Case Number(s): 09-O-11877, 10-O-00161, 10-O-07237; Investigation Matters 09-O-12909; 09-O-19182; 10-O-06344; 10-O-10086
In the Matter of: Gregory A. Paiva , Bar # 207218 , A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Margaret P. Warren, 1149 So. Hill St.
Los Angeles, CA 90015-2299
(213) 765-1342
Bar #108774,
Counsel for Respondent: Poonam K. Walia,
4295-A Jurupa St., Suite 114
Ontario, CA 91761
(909) 390-1515
Bar #256781
Submitted to: Settlement Judge – State Bar Court Clerk’s Office Los Angeles
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted June 5, 2000.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 19 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
checked. Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 5.130, Rules of Procedure.
<<not>> checked. Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
<<not>> checked. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs are entirely waived.
Case Number(s): 09-O-11877, 10-O-00161, 10-O-07237;
Investigation Matters 09-O-12909; 09-O-19182; 10-O-06344; 10-O-10086
In the Matter of: Gregory A. Paiva, CSBN 207218
a. Restitution
checked. Respondent must pay restitution (including the principal amount, plus interest of 10% per annum) to the payee(s) listed below. If the Client Security Fund (“CSF”) has reimbursed one or more of the payee(s) for all or any portion of the principal amount(s) listed below, Respondent must also pay restitution to CSF in the amount(s) paid, plus applicable interest and costs.
1. Payee: Please see p.17, below.<<Financial Conditions, Restitution >>
Principal Amount:
Interest Accrues From:
2. Payee:
Principal Amount:
Interest Accrues From:
3. Payee:
Principal Amount:
Interest Accrues From:
4. Payee:
Principal Amount:
Interest Accrues From:
checked. Respondent must pay above-referenced restitution and provide satisfactory proof of payment to the Office of Probation not later than Please see p.17, below.<<Financial Conditions, Restitution.>>
checked. Respondent must pay the above-referenced restitution on the payment schedule set forth below. Respondent must provide satisfactory proof of payment to the Office of Probation with each quarterly probation report, or as otherwise directed by the Office of Probation. No later than 30 days prior to the expiration of the period of probation (or period of reproval), Respondent must make any necessary final payment(s) in order to complete the payment of restitution, including interest, in full.
1. Payee/CSF (as applicable) Please see p.17, below. Minimum Payment Amount
Payment Frequency
2. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
Payment Frequency
3. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
Payment Frequency
4. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
Payment Frequency
checked. If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
<<not>> checked.
1. If Respondent possesses client funds at any time during the period covered by a required quarterly report, Respondent must file with each required report a certificate from Respondent and/or a certified public accountant or other financial professional approved by the Office of Probation, certifying that:
a. Respondent has maintained a bank account in a bank authorized to do business in the State of California, at a branch located within the State of California, and that such account is designated as a “Trust Account” or “Clients’ Funds Account”;
b. Respondent has kept and maintained the following:
i. A written ledger for each client on whose behalf funds are held that sets forth:
1. the name of such client;
2. the date, amount and source of all funds received on behalf of such client;
3. the date, amount, payee and purpose of each disbursement made on behalf of such client; and,
4. the current balance for such client.
ii. a written journal for each client trust fund account that sets forth:
1. the name of such account;
2. the date, amount and client affected by each debit and credit; and,
3. the current balance in such account.
iii. all bank statements and cancelled checks for each client trust account; and,
iv. each monthly reconciliation (balancing) of (i), (ii), and (iii), above, and if there are any differences between the monthly total balances reflected in (i), (ii), and (iii), above, the reasons for the differences.
c. Respondent has maintained a written journal of securities or other properties held for clients that specifies:
i. each item of security and property held;
ii. the person on whose behalf the security or property is held;
iii. the date of receipt of the security or property;
iv. the date of distribution of the security or property; and,
v. the person to whom the security or property was distributed.
2. If Respondent does not possess any client funds, property or securities during the entire period covered by a report, Respondent must so state under penalty of perjury in the report filed with the Office of Probation for that reporting period. In this circumstance, Respondent need not file the accountant’s certificate described above.
3. The requirements of this condition are in addition to those set forth in rule 4-100, Rules of Professional Conduct.
checked. Within one (1) year of the effective date of the discipline herein, Respondent must supply to the Office of Probation satisfactory proof of attendance at a session of the Ethics School Client Trust Accounting School, within the same period of time, and passage of the test given at the end of that session.
