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kwiktag * 078 542 566 		State Bar Court of California Hearing Department Los Angeles	
Counsel For The State Bar Djinna M. Gochis, Assistant Chief Trial Counsel 1149 South Hill Street Los Angeles, California 90015 (213) 765-1000 Bar # 108360		Case Number (s) 06-0-13651 and 09-0-11017	(for Court's use) PUBLIC MATTER FILED AUG 19 2009 STATE BAR COURT CLERK'S OFFICE LOS ANGELES
Counsel For Respondent Arthur L. Margolis, Esq. 2000 Riverside Drive Los Angeles, California 90039 (323) 953-8996 Bar # 57703		Submitted to: Settlement Judge	
In the Matter Of: RICHARD HUDSON SHARE Bar # 35202 A Member of the State Bar of California (Respondent)		STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING STAYED SUSPENSION; NO ACTUAL SUSPENSION <input type="checkbox"/> PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED	

Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.

A. Parties' Acknowledgments:

- (1) Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted **January 14, 1964**.
- (2) The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
- (3) All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of **12** pages, not including the order.
- (4) A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
- (5) Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
- (6) The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."

- (7) No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
- (8) Payment of Disciplinary Costs—Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
- ☐ costs added to membership fee for calendar year following effective date of discipline.
 - ☒ costs to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: **for the two billing cycles following the effective date of the Supreme Court Order.**
(hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 284, Rules of Procedure)
 - ☐ costs waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs"
 - ☐ costs entirely waived

B. Aggravating Circumstances [for definition, see Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct, standard 1.2(b)]. Facts supporting aggravating circumstances are required.

- (1) ☐ **Prior record of discipline** [see standard 1.2(f)]
- (a) ☐ State Bar Court case # of prior case
 - (b) ☐ Date prior discipline effective
 - (c) ☐ Rules of Professional Conduct/ State Bar Act violations:
 - (d) ☐ Degree of prior discipline
 - (e) ☐ If Respondent has two or more incidents of prior discipline, use space provided below or a separate attachment entitled "Prior Discipline."
- (2) ☐ **Dishonesty:** Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by or followed by bad faith, dishonesty, concealment, overreaching or other violations of the State Bar Act or Rules of Professional Conduct.
- (3) ☐ **Trust Violation:** Trust funds or property were involved and Respondent refused or was unable to account to the client or person who was the object of the misconduct for improper conduct toward said funds or property.
- (4) ☐ **Harm:** Respondent's misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public or the administration of justice.
- (5) ☐ **Indifference:** Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for the consequences of his or her misconduct.
- (6) ☐ **Lack of Cooperation:** Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims of his/her misconduct or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation or proceedings.
- (7) ☐ **Multiple/Pattern of Misconduct:** Respondent's current misconduct evidences multiple acts of wrongdoing or demonstrates a pattern of misconduct.
- (8) ☒ **No aggravating circumstances** are involved.

