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**PUBLIC MATTER**  
**State Bar Court of California**  
**Hearing Department**  
**Los Angeles**

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Counsel For The State Bar

**Diane J. Meyers**  
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**Los Angeles, CA 90015**  
**(213) 765-1000**

Bar # **146643**

In Pro Per Respondent

**Robert Parker Mills**  
**P.O. Box 1405**  
**Manhattan Beach, CA 90267-1405**  
**(310) 545-7449**

Bar # **48342**

In the Matter Of:

Bar # **48342**

A Member of the State Bar of California  
 (Respondent)

Case Number (s)  
**06-O-14733**

(for Court's use)

**FILED**

**JUL 16 2009**

**STATE BAR COURT**  
**CLERK'S OFFICE**  
**LOS ANGELES**

Submitted to: **Settlement Judge**

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND  
 DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING

**STAYED SUSPENSION; NO ACTUAL SUSPENSION**

☐ PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED

**Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.**

**A. Parties' Acknowledgments:**

- (1) Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted **January 7, 1971**.
- (2) The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
- (3) All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of **11** pages, not including the order.
- (4) A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
- (5) Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
- (6) The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."

(Do not write above this line.)

- (7) No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
- (8) Payment of Disciplinary Costs—Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
- ☐ costs added to membership fee for calendar year following effective date of discipline.
  - ☒ costs to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: **2010 and 2011**  
(hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 284, Rules of Procedure)
  - ☐ costs waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs"
  - ☐ costs entirely waived

**B. Aggravating Circumstances [for definition, see Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct, standard 1.2(b)]. Facts supporting aggravating circumstances are required.**

- (1) ☐ **Prior record of discipline** [see standard 1.2(f)]
- (a) ☐ State Bar Court case # of prior case
  - (b) ☐ Date prior discipline effective
  - (c) ☐ Rules of Professional Conduct/ State Bar Act violations:
  - (d) ☐ Degree of prior discipline
  - (e) ☐ If Respondent has two or more incidents of prior discipline, use space provided below or a separate attachment entitled "Prior Discipline."
- (2) ☐ **Dishonesty:** Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by or followed by bad faith, dishonesty, concealment, overreaching or other violations of the State Bar Act or Rules of Professional Conduct.
- (3) ☐ **Trust Violation:** Trust funds or property were involved and Respondent refused or was unable to account to the client or person who was the object of the misconduct for improper conduct toward said funds or property.
- (4) ☐ **Harm:** Respondent's misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public or the administration of justice.
- (5) ☐ **Indifference:** Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for the consequences of his or her misconduct.
- (6) ☐ **Lack of Cooperation:** Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims of his/her misconduct or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation or proceedings.
- (7) ☐ **Multiple/Pattern of Misconduct:** Respondent's current misconduct evidences multiple acts of wrongdoing or demonstrates a pattern of misconduct.
- (8) ☒ **No aggravating circumstances** are involved.

**Additional aggravating circumstances**

**C. Mitigating Circumstances [see standard 1.2(e)]. Facts supporting mitigating circumstances are required.**

- (1) ☒ **No Prior Discipline:** Respondent has no prior record of discipline over many years of practice coupled with present misconduct which is not deemed serious. **Respondent was admitted to the State Bar of California on January 7, 1971 and has no prior record of discipline which is entitled to significant weight in mitigation. (See In the Matter of Bleecker (Review Dept. 1990) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 113, 127, citing Heavey v. State Bar (1976) 17 Cal.3d 553, 560, 30 years of practice with no prior discipline.)**
- (2) ☒ **No Harm:** Respondent did not harm the client or person who was the object of the misconduct. **While not the object of Respondent's misconduct, his client was not harmed by his misconduct.**
- (3) ☒ **Candor/Cooperation:** Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and cooperation with the victims of his/her misconduct and to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation and proceedings. **Respondent was candid and cooperative during the State Bar's investigation and proceedings.**
- (4) ☐ **Remorse:** Respondent promptly took objective steps spontaneously demonstrating remorse and recognition of the wrongdoing, which steps were designed to timely atone for any consequences of his/her misconduct.
- (5) ☐ **Restitution:** Respondent paid \$ \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_ in restitution to \_\_\_\_\_ without the threat or force of disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings.
- (6) ☐ **Delay:** These disciplinary proceedings were excessively delayed. The delay is not attributable to Respondent and the delay prejudiced him/her.
- (7) ☐ **Good Faith:** Respondent acted in good faith.
- (8) ☐ **Emotional/Physical Difficulties:** At the time of the stipulated act or acts of professional misconduct Respondent suffered extreme emotional difficulties or physical disabilities which expert testimony would establish was directly responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities were not the product of any illegal conduct by the member, such as illegal drug or substance abuse, and Respondent no longer suffers from such difficulties or disabilities.
- (9) ☐ **Severe Financial Stress:** At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered from severe financial stress which resulted from circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond his/her control and which were directly responsible for the misconduct.
- (10) ☐ **Family Problems:** At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered extreme difficulties in his/her personal life which were other than emotional or physical in nature.
- (11) ☐ **Good Character:** Respondent's good character is attested to by a wide range of references in the legal and general communities who are aware of the full extent of his/her misconduct.
- (12) ☐ **Rehabilitation:** Considerable time has passed since the acts of professional misconduct occurred followed by convincing proof of subsequent rehabilitation.
- (13) ☐ **No mitigating circumstances** are involved.

