


State Bar Court of California Hearing Department Los Angeles DISBARMENT			kwiktag® 018 042 168 
Counsel For The State Bar Jessica A. Lienau Office of the Chief Trial Counsel 1149 S. Hill Street Los Angeles, CA 90015 Bar # 269753	Case Number(s): 09-O-15204-PEM (09-O-16853; 09-O-19370; 10-O-00254; 10-O-00977; 10-O-03819)	For Court use only <div style="text-align: center;"> PUBLIC MATTER FILED OCT 11 2011 STATE BAR COURT CLERK'S OFFICE SAN FRANCISCO </div>	
In Pro Per Respondent Thomas G. Key 360 E. First Street #739 Tustin, CA 92780 Bar # 152520	Submitted to: Settlement Judge STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING; ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE ENROLLMENT DISBARMENT <input type="checkbox"/> PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED		
In the Matter of: THOMAS GEORGE KEY Bar # 152520 A Member of the State Bar of California (Respondent)			

Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.

A. Parties' Acknowledgments:

- (1) Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted June 6, 1991.
- (2) The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
- (3) All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of (13) pages, not including the order.
- (4) A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."

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- (5) Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law."
- (6) The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
- (7) No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
- (8) Payment of Disciplinary Costs—Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
- ☐ Costs to be awarded to the State Bar.
- ☐ Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
- ☒ Costs are entirely waived.
- (9) ORDER OF INACTIVE ENROLLMENT:
The parties are aware that if this stipulation is approved, the judge will issue an order of inactive enrollment under Business and Professions Code section 6007, subdivision (c)(4), and Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, rule 5.111(D)(1).

B. Aggravating Circumstances [for definition, see Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct, standard 1.2(b)]. Facts supporting aggravating circumstances are required.

- (1) ☒ **Prior record of discipline**
- (a) ☒ State Bar Court case # of prior case 95-O-14437-CEV
- (b) ☒ Date prior discipline effective July 22, 1998
- (c) ☒ Rules of Professional Conduct/ State Bar Act violations: Rules 4-100(B)(3) and 3-700(D)(3), Rules of Professional Conduct
- (d) ☒ Degree of prior discipline Two (2) years probation, six (6) months suspension stayed, probationary conditions, restitution conditions
- (e) ☒ If respondent has two or more incidents of prior discipline, use space provided below:

State Bar Case No. 97-O-15451-RMT

Discipline Effective: July 12, 2002

Rules of Professional Conduct/State Bar Act Violations: Sections 6068(k) and 6106, Business and Professions Code; Rule 4-100(a), Rules of Professional Conduct

Degree of Prior Discipline: Four (4) years probation, Four (4) years of suspension stayed, 30 days actual suspension, probationary conditions

State Bar Case No. 03-O-01114-RMT

Discipline Effective: January 14, 2005

Rules of Professional Conduct/State Bar Act Violations: Section 6068(a), Business and Professions Code

Degree of Prior Discipline: Two (2) years probation, One (1) year suspension stayed, probationary conditions

- (2) ☐ **Dishonesty:** Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by or followed by bad faith, dishonesty, concealment, overreaching or other violations of the State Bar Act or Rules of Professional Conduct.
- (3) ☐ **Trust Violation:** Trust funds or property were involved and respondent refused or was unable to account to the client or person who was the object of the misconduct for improper conduct toward said funds or property.
- (4) ☐ **Harm:** Respondent's misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public or the administration of justice.
- (5) ☐ **Indifference:** Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for the consequences of his or her misconduct.
- (6) ☐ **Lack of Cooperation:** Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims of his/her misconduct or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation or proceedings.
- (7) ☐ **Multiple/Pattern of Misconduct:** Respondent's current misconduct evidences multiple acts of wrongdoing or demonstrates a pattern of misconduct.
- (8) ☐ **No aggravating circumstances** are involved.

