

PUBLIC MATTER

FILED

OCT 27 2008

STATE BAR COURT CLERK'S OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO

**STATE BAR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
HEARING DEPARTMENT – SAN FRANCISCO**

In the Matter of)	Case No.: 07-O-11542-PEM
)	
DONALD EUGENE ROY,)	DECISION
)	
Member No. 96043,)	
)	
<u>A Member of the State Bar.</u>)	

I. Introduction

In this default disciplinary matter, respondent **Donald Eugene Roy** is found culpable, by clear and convincing evidence, of (1) engaging in unauthorized practice of law; (2) committing an act of dishonesty, and (3) charging or collecting an illegal fee.

In light of respondent's culpability in this proceeding, and after considering any and all aggravating and mitigating circumstances surrounding respondent's misconduct, the court recommends, among other things, that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year, that execution of said suspension be stayed, and that respondent be actually suspended from the practice of law for 180 days and until he makes specified restitution and until the State Bar Court grants a motion to terminate respondent's actual suspension. (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 205.)

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II. Pertinent Procedural History

On March 24, 2008, the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel of the State Bar of California (State Bar) initiated this proceeding by filing and properly serving a Notice of Disciplinary Charges (NDC) on respondent by certified mail, return receipt requested, at his official membership records address (official address) under Business and Professions Code section 6002.1, subdivision (a).¹ The mailing was returned by the U.S. Postal service as "Unclaimed."

Respondent did not file a response to the NDC. (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 103.)

On April 21, 2008, the deputy trial counsel (DTC) assigned to this case performed various internet searches in an attempt to locate respondent, but no viable addresses or telephone numbers were located. On that same date the DTC also tried to contact respondent by telephone at the telephone number listed for respondent by the State Bar's Membership Records Department. The number was disconnected.

On the State Bar's motion, respondent's default was entered on July 11, 2008, and respondent was enrolled as an inactive member on July 14, 2008, under section 6007, subdivision (e). An order of entry of default was sent to respondent's official address by certified mail. It was returned bearing the label "UNCLAIMED UNABLE TO FORWARD."

Respondent did not participate in the disciplinary proceedings. This matter was submitted for decision on July 31, 2008, following the filing of the State Bar's brief on culpability and discipline.

¹ References to section are to the California Business and Professions Code, unless otherwise noted.

III. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

A. Jurisdiction

Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in California on December 16, 1980, and has since been a member of the State Bar of California.

B. Unauthorized Practice of Law

On August 22, 2006, the California Supreme Court filed Supreme Court order S145875, suspending respondent from the practice of law in the State of California for nonpayment of State Bar membership fees. The order, which was served on respondent on August 25, 2006, became effective September 18, 2006. Respondent received a copy of the order shortly after August 25, 2006.

At all relevant times: (1) Supreme Court order S145875 was a valid order, in full force and effect; (2) respondent had the ability, and was legally obligated, to comply with Supreme Court order S145875; and (3) respondent knew he was suspended from the practice of law. At no time on or after August 22, 2006, did respondent pay his State Bar membership fees. At all times on and after September 18, 2006, and continuing to the present date, respondent remained suspended from practice of law in California and was not entitled to practice law in California.

1. *The Representation of Linda Ochs*

At all times on and subsequent to September 18, 2006, respondent remained attorney of record for Linda Ochs (Ochs) in a family law matter, *Ochs v. Ochs*, Superior Court of the State of California, in and for the County of Modoc (Modoc County Superior Court), case No. FL-05-058 (*Ochs v. Ochs*). At no time did respondent inform Ochs or the court in relation to *Ochs v. Ochs* that he was ineligible to practice law. Respondent's representation of Ochs in *Ochs v. Ochs* continued through at least March 19, 2007.