IN THE MATTER OF: Gregory A. Paiva ,
STATE BAR COURT CASE NUMBER: 09-O-11877, 10-O-00161,10-O-07237; Investigation Matters 09-O-12909; 09-O-19182;10-O-06344;10-O-10086
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that he is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct:
1. Respondent is not presently, and never has been, admitted to the practice of law in the States of Florida and Washington.
Case No. 09-O-11877 (Counts 1 and 2)
Facts:
1. In May 2008, Respondent accepted the representation of Kelly Taylor ("Taylor"), a resident of the State of Florida, in order to negotiate and obtain for Taylor a residential home loan modification on real property Taylor owned in Florida.
2. In June 2008, Taylor paid Respondent legal fees of $2,000.00.
3. In May 2009, Respondent refunded $1,000.00 to Taylor.
Legal Conclusions:
4. By holding himself out as entitled to practice law in the State of Florida when he was not so licensed, and accepting Taylor as a client, in violation of the regulations of the profession in that jurisdiction, Respondent willfully violated rule 1-300(B) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
5. By entering into an agreement for, charging, and collecting a fee from Taylor in a jurisdiction where Respondent was not licensed to practice law, Respondent entered into an agreement for, charged, and collected an illegal fee in violation of rule 4-200(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Case No. 10-O-07237 (Counts 5 and 6)
6. In August 2008, Respondent accepted the representation of Cora Wells, a resident of the State of Washington, in order to negotiate and obtain for Wells a residential home loan modification on real property Wells owned in Washington.
7. In August 2008, Wells paid Respondent legal fees in the amount of $1,995.00.
Legal Conclusions:
8. By holding himself out as entitled to practice law in the State of Washington when he was not so licensed, and accepting Wells as a client, in violation of the regulations of the profession in that jurisdiction, Respondent willfully violated rule 1-300(B) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
9. By entering into an agreement for, charging, and collecting a fee from Wells in a jurisdiction where Respondent was not licensed to practice law, Respondent entered into an agreement for, charged, and collected an illegal fee in violation of rule 4-200(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Case No. 10-O-00161 (Count 3)
10. In July 2008, Victor Espinosa hired Respondent to negotiate and obtain for him a home mortgage loan modification, and paid Respondent an advanced fee of $3,995.00.
11. On August 31, 2009, Espinosa wrote a letter to Respondent in which he demanded a complete refund of the $3,995.00 in advanced fees he had paid to Respondent, thereby effectively terminating Respondent’s employment.
12. Respondent did not respond to Espinosa’s letter or provide Espinosa with an accounting for the legal services Respondent performed on Espinosa’s behalf.
13. In December 2009, Espinosa sued Respondent in small claims court, to recover the $3,995.00 he had paid to Respondent.
14. Only after Espinosa sued him did Respondent provide an accounting for his services to Espinosa.
15. On February 3, 2010, a Notice of Entry of Judgment in Espinosa’s small claims case was filed. Judgment was in favor of Respondent.
Legal Conclusions:
16. By not rendering to Espinosa an accounting for the $3,995.00 in fees Espinosa had paid him after Espinosa demanded a refund in late August 2009, and by not rendering such an accounting until after Espinosa sued Respondent in December 2009 to recover the $3,995.00, Respondent failed to render appropriate accounts to a client regarding all funds coming into Respondent’s possession, in willful violation of rule 4-100(B)(3) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Investigation No. 09-O-12909
17. On August 27, 1998, Mary Chandra ("Chandra") obtained a $2,145.00 judgment
("judgment") on behalf of Chandra Property Management against tenants Steve Agers ("Agers") and James Richlin ("Richlin") in an unlawful detainer action filed in the San Bernardino County Superior Court, case number CWV 123807 ("Chandra case"). Chandra was the former property manager for Donald Kline ("Kline"), who owned the property rented by the tenants.
18. On or about November 5, 1998, Chandra assigned the judgment to Kline.
19. In February 2007, Kline hired Respondent to collect on the judgment. Kline agreed to pay Respondent on a contingency fee basis with Respondent receiving 40% of the first $1,000 collected, 30% of the next $1,000 collected, and 20% of any and all amounts collected thereafter. Respondent and Kline did not execute a written fee agreement.
20. On August 14, 2008, Respondent filed a substitution of attorney in the Chandra case that contained a false signature for Chandra, substituting himself as counsel for the judgment creditor in place of Chandra, who was in pro. per. for Chandra Property Management. When Respondent filed this substitution of attorney with the Court, he knew that Chandra had not authorized her signature on the substitution.
21. On August 14, 2008, Respondent filed an application for renewal of the judgment, and renewed the Judgment for an additional 10 years.