Additional aggravating circumstances:

C. Mitigating Circumstances [see standard 1.2(e)]. Facts supporting mitigating circumstances are required.

- (1) ☐ **No Prior Discipline:** Respondent has no prior record of discipline over many years of practice coupled with present misconduct which is not deemed serious.
- (2) ☐ **No Harm:** Respondent did not harm the client or person who was the object of the misconduct.
- (3) ☐ **Candor/Cooperation:** Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and cooperation with the victims of his/her misconduct and to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation and proceedings.
- (4) ☐ **Remorse:** Respondent promptly took objective steps spontaneously demonstrating remorse and recognition of the wrongdoing, which steps were designed to timely atone for any consequences of his/her misconduct.
- (5) ☐ **Restitution:** Respondent paid \$ on in restitution to without the threat or force of disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings.
- (6) ☐ **Delay:** These disciplinary proceedings were excessively delayed. The delay is not attributable to respondent and the delay prejudiced him/her.
- (7) ☒ **Good Faith:** Respondent acted in good faith. Respondent mistakenly believed that he was entitled to render legal services to out-of-state clients.
- (8) ☐ **Emotional/Physical Difficulties:** At the time of the stipulated act or acts of professional misconduct respondent suffered extreme emotional difficulties or physical disabilities which expert testimony would establish was directly responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities were not the product of

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any illegal conduct by the member, such as illegal drug or substance abuse, and respondent no longer suffers from such difficulties or disabilities.

- (9) ☐ **Severe Financial Stress:** At the time of the misconduct, respondent suffered from severe financial stress which resulted from circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond his/her control and which were directly responsible for the misconduct.
- (10) ☐ **Family Problems:** At the time of the misconduct, respondent suffered extreme difficulties in his/her personal life which were other than emotional or physical in nature.
- (11) ☐ **Good Character:** Respondent's good character is attested to by a wide range of references in the legal and general communities who are aware of the full extent of his/her misconduct.
- (12) ☐ **Rehabilitation:** Considerable time has passed since the acts of professional misconduct occurred followed by convincing proof of subsequent rehabilitation.
- (13) ☐ **No mitigating circumstances** are involved.

Additional mitigating circumstances:

Respondent has cooperated with the State Bar and wishes to enter into a Stipulation.

D. Discipline: **Disbarment.**

E. Additional Requirements:

- (1) **Rule 9.20, California Rules of Court:** Respondent must comply with the requirements of rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 calendar days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court's Order in this matter.
- (2) ☒ **Restitution:** Respondent must make restitution to Myriam Sepulveda in the amount of \$ 3000.00 plus 10 percent interest per year from April 29, 2009. If the Client Security Fund has reimbursed Myriam Sepulveda for all or any portion of the principal amount, respondent must pay restitution to CSF of the amount paid plus applicable interest and costs in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6140.5. Respondent must pay the above restitution and furnish satisfactory proof of payment to the State Bar's Office of Probation in Los Angeles no later than n/a days from the effective date of the Supreme Court order in this case.
- (3) ☒ **Other:** Further Restitution:
Respondent must make restitution to Robert and Nancy Eubanks in the amount of \$2,250.00 plus 10 percent interest per year from May 20, 2009.
Respondent must make restitution to Hoang Tong and Ngoc Yen Le in the amount of \$4,000.00 plus 10 percent interest per year from August 8, 2009.
Respondent must make restitution to Marilyn McChesney in the amount of \$3,000.00 plus 10 percent interest per year from June 25, 2009.
If the Client Security Fund has reimbursed Robert and Nancy Eubanks, Hoang Tong and Ngoc Yen Le, and/or Marilyn McChesney for all or any portion of the principal amount, Respondent must pay restitution to CSF of the amount paid plus applicable interest and costs in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6140.5.

ATTACHMENT TO
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION

IN THE MATTER OF: Thomas George Key (State Bar No. 152520)

CASE NUMBER(S): 09-O-15204; 09-O-16853; 09-O-19370; 10-O-00254; 10-O-00977; 10-O-03819

FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

Respondent pleads nolo contendere to the following facts and violations. Respondent completely understands that the plea for nolo contendere shall be considered the same as an admission of the stipulated facts and of his culpability of the statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct specified herein.

The Sepulveda Matter (Case No. 09-O-16853)

Facts.

The laws of the State of Nevada, including the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct, prohibit attorneys not licensed in Nevada from practicing law in Nevada subject to several limited exceptions. Respondent is not presently, and never has been, admitted to practice law in the state of Nevada and Respondent was not otherwise entitled to practice law in the State of Nevada during the time period addressed in this Notice of Disciplinary Charges.