### Additional mitigating circumstances

Given Respondent's decades of practice with no prior record of discipline, the parties agree that Respondent's misconduct was aberrational. Respondent did not act with any intent to financially benefit from his misconduct. Respondent has been active in public service. Respondent demonstrated remorse for his misconduct and recognition of wrongdoing by entering into this stipulation at an early stage, thereby saving the resources of the State Bar.

### D. Discipline:

(1) ☒ **Stayed Suspension:**

(a) ☒ Respondent must be suspended from the practice of law for a period of **one year**.

- i. ☐ and until Respondent shows proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of rehabilitation and present fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the law pursuant to standard 1.4(c)(ii), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.
- ii. ☐ and until Respondent pays restitution as set forth in the Financial Conditions form attached to this stipulation.
- iii. ☐ and until Respondent does the following:

The above-referenced suspension is stayed.

(2) ☒ **Probation:**

Respondent is placed on probation for a period of **two years**, which will commence upon the effective date of the Supreme Court order in this matter. (See rule 9.18 California Rules of Court)

### E. Additional Conditions of Probation:

- (1) ☒ During the probation period, Respondent must comply with the provisions of the State Bar Act and Rules of Professional Conduct.
- (2) ☒ Within ten (10) days of any change, Respondent must report to the Membership Records Office of the State Bar and to the Office of Probation of the State Bar of California ("Office of Probation"), all changes of information, including current office address and telephone number, or other address for State Bar purposes, as prescribed by section 6002.1 of the Business and Professions Code.
- (3) ☒ Within thirty (30) days from the effective date of discipline, Respondent must contact the Office of Probation and schedule a meeting with Respondent's assigned probation deputy to discuss these terms and conditions of probation. Upon the direction of the Office of Probation, Respondent must meet with the probation deputy either in-person or by telephone. During the period of probation, Respondent must promptly meet with the probation deputy as directed and upon request.
- (4) ☒ Respondent must submit written quarterly reports to the Office of Probation on each January 10, April 10, July 10, and October 10 of the period of probation. Under penalty of perjury, Respondent must state whether Respondent has complied with the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and all conditions of probation during the preceding calendar quarter. Respondent must also state whether there are any proceedings pending against him or her in the State Bar Court and if so, the case number and current status of that proceeding. If the first report would cover less than 30 days, that report must be submitted on the next quarter date, and cover the extended period.

In addition to all quarterly reports, a final report, containing the same information, is due no earlier than twenty (20) days before the last day of the period of probation and no later than the last day of probation.

- (5) ☐ Respondent must be assigned a probation monitor. Respondent must promptly review the terms and conditions of probation with the probation monitor to establish a manner and schedule of compliance. During the period of probation, Respondent must furnish to the monitor such reports as may be requested, in addition to the quarterly reports required to be submitted to the Office of Probation. Respondent must cooperate fully with the probation monitor.
- (6) ☒ Subject to assertion of applicable privileges, Respondent must answer fully, promptly and truthfully any inquiries of the Office of Probation and any probation monitor assigned under these conditions which are directed to Respondent personally or in writing relating to whether Respondent is complying or has complied with the probation conditions.
- (7) ☒ Within one (1) year of the effective date of the discipline herein, Respondent must provide to the Office of Probation satisfactory proof of attendance at a session of the State Bar Ethics School, and passage of the test given at the end of that session.
- ☐ No Ethics School recommended. Reason: .
- (8) ☐ Respondent must comply with all conditions of probation imposed in the underlying criminal matter and must so declare under penalty of perjury in conjunction with any quarterly report to be filed with the Office of Probation.
- (9) ☐ The following conditions are attached hereto and incorporated:
- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Substance Abuse Conditions | <input type="checkbox"/> Law Office Management Conditions |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Medical Conditions         | <input type="checkbox"/> Financial Conditions             |