Additional aggravating circumstances

C. Mitigating Circumstances [see standard 1.2(e)]. Facts supporting mitigating circumstances are required.

- (1) ☐ **No Prior Discipline:** Respondent has no prior record of discipline over many years of practice coupled with present misconduct which is not deemed serious.
- (2) ☐ **No Harm:** Respondent did not harm the client or person who was the object of the misconduct.
- (3) ☐ **Candor/Cooperation:** Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and cooperation with the victims of his/her misconduct and to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation and proceedings.
- (4) ☐ **Remorse:** Respondent promptly took objective steps spontaneously demonstrating remorse and recognition of the wrongdoing, which steps were designed to timely atone for any consequences of his/her misconduct.
- (5) ☐ **Restitution:** Respondent paid \$ on in restitution to without the threat or force of disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings.
- (6) ☐ **Delay:** These disciplinary proceedings were excessively delayed. The delay is not attributable to Respondent and the delay prejudiced him/her.
- (7) ☐ **Good Faith:** Respondent acted in good faith.
- (8) ☒ **Emotional/Physical Difficulties:** At the time of the stipulated act or acts of professional misconduct Respondent suffered extreme emotional difficulties or physical disabilities which expert testimony would establish was directly responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities were not the product of any illegal conduct by the member, such as illegal drug or substance abuse, and Respondent no longer suffers from such difficulties or disabilities. **see page 9-10.**
- (9) ☐ **Severe Financial Stress:** At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered from severe financial stress which resulted from circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond his/her control and which were directly responsible for the misconduct.
- (10) ☐ **Family Problems:** At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered extreme difficulties in his/her personal life which were other than emotional or physical in nature.
- (11) ☐ **Good Character:** Respondent's good character is attested to by a wide range of references in the legal and general communities who are aware of the full extent of his/her misconduct.
- (12) ☐ **Rehabilitation:** Considerable time has passed since the acts of professional misconduct occurred followed by convincing proof of subsequent rehabilitation.
- (13) ☐ **No mitigating circumstances** are involved.

Additional mitigating circumstances

see page 9-11 for discussion of medical and other mitigation.

D. Discipline:

(1) ☒ **Stayed Suspension:**

(a) ☒ Respondent must be suspended from the practice of law for a period of **one (1) year**.

- i. ☐ and until Respondent shows proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of rehabilitation and present fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the law pursuant to standard 1.4(c)(ii), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.
- ii. ☐ and until Respondent pays restitution as set forth in the Financial Conditions form attached to this stipulation.
- iii. ☐ and until Respondent does the following:

The above-referenced suspension is stayed.

(2) ☒ **Probation:**

Respondent is placed on probation for a period of **18 MONTHS**, which will commence upon the effective date of the Supreme Court order in this matter. (See rule 9.18 California Rules of Court)

E. Additional Conditions of Probation:

- (1) ☒ During the probation period, Respondent must comply with the provisions of the State Bar Act and Rules of Professional Conduct.
- (2) ☒ Within ten (10) days of any change, Respondent must report to the Membership Records Office of the State Bar and to the Office of Probation of the State Bar of California ("Office of Probation"), all changes of information, including current office address and telephone number, or other address for State Bar purposes, as prescribed by section 6002.1 of the Business and Professions Code.
- (3) ☒ Within thirty (30) days from the effective date of discipline, Respondent must contact the Office of Probation and schedule a meeting with Respondent's assigned probation deputy to discuss these terms and conditions of probation. Upon the direction of the Office of Probation, Respondent must meet with the probation deputy either in-person or by telephone. During the period of probation, Respondent must promptly meet with the probation deputy as directed and upon request.
- (4) ☒ Respondent must submit written quarterly reports to the Office of Probation on each January 10, April 10, July 10, and October 10 of the period of probation. Under penalty of perjury, Respondent must state whether Respondent has complied with the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and all conditions of probation during the preceding calendar quarter. Respondent must also state whether there are any proceedings pending against him or her in the State Bar Court and if so, the case number and current status of that proceeding. If the first report would cover less than 30 days, that report must be submitted on the next quarter date, and cover the extended period.

In addition to all quarterly reports, a final report, containing the same information, is due no earlier than twenty (20) days before the last day of the period of probation and no later than the last day of probation.

- (5) ☐ Respondent must be assigned a probation monitor. Respondent must promptly review the terms and conditions of probation with the probation monitor to establish a manner and schedule of compliance. During the period of probation, Respondent must furnish to the monitor such reports as may be requested, in addition to the quarterly reports required to be submitted to the Office of Probation. Respondent must cooperate fully with the probation monitor.
- (6) ☒ Subject to assertion of applicable privileges, Respondent must answer fully, promptly and truthfully any inquiries of the Office of Probation and any probation monitor assigned under these conditions which are

directed to Respondent personally or in writing relating to whether Respondent is complying or has complied with the probation conditions.

