Case Number(s): 07-0-13993; 08-O-12644; 08-0-14348; 08-0-14464; 09-0-11082; 09-0-11415; 09-0-13013; 09-0-14472; 10-O-01319; 10-O-02116
In the Matter of: EMILIO N. FRANCISCO, Bar # 69900, A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Ashod Mooradian, Deputy Trial Counsel
1149 S. Hill Street
Los Angeles, CA 90015
(213) 765-1004
Bar # 194283,
Counsel for Respondent: Arthur L. Margolis, MARGOLIS & MARGOLIS, LLP
2000 Riverside Drive
Los Angeles, CA 90039
(323) 953-8996
Bar # 57703,
Submitted to: Assigned Judge – State Bar Court Clerk’s Office Los Angeles.
Filed: September 29, 2011.
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted November 30, 1976.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 18 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
<<not>> checked. Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 5.130, Rules of Procedure.
checked. Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: 2012 and 2013. (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
<<not>> checked. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs are entirely waived.
Additional aggravating circumstances: None.
Additional mitigating circumstances: None.
Attachment language (if any):
IN THE MATTER OF: EMILIO N. FRANCISCO, State Bar No. 69900
STATE BAR COURT CASE NUMBER: 07-0-13993; 08-0-12644; 08-0-14348; 08-0-14464; 09-O-11082; 09-O-11415; 09-0-13013; 09-0-14472; 10-O-01319; 10-O-02116
EMILIO N. FRANCISCO ("Respondent") admits that the following facts are true and that he is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct.
1. Respondent’s firm provided debt negotiation/reduction services. In general terms, the written retainer agreement with respondent’s clients was that the clients agreed to pay 10% of the total debt to be negotiated, plus earned fees of 15% of the amount by which the debt was reduced at the time of settlement. A projected monthly payment schedule was provided, the firm’s 10% fee was to be paid to the firm from those payments prior to any portion of the clients’ payments being used to negotiate and resolve the debts. The contingency portion of the fee was to be paid to the firm after a particular debt was negotiated. Further, if it became necessary to respond to a lawsuit in another state, the firm charged an additional $350 for the work of the out-of-state attorney. The client was free, however, to hire any attorney the client chose in the other state.
2. The retainer also stated:
"Client understands that contracted credit accounts will continue to accrue interest until the accounts are settled. Creditors may impose other penalties as a result of delinquent payments not excluding filing a lawsuit to collect subject debts in the event creditor(s) is/are willing to accept a settlement or Client is unable to propose a settlement acceptable to the creditor. After considering these possibilities, client wishes to proceed with representation in accordance with the terms and conditions of this agreement."
3. It further stated:
"…Settlements are negotiated as to each creditor. When all funds for a particular creditor are available in the trust account, then that particular creditor shall be paid."
4. In another portion of the Retainer Agreement, the clients initialed certain statements, confirming their understanding. Among those items were the following:
’I understand that my payments will first apply to the NON-REFUNDABLE 10% retainer fee. After this retainer fee has been paid, a settlement account will be established, and this account is for the exclusive purpose of paying the negotiated settlements and a contingency fee of 15% on the savings.’
’I understand that there must be sufficient funds in my settlement account to cover a settlement of any particular account at the time the settlement is achieved. I understand that the settlement fee for any settlement is due and payable at the time the settlement is completed.’
5. Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in the State of California on
November 30, 1976, was a member at all times pertinent to these charges, and is currently a member of the State Bar of California.
Facts:
6. Paragraphs one through five are fully incorporated herein by this reference.
7. On September 15, 2008, James Jewell ("Jewell") retained the Respondent’s firm.
8. Prior to retaining the Respondent’s firm, Jewell spoke with one of the firm’s debt ,analysts. The analyst induced Jewell to retain Respondent’s firm by, in part, making certain predictions and assurances of success that were not warranted and which caused Jewell to disregard the written retainer provisions.
9. Prior to Jewell retaining the Respondent’s firm, Respondent did not arrange for him to speak with an attorney
10. Prior to retaining the Respondent’s firm, Jewell received no legal advice regarding his specific situation or the potential advantages of filing for bankruptcy versus debt reduction.
