Case Number(s): 07-O-14171, 09-O-12378
In the Matter of: Scott S. Furstman, Bar # 76476 , A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Mark Hartman, Deputy Trial Counsel
180 Howard Street, 7th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94105
Telephone: (415) 538-2558
Bar # 114925
Counsel for Respondent: Jonathan I. Arons, 221 Main Street, suite 740
San Francsico, CA 94105
Bar # 111257
Submitted to: Assigned Judge – State Bar Court Clerk’s Office – San Francisco .
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted December 21, 1977.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 11 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
checked. Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 5.130, Rules of Procedure.
<<not>> checked. Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
<<not>> checked. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs are entirely waived.
Respondent’s culpability of willfully violation section 6068, subdivision (i) of the Business and Professions Code) receives no weight in determining discipline in the current cases because respondent reasonably relied on respondent’s counsel to provide a response to Ziegler’s inquiry letter. See Page 9.
IN THE MATTER OF: Scott Smith Furstman, State Bar No. 76476
STATE BAR COURT CASE NUMBER: 07-O-14171, 09-O-12378
DISMISSALS
The State Bar of California ("the State Bar") dismisses Counts One and Two of the Notice of Disciplinary Charges ("NDC") against respondent in case numbers 07-O-14171 and 09-O-12378 ("the current cases").
WAIVERS
The parties waive all variances between the facts and conclusions of law asserted in the NDC and the facts and conclusions of law contained in this Stipulation.
FACTS
Respondent admits that the following facts are true:
1. Between June 2007 and December 2009, respondent maintained an attorney client trust account ("trust account"), into which he deposited client funds. He regularly deposited personal funds into the trust account and regularly made withdrawals from the trust account for personal and business expenses.
2. Between November 2007 and December 2009, respondent let the trust account be overdrawn 13 times through electronic debits, when he knew, or was grossly negligent if he failed to know, that the trust account had insufficient funds to cover the electronic debits.
3. On April 29, 2009, the State Bar opened its investigation of State Bar Court case number 09-O-12378.
4. On July 20, 2009, State Bar Investigator Dolores Ziegler ("Ziegler") sent respondent an inquiry letter regarding respondent’s conduct in case number 09-O-12378. The letter requested that respondent respond in writing to allegations against him. Respondent received the letter.
5. On July 23, 2009, respondent employed attorney Jonathan Arons ("respondent’s counsel") to represent him in case number 09-O-12378. On the same day, respondent counsel’s staff informed the State Bar that respondent’s counsel would provide a written response to the allegations by August 13, 2009. On the next day, respondent’s counsel received a letter confirming that he was granted an extension until August 17, 2009, to provide a written response to the allegations against respondent.
6. Thereafter, neither respondent nor respondent’s counsel provided the State Bar with a written response to the allegations against respondent in case number 09-O-12378.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Respondent admits that the following conclusions of law are true:
1. In violation of rule 4-100(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, respondent wilfully deposited and commingled his personal funds in a bank account labeled "Trust Account" by using his trust account as a general business account and as personal account between June 2007 and December 2009.
2. In violation of section 6106 of the Business and Professions Code, respondent committed acts involving moral turpitude by making 13 electronic debits from his trust account between November 2007 and December 2009, when he knew, or was grossly negligent if he failed to know, that the trust account had insufficient funds to cover the electronic debits.
3. In violation of section 6068, subdivision (i) of the Business and Professions Code, respondent willfully failed to cooperate and participate in a disciplinary investigation by not providing a written response to Ziegler’s inquiry letter.
AGGRAVATION
Prior Record of Discipline: Inca decision filed on November 29, 2010, the State Bar Court found respondent culpable of misconduct of misconduct in case numbers 04-O-10156, 04-O-13227, 04-O-15145, 04-O-15425, 05-O-00597, and 06-O-11170 (’~the prior cases"). The Court recommended a one-year stayed suspension and a two-year probation, subject to a nine-month actual suspension and other conditions. The California Supreme Court has not yet acted on the prior cases.
Multiple Acts: Respondent’s misconduct included multiple acts of wrongdoing.
MITIGATION
Candor/Cooperation: Respondent has displayed candor to, and cooperation with, the State Bar in resolving the current cases by entering into this Stipulation.
No Weight Given to Culpability of Willfully Violating Section 6068, Subdivision (i) of the Business and Professions Code: Respondent’s culpability of willfully violating section 6068, subdivision (i) of the Business and Professions Code) receives no weight in determining discipline in the current cases because respondent reasonably relied on respondent’s counsel to provide a response to Ziegler’s inquiry letter.
SUPPORTING AUTHORITY
The determination of discipline begins "by looking to the purpose of sanctions for attorney misconduct." (In re Morse (1995) 11 Cal.4th 184, 205.) Standard 1.3 provides: "The primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings.., are the protection of the public, the courts[,] and the legal profession; the maintenance of high professional standards by attorneys[;] and the preservation of public confidence in the legal profession."