#### F. Other Conditions Negotiated by the Parties:

- (1) ☒ **Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination:** Respondent must provide proof of passage of the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination ("MPRE"), administered by the National Conference of Bar Examiners, to the Office of Probation within one year. **Failure to pass the MPRE results in actual suspension without further hearing until passage. But see rule 9.10(b), California Rules of Court, and rule 321(a)(1) & (c), Rules of Procedure.**
- ☐ No MPRE recommended. Reason: .
- (2) ☐ **Other Conditions:**

#### G. Supporting Authorities:

##### Standards:

**Standard 2.3, Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct ("standards") provides that the culpability of a member of an act of moral turpitude toward another person or concealment of a material fact to another person shall result in actual suspension or disbarment depending upon the extent to which the victim of the misconduct is harmed or misled and depending upon the magnitude of the act of misconduct and the degree to which it relates to the member's acts within the practice of law.**

**However, the standards, while entitled to great weight, do not mandate a specific discipline. The court is "not bound to follow the standards in talismanic fashion. . .," but the Supreme Court is ". . .permitted to**

temper the letter of the law with considerations peculiar to the offense and the offender." [Citations.] ". . .[A]lthough the standards were established as guidelines, ultimately, the proper recommendation of discipline rest[s] on a balanced consideration of the unique factors in each case. [Citations.] " (In the Matter of VanSickle (Review Dept. 2006) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 980, 994.)

**Cases:**

In the Matter of Jeffers (Review Dept. 1994) 3 Cal State Bar Ct. Rptr. 211, the attorney was given a one-year stayed suspension and two-year probation for intentionally misleading a settlement conference judge regarding his client's death and failing to appear as ordered at a mandatory settlement conference.

While decided prior to the adoption of the standards, the following cases are also instructive:

In *In re Cooper* (1971) 5 Cal.3d 256, an attorney was convicted of federal criminal contempt charges. He obtained and used grand jury transcripts that had not yet been released from secrecy status and made misrepresentations concerning the source of the transcripts. The court concluded that the attorney's misconduct involved moral turpitude, but imposed a public reproof against the attorney.

In *Mosesian v. State Bar* (1972) 8 Cal.3d 60, an attorney testified falsely about his aunt's reputation in civil litigation also involving his father. The attorney had been admitted to practice only three years at the time of his misconduct. The court described the attorney's misconduct as "reprehensible," but concluded that a reprimand was sufficient.

In *Sullins v. State Bar* (1975) 15 Cal.3d 609, an attorney with no prior record of discipline in 45 years of practice misled a superior court by concealing a document material to issues in a will contest. The court imposed a public reproof against the attorney.

In *Mushrush v. State Bar* (1976) 17 Cal.3d 487, an attorney while representing a debtor in a bankruptcy, misrepresented a fact to the bankruptcy court regarding an issue in the proceeding. The attorney repeated the misrepresentation during State Bar proceedings. The attorney had been admitted to practice for 10 years at the time of his misrepresentation to the bankruptcy court. The court found that the attorney's conduct involved moral turpitude, but determined that a public reprimand was warranted under the circumstances.

In *Davidson v. State Bar* (1976) 17 Cal.3d 570, an attorney, when the court inquired about the whereabouts of his client and the client's child in a custody matter, failed to disclose a telephone number where the client could be reached. The court concluded that the attorney failed to disclose a material fact and committed an act of moral turpitude. In mitigation, the court considered letters of recommendation attesting to the attorney's competency after the misconduct, and the fact that the attorney's misconduct occurred under confused circumstances caused by contradictory custody orders and not with any intent to secure a personal gain. The attorney had a prior public reproof concerning a fee dispute with a client.

In *DiSabatino v. State Bar* (1980) 27 Cal.3d 159, an attorney misled a bail commissioner by failing to disclose all the facts surrounding his effort to obtain a bail reduction for his clients in 1976. The attorney was admitted to practice in 1971 and had no prior record of discipline. The attorney was publicly reproofed.

Attachment language (if any):

**Facts:**

1. On March 10, 2003, State Farm General Insurance Company ("State Farm") issued a renter's insurance policy to Parisa Anderson ("Anderson") and her sister, Zahra Moarefian ("Moarefian"), for Anderson's apartment with \$165,500 coverage for personal property losses.