Conclusion of Law:
11. By failing to adequately supervise his employee debt analyst, by not arranging for Jewell to speak with an attorney prior to retaining the firm, and by failing to provide Jewell with legal advice regarding his specific situation and regarding the potential advantages of filing for bankruptcy as opposed to engaging in debt reduction, Respondent repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3110(A).
Facts:
12. Paragraphs one through five are fully incorporated herein by this reference.
13. On April 7, 2006, Gene and Jan Murray ("the Murrays") retained the Respondent’s firm.
14. Prior to retaining the Respondent’s firm, the Murrays spoke with one of the firm’s debt analysts. The analyst induced the Murrays to retain the firm by, in part, making certain predictions and assurances of success that were not warranted and which caused the Murrays to disregard the written retainer provisions.
15. Prior to the Murrays retaining the Respondent’s firm, Respondent did not arrange for the Murrays to speak with an attorney.
16: Prior to retaining the Respondent’s firm, the Murrays received no legal advice regarding their specific situation or the potential advantages of filing for bankruptcy versus debt reduction.
17. Between in or about May 2006 to in or about June 2007, the Murrays regularly requested status reports on their case. Respondent’s office received the requests, but failed to adequately provide the Murrays with the requested information.
18. Due to the conduct of respondent’s debt analyst, a fee refund was due the Murrays in the amount of $6,794.83. Respondent made a full refund, but the payment was not prompt.
Conclusions of Law:
19. By failing to adequately supervise his employee debt analyst, by not arranging for the Murrays to speak with an attorney prior to retaining the firm, and by failing to provide the Murrays with legal advice regarding their specific situation and regarding the potential advantages of filing for bankruptcy as opposed to engaging in debt reduction, Respondent repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A).
20. By failing to respond to the Murrays’ requests for status reports, Respondent failed to respond promptly to reasonable status inquiries of a client in willful violation of Business & Professions Code section 6068(m).
21. By failing to promptly refund the $6,794.83 advanced fee to the Murrays that had not been earned, Respondent failed to refund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that had not been earned in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(2).
Facts:
22. Paragraphs one through five are fully incorporated herein by this reference.
23. On February 29, 2008, Barbara and Lorenzo Hill ("the Hills") retained the
Respondent’s firm.
24. Prior to retaining the Respondent’s firm, the Hills spoke with one of the firm’s debt analysts. The analyst induced the Hills to retain the firm by, in part, making certain predictions and assurances of success that were not warranted and which caused the Hills to disregard the written retainer provisions.
25. Prior to the Hills retaining the firm, Respondent did not arrange for them to speak with an attorney.
26. Prior to retaining the Respondent’s firm, the Hills received no legal advice regarding their specific situation or the potential advantages of filing for bankruptcy versus debt reduction.
27. Due to the conduct of Respondent’s debt analyst, a fee refund was due the Hills in the amount of $1,221.10. Respondent made a full refund, but the payment was not prompt.
Conclusions of Law:
28. By failing to adequately supervise his employee debt analyst, by not arranging for the Hills to speak with an attorney prior to retaining the firm, and by failing to provide the Hills with legal advice regarding their specific situation and regarding the potential advantages of filing for bankruptcy as opposed to engaging in debt reduction, Respondent repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A).
29. By failing to promptly refund the $1,221.10 advanced fee to the Hills that had not been earned, Respondent failed to refund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that had not been earned in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(2).
Facts:
30. Paragraphs one through five are fully incorporated herein by this reference.
31. On August 29, 2007, Gary and Billie Crossno ("the Crossnos") retained the
Respondent’s firm.
32. Prior to retaining the Respondent’s firm, the Crossnos spoke with one of the firm’s debt analysts. The analyst induced the Crossnos to retain the firm by, in part, making certain predictions and assurances of success that were not warranted and which caused the Crossnos to disregard the written retainer provisions.
33. Prior to the Crossnos retaining the firm, Respondent did not arrange for them to speak with an attorney.
34. Prior to retaining the Respondent’s firm, the Crossnos received no legal advice regarding their specific situation or the potential advantages of filing for bankruptcy versus debt reduction.
Conclusion of Law:
35. By failing to adequately supervise his employee debt analyst, by not arranging for the Crossnos to speak with an attorney prior to retaining the firm, and by failing to provide the Crossnos with legal advice regarding their specific situation and regarding the potential advantages of filing for bankruptcy as opposed to engaging in debt reduction, Respondent repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A).