The standards provide guidance and deserve "great weight." (In re Nancy (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 190; Van Sloten v. State Bar (1989) 48 Cal.3d 921,933, fn. 5.) "[A]dherence to the standards in the great majority of cases serves the valuable purpose of eliminating disparity and assuring consistency, that is, the imposition of similar attorney discipline for instances of similar misconduct." (In re Naney, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 190; see also In re Brown (1995) 12 Cal.4th 205,220.) The California Supreme Court accepts a disciplinary recommendation resulting from application of the standards unless it has "grave doubts" about the recommendation’s propriety. (In re Morse, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 206; In re Lamb (1989) 49 Cal.3d 239, 245.)
Standard 1.7(a) requires greater discipline in a second disciplinary proceeding than the discipline in a first disciplinary proceeding. Because the disciplinary recommendation in respondent’s prior cases was a one-year stayed suspension and a two-year probation, subject to a nine-month actual suspension and other conditions, standard 1.7(a) calls for more severe discipline in the current cases.
Standard 2.2(b) provides that culpability of a member of commingling of entrusted funds or property with personal property or some other violation of rule 4-100 of the Rules of Professional Conduct shall result in at least a three-month actual suspension from the practice of law, irrespective of mitigating circumstances. Pursuant to standard 2.2(b), respondent’s commingling warrants at least a three-month actual suspension.
Standard 2.3 provides in part that an act of moral turpitude, fraud, or intentional dishonesty toward a client shall result in actual suspension or disbarment depending upon the extent to which the victim of the misconduct is harmed or misled and depending upon the magnitude of the act of misconduct and the degree to which it relates to the member’s acts within the practice of law. Pursuant to standard 2.3, respondent acts of moral turpitude require actual suspension or disbarment.
Similar cases can indicate appropriate discipline. (In re Morse, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 207-208; Snyder v. State Bar (1990) 49 Cal.3d 1302, 1310-1311.) In the Matter of Heiser (Review Dept. 1990) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr 47 ("Heiser") is instructive for the current cases.
In Heiser, an attorney willfully violated rule 4-100(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct and section 6106 of the Business and Professions Code by writing seven non-sufficient-funds ("NSF") checks between June 1987 and April 1988. Four of these checks were drawn on a personal account, and three were drawn on a client trust account. Also, the attorney willfully violated section 6068, subdivision (i) of the Business and Professions Code by failing to cooperate with the disciplinary investigation against him and section 6068, subdivision (j) of the Business and Professions Code by failing to maintain a current address with the State Bar. The State Bar Court Review Department recommended a one-year stayed suspension and a two-year probation, conditioned on a six-month actual suspension and restitution. The Supreme Court adopted this recommendation.
Respondent committed misconduct similar to Heiser’s misconduct. Unlike Heiser, respondent cooperated with the State Bar by entering into this stipulation; and his culpability of willfully violating section 6068, subdivision (i) of the Business and Professions Code deserves no weight in determining discipline. Yet respondent has a prior disciplinary recommendation. In the prior cases, the State Bar Court recommended a one-year stayed suspension and a two-year probation, conditioned on a nine-month actual suspension and other requirements. Based on this prior disciplinary recommendation, the facts and culpability in the current cases, the standards, and Heiser, the appropriate discipline in the current cases is a two-year stayed suspension and a three-year probation, subject to a one-year actual suspension.
DATE OF DISCLOSURE OF ANY PENDING INVESTIGATION OR PROCEEDING
On January 25,2011, the State Bar sent a disclosure letter by e-mail to respondent’s counsel. In this letter, the State Bar advised respondent’s counsel of any pending investigations or proceedings against respondent other than the current cases.
OVERLAP OF DISCIPLINE IN THE CURRENT AND PRIOR CASES
The parties recognize that the discipline in the current cases is likely to overlap the discipline in the prior cases. They intend the following:
Starting Date of Discipline: The discipline in the current cases shall start on the effective date of the Supreme Court’s order in the current cases regardless of any overlap with the discipline in the prior cases.
Ethics School: In the prior cases, the Supreme Court is likely to require that within one year after the effective date of the discipline in the prior cases, respondent must provide to the Office of Probation satisfactory proof of attendance at a session of Ethics School and passage of the test given at the end of that session. If respondent complies with such a requirement within one year after the effective date of the discipline in the current cases, this compliance shall satisfy the Ethics School condition in the current cases, as well as the Ethics School condition in the prior cases.
MPRE: In the prior cases, the Supreme Court is likely to require that within one year after the effective date of the discipline in the prior cases, respondent must provide proof of passage of the MPRE to the Office of Probation. If respondent complies with such a requirement within one year after the effective date of the discipline in the current cases, this compliance shall satisfy the MPRE condition in the current cases, as well as the MPRE condition in the prior cases.
