must answer fully, promptly and truthfully any inquiries of the Office of Probation and any probation monitor assigned under these conditions which are directed to Respondent personally or in writing relating to whether Respondent is complying or has complied with the probation conditions.				
(8)	\boxtimes	Within one (1) year of the effective date of the discipline herein, Respondent must provide to the Office of Probation satisfactory proof of attendance at a session of the Ethics School, and passage of the test given at the end of that session.				
		☐ No Ethics School recommended. Reason:				
(9)		Respondent must comply with all conditions of probation imposed in the underlying criminal matter and must so declare under penalty of perjury in conjunction with any quarterly report to be filed with the Office of Probation.				
(10)		The following conditions are attached hereto and incorporated:				
			Substance Abuse Conditions		Law Office Management Conditions	
			Medical Conditions		Financial Conditions	
F. O	F. Other Conditions Negotiated by the Parties:					
(1)		Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination: Respondent must provide proof of passage of the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination ("MPRE"), administered by the National Conference of Bar Examiners, to the Office of Probation during the period of actual suspension or within one year, whichever period is longer. Failure to pass the MPRE results in actual suspension without further hearing until passage. But see rule 9.10(b), California Rules of Court, and rule 321(a)(1) & (c), Rules of Procedure. No MPRE recommended. Reason:				
(2)	⊠	Rul e Cali	le 9.20, California Rules of Court: Respond ifornia Rules of Court, and perform the acts s	pecif	must comply with the requirements of rule 9.20 , ied in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 date of the Supreme Court's Order in this matter.	

(Do no	(Do not write above this line.)				
(3)		Conditional Rule 9.20, California Rules of Court: If Respondent remains actually suspended for 90 days or more, he/she must comply with the requirements of rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 120 and 130 calendar days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court's Order in this matter.			
(4)		Credit for Interim Suspension [conviction referral cases only]: Respondent will be credited for the period of his/her interim suspension toward the stipulated period of actual suspension. Date of commencement of interim suspension:			
(5)		Other Conditions:			
	4.				

Attachment language begins here (if any):

ATTACHMENT TO

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION

IN THE MATTER OF:

Corecia Woo

CASE NUMBER(S): 06-O-12824

FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

COUNT ONE

Case No. 06-O12824 Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(2) [Failure to Refund Unearned Fees]

- 1. Respondent wilfully violated Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(2), by failing, upon termination of employment, to refund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned. as follows:
- 2. On or about January 18, 2005, Carley Burrell-Pouley employed respondent to represent her in a dissolution action entitled Marriage of Pouley, case no. 05-FL 00362, Sacramento County Superior Court. Burrell-Pouley paid respondent \$3,000 as an advanced attorney fee plus \$314.50 for court costs. Between January 18, 2005 and January 25, 2005, respondent performed services for Burrell-Pouley. Thereafter, the case became inactive and respondent did not perform any significant services for Burrell-Pouley.
- 3. On or about August 29, 2005, Burrell-Pouley sent respondent a letter, terminating respondent's employment and requesting a refund of the unearned fees. Respondent received the letter soon thereafter. On November 21, 2005, Burrell-Pouley filed a substitution of counsel, placing herself in proper. Respondent received notice of the substitution soon thereafter.
- 4. At the time her employment was terminated, respondent had not earned the advanced fee. In fact, according to respondent's own billing statement, respondent owed Burrell-Pouley a refund of \$1,910 for unearned fees. The \$1910 figure was smaller than the actual amount owed because Burrell-Pouley had paid respondent \$314.50 more than was reflected on respondent's billing statement.
- 5. On or about November 18, 2005 and December 5, 2005, Burrell-Pouley sent respondent written requests for a refund of the unearned fees. Respondent received these letters but did not respond.
- 6. On or about April 14, 2006, Burrell-Pouley obtained a small claims court judgment against respondent in the amount \$2,224.50 plus costs. Respondent failed to appear at the small claims court hearing even though she had actual notice of it.
 - 7. Respondent received notice of the small claims judgment sometime after it was entered.