On or about April 27, 2009, Respondent accepted the representation of Myriam Sepulveda ("Sepulveda"), a resident of Nevada, in order to negotiate and obtain for Sepulveda a home mortgage loan modification for her Nevada residential property, services which Respondent's "Attorney-Client Agreement" describes as including "negotiations, motions, pleadings, and all litigation." Respondent's "Attorney-Client Agreement," in several places, states that Respondent will be providing Sepulveda "legal services."

Between on or about April 29, 2009, and on or about July 3, 2009, Sepulveda paid Respondent advanced fees totaling \$3,000.00. Respondent entered into an agreement for and charged and collected fees to provide legal services from Sepulveda, in a jurisdiction, specifically Nevada, in which he was not admitted to practice law.

Between on or about June, 2009, and on or about August, 2009, Respondent and agents acting on behalf of Respondent negotiated with Sepulveda's home loan mortgage lender regarding Sepulveda's home loan mortgage modification.

At no point did Respondent associate with an attorney licensed to practice in Nevada on Sepulveda's home loan mortgage modification matter.

Conclusions of Law.

By accepting representation of Sepulveda as a client, collecting an advanced attorney fee and negotiating with Sepulveda's lender, Respondent willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of the regulations of the profession in Nevada in wilful violation of rule 1-300(B), Rules of Professional Conduct.

By accepting representation of Sepulveda and charging and collecting fees from Sepulveda, when he was not licensed to practice law in Nevada, Respondent willfully entered into an agreement for, charged, and collected an illegal fee from Sepulveda in wilful violation of rule 4-200(A), Rules of Professional Conduct.

The Eubanks Matter (Case No. 09-O-19370)

Facts.

The laws of the State of Washington, including the Washington Rules of Professional Conduct, prohibit attorneys not licensed in Washington from practicing law in Washington subject to several limited exceptions. Respondent is not presently, and never has been, admitted to practice law in the state of Washington and Respondent was not otherwise entitled to practice law in the State of Washington during the time period addressed in this Notice of Disciplinary Charges.

On or about September 14, 2009, Respondent accepted the representation of Robert and Nancy Eubanks ("collectively "the Eubanks"), residents of Washington, in order to negotiate and obtain for the Eubanks a home mortgage loan modification for their Washington residential property, services which Respondent's "Attorney-Client Agreement" describes as including "**loan modification negotiations, trial preparation, motions, pleading, and all litigation, with the Bank.**" [emphasis in original]. Respondent's "Attorney-Client Agreement," in several places, states that Respondent will be providing the Eubanks "legal services."

Between on or about May 20, 2009, and on or about September 14, 2009, the Eubanks paid Respondent advanced fees totaling \$2,250.00. Respondent entered into an agreement for and charged and collected fees to provide legal services from the Eubanks, in a jurisdiction, specifically Washington, in which he was not admitted to practice law.

Between on or about July, 2009, and on or about August, 2009, Respondent and agents acting on behalf of Respondent negotiated with the Eubanks' home loan mortgage lender regarding the Eubanks' home loan mortgage modification.

At no point did Respondent associate with an attorney licensed to practice in Washington on the Eubanks' home loan mortgage modification matter.

Conclusions of Law.

By accepting representation of the Eubanks as clients, collecting an advanced attorney fee and negotiating with the Eubanks' lender, Respondent willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of the regulations of the profession in Washington in wilful violation of rule 1-300(B), Rules of Professional Conduct.

By accepting representation of the Eubanks and charging, and collecting fees from the Eubanks, when he was not licensed to practice law in Washington, Respondent wilfully entered into an agreement for, charged, and collected an illegal fee from the Eubanks in wilful violation of rule 4-200(A), Rules of Professional Conduct.

The Tong/Le Matter (Case No. 10-O-00977)

Facts.

The laws of the State of Oregon, including the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct, prohibit attorneys not licensed in Oregon from practicing law in Oregon subject to several limited exceptions. Respondent is not presently, and never has been, admitted to practice law in the state of Oregon and Respondent was not otherwise entitled to practice law in the State of Oregon during the time period addressed in this Notice of Disciplinary Charges.