- (7) ☒ Within one (1) year of the effective date of the discipline herein, Respondent must provide to the Office of Probation satisfactory proof of attendance at a session of the State Bar Ethics School, and passage of the test given at the end of that session.

☐ No Ethics School recommended. Reason:

- (8) ☐ Respondent must comply with all conditions of probation imposed in the underlying criminal matter and must so declare under penalty of perjury in conjunction with any quarterly report to be filed with the Office of Probation.

- (9) ☐ The following conditions are attached hereto and incorporated:

☐ Substance Abuse Conditions

☐ Law Office Management Conditions

☐ Medical Conditions

☐ Financial Conditions

F. Other Conditions Negotiated by the Parties:

- (1) ☒ **Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination:** Respondent must provide proof of passage of the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination ("MPRE"), administered by the National Conference of Bar Examiners, to the Office of Probation within one year. **Failure to pass the MPRE results in actual suspension without further hearing until passage. But see rule 9.10(b), California Rules of Court, and rule 321(a)(1) & (c), Rules of Procedure.**

☐ No MPRE recommended. Reason:

- (2) ☒ **Other Conditions:**

The complaint of Norma Maravilla came to the State Bar's attention as a result of her complaint about ICPEIR to the Department of Consumer Affairs. ICPEIR was trying to collect the additional sum of \$4,472.50 from Maravilla. Respondent responded to the Department of Consumer Affairs on behalf of ICPEIR claiming that "our office" earned the money as heretofore outlined. Although it is understood that Respondent cannot compel Soracco and/or ICPEIR to refund monies already paid to them, nor prevent them from seeking further funds from Maravilla, over his objection, Respondent will, as a condition of this stipulation, within thirty (30) days of the Supreme Court Order, write a letter to ICPEIR advising them

1. that they are not entitled to those funds from Maravilla and
2. requesting that they stop any further collection on Maravilla's account.

Respondent shall provide proof of this contact with ICPEIR, in writing, to the Office of Probation, within ninety (90) days of the effective date of the Supreme Court Order.

(Do not write above this line.)

Attachment language (if any):

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ATTACHMENT TO
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION

IN THE MATTER OF: RICHARD HUDSON SHARE

CASE NUMBER(S): ET AL. 06-0-13651 and 09-0-11017

FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

1. Respondent RICHARD HUDSON SHARE ("Respondent") was admitted to the practice of law in the State of California on January 14, 1964, was a member at all times pertinent to these charges, and is currently a member of the State Bar of California.
2. Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that he is culpable of the violations of the specified Rules of Professional Conduct.
3. The State Bar received two complaints, one in 2006 and the other in 2009, related to conduct overlapping the same time frame from in or about 2002 through June 2008.
4. In the first complaint, Donald Ungar, Esq. representing Alfonso Mendez-Lopez ("Mendez-Lopez") wrote to the Respondent, in March 2006 related to representation by the International Center for Protection of Employer and Immigrants' Rights ("ICPEIR") and Robert Soracco and an appeal from Mendez-Lopez' deportation order. That representation occurred between approximately 2001 or 2002 until 2006. Based upon Respondent's name on ICPEIR's letterhead, Ungar believed Respondent to be managing attorney of ICPEIR. Respondent replied that he was a contract attorney for ICPEIR and disclaimed any involvement with the management of the firm. Respondent never met Mendez-Lopez and made no appearances on his behalf.
5. In the second matter, the Department of Consumer Affairs forwarded the complaint of Norma Maravilla ("Maravilla") to the State Bar. Her complaint was nominally against ICPEIR and non-attorney Robert Soracco, whom she hired in 2002. She was also being referred to collection for fees in addition to \$14,000 she already paid to ICPEIR. Respondent replied to the Department of Consumer Affairs investigator with regard to this complaint on behalf of ICPEIR defending the work performed. Respondent made an appearance on behalf of Maravilla in or about April 2006 in her immigration matter and filed a motion on behalf of ICPEIR to withdraw as her attorney thereafter related to the additional fees charged by ICPEIR.
6. In or about 1999, Respondent "retired" from the 39 attorney law firm that he had co-founded, largely in the area of banking law and creditor's rights. He had developed a medical condition which affected his memory, concentration and judgment (see mitigating circumstances for detail) such that he determined he could no longer carry on the duties of a senior partner (member) of that law corporation.