- 8. On or about July 27, 2006, respondent received an e-mail from Burrell-Pouley, requesting that the judgment be paid.
- 9. On August 1, 2006, respondent filed a declaration with the small claims court requesting that the judgement be vacated. In the declaration, respondent claimed that she had not been properly served with the small claims court complaint and that she had already made a full refund to Burrell-Pouley. These statements were false.
 - 10. On September 18, 2006, the small claims court reaffirmed its prior judgment.
- 11. On September 13, 2006 and October 12, 2006, the State Bar sent respondent letters of inquiry concerning Burrell-Pouley's claim for unearned fee. Respondent received these letters promptly after they were sent.
- 12. On or about October 23, 2006, respondent sent a letter to the State Bar claiming that she had repaid the unearned fees. This statement was not true.
- 13. On or about November 13, 2006, respondent finally sent Burrell-Pouley payment to satisfy the small claims judgment.
- 14. By failing to make this payment until approximately November 13, 2006, more than a year after her employment was terminated, respondent failed to refund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned.

COUNT TWO

Case No. 06-O-12824
Business and Professions Code, section 6106
[Moral Turpitude–Misrepresentations]

- 15. Respondent wilfully violated Business and Professions Code, section 6106, by committing acts involving moral turpitude, dishonesty and corruption, as follows:
 - 16. The allegations contained in Count Two (A) are hereby incorporated by this reference.
 - 17. Respondent's declaration, mentioned above in paragraph 22, contained the following statement:
 - "5. On July 28, 2006, I requested that she [Burrell-Pouley] show some proof that I was served with this action. On that date, she faxed the proof of service (attached hereto and marked as Exhibit A). Therein it states that service was "substituted" and served upon Jennifer Henry on February 23, 2006 at the 3017 Douglas Blvd. address in Roseville, CA.
 - "6. I have never known, employed or associated with anyone by the name of Jennifer Henry.

- "7. Since I had already relocated my office to Auburn (7) weeks prior, there would be no reason for anyone to attempt to serve me at 3017 Douglas Blvd. or for anyone there to accept service for me, forward service to me or act on my behalf. Additionally, any mail delivered there took several weeks (and in many cases months) to get routed to me.
- "8. The office at 3017 Douglas Blvd. is a 'virtual office' sknown [sic] as HQ Global Workplace. There, one can receive mail, have their calls answered and meet clients based upon need. Because everyone in the office (more than 100 other businesses) also share the suite '#300,' forwarding mail is impossible. The post office literally will not forward mail sent to Suite 300 for an individual or a business. As a result, the individual or business must work out special arrangements to have their mail held and delivered. I was not aware of this problem until I failed to receive the volume of mail I had grown accustomed to receiving for the preceding year there. By the first week of March, I had worked out an extended plan with HQ where they would send my mail to me in batches for the next three months while I notified all of my business contacts individual. Therefore, I might receive a piece of mail sent March 10 in mid-April sometime.
- "9. I do not know what happened to all of my mail that was sent between January 1, 2006 and March when I worked out the mail system with HQ, but declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the state of California that during that period of time, I thought my mail was going to be forwarded and believed the delay was with the postal service. After I became aware of the problem, I was told that much of the mail was 'returned to sender.'
- "10. It should be noted that my address is and has always been updated on the State Bar's website (see California Bar Profile for Corecia J. Woo pulled this afternoon attached hereto and marked as **Exhibit B**) and Ms. Pouley is aware of my address as she used it on a letter sent to my email address on July 27, 2006 (see email from Carley Pouley to Corecia J. Woo attached hereto and marked as **Exhibit C**). "
- 18. The declaration was false and misleading in the following respects:

First, respondent's statement that "...my address is and has always been updated on the State Bar's website..." (paragraph 10 of the declaration) was misleading. The statement falsely suggested that respondent had changed her State Bar membership address as of the date the small claims lawsuit was served and, further, falsely suggested that Burrell-Pouley knew about her new address at time she commenced the small claims action in February 2006. In truth, the 3017 Douglas Boulevard address remained respondent's address of record with the State Bar until April 11, 2006. Respondent made this statement deliberately and with reckless disregard for the truth.