22. Respondent never collected, on the judgment.
23. On March 20, 2009, Kline emailed Respondent concerning Respondent’s failure to collect on the judgment.
24. On March 24, 2009, Respondent emailed Kline stating that as a result of his investigation, he discovered that Agers was now deceased and that he had located Richlin. Respondent also stated that he filed an application for a judgment debtor examination ("debtor examination"), which would allow Respondent to ask Richlin to provide information as to his assets and financial situation.
25. Thereafter, Respondent took no further action on behalf of Kline to obtain a debtor’s examination of Richlin or otherwise collect on the judgment.
26. On June 10, 2009, Kline emailed Respondent terminating his legal services and requesting his case file. On that same day, Respondent replied to Kline, stating that he would provide the file as soon as possible. To date, Respondent has not provided Kline with his client file.
Legal Conclusions:
27. By filing a substitution of attorney that contained a false signature, Respondent sought to mislead the judge or judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law, in willful violation of section 6068(d) of the Business and Professions Code.
28. By failing to timely investigate Agers and Richlin, failing to pursue a debtor examination, or otherwise collecting the judgment, Respondent intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence, in willful violation of rule 3-110(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
29. By failing to provide Kline with his client file, Respondent failed to release promptly, upon termination of employment, to the client, at the request of the client, all the client papers and property, in willful violation of rule 3-700(D)(1) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Investigation No. 09-O-19182
30. Randi Yager, a loan consultant and independent loss mitigation broker, hired Respondent in February 2009 to obtain loan modifications of the home mortgage loans of seven (7) different property owners.
31. Yager paid Respondent advance fees by credit card, on February 9, 2009 in the amount of $4,000.00, and on March 4, 2009, in the amount of $4,000.00 (for a total of $8,000.00) to obtain home mortgage loan modifications for the seven property owners. The $8,000.00 Yager paid to Respondent were Yager’s personal funds, which she advanced on behalf of the seven property owners.
32. In 2009, Respondent had a financial arrangement with Sequoia Consulting Group ("Sequoia"), owned by John Camacho, a non-lawyer, whereby Sequoia would "process" home mortgage loan modifications in exchange for Respondent paying
Camacho/Sequoia the funds he received from Yager; Camacho/Sequoia would in turn pay Respondent $500.00 per client file as a "retainer." Camacho paid Respondent $2,000.00 in "retainer" fees for four of the seven property owners’ files.
33. Respondent performed no legal services of value on behalf of the seven property owners. Camacho/Sequoia did not "process" any of the seven property owners’ home mortgage loan modifications. Camacho/Sequoia did not return any portion of the $8,000.00 Respondent paid him from the funds Respondent received from Yager.
34. Respondent did not earn any portion of the $8,000.00 Yager paid him.
35. To date, Respondent has not refunded to Yager or anyone else any portion of the $8,000.00 Yager paid him.
36. Beginning in approximately mid-2009, Respondent ceased responding to Yager’s numerous attempts to obtain status updates from him on the seven home mortgage loan modification matters she had hired him to handle.
Legal Conclusions:
37. By failing to perform any legal services of value on behalf of the seven property owners Yager hired him to represent in home mortgage loan modification matters, Respondent intentionally,recklessly, or repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence, in willful violation of rule 3110(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
38. By not refunding any portion of the $8,000.00 in advance fees paid to him by Yager, Respondent failed to refund promptly a fee paid in advance that had not been earned, in willful violation of rule 3-700(D)(2) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
39. By sharing legal fees with Camacho, a non-lawyer, Respondent directly or indirectly shared legal fees with a person who is not a lawyer, in willful violation of rule 1-320 (A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
40. By failing to respond to Yager’s reasonable status inquiries in and after mid-2009, Respondent failed to respond promptly to reasonable status inquiries of clients and to keep clients reasonably informed of significant developments in matters with regard to which the attorney has agreed to provide legal services, in willful violation of section 6068(m) of the Business and Professions Code.
Investigation No. 10-O-6344
41. On June 16, 2009, Gwen Jepeway hired Respondent to represent her in a marital dissolution matter.
42. Effective October 29, 2009, Respondent was suspended from the practice of law in the State of California for a period of 60 days, by disciplinary order of the Supreme Court (S 175109) filed on September 29, 2009 in Case Nos. 06-O-14235 and 07-O-13173. Respondent was actually suspended from the practice of law from October 29, 2009 through December 28, 2009. Respondent knew he was not entitled to practice law during the period of his actual suspension.
43. Jepeway did not terminate Respondent’s services at any time during the period of his 60-day suspension; Respondent did not withdraw from representation of Jepeway during his actual suspension;and Jepeway’s marital dissolution proceeding was not dismissed by the court at any time during
Respondent’s 60-day actual suspension.