Facts:
36. Paragraphs one through five are fully incorporated herein by this reference.
37. On August 16, 2007, Daniela and Roger Williams ("the Williams") retained the Respondent’s firm.
38. Prior to retaining the Respondent’s firm, the Williams spoke with one of the firm’s debt analysts. The analyst induced the Williams to retain the firm by, in part, making certain predictions and assurances of success that were not warranted and which caused the Williams to disregard the written retainer provisions.
39. Prior to the Williams retaining the firm, Respondent did not arrange for them to speak with an attorney.
40. Prior to retaining the Respondent’s firm, the Williams received no legal advice regarding their specific situation or the potential advantages of filing for bankruptcy versus debt reduction.
Conclusion of Law:
41. By failing to adequately supervise his employee debt analyst, by not arranging for the Williams to speak with an attorney prior to retaining the firm, and by failing to provide the Williams with legal advice regarding their specific situation and regarding the potential advantages of filing for bankruptcy as opposed to engaging in debt reduction, Respondent repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A).
Facts:
42. Paragraphs one through five are fully incorporated herein by this reference.
43. On April 11, 2008, Bruce Larsen ("Larsen") retained the Respondent’s firm.
44. Prior to retaining the Respondent’s firm, Larsen spoke with one of the firm’s debt analysts. The analyst induced Larsen to retain the firm by, in part, making certain predictions and assurances of success that were not warranted and which caused Larsen to disregard the written retainer provisions.
45. Prior to Larsen retaining the firm, Respondent did not arrange for him to speak with an attorney.
46. Prior to retaining the Respondent’s firm, Larsen received no legal advice regarding his specific situation or the potential advantages of filing for bankruptcy versus debt reduction.
47. Due to the conduct of Respondent’s debt analyst, a fee refund was due to Larsen in the amount of $3,856.23. Respondent made a full refund, but the payment was not prompt.
Conclusions of Law:
48. By failing to adequately supervise his employee debt analyst, by not arranging for Larsen to speak with an attorney prior to retaining the firm, and by failing to provide him with legal advice regarding his specific situation and regarding the potential advantages of filing for bankruptcy as opposed to engaging in debt reduction, Respondent repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3110(A)
49. By failing to promptly refund the $3,856.23 advanced fee to Larsen that had not been earned, Respondent failed to refund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that had not been earned in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(2).
Facts:
50. Paragraphs one through five are fully incorporated herein by this reference.
51. On August 31, 2006, Linda Persinger ("Persinger") retained the Respondent’s firm.
52. Prior to retaining the Respondent’s firm, Persinger spoke with one of the firm’s debt analysts. The analyst induced Persinger to retain the firm by, in part, making certain predictions and assurances of success that were not warranted and which caused Persinger to disregard the written retainer provisions.
53. Prior to Persinger retaining the firm, Respondent did not arrange for her to speak with an attorney.
54. Prior to retaining the Respondent’s firm, Persinger received no legal advice regarding her specific situation or the potential advantages of filing for bankruptcy versus debt reduction.
55. On April 29, 2008, US Bank filed a lawsuit against Persinger in Michigan State Court, entitled Capital Alliance LLC v. Linda D. Persinger.
56. Pursuant to the retainer agreement, the Respondent’s firm retained a firm in Michigan to represent Persinger in that lawsuit.
57. While the Michigan firm was representing Persinger, Summary Judgment was awarded against her in August 2008, and based upon that Judgment, US Bank attached Persinger’s bank account in February 2009.
58. During the period from June 2008 through August 2008, Persinger made a number of requests to Respondent’s firm for information as to the status of the Michigan case, but Respondent’s firm failed to obtain that information from the Michigan law firm that was representing Persinger, and, therefore, Respondent’s firm also failed to inform Persinger of the status of her Michigan case.
Conclusions of Law:
59. By failing to adequately supervise his employee debt analyst, by not arranging for Persinger to speak with an attorney prior to retaining the firm, and by failing to provide her with legal advice regarding her specific situation and regarding the potential advantages of filing for bankruptcy as opposed to engaging in debt reduction, Respondent repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3110(A).