Second, respondent's statement that "...there would be no reason for anyone to attempt to serve me at 3017 Douglas Blvd. or for anyone there to...forward service to me or act on my behalf..." (paragraph 7 of the declaration) was false and misleading. In truth: (1) respondent maintained her State Bar membership record address at the 3017 Douglas Boulevard address as of the dates in question (and in fact until April 11, 2006); (2) respondent contracted for mail service with HQ Global during the period January 1, 2006, through March 31, 2006; (3) pursuant to this contract, respondent was allowed to and did receive mail through HQ Global at the Douglas Boulevard address; and (4) respondent made regular payments to HQ

Global for this mail service during said period of time. Respondent made this false statement deliberately and with reckless disregard for the truth.

Third, respondent's statement that she did not know "...what happened to all of my mail that was sent between January 1, 2006 and March..." was false and misleading. In truth: (1) respondent maintained her State Bar membership record address at the 3017 Douglas Boulevard address as of the dates in question (and in fact until April 11, 2006); (2) respondent contracted for mail service with HQ Global during the period January 1, 2005, through March 31, 2005; (3) pursuant to this contract, respondent was allowed to and did receive mail through HQ Global at the Douglas Boulevard address; and (4) respondent made regular payments to HQ Global for this mail service during said period of time. Respondent made this false statement deliberately and with reckless disregard for the truth.

19. Respondent's declaration also contained the following statements:

"III. PAYMENT WAS SUBMITTED TO MS. POULEY

- "12. An invoice was mailed to Ms. Carley Pouley reflecting my hours and work associated therewith. Shortly thereafter, the invoice AND a check written by me were remailed to Ms. Pouley. After hearing absolutely nothing from her for almost a year, the natural assumption was that she received her payment and has gone on about her business.
- "13. Thereafter, I received a facsimile from Ms. Pouley indicating that she was not paid the \$1910.00. The account from which Ms. Pouley's \$1910.00 was drawn was closed because I opened a new account in the town of Auburn, California. Due to the volatile nature of Mr. and Mrs. Pouley's divorce action, I wanted to make sure that the check had not in fact been cashed by MR. Pouley since the couple shared a residence during their divorce proceeding. Perhaps Mr. Pouley received it and cashed it if the finances were stretched for the two of them; I had no idea. Determining whether the check had ever been cashed would take some time because it was drawn on a then closed account. Thereafter, the improperly served and filed Small Claims action, etc. was initiated.
- "14. In addition to the fact that I believe the check was cashed..."
- 20. These statements were false and misleading for the following reasons:

First, respondent's claim that she had sent payment to Burrell-Pouley was false. In truth, respondent had not sent such payment. Respondent made this false statement deliberately and with reckless disregard for the truth.

Second, respondent's claim that someone had cashed the check (and her ungrounded and reckless speculation that Mr. Pouley may have forged Burrell-Pouley's endorsement on the check) were both false. In truth, respondent had sent no such payment. Respondent made this false statement deliberately and with reckless disregard for the truth.

Third, respondent's claim that she had heard "absolutely nothing" from Burrell-Pouley "for almost a year" (paragraph 12 of the declaration) was false. In truth, as alleged in paragraphs 17-20: (1) Burrell-

Pouley had repeatedly contacted respondent by letters, through the Better Business Bureau, and by the small claims action and (2) respondent was aware of the communications. Respondent made this false statement deliberately and with reckless disregard for the truth.