44. At no time did Respondent inform Jepeway that he would not be able to practice law for 60 days, effective October 29, 2009.
45. In November 2009, while Respondent was still on his 60-day suspension from the practice of law, he spoke with Jepeway, gave her legal advice, and told her he would take certain affirmative steps on her behalf in her dissolution matter regarding Jepeway’s husband’s failure to pay court-ordered child and spousal support. Respondent did not disclose to Jepeway, however, that he was precluded from practicing law through December 28, 2009.
46. On November 18, 2009, Respondent billed Jepeway $300.00 for legal services he performed on her behalf while actually suspended from the practice of law. On December 17, 2009, Respondent billed Jepeway $30.00 for legal services he performed on her behalf while actually suspended from the practice of law.
Jepeway did not, however, pay the $330.00 to Respondent.
Legal Conclusions:
47. By giving legal advice to, and performing legal services for, a client when he was not entitled to practice law, Respondent practiced law when he was not entitled to do so in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, sections 6125 and 6126, and thereby failed to support the laws of the State of California in willful violation of section 6068(a) of the Business and Professions Code.
48. By entering into an agreement for, charging, or collecting a fee from Jepeway for legal services he performed, when he knew he was on actual suspension from the practice of law, Respondent entered into an agreement for, charged, or collected an illegal fee in violation of rule 4-200(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Investigation No. 10-O-10086:
49. On October 16, 2008, Timothy Campbell hired Respondent to obtain a loan modification on a rental property owned by Campbell. On that same date, Campbell executed a "Fee Agreement for Loan Modification" with the "Law Offices of Gregory A. Paiva & Assoc., P.C.", that quoted an advance fee of $3,000.00 to be paid "prior to any work being started".
50. Campbell paid "The Law Offices of Paiva" and "Law Offices of George [sic] A. Paiva and Assoc." by two cashier’s checks, dated January 26 and January 27, 2009, in the amounts of $1,700.00 and $1,750.00, respectively (for a total of $3,450.00).
51. Thereafter, Respondent failed to perform any legal services of value for Campbell.
52. Respondent did not earn any portion of the $3,450.00 Campbell paid him.
53. In late February/early March 2009, Campbell made several telephone calls to Respondent’s office to inquire about the status of his matter. Each time he called, Campbell was told by an employee of Respondent’s office that Respondent was unavailable. Each time he called, Campbell left messages for Respondent, requesting Respondent to call him back. Respondent never returned Campbell’s
telephone calls or otherwise communicated with him.
54. On August 12, 2010, T.Y.P. Legal Business Services, acting on behalf of Campbell, wrote to Respondent, requesting Respondent to refund to Campbell the monies he had paid to Respondent. Respondent’s office replied to this letter, claiming that Respondent’s office had "never extended a modification retainer to Mr. Campbell" and denying that Campbell had paid Respondent any monies other than a $200.00 consultation fee in another, unrelated matter.
55. By taking no action on behalf of Campbell, Respondent effectively withdrew from representation of Campbell. At no time did Respondent inform Campbell that he was withdrawing from employment.
56. To date, Respondent has not refunded any portion of the $3,450.00 in advance fees Campbell paid him.
Legal Conclusions:
57. By failing to perform any legal services of value for Campbell on and after January 26, 2009, Respondent intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence, in willful violation of rule 3-110(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
58. By failing to respond to Campbell’s status inquiries in late February/early March 2009, Respondent failed to respond promptly to reasonable status inquiries of clients and to keep clients reasonably informed of significant developments in matters with regard to which the attorney has agreed to provide legal services, in willful violation of section 6068(m) of the Business and Professions Code.
59. By withdrawing from his representation of Campbell without informing Campbell of his withdrawal from employment, Respondent withdrew from employment without taking reasonable steps to avoid reasonably foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his client, in willful violation of rule 3700(A)(2) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
60. By not refunding any portion of the $3,450.00 in advanced fees paid to him by Campbell, Respondent failed to refund promptly a fee paid in advance that had not been earned, in willful violation of rule 3-700(D)(2) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
FINANCIAL CONDITIONS, RESTITUTION.
Respondent must pay restitution (including principal amount, plus statutory interest of 10% per annum) to the payees listed below, on the payment schedule set forth below. If the Client Security Fund ("CSF") has reimbursed one or more of the payees for all or any portion of the principal amounts listed below, Respondent must pay restitution to CSF in the amount(s) paid, plus applicable interest and costs. Respondent is to pay any and all amounts owed to the payees listed below, before making any reimbursement to CSF, if CSF makes payment(s), in any amount(s), to any payee(s).