7. In or about 2002¹, Respondent was approached by a long time acquaintance, Robert Soracco ("Soracco"), whom he had known when he was in practice, from the banking industry, and with whom Respondent had kept in contact socially. Soracco was not, and is not, an attorney, as Respondent knew.
8. Soracco introduced Respondent to the International Center for Protection of Employers and Immigration Rights ("ICPEIR"). ICPEIR identified itself various ways over the years, but among these, was ICPEIR, INC. LAW OFFICES. Letterhead variously identified individuals as attorneys for ICPEIR, including a Carlos Caselli, purportedly a lawyer from Chile, not licensed in California, and others who were licensed in California. Soccaro recommended that Respondent work for ICPEIR. Socarro was designated as "Executive Director." None of the named attorneys who were licensed in California were responsible for the day to day operations of the "firm." They were contract attorneys.
9. Based upon his discussions with Soracco, Respondent began to work, for approximately 9-18 hours a month, for ICPEIR, also as a "contract attorney". His payments were made by checks on an account of "ICPEIR, INC. LAW OFFICES". Respondent never met an attorney owner or manager of ICPEIR. In or about 2003, Respondent became "of counsel" to ICPEIR.
10. The procedure for Respondent's function with ICPEIR was, generally, as follows:
 - Respondent received a court calendar of Master Hearings by facsimile from ICPEIR, usually from a non-attorney staff member, for example, Patricia Del C. Bravo, or Cheryl Herrera.
 - He picked up the file related to the immigration client, read a memo from a paralegal in the office regarding what was involved in the case, and/or met with an office paralegal regarding the case;
 - Met the client.
 - Made sure he had a G-28 signed by the client making Respondent the attorney of record
 - Went with the client to court.
 - Made the appearance
 - Returned with the file to the office
 - Met with a paralegal and dictated a memo of what had occurred, his observations of the case and the client and what Respondent thought would happen at the next hearing.
11. Respondent also would edit, or review and modify briefs present to him by Soracco. It would be signed by Respondent if the client wished to be represented, but in propria persona if the client did not so wish to be represented. Respondent was paid "flat fee" for master hearings and a flat fee for revising or editing a brief or motion.
12. Respondent did not question the designation of ICPEIR as a law office, nor did he seek to confirm that he was, in fact, working for a lawyer owned entity, although he had been introduced to the "firm" by a non-attorney acquaintance, Soracco and although any other attorneys who worked there, also were only contract attorneys. Respondent had reason to

¹ The exact year is reported from anywhere from 2000 to 2003. Based upon documentation, for purposes of this stipulation, it is 2002.

know that ICPEIR was not, in fact, a law office. Respondent had reason to know that by allowing his name on any letterhead, as "of counsel" or any other designation, he was effectively taking responsibility for the work of that "firm", and that in fact, he could not be "of counsel" to a firm operated by non-attorneys.

13. Respondent terminated his relationship with ICPEIR on or about June 26, 2008, after intervention of and discussion with the State Bar.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

14. By his conduct, Respondent aided the unlawful practice of law by ICPEIR, and shared legal fees with a non-attorney each in willful violation of rules 1-300(A) and rule 1-320(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

The Respondent has provided to the State Bar, Office of the Chief Trial Counsel, medical documentation which, for purposes of this stipulation, provides a nexus to the misconduct herein. The State Bar was provided reports from Dr. N. Paul Rosenthal, M.D., Ph.D. from 1999 related to a condition which impaired Respondent's judgment such that he had retired from his own law practice.