On January 8, 2007, respondent agreed with opposing counsel in *Ochs v. Ochs* to continue a scheduled hearing on a motion to enforce judgment and for an accounting. On March 19, 2007, respondent appeared in court in the *Ochs v. Ochs* matter for a hearing on a motion to enforce judgment and for an accounting. On January 8, 2007, when respondent agreed to continue the scheduled hearing and on March 19, 2007, when he appeared in court at a hearing on a motion to enforce judgment and for an accounting, respondent did so as attorney on behalf of his client Ochs in *Ochs v. Ochs*.

2. *The Representation of Paul Honsuick*

Subsequent to September 18, 2006, Paul Honsuick (Honsuick) received a misdemeanor citation. Thereafter, respondent agreed to provide Honsuick with legal services related to the resulting court proceeding, *People v. Honsuick*, Modoc County Superior Court case No. TR -07-0060 (*People v. Honsuick*.) In relation to *People v. Honsuick*, at no time did respondent inform the court that he was ineligible to practice law.

On February 23, 2007, respondent appeared in court at an arraignment hearing in *People v. Honsuick*. Respondent stipulated that Honsuick was properly advised of his constitutional rights, waived formal arraignment, and entered a plea of not guilty for Honsuick. On April 6, 2007, respondent appeared in court at a bench trial in *People v. Honsuick*. Respondent examined a witness and presented arguments to the court. Honsuick was found guilty and the court imposed sentence on Honsuick.

When, on February 23, 2007, respondent appeared for the arraignment hearing and stipulated that Honsuick was properly advised of his constitutional rights, waived formal arraignment, and entered a plea of not guilty for Honsuick and when, on April 6, 2007,

respondent examined a witness and presented arguments to the court, he did so as attorney on behalf of his client, Honsuick, in *People v. Honsuick*.

3. Respondent's Misrepresentation Regarding Entitlement to Practice Law

On May 18, 2007, respondent appeared in court before the Honorable Dave Mason, Judge Pro Tempore of the Modoc County Superior Court, on behalf of two clients, Marcus D. Gwilliam (Gwilliam) and Marvin F. Wood (Wood). Before discussing issues related to either client, Judge Mason asked respondent if he had paid his State Bar dues, entitling him to practice law. Respondent informed Judge Mason that he had paid his State Bar dues.

4. The Representation of Marcus D. Gwilliam

On March 12, 2007, Marcus D. Gwilliam (Gwilliam) received a misdemeanor citation. Thereafter, respondent charged and collected \$150 as an advanced attorney fee from Gwilliam for legal services related to the resulting court proceeding, *People v. Gwilliam*, Modoc County Superior Court, case No. TR-07-0302 (*People v. Gwilliam*). At no time did respondent inform Gwilliam that he was not entitled to practice law.

On May 18, 2007, respondent appeared in court on behalf of Gwilliam at an arraignment hearing in *People v. Gwilliam*. Gwilliam was not present in court. Respondent stipulated that Gwilliam was properly advised of his constitutional rights, waived formal arraignment, and entered a plea of not guilty for Gwilliam.

When respondent appeared in court on Gwilliam's behalf at the May 18, 2007 arraignment hearing and stipulated that Gwilliam was properly advised of his constitutional rights, waived formal arraignment, and entered a plea of not guilty for Gwilliam, respondent did so as an attorney on behalf of his client, Gwilliam, in *People v. Gwilliam*.

5. *The Representation of Marvin F. Wood*

On April 5, 2007, Marvin F. Wood (Wood) received a misdemeanor citation. Thereafter, respondent agreed to provide Wood with legal services related to the resulting court proceeding, *People v. Wood*, Modoc County Superior Court case No. TR-07-0388 (*People v. Wood*).

On May 18, 2007, respondent appeared in court on behalf of Wood at an arraignment hearing in *People v. Wood*. Wood was not present in court. Respondent stipulated that Wood was properly advised of his constitutional rights, waived formal arraignment, and entered a plea of not guilty for Wood.

When respondent appeared in court on behalf of Wood at the May 18, 2007 arraignment hearing in *People v. Wood* and stipulated that Wood was properly advised of his constitutional rights, waived formal arraignment, and entered a plea of not guilty for Wood, respondent did so as an attorney on behalf of his client, Wood in *People v. Wood*.