Payee Kelly Taylor, Principal Amount $1,000.00, Interest Accrues From June 2008
Payee Cora Wells, Principal Amount $1,995.00, Interest Accrues From August 2008
Payee Timothy Campbell, Principal Amount $3,450.00, Interest Accrues From January 2009
Payee Randi Yager, Principal Amount $8,000.00, Interest Accrues From March 2009
Respondent must make a minimum payment of $1,245.00 in each of the first eleven (11) reporting quarters of his probation. Respondent has the discretion to determine which payee(s) he will pay each quarter. Respondent may, in his discretion, elect to pay two or more payees per quarter, as long as the total amount paid equals or exceeds the minimum quarterly payment of $1,245.00.
Respondent must provide satisfactory proof of payment to the Office of Probation with each quarterly probation report, or as otherwise directed by the Office of Probation. No later than thirty (30) days prior to the expiration of the period of probation, Respondent must make any necessary final payment(s) in order to complete the payment of restitution, including interest, in full.
The reason this Stipulation is for a probation period of three (3) years is to afford Respondent the opportunity to make restitution payments in quarterly installments as set forth above. If Respondent completes full restitution (principal plus interest) to all payees, timely complies with all other required conditions of his probation, and has completed at least two (2) years of the probation period, Respondent may request early termination of his probation.
PENDING PROCEEDINGS.
The disclosure date referred to, on page 2, paragraph A(7), was March 8,2011.
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.
Standard 1.7 (a):
If a member is found culpable of professional misconduct in any proceeding in which discipline may be imposed and the member has a record of one prior imposition of discipline as defined by standard 1.2 (f), the degree of discipline imposed in the current proceeding shall be greater than that imposed in the
prior proceeding unless the prior discipline imposed was so remote in time to the current proceeding and the offense for which it was imposed was so minimal in severity that imposing greater discipline in the current proceeding would be manifestly unjust. [Emphasis added.]
Standard 1.6 (a): "... If two or more acts of professional misconduct are found or acknowledged in a single disciplinary proceeding, and different sanctions are prescribed by these standards for said acts, the sanction imposed shall be the more or most severe of the different applicable sanctions."
Standard 2.2 (b):
Culpability of a member of... the commission of another violation of rule 4-100... none of which offenses result in the wilful misappropriation of entrusted funds or property shall result in at least a three month actual suspension from the practice of law, irrespective of mitigating circumstances.
Standard 2.3 provides:
Culpability of a member of an act of moral turpitude, fraud, or intentional dishonesty toward a court, client or another person or of concealment of a material fact to a court, client or another person shall result in actual suspension or disbarment depending upon the extent to which the victim of the misconduct is harmed or misled and depending upon the magnitude of the act of misconduct and the degree to which it relates to the member’s acts within the practice of law.
Standard 2.4 (b):
Culpability of a member of wilfully failing to perform services in an individual matter or matters not demonstrating a pattern of misconduct or culpability of a member of wilfully failing to communicate with a client shall result in reproval or suspension depending on the extent of the misconduct and the
degree of harm to the client.
DISMISSALS.
The parties respectfully request the Court to dismiss the following alleged violations in the interest of justice:
Case No. 10-O-00161, Count 4, Alleged Violation section 6106, Bus. & Prof. Code
Case Number(s): Gregory A. Paiva, CSBN 207218
In the Matter of: 09-O-11877, 10-O-00161,10-O-07237;
Investigation Matters 09-O-12909; 09-O-19182; 10-O-06344; 10-O-10086
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: Gregory A. Paiva
Date: 03-09-2011
Respondent’s Counsel: Poonam K. Walia
Date: 03-10-2011
Deputy Trial Counsel: Margaret P. Warren
Date: 03-11-2011
Case Number(s): Gregory A. Paiva, CSBN 207218
In the Matter of: 09-O-11877, 10-O-00161, 10-O-07237; Investigation Matters 09-O-12909; 09-O-19182; 10-O-06344; 10-O-10086
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58 (E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Richard A. Platel
Date: 03-22-2011
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and
County of <select city>, on March 22, 2011, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:
POONAM K. WALIA, ESQ.
GATEWAY LEGAL GROUP, P.C.
4295-A ]URUPA ST STE 114
ONTARIO, CA 93.761
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows: MARGARET WARREN, ESQ., Enforcement, Los Angeles
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on March 22, 2011.
Signed by:
Rose Luthi
Case Administrator
State Bar Court