Case Number(s): 07-O-14071; 09-O-12378
In the Matter of: Scott S. Furstman, Bar No.: 76476
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: Scott S. Furstman
Date: 02/01/2011
Respondent’s Counsel: Jonathan I. Arons
Date: 02/01/2011
Deputy Trial Counsel: Mark Hartman
Case Number(s): 07-O-14171, 09-O-12378
In the Matter of: Scott S. Furstman
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
On page 4 of the stipulation, the "X" in box D(1)(a)(i) is DELETED to remove the "and until" standard 1.4(c)(ii) condition. (It is inappropriate to attach an "and until" condition to a period of stayed suspension.)
On page 5 of the stipulation, the "X" in box E(1) is DELETED to remove the conditional standard 1.4(c)(ii) requirement. (Because no "and until" condition is attached to respondent’s one-year suspension, he will not and cannot be "actually suspended for two years or more." Thus, it is inappropriate to "attach" the conditional standard 1.4(c)(ii) requirement in paragraph E(t) to respondent’s one-year suspension.")
On page 5 of the stipulation, the "X" in box E(8) is DELETED to remove the probation condition requiring that respondent attend and complete Ethics School.
On page 5 of the stipulation, in paragraph E(8), an "X" is INSERTED in the second box to provide that “No Ethics School [is] Recommended" in this proceeding, and the following text is INSERTED after the word
"Reason:"
On January 19, 2011, the State Bar Court transmitted its discipline recommendation in respondent’s prior disciplinary proceeding to the Supreme Court in case number S189928, styled In re Scott Smith Furstman on Discipline (hereafter Furstman I). The State Bar Court’s discipline recommendation in Furstman I already includes a probation condition requiring that respondent complete Ethics School.
On page 6 of the stipulation, the "X" in box F(1) is DELETE to remove the requirement that respondent take and pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination.
On page 6 of the stipulation, in paragraph F(1), an "X" is INSERTED in the second box to provide that "No MPRE [is] recommended" in the present proceeding, and the following text is INSERTED after the word
"Reason:"
The State Bar Court’s discipline recommendation in Furstman I, which was filed in the Supreme Court on January 19, 2011, already includes a requirement that respondent take and pass the MPRE.
On page 10 of the stipulation, the last two paragraphs, which are titled "Ethics School" and "MPRE," respectively, are DELETED in their entirety.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58 (E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Lucy Armendariz
Date: March 1, 2011
Case Number(s): 07-O-14171, 09-O-12378
In the Matter of: Scott S. Furstman
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
On page 4 of the stipulation, the "X" in box D(1)(a)(i) is DELETED to remove the "and until" standard 1.4(c)(ii) condition. (It is inappropriate to attach an "and until" condition to a period of stayed suspension.)
On page 5 of the stipulation, the "X" in box E(1) is DELETED to remove the conditional standard 1.4(c)(ii) requirement. (Because no "and until" condition is attached to respondent’s one-year suspension, he will not and cannot be "actually suspended for two years or more." Thus, it is inappropriate to "attach" the conditional standard 1.4(c)(ii) requirement in paragraph E(t) to respondent’s one-year suspension.")
On page 5 of the stipulation, the "X" in box E(8) is DELETED to remove the probation condition requiring that respondent attend and complete Ethics School.
On page 5 of the stipulation, in paragraph E(8), an "X" is INSERTED in the second box to provide that “No Ethics School [is] Recommended" in this proceeding, and the following text is INSERTED after the word
"Reason:"
On January 19, 2011, the State Bar Court transmitted its discipline recommendation in respondent’s prior disciplinary proceeding to the Supreme Court in case number S189928, styled In re Scott Smith Furstman on Discipline (hereafter Furstman I). The State Bar Court’s discipline recommendation in Furstman I already includes a probation condition requiring that respondent complete Ethics School.
On page 6 of the stipulation, the "X" in box F(1) is DELETE to remove the requirement that respondent take and pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination.
On page 6 of the stipulation, in paragraph F(1), an "X" is INSERTED in the second box to provide that "No MPRE [is] recommended" in the present proceeding, and the following text is INSERTED after the word
"Reason:"
The State Bar Court’s discipline recommendation in Furstman I, which was filed in the Supreme Court on January 19, 2011, already includes a requirement that respondent take and pass the MPRE.
On page 10 of the stipulation, the last two paragraphs, which are titled "Ethics School" and "MPRE," respectively, are DELETED in their entirety.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58 (E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Lucy Armendariz
Date: March 1, 2011
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and
County of San Francisco, on March 1, 2011, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at San Francisco, California, addressed as follows:
JONATHAN IRWIN ARONS
LAW OFFICE OF JONATHAN I ARONS
221 MAIN ST STE 740
SAN FRANCISICO, CA 94105
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
MARK HARTMAN, Enforcement, San Francisco
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on March 1, 2011.
Signed by:
Laine Sibler
Case Administrator
State Bar Court