Count 1: Unauthorized Practice of Law (§§ 6068, Subd. (a), 6125 and 6126)

Section 6068, subdivision (a) provides that an attorney has a duty to support the laws of the United States and of this state. Section 6125 prohibits the practice of law by anyone other than an active attorney and section 6126 prohibits holding oneself out as entitled to practice law by anyone other than an active attorney.

By clear and convincing evidence, respondent willfully violated sections 6068, subdivision (a), 6125, and 6126. While he was on suspension for failing to pay State Bar membership dues, respondent knew or should have known that he was not entitled to practice law effective since September 18, 2006, to the present. Yet he held himself out as entitled to practice law and practiced law by: (1) remaining the attorney of record for Linda Ochs in *Ochs v.*

Ochs on and subsequent to September 18, 2006; (2) accepting new clients and legal fees from clients after September 18, 2006; (3) agreeing on January 8, 2007, to continue hearing dates; (4) making court appearances before the Modoc County Superior Court on February 23, March 19, April 6, and May 18, 2007; (5) stipulating on February 23 and May 18, 2007, that clients had been advised of their constitutional rights; (6) waiving formal arraignments on February 23 and May 18, 2007; (7) entering pleas on behalf of clients on February 23 and May 18, 2007; (8) examining a witness at a bench trial before the Modoc County Superior Court and presenting arguments to the court on April 6, 2007; and (9) affirmatively stating to Judge Pro Tempore Dave Mason that respondent had paid his State Bar dues, entitling him to practice law, when he had not paid his dues and was not entitled to practice law.

Count 2: Moral Turpitude (§ 6106)

Section 6106 prohibits an attorney from engaging in conduct involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption.

Subsequent to September 18, 2006, while suspended from the practice of law, respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, held himself out as entitled to practice law to the court and to clients, and informed a judge of the Modoc County Superior Court that respondent had paid his State Bar dues when he had not done so. Such misconduct constituted acts of moral turpitude and dishonesty in willful violation of section 6106.

Count 3: Illegal Fee ((Rules Prof. Conduct, Rule 4-200(A))²

Rule 4-200(A) prohibits an attorney from entering into an illegal or unconscionable fee agreement or charging or collecting an illegal or unconscionable fee.

² References to rule are to the current Rules of Professional Conduct, unless otherwise noted.

While respondent was suspended from the practice of law, he was legally precluded from practicing law and therefore, his performance of legal services in exchange for a fee was illegal. He was not entitled to charge or collect fees for those services that constituted the unauthorized practice of law. (*Birbrower, Montalbana, Condon, and Frank v. Superior Court* (1998) 17 Cal.4th 19, 136.) "Permitting respondent to have earned any of the money paid him by [his client], even a reasonable fee under a quantum meruit theory, would condone his unauthorized practice of law." (*In the Matter of Taylor* (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 563, 574.)

After March 12, 2007, while he was suspended from the practice of law, respondent charged and collected \$150 as an advanced attorney fee from Marcus D. Gwilliam. By accepting the \$150 as an attorney fee, respondent entered into an agreement for, charged, or collected an illegal fee, in willful violation of rule 4-200(A).

Count 4: Failure to Withdraw from Employment, Where Mandated (Rules Prof. Conduct, Rule 3-700(B)(2))

Rule 3-700(B)(2) provides that "a member representing a client . . . shall withdraw from employment if . . . [t]he member knows or should know that continued employment will result in violation of [the Rules of Professional Conduct] or the State Bar Act."

The State Bar alleges that respondent failed to withdraw from employment in violation of rule 3-700(B)(2), by continuing to represent Linda Ochs after he knew or should have known that his continued employment would violate the State Bar Act. Specifically, it is alleged in paragraph 22 of count 4 that respondent's continued representation of Ochs on and after September 18, 2006, resulted in violations of the State Bar Act, including sections 6068(a), 6125, and 6126. Thus, both the rule 3-700(B)(2) charge and the sections 6068(a), 6125, and 6126

charges are based on the same facts, which are: (1) while he was on suspension for failing to pay State Bar membership dues, respondent knew or should have known that he was not entitled to practice law effective since September 18, 2006, and (2) respondent held himself out as entitled to practice law and practiced law by continuing as the attorney of record for Linda Ochs in *Ochs v. Ochs* on and subsequent to September 18, 2006.