It is in this context that Respondent met with Mr. Soracco and became involved with ICPEIR in the early 2000's. According to the Respondent, and for the purposes of this stipulation, it is accepted, Soracco and Respondent had known each other for some 20 years, beginning when Soracco was himself a "banker" and Respondent had co-founded his own firm (the law corporation had at one time more than 65 attorneys, and at the time of retirement the law corporation had approximately 39 attorneys, of which 12 were partners). Soracco flattered the Respondent, to which he was then susceptible. He based his actions in joining ICPEIR on what he was told by Soracco, rather than taking any action to verify the information being given to him or to assess the nature of the company. He was told that Carlos Caselli was a lawyer in Chile, and accepted that, although a lawyer from Chile could not run a law office in California. He was told that the ABA allowed "out of state" lawyers to create a firm, as long as there were lawyers working in it. Respondent never met Caselli or any lawyer actually running ICPEIR, and he never thought to ask to do so.

Respondent jumped at the chance to be part of a firm, with no responsibility for the daily operations, without considering fully, if at all, the true nature of the relationships within the firm, although he should have been, by the fact that he never saw or dealt with any other attorney, and that his assignments were given to him by and discussed with non-attorneys. He did not see a problem with representing ICPEIR against Mendez-Lopez, nor did he understand why his being on the letterhead, then as "of counsel" made him arguably responsible for the actions of the firm in the Mendez-Lopez case. As to Maravilla, although Respondent realizes he should have, he did not see a problem with supporting ICPEIR's claim for additional fees, particularly as he had made an appearance for Maravilla.

In connection with determining whether this matter could be settled, or what was an appropriate disposition in this matter, in light of the clear challenge with his judgment in beginning and continuing relationship with Soracco and ICPEIR from 2003 until June 2008. Respondent agreed to and did have a full neurological consultation with Hyman Gross, M.D. through UCLA in September 2008 and a full

and detailed report has been provided to the State Bar. Dr. Gross had access to some of the medical records from 1999.

Dr. Gross' conclusion, after a detailed report, was that Respondent does not have impairment in judgment or abstraction and that he is able to practice law in his present capacity without any manifest difficulty.

From a disciplinary point of view, the medical condition diagnosed in 1999 provides explanation for the fact that Respondent did not ask the kinds of questions he should have as a practicing attorney when he began his contract work with ICPEIR. There is a basis to believe that, having severed that relationship, albeit with the intervention of the State Bar, that Respondent poses no threat to the public in his current occupation. He now works for Poser Investments, doing debt collection, part time.

The fact that the Respondent has been an attorney since 1964, without the imposition of discipline, is also to be taken into consideration, even though he worked over five years with ICPEIR without taking reasonable steps to supervise its function or to disengage himself until the State Bar's intervention.

AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.

Determining the proper level of discipline, requires reference to the *Standards for Sanctions for Attorney Misconduct*, beginning with Standard 1.3, the protection of the public, the courts, the legal profession and the maintenance of the highest possible professional standards. See, also, *Drociak v. State Bar* (1991) 52 Cal. 3d 1095, at page 1090 and *In the Matter of Koehler* (Review Dept. 1991, 1 Cal State Bar Ct. Rptr. 615 at 628).

Although one could argue that the conduct is like that of Valinoti, in that Respondent was arguably aiding the unlawful practice of immigration law *In the Matter of Valinoti* (Review Dept. 2002) 4 Cal.State Bar Ct. Rptr. 498, where Respondent was suspended for three years actual, we have before us less serious misconduct. We have only two matters, one in which an attorney contacted Respondent in an effort to assist his client in obtaining information from ICPEIR, and another from an individual for whom Respondent did make an appearance in his role as contract attorney. However, both revealed a longstanding, albeit part time relationship between Respondent and ICPEIR that Respondent now understands he should never have had. Respondent terminated that working relationship more than a year ago, and did not continue to argue for its propriety once the State Bar brought the problem to his attention. Respondent did not misrepresent his status. Although he argued that his status did not make him responsible, and although that was incorrect, Respondent's medical condition was such that his judgment was arguably impaired. There was a true nexus between his medically generated lack of judgment and his conduct and a good faith belief that what he did was not wrong, when in fact it was wrong, and was misconduct.