- 21. In her October 23, 2006, letter to the State Bar, mentioned above in paragraph 23, respondent claimed to "...have forwarded a check to Ms. Pouley's work place..." for the purposes of satisfying the small claims court judgement. This statement was false because respondent had not sent Burrell-Pouley the payment until as of the date of the October 23 letter and, in fact, respondent did not send the payment until on or about November 13, 2006. Respondent made this false statement deliberately and with reckless disregard for the truth.
- 22. On or about January 18, 2007, respondent's counsel, Jonathan I. Arons, sent a letter to the State Bar stating in part as follows:

"Enclosed is a copy of the check stub which substantiates that Ms. Woo sent a check to Ms. Pouley in August 2005 to refund the fees paid in advance...."

- 23. The check stub was not authentic and was a falsification. Respondent created this check stub at some later point in time in order to deceive the State Bar. Respondent provided this "check stub" document to her counsel on or about January 10, 2007, knowing and intending that her counsel would provide the document to the State Bar as evidence that respondent had attempted to make a payment to Burrell-Pouley in August 2005.
- 24. Respondent committed acts involving moral turpitude, dishonesty and corruption when she made the false and misleading statements identified above and when she provided the falsified "check stub" document to her counsel with the intent and knowledge that the document would be passed along to the State Bar.

PENDING PROCEEDINGS.

The disclosure date referred to, on page one, paragraph A.(7), was March 28, 2007.

AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.

Standard 2.3, Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct, provide that an attorney who commits an act of moral turpitude should receive actual suspension or be disbarred depending upon the extent of harm, the magnitude of the misconduct, and the relationship of the misconduct to the practice of law. The extensive nature of respondent's misconduct distinguishes this matter from cases like Bach v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 848 (30 day suspension for misstatement to a judge by attorney with prior public reproval). Other cases have imposed longer periods of actual suspension (e.g., In the Matter of Farrell (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 490 (six-month actual suspension imposed upon attorney with prior discipline upon an attorney who misled a judge and failed to cooperate with the State Bar). The parties have agreed that the stipulated disposition is appropriate given the fact that this case is being settled at a very early stage and the other factors present in this case.

(Do not write above this line.)		
In the Matter of	Case number(s):	
Corecia Woo	06-O-12824	
	•	
		-

SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES

By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitations and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Fact, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.

4/28/07	Roseum	Corecia Woo
Date	Respondent's Signature	Print Name
May 3 200)	Mal Avel	Jonathan Arons
Date	Responden 's Coursel Signature /	Print Name
May 3, 2007	U (up) Duste	Donald Steedman
Date I	Deputy Trial Counsel's Signature	Print Name

(Do not write above this line.)				
In the Matter Of Corecia Woo	Case Number(s): 06-O-12824			
	ORDER			
	arties and that it adequately protects the public, nissal of counts/charges, if any, is GRANTED without			
The stipulated facts and disp RECOMMENDED to the Suj	preme Court.			
	oosition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.			
All Hearing dates are vacate	ed.			
The following modifications to the F	Facts and Conclusions of Law are made:			
paragraph is deleted and in it	ge 8 of the Stipulation: The first sentence of the ts place the following is added: "Respondent's in paragraph 9, contained the following statement:"			
(2) The last line on page 10 of the deleted and are replaced with	ne Stipulation: The words "paragraphs 17-20" are "paragraphs 5-7:"			
	Numbered paragraph 21 on page 11 of the Stipulation: The words "paragraph 23," are deleted and are replaced with "paragraph 12,"			
the stipulation, filed within 15 days after or further modifies the approved stipulat effective date of this disposition is the	as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies tion. (See rule 135(b), Rules of Procedure.) The see effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)			
5/23/07	Mense list			
Date	Judge of the State Bar Court			

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

[Rule 62(b), Rules Proc.; Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of San Francisco, on May 31, 2007, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:

[X] by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at San Francisco, California, addressed as follows:

JONATHAN IRWIN ARONS LAW OFC JONATHAN I ARONS 101 HOWARD ST #310 SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94105

[X] by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

DONALD R. STEEDMAN, Enforcement, San Francisco

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on May 31, 2007.

Bernadette C. O. Molina

Case Administrator State Bar Court