It is, however, generally inappropriate to find redundant charged allegations. The appropriate level of discipline for an act of misconduct does not depend on how many rules of professional conduct or statutes proscribe the misconduct. “There is little, if any, purpose served by duplicative allegations of misconduct.” (*In the Matter of Torres* (Review Dept. 2000) 4 Cal.State Bar Ct. Rptr. 138, 148.)

Accordingly, because the rule 3-700(B)(2) charge, is based on the same facts relied on in finding a violation of sections 6068(a), 6125, and 6126, as those sections relate to Linda Ochs, the rule 3-700(B)(2) charge is duplicative and therefore dismissed with prejudice.

IV. Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstances

A. Mitigation

No mitigating evidence was submitted into evidence. (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, std. 1.2(e).)³

However, respondent has no prior disciplinary record in his almost 26 years of practice at the time of his misconduct in 2006, which is a strong mitigating factor. (Std. 1.2(e)(i).) “Absence of a prior disciplinary record is an important mitigating circumstance when an attorney has practiced for a significant period of time.” (*In re Young* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 269.)

³ All further references to standards are to this source.

B. Aggravation

There are several aggravating factors. (Std. 1.2(b).)

Respondent committed multiple acts of wrongdoing, including engaging in the unauthorized practice of law, collecting an illegal fee, and committing acts of dishonesty. (Std. 1.2(b)(ii).)

Respondent's failure to participate in this disciplinary matter before the entry of his default is also a serious aggravating factor. (Std. 1.2(b)(vi).)

V. Discussion

The purpose of State Bar disciplinary proceedings is not to punish the attorney, but to protect the public, to preserve public confidence in the profession and to maintain the highest possible professional standards for attorneys. (*Chadwick v. State Bar* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 103, 111; *Cooper v. State Bar* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1016, 1025; std. 1.3.)

The standards for respondent's misconduct provide a broad range of sanctions ranging from suspension to disbarment, depending upon the gravity of the offenses and the harm to the client. (Stds. 1.6, 2.3, 2.6, and 2.10.)⁴ While the standards are not binding, they are entitled to great weight. (*In re Silvertown* (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 92.)

The State Bar recommends that respondent be actually suspended for 180 days, citing *Silva-Vidor v. State Bar* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1071, *In the Matter of Farrell* (Review Dept. 1991) 1

⁴ On page 4, at lines 19 through 22 of its brief on culpability and discipline, the State Bar appears to state that standard 2.7 is applicable to respondent's misconduct. However, standard 2.7 only applies to "[c]ulpability of a member of a willful violation of that portion of rule 4-200, Rules of Professional Conduct re entering into an agreement for, charging or collecting an unconscionable fee for legal services" (Emphasis added.) As respondent's misconduct does not involve an unconscionable fee, but rather involves an illegal fee of \$150, standard 2.7 is not applicable.

Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 490, and *In the Matter of Wells* (Review Dept. 2006) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 896.

In *Silva-Vidor*, the attorney was admitted to the practice of law in May 1979, and her earliest acts of misconduct occurred in mid-1981. She entered into a stipulation regarding the facts of the case. The stipulation indicated that the attorney's actions or failure to act affected 14 clients. The attorney stipulated to the following acts of misconduct: (1) willful withdrawal from employment without taking reasonable steps to avoid prejudice to seven clients, including failure to return papers and property to which the clients were entitled; (2) failure to promptly return unearned fees to six clients; (3) failure to competently perform legal services for 13 clients; (4) failure to hold advance payments for costs and expenses in a client trust account; (5) failure to render an appropriate accounting; (6) failure to promptly pay \$760 held on behalf of two clients; (7) engaging in acts involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption; (8) engaging in the unauthorized practice of law from August 1983 to January 1987; and (9) violating section 6068(a) and section 6103 by engaging in the afore-listed acts of misconduct.