60. By failing to inform Persinger that US Bank had sought and obtained Summary Judgment and that the Judgment could be used by US Bank to attach her assets, Respondent failed to respond promptly to reasonable status inquiries of a client and failed to inform his client of significant developments in a matter in which Respondent had agreed to provide legal services in willful violation of Business & Professions Code section 6068(m).
Facts:
61. Paragraphs one through five are fully incorporated herein by this reference.
62. On February 4, 2009, June Tilem ("Tilem") retained the Respondent’s firm.
63. Prior to retaining the Respondent’s firm, Tilem spoke with one of the firm’s debt analysts. The analyst induced her to retain the firm by, in part, making certain predictions and assurances of success that were not warranted and which caused Tilem to disregard the written retainer provisions.
64. Prior to Tilem retaining the firm, Respondent did not arrange for her to speak with an attorney.
65. Prior to retaining the Respondent’s firm, Tilem received no legal advice regarding her specific situation or the potential advantages of filing for bankruptcy versus debt reduction.
Conclusion of Law:
66. By failing to adequately supervise his employee debt analyst, by not arranging for Tilem to speak with an attorney prior to retaining the firm, and by failing to provide her with legal advice regarding her specific situation and regarding the potential advantages of filing for bankruptcy as opposed to engaging in debt reduction, respondent repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3110(A).
Facts:
67. Paragraphs one through five are fully incorporated herein by this reference.
68. On July 10, 2009, Stacy Sansone ("Sansone") retained the Respondent’s firm to assist her in obtaining a loan modification.
69. Prior to retaining the Respondent’s firm, Sansone spoke with one of the firm’s loan modification analysts. The analyst induced her to retain the firm by, in part, making certain predictions and assurances of success that were not warranted.
70. Prior to Sansone retaining the firm, Respondent did not arrange for her to speak with an attorney.
71. Prior to retaining the Respondent’s firm, Sansone received no legal advice regarding her specific situation.
72. Due to the conduct of Respondent’s loan modification analyst, a fee refund was due Sansone in the amount of $1,995. Respondent made a full refund, but the payment was not prompt.
Conclusions of Law:
73. By failing to adequately supervise his employee loan modification analyst, by not arranging for Sansone to speak with an attorney prior to retaining the firm, and by failing to provide her with legal advice regarding her specific situation, Respondent repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A).
74. By failing to promptly refund the $1,995 advanced fee to Sansone that had not been earned, Respondent failed to refund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that had not been earned in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(2).
Facts:
75. At all relevant times, Respondent employed attorney Frank Kucera ("Kucera") to handle certain client matters and responsibilities for Respondent’s clients. Respondent delegated, among others, the following client litigation matters for which he was employed to Kucera ("Kucera Litigation Clients"):
a. Christine Madden, Wells Fargo Bank v. Christine Madden, Marin County Superior Court Case Number 0551354.
b. Juan Garrido, First Resolution Investment Corporation v. Garrido, Marin County Superior Court Case Number CB053300.
c. Mihran Keeshisian, Unifund CCR Partners v. Keeshishian, Marin County Superior Court CV 1060495.
d. Mary Ann Tang-Perlas, Capital One Bank v. Tang-Perlas, Contra Costa County Superior Court Case Number CIV MSL06-04106.
e. Steven G. and Evelyn Angulo, Discover Bank v. Angelo, San Diego Superior Court Case Number IC865717.
76. Kucera appeared as counsel of record for the Kucera Litigation Cases.
77. Between November 2005 and June 2007, Kucera, on numerous occasions, failed to comply with court orders, failed to make court appearances, and he was sanctioned on a number of occasions for matters involving the Kucera Litigation Clients.
78. Among the court-sanctions was the striking of a client’s Answer to the plaintiffs Complaint. On a number of occasions, the courts imposed monetary sanctions on Kucera as a result of his failures to comply with court orders and failures to appear. Kucera failed to pay a number of the sanctions.
79. Respondent failed to properly supervise Kucera by failing to inform himself as to the status of the cases in question, by failing to require Kucera or another attorney to file the required documents, make court appearances, and pay the court-ordered sanctions for the Kucera Litigation Clients.
Conclusion of Law:
80. By failing to properly supervise Kucera for matters involving the Kucera Litigation
Clients, Respondent repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A).