2. On April 6, 2003, Anderson filed a police report regarding an alleged theft at her apartment. Anderson had alleged that her close personal friend and former roommate, Arlene Regos ("Regos"), and Regos's boyfriend stole expensive clothing, artwork, and collectibles from her apartment on April 6, 2003, while Anderson was visiting her mother in the hospital. Regos denied the allegations of theft and sued Anderson for locking Regos out of the apartment and wrongfully withholding Regos's property.

3. Anderson initially reported to the police that the value of the items allegedly stolen was \$43,650. Anderson amended the items allegedly stolen and increased the value of the items to \$121,428 in an inventory dated March 30, 2004, then to \$165,753 in an inventory dated February 3, 2005.

4. In February 2004, Respondent contacted State Farm and discussed Anderson's claim on her behalf with State Farm's claims representative, Cari Shannon ("Shannon"). Respondent informed Shannon that he was assisting Anderson in preparing her inventory of the alleged stolen items.

5. On February 24, 2004, Shannon sent a \$28,212 draft payable to Anderson and Moarefian in payment of the original inventory submitted by Anderson. Respondent informed Shannon that he did not want his name on the draft.

6. On April 12, 2004, State Farm received additional inventory forms and documents in support of the claim from Anderson. The receipts Anderson provided were copies, not originals; many receipts were handwritten with no sales tax; and some receipts appeared to be in the same handwriting but different stores. State Farm requested that Anderson provide the original receipts for review and evaluation.

7. On April 22, 2004, State Farm received an invoice from Anderson marked as "No. 374459", which she falsely represented to be the original invoice for an antique picture frame stolen from her apartment on April 6, 2003. Respondent and Anderson created invoice No. 374459 after Anderson submitted her claim to State Farm with the intent to mislead State Farm into believing that the antique picture frame was sold to Anderson for \$850 on May 5,

2002. Anderson had submitted another invoice to State Farm with the identical invoice number, "No. 374459", which she purported to be the original invoice for a plum-colored 1937 Elgin Skylark antique bicycle and antique wall sconces sold to Anderson on December 20, 1994 for \$3,000 and \$2,500, respectively, and stolen from her apartment on April 6, 2003.

8. On or about April 22 or 23, 2004, State Farm received other original receipts from Anderson.

9. On May 17, 2004, Respondent told State Farm's investigator, Vicki Saul ("Saul"), that he was not acting as Anderson's attorney for her claim, but had been assisting her as a friend.

10. On May 26, 2004, State Farm obtained a lengthy recorded statement from Anderson regarding her claim.

11. On June 7, 2004, Respondent requested a copy of the transcribed recorded statement on behalf of Anderson from State Farm. State Farm informed Respondent that the company could not discuss Anderson's claim with him without a letter of representation.

12. On June 8, 2004, State Farm received a letter of representation from Respondent on behalf of Anderson.

13. On June 10, 2004, State Farm sent a letter to Respondent requesting additional documentation and information from Anderson.

14. On June 18, 2004, State Farm sent a copy of Anderson's transcribed recorded statement to Respondent.

15. On June 22, 2004, State Farm sent a reservation of rights letter to Anderson for possible material misrepresentation.

16. On June 23, 2004, Respondent sent a letter to State Farm. In the letter, Respondent stated that Anderson was recently informed that Moarefian had died in Iran in 2002 and as such, Anderson was unable to deposit the \$28,212 draft. Respondent requested that the draft be reissued in Anderson's name only.

17. On August 19, 2004, State Farm reissued a \$12,521.38 draft payable to Anderson for three items listed on her original inventory which indicated that the items were purchased by Anderson. State Farm declined payment for the other items on the original inventory because of insufficient proof that Anderson had purchased the items.



18. Respondent provided other legal services to Anderson in her claim, including but not limited to, corresponding with State Farm's representatives on July 9 and 11, 2004, September 21, 2004, and March 1, 2005; and representing Anderson as her attorney during her examinations under oath by State Farm on December 17, 2004 and February 16 and 22, 2005.

19. On May 2, 2005, State Farm received a letter from Respondent with an enclosure entitled, "ERRATA SHEET," comprised of 13 single-spaced pages of typewritten changes, corrections, and additions to Anderson's examination under oath. In the letter, Respondent demanded that State Farm pay Anderson's claims as stated in her final inventory or he would send Anderson to an experienced bad faith attorney to pursue a lawsuit against State Farm.