The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct, as does case law, provide a wide range of potential discipline, anywhere from a reproof to suspension depending on the gravity of the offense or harm, if any, to the victim, with due regard to the purposes of discipline. Looking at the two complaints, the second, Maravilla, has the most articulable potential harm. Whether or not Maravilla obtained a good result, as Respondent claimed when he wrote to the Department of Consumer Affairs on ICPEIR's behalf, that non-attorneys were receiving money for legal work, and sought further collection of funds against her, is harm. Balancing everything, including the facts of these two complaints, Respondent's long history without discipline, his medical condition which impaired his apparent

understanding of the problematic nature of his relationship with ICPEIR, a stayed suspension with probation and conditions will address the conduct.

Respondent's medical condition has been re-evaluated after a substantial number of years, is under current scrutiny, and he has been found actually to be improved such that his current work as a debt collection attorney does not appear to pose a danger to the public.

PENDING PROCEEDINGS.

The disclosure date referred to, on page one, paragraph A. (7), was July 20, 2009.

COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has informed Respondent that as of June 23, 2009, the prosecution costs of this matter are \$3,966.00. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.

STATE BAR ETHICS SCHOOL.


Because respondent has agreed to attend State Bar Ethics School as part of this stipulation, respondent may receive Minimum Continuing Legal Education credit upon the satisfactory completion of State Bar Ethics School.

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In the Matter of RICHARD HUDSON SHARE	Case number(s): 06-0-13651 AND 09-0-11097
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SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES

By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitations and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Fact, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.

_____ Date	_____ Respondent's Signature	_____ RICHARD HUDSON SHARE Print Name
_____ Date	_____ Respondent's Counsel Signature	_____ ARTHUR MARGOLIS Print Name
<u>7/29/09</u> Date	<u></u> Deputy Trial Counsel's Signature	_____ DJINNA M. GOCHIS Print Name

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(Stipulation form approved by SBC Executive Committee 10/16/00. Revised 12/16/2004; 12/13/2006.) Signature Page

_____	_____	_____	_____
Date	Deputy Trial Counsel's Signature	Print Name	
_____	_____	_____	_____
Date	Respondent's Counsel Signature	Print Name	
7/23/09	<i>Allen J. Margolis</i>	ARTHUR MARGOLIS	
_____	_____	_____	_____
Date	Respondent's Signature	Print Name	
July 21, 2009	<i>Richard Hudson Share</i>	RICHARD HUDSON SHARE	

By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitations and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Fact, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.

SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES

In the Matter of RICHARD HUDSON SHARE	Case number(s): 06-0-13651 AND 09-0-11097
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In the Matter Of RICHARD HUDSON SHARE	Case Number(s): 06-0-13651 AND 09-0-11097
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ORDER

Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any, is GRANTED without prejudice, and:

- ☒ The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
- ☐ The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
- ☐ All Hearing dates are vacated.

The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 135(b), Rules of Procedure.) **The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)**

8/18/09
Date


Judge of the State Bar Court

DONALD F. MILES

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

[Rule 62(b), Rules Proc.; Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on August 19, 2009, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND
ORDER APPROVING

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:


- ☒ by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:

ARTHUR LEWIS MARGOLIS, ESQ.
MARGOLIS & MARGOLIS LLP
2000 RIVERSIDE DR
LOS ANGELES, CA 90039

- ☒ by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

DJINNA GOCHIS, ESQ., Enforcement, Los Angeles

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on August 19, 2009.



Rose Luthi
Case Administrator
State Bar Court