In State Bar Court case number 90-O-16014 et al. (Supreme Court Order Number SO41090, effective October 28, 1994), Respondent was suspended for one year, stayed, and placed on probation for three years resulting from seven client matters for failing to maintain complete records regarding the receipt of client funds, failing to communicate, failing to competently perform and failing to promptly refund unearned fees.
Respondent’s misconduct involved ten (10) separate client matters and sixteen (16) counts alleging violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct which constitute multiple acts of misconduct.
1. Candor/Cooperation [Standard 1.2(e)(v)]
Respondent cooperated in that he has stipulated to facts, conclusions of law and level of discipline.
Applicable Standards:
Standard 1.3 provides that the primary purposes of attorney discipline are, "the protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; the maintenance of high legal professional standards by attorneys and the preservation of public confidence in the legal profession."
Standard 1.6(a) provides that if two or more acts of misconduct are found in the same proceeding, the sanction imposed shall be the more or most severe of the different applicable sanctions. Standard 1.6(b) provides that a greater or lesser degree of discipline than the appropriate sanction prescribed by these standards shall be imposed or recommended, depending on the net effect of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, if any.
Standard 2.4(b), in relevant part, provides that culpability of a member of willfully failing to perform services in an individual matter or matters not demonstrating a pattern of misconduct shall result in reproval or suspension depending upon the extent of the misconduct and the degree of harm to the client.
Standard 2.6 provides that culpability of a member of a violation of any of the following provisions of the Business and Professions Code shall result in disbarment or suspension depending on the gravity of the offense or the harm, if any, to the victim, with due regard to the purposes of imposing discipline set forth in standard 1.3....(a) Sections 6067 and 6068 ....
Standard 2.10 provides that the culpability of a member for violation of any provision of the Business and Professions Code or any Rule of Professional Conduct not specified in the Standards shall result in reproval or suspension, according to the gravity of the offense or harm, if any, to the victim, with due regard to the purposes of imposing discipline set forth in Standard 1.3.
Based on Standard 1.6(a), the most severe sanction for Respondent’s misconduct herein is found in Standard 2.6, which provides for suspension or disbarment. However, ten of the sixteen violations stipulated to herein are for failures to perform services in individual matters, which are under the ambit of Standard 2.4(b), which provides for reproval or suspension. Therefore, the application of Standard 2.4(b) is more reasonable.
Moreover, the mitigating circumstances discussed above do not justify a deviation from the Standards or a discipline less than suspension. Therefore, parties acknowledge that Respondent’s misconduct herein, and the aggravating circumstances surrounding that misconduct warrant actual suspension for a period of nine (9) months.
The disclosure date referred to on page two, paragraph A. (7) was September 15, 2011.
Respondent acknowledges that the Office of Chief Trial Counsel has informed him that as of September 15, 2011, the estimated prosecution costs in this matter are approximately $14,201.47. Respondent acknowledges that this figure is an estimate only. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.
Case Number(s): 07-O-13993; 08-O-12644; 08-O-14348; 08-O-14464; 09-O-11082; 09-O-11415; 09-O-13013; 09-O-14472; 10-O-01319; 10-O-02116
In the Matter of: EMILIO N. FRANCISCO
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: Emilio N. Francisco
Date: 09/16/2011
Respondent’s Counsel: Arthur L. Margolis
Date: 09/20/2011
Deputy Trial Counsel: Ashod Mooradian
Date: 09/21/2011
Case Number(s): 07-0-13993; 08-0-12644; 08-0-14348; 08-0-14464; 09-O-11082; 09-O-11415; 09-0-13013; 09-0-14472; 10-O-01319; 10-O-02116
In the Matter of: EMILIO N. FRANCISCO
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
On page 2 of the stipulation, in paragraph A(8), the stipulated membership years “2012 and 2013” are CHANGED to “2013 and 2014” so that the affected sentence now reads: “Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: 2013 and 2014.”
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58 (E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: DONALD F. MILES
Date: 09/29/2011
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on September 29, 2011, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND
ORDER APPROVING ACTUAL SUSPENSION
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:
ARTHUR LEWIS MARGOLIS
MARGOLIS & MARGOLIS LLP
2000 RIVERSIDE DR
LOS ANGELES, CA 90039
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
ASHOD MOORADIAN, Enforcement, Los Angeles
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on September 29, 2011.
Signed by:
Tammy Cleaver
Case Administrator
State Bar Court