20. On June 21, 2005, State Farm denied Anderson's claim for property losses. State Farm concluded after conducting a thorough investigation that Anderson's claim was fraudulent, and that Anderson had misrepresented and concealed material facts in the presentation of her claim. As a result, State Farm voided the renter's policy.

21. On November 18, 2005, other counsel filed an insurance bad faith lawsuit on behalf of Anderson against State Farm in the Orange County Superior Court, entitled Parisa Anderson v. State Farm General Insurance Company, et al., case number 05CC12364 ("Anderson's lawsuit").

22. During Respondent's deposition taken by State Farm's counsel on June 14, 2006 in connection with Anderson's lawsuit, he admitted that he and Anderson created invoice No. 374459 for the antique picture frame. When Respondent was questioned if he ever told State Farm that he had filled out the invoice in his own handwriting, Respondent replied, "I don't recall. If somebody would have asked me, I would have told them, though."

23. Yet State Farm had questioned the authenticity of invoice No. 374459 for the antique frame in its letter of June 10, 2004 because it did not reflect the store where the frame was purchased, the sales tax charged, or the amount actually paid for the frame. In Respondent's letter to State Farm dated July 9, 2004, he attempted to conceal the material fact that he and Anderson had created invoice No. 374459 for the antique frame by replying as follows:

"Our original copy of the invoices provided by the stores were provided  
to Cari Shannon. . . my client doesn't remember where this item was  
purchased over 2 years ago, only that she found this receipt along with  
others in boxes of receipts not taken in the theft." (Italics added.)

24. Also, in Respondent's letter to State Farm dated July 11, 2004, he again attempted to conceal the material fact that he and Anderson had created invoice No. 374459 for the antique frame by replying as follows:

"My client doesn't remember where this item would have been purchased over 2 years ago, only that she found this receipt after the theft along with others provided and she believed it may have evidenced an item stolen, but on reflection she can't say for sure even who would have purchased it or she purchased it. It could have just as easily been her sister, Zahre."

(Italics added.)

25. Anderson deleted the antique picture frame from her inventory dated February 3, 2005.

26. Also, while represented by Respondent, Anderson was specifically asked about invoice No. 374459 for the antique frame during her examination under oath on February 22, 2005, "Q. Who prepared this receipt? A. The sales—whoever sells me. It was a guy. I don't remember his name."

27. In the ERRATA SHEET, Respondent and Anderson again did not disclose the material fact that he and Anderson had created invoice No. 374459 for the antique frame. Instead, they continued to conceal that material fact and changed her testimony about the invoice by stating as follows:

"... On reflection, I just found this receipt when I was searching for receipts with my sister to turn over to my attorney to document my supplemental inventory, none of which I looked closely at as they would bring back memories of the theft I was trying to avoid. ..." (Italics added.)

28. On September 27, 2006, Anderson's counsel dismissed Anderson's lawsuit with prejudice.

**Conclusion of Law:**



By creating invoice No. 374459 for the antique frame with the intent to mislead State Farm to believe that the antique picture frame was sold to Anderson for \$850 on May 5, 2002 and to obtain payment on the claim for Anderson; and by concealing from State Farm that he had created invoice No. 374459 for the antique picture frame, Respondent wilfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.

(Do not write above this line.)

In the Matter of <b>Robert Parker Mills</b>	Case number(s): <b>06-O-14733</b>
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### SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES

By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitations and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Fact, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.

<u>7/7/09</u> Date	 Respondent's Signature	<u>Robert Parker Mills</u> Print Name
<u>7/8/09</u> Date	 Respondent's Counsel Signature	<u>Diane J. Meyers</u> Print Name

(Do not write above this line.)

In the Matter Of <b>Robert Parker Mills</b>	Case Number(s): <b>06-O-14733</b>
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### ORDER

Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any, is GRANTED without prejudice, and:

- ☒ The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
- ☐ The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
- ☐ All Hearing dates are vacated.

The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 135(b), Rules of Procedure.) **The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)**

July 15, 2009  
Date

  
Judge of the State Bar Court

**RICHARD A. PLATEL**

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

[Rule 62(b), Rules Proc.; Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on July 16, 2009, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND  
ORDER APPROVING

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:


- ☒ by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:

ROBERT PARKER MILLS  
MILLS LAW CORP  
P O BOX 1405  
MANHATTAN BEACH, CA 90267 - 1405

- ☒ by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

DIANE MEYERS , Enforcement, Los Angeles

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on July 16, 2009.



Johnnie Lee Smith  
Case Administrator  
State Bar Court