The court found the attorney's severe personal problems during the period of her misconduct to be significantly mitigating. The attorney was suspended for five years, stayed, and placed on probation for five years with conditions, including a one-year actual suspension.

In *Farrell*, the attorney misrepresented to a judge that a witness was under subpoena. The attorney also failed to cooperate with a State Bar investigation. In aggravation the attorney had a prior record of discipline; in mitigation the attorney was found to have acted in good faith. The review department recommended a two-year stayed suspension, a three-year probation, and a six-month actual suspension.

In *Wells*, the attorney was found culpable of engaging in the unauthorized practice of law in another jurisdiction, charging and collecting illegal and unconscionable fees, failing to return unearned fees, failing to maintain funds in trust, and committing multiple acts of moral turpitude. The review department found mitigation for extreme emotional distress, good character, and cooperation with the State Bar. In aggravation, the attorney had a prior record of discipline, engaged in multiple acts of wrongdoing, caused significant harm to clients, the public and the administration of justice, and showed indifference toward the consequences of her misconduct.

Here, respondent's misconduct is not nearly as extensive or as egregious as that of the attorneys in *Silva-Vidor* or *Wells*. Nor does respondent have a prior record of discipline, as did the attorneys in *Farrell* and *Wells*.

There are several additional cases regarding the unauthorized practice of law that also provide guidance to the court, including *In the Matter of Trousil* (Review Dept. 1990) 1 Cal.State Bar Ct. Rptr. 229; *In the Matter of Mason* (Review Dept. 1997) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 639; *Chasteen v. State Bar* (1985) 40 Cal.3d 586; *In the Matter of Johnston* (Review Dept. 1997) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 585; and *Farnham v. State Bar* (1976) 17 Cal.3d 605. The level of discipline in these cases ranges from 30 days' to six months' actual suspension.

In *Mason*, the attorney made a court appearance and signed and served a trial brief while suspended by the Supreme Court for misconduct in a prior discipline. He did not inform either the court or opposing counsel that he was suspended from the practice of law. He was found culpable of moral turpitude in practicing law while suspended. As a result, he was actually suspended for 90 days with a three-year stayed suspension and a three-year probation.

In *Chasteen*, the attorney was found culpable of the unauthorized practice of law for over a year, deceit of clients, commingling, and failure to return fees. The bulk of his misconduct was

attributable to his long history of alcoholism. In light of his prior record of discipline and mitigation, the Supreme Court imposed a two-month actual suspension and until he made restitution of \$275 to his client.

In *Johnston*, the attorney who had no prior record of discipline in 12 years of practice was actually suspended for 60 days for misconduct in a single client matter. The attorney failed to communicate with his client and failed to perform competently, which caused his client to lose her case. He also improperly held himself out as entitled to practice law by misleading his client into believing that he was still working on her case while he was on suspension for not paying his State Bar dues. He defaulted in the disciplinary proceeding as well.

In *Farnham v. State Bar* (1976) 17 Cal.3d 605, the attorney abandoned two clients and engaged in the unauthorized practice of law while under actual suspension. The Supreme Court found that the attorney's actions "evidence a serious pattern of misconduct whereby he willfully deceived his clients, avoided their efforts to communicate with him and eventually abandoned their causes." (*Id.* at p. 612.) He also had a prior record of discipline for abandonment of clients' interests in four separate matters and lacked insight into the impropriety of his actions. As a result, the attorney was actually suspended for six months with a stayed suspension of two years upon conditions of probation.

Here the gravamen of respondent's misconduct is his unauthorized practice of law during his suspension and his affirmative misrepresentation to the court regarding his entitlement to practice law. Respondent also accepted an illegal fee of \$150. Respondent's misconduct reflects a blatant disregard of professional and ethical responsibilities.

In recommending discipline, the "paramount concern is protection of the public, the courts and the integrity of the legal profession." (*Snyder v. State Bar* (1990) 49 Cal.3d 1302.)

Failing to appear and participate in the hearing shows that respondent comprehends neither the seriousness of the charges against him nor his duty as an officer of the court to participate in disciplinary proceedings. (*Conroy v. State Bar* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 495, 507-508.) His failure to participate in this proceeding leaves the court without information about the underlying cause of respondent's misconduct or mitigating circumstances surrounding his misconduct. Thus, balancing all relevant facts and circumstances to reach the appropriate recommendation of degree of discipline, the court finds that the State Bar's recommendation of 180 days actual suspension and until payment of restitution is proper.

It has long been held that "[r]estitution is fundamental to the goal of rehabilitation." (*Hippard v. State Bar* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1084, 1094.) Restitution is a method of protecting the public and rehabilitating errant attorneys because it forces an attorney to confront the harm caused by his misconduct in real, concrete terms. (*Id.* at p. 1093.) Therefore, the court recommends that respondent refund \$150 to Marcus D. Gwilliam.

VI. Recommended Discipline

Accordingly, the court hereby recommends that respondent **Donald Eugene Roy** be suspended from the practice of law for one year, that said suspension be stayed, and that respondent be actually suspended from the practice of law for 180 days and until he files and the State Bar Court grants a motion to terminate his actual suspension (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 205) and until he makes restitution to Marcus D. Gwilliam in the amount of \$150, plus 10 percent interest per annum from March 12, 2007 (or to the Client Security Fund to the extent of any payment from the fund to Marcus D. Gwilliam, plus interest and costs, in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6140.5) and furnishes satisfactory proof thereof to the

State Bar's Office of Probation. Any restitution to the Client Security Fund is enforceable as provided in Business and Professions Code section 6140.5, subdivisions (c) and (d).

It is also recommended that respondent be ordered to comply with any probation conditions hereinafter imposed by the State Bar as a condition for terminating his actual suspension. (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 205(g).)

It is also recommended that if respondent is actually suspended for two years or more, he must remain actually suspended until he has shown proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of his rehabilitation fitness to practice, and learning and ability in the general law pursuant to standard 1.4(c)(ii).

It is further recommended that respondent take and pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility Exam within one year after the effective date of the Supreme Court order or during the period of his actual suspension, whichever is longer. (See *Segretti v. State Bar* (1976) 15 Cal.3d 878, 891, fn. 8.)


The court recommends that respondent be ordered to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 9.20, and to perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 calendar days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court order in this matter. Willful failure to comply with the provisions of rule 9.20 may result in revocation of probation, suspension, disbarment, denial of reinstatement, conviction of contempt, or criminal conviction.⁵

⁵ Respondent is required to file a rule 9.20(c) affidavit, even if he has no clients to notify. (*Powers v. State Bar* (1988) 44 Cal.3d 337, 341.)

VII. Costs

It is further recommended that costs be awarded to the State Bar in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6086.10 and are enforceable both as provided in Business and Professions Code section 6140.7 and as a money judgment.

Dated: October 27, 2008



PAT E. McELROY
Judge of the State Bar Court

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

[Rule 62(b), Rules Proc.; Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of San Francisco, on October 27, 2008, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):

DECISION

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:

by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at San Francisco, California, addressed as follows:

DONALD EUGENE ROY
1603 N EAST ST
ALTURAS, CA 96101

by certified mail, No. , with return receipt requested, through the United States Postal Service at , California, addressed as follows:

by overnight mail at , California, addressed as follows:


by fax transmission, at fax number . No error was reported by the fax machine that I used.

By personal service by leaving the documents in a sealed envelope or package clearly labeled to identify the attorney being served with a receptionist or a person having charge of the attorney's office, addressed as follows:

by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

Treva R. Stewart, Enforcement, San Francisco

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on October 27, 2008.


George Hue
Case Administrator
State Bar Court