On or about July, 2009, Respondent accepted the representation of Hoang Tong ("Tong") and Ngoc Yen Le ("Le"), residents of Oregon, in order to negotiate and obtain for Tong and Le a home mortgage loan modification for their Oregon residential property, services which Respondent's "Attorney-Client Agreement" describes as including **"loan modification negotiations, trial preparation, motions, pleading, and all litigation, with the Bank."** [emphasis in original]. Respondent's "Attorney-Client Agreement," in several places, states that Respondent will be providing Tong and Le "legal services."

Between on or about August 8, 2009, and on or about September 19, 2009, Tong and Le paid Respondent advanced fees totaling \$4,000.00. Respondent entered into an agreement for and charged and collected fees to provide legal services from Tong and Le, in a jurisdiction, specifically Oregon, in which he was not admitted to practice law.

On or about September, 2009, Respondent and or agents acting on behalf of Respondent negotiated with Tong's and Le's home loan mortgage lender regarding Tong's and Le's home loan mortgage modification.

At no point did Respondent associate with an attorney licensed to practice in Oregon on Tong's and Le's home loan mortgage modification matter.

Conclusions of Law.

By accepting representation of Tong and Le as clients, collecting an advanced attorney fee and negotiating with Tong's and Le's lender, Respondent willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of the regulations of the profession in Oregon in wilful violation of rule 1-300(B), Rules of Professional Conduct.

By accepting representation of Tong and Le and charging, and collecting fees from Tong and Le, when he was not licensed to practice law in Oregon, Respondent wilfully entered into an agreement for, charged, and collected an illegal fee from Tong and Le in wilful violation of rule 4-200(A), Rules of Professional Conduct.

Facts.

The laws of the State of Arizona, including the Arizona Ethics Rules, prohibit attorneys not licensed in Arizona from practicing law in Arizona subject to several limited exceptions. Respondent is not presently, and never has been, admitted to practice law in the state of Arizona and Respondent was not otherwise entitled to practice law in the State of Arizona during the time period addressed in this Notice of Disciplinary Charges.

On or about June 23, 2009, Respondent accepted the representation of Marilyn McChesney ("McChesney"), a resident of Arizona, in order to negotiate and obtain for McChesney a home mortgage loan modification for her Arizona residential property, services which Respondent's "Attorney-Client Agreement" describes as including **"loan modification negotiations, trial preparation, motions, pleading, and all litigation, with the Bank."** [emphasis in original]. Respondent's "Attorney-Client Agreement," in several places, states that Respondent will be providing McChesney "legal services."

Between on or about June 25, 2009, and on or about August 19, 2009, McChesney paid Respondent advanced fees totaling \$3,000.00. Respondent entered into an agreement for and charged and collected fees to provide legal services from McChesney, in a jurisdiction, specifically Arizona, in which he was not admitted to practice law.

Between on or about July, 2009, and on or about August, 2009, Respondent and agents acting on behalf of Respondent negotiated with McChesney's home loan mortgage lender regarding McChesney's home loan mortgage modification.

At no point did Respondent associate with an attorney licensed to practice in Arizona on McChesney's home loan mortgage modification matter.

Conclusions of Law.

By accepting representation of McChesney as a client, collecting an advanced attorney fee and negotiating with McChesney's lender, Respondent willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in violation of the regulations of the profession in Arizona in wilful violation of rule 1-300(B), Rules of Professional Conduct.

By accepting representation of McChesney and charging, and collecting fees from McChesney, when he was not licensed to practice law in Arizona, Respondent wilfully entered into an agreement for, charged, and collected an illegal fee from McChesney in wilful violation of rule 4-200(A), Rules of Professional Conduct.

PENDING PROCEEDINGS.

The disclosure date referred to, on page 2, paragraph A(7), was September 13, 2011.

DISMISSALS.

<u>Case No.</u>	<u>Count</u>	<u>Alleged Violation</u>
09-O-15204	One	Business & Professions Code, § 6068(d) [Misrepresentation to the Court]
09-O-15204	Two	Business & Professions Code, § 6103 [Failure to Obey a Court Order]
10-O-03819	Eleven	Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(A) [Commingle in CTA]

COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.

Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has informed respondent that as of August 10, 2011, the estimated prosecution costs in this matter are approximately \$6837.00.

Respondent acknowledges that this figure is an estimate only and that it does not include State Bar costs which will be included in any final cost assessment.

Respondent has been informed that the State Bar will waive the imposition of fees should this Stipulation be approved.

Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase and may not be waived due to the cost of further proceedings.

AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.

Standards.

The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct support disbarment in this matter.

Standard 1.3 provides guidance as to the imposition of discipline and interpretation of specific Standards. That Standard states that the primary purpose of discipline is the protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession.

Standard 1.7(b) states:

If a member is found culpable of professional misconduct in any proceeding in which discipline may be imposed and the member has a record of two prior impositions of discipline as defined by Standard 1.2(f), the degree of discipline in the current proceeding shall be disbarment unless the most compelling mitigating circumstances clearly predominate.

Respondent has three prior impositions of discipline, so disbarment is the presumptive discipline in this case. Respondent has not presented evidence of the most compelling mitigating circumstances and the facts and circumstances surrounding Respondent's misconduct do not suggest that mitigating circumstances clearly predominate.

Respondent violated rules 1-300(B) and 3-700(D)(2), Rules of Professional Conduct. There are no standards specifically applicable to violations of these rules. Accordingly, the applicable standard is Standard 2.10, Title IV, of the Standards for Professional Conduct.

Standard 2.10 states:

Culpability of a member of a violation of any provision of the Business and Professions Code not specified in these standards or of a willful violation of any Rule of Professional Conduct not specified in these standards shall result in reproof or suspension according to the gravity of the offense or the harm, if any, to the victim, with due regard to the purposes of imposing discipline set forth in standard 1.3.

Considering the facts and circumstances surrounding Respondent's misconduct, and both the aggravating and mitigating circumstances that are present, the parties submit that the intent and goals of the Standards for Professional Conduct are met in this matter by disbarring the Respondent.

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In the Matter of:
THOMAS GEORGE KEY

Case Number(s):
09-O-15204-PEM (09-O-16853-09-O-19370; 10-
O-00254; 10-O-00977) 10-O-03819 JAL

Nolo Contendere Plea Stipulations to Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Disposition

The terms of pleading nolo contendere are set forth in the Business and Professions Code and the Rules of Procedures of the State Bar. The applicable provisions are set forth below:

Business and Professions Code § 6085.5 Disciplinary Charges; Pleas to Allegations

There are three kinds of pleas to the allegations of a notice of disciplinary charges or other pleading which initiates a disciplinary proceeding against a member:

- (a) Admission of culpability.
- (b) Denial of culpability.
- (c) Nolo contendere, subject to the approval of the State Bar Court. The court shall ascertain whether the member completely understands that a plea of nolo contendere will be considered the same as an admission of culpability and that, upon a plea of nolo contendere, the court will find the member culpable. The legal effect of such a plea will be the same as that of an admission of culpability for all purposes, except that the plea and any admissions required by the court during any inquiry it makes as to the voluntariness of, or the factual basis for, the pleas, may not be used against the member as an admission in any civil suit based upon or growing out of the act upon which the disciplinary proceeding is based.

Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, rule 5.56. Stipulations to Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Disposition

“(A) **Contents.** A proposed stipulation to facts, conclusions of law, and disposition must comprise:

[¶] . . . [¶]

(5) a statement that the member either:

- (a) admits the truth of the facts comprising the stipulation and admits culpability for misconduct; or
- (b) pleads nolo contendere to those facts and misconduct;

[¶] . . . [¶]


(B) **Plea of Nolo Contendere.** If the member pleads nolo contendere, the stipulation must also show that the member understands that the plea is treated as an admission of the stipulated facts and an admission of culpability.”

I, the Respondent in this matter, have read the applicable provisions of Business and Professions Code section 6085.5 and rule 5.56 of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar. I plead nolo contendere to the charges set forth in this stipulation and I completely understand that my plea will be considered the same as an admission of culpability except as stated in Business and Professions Code section 6085.5(c).

Date

8/31/2011

Respondent's Signature



Thomas George Key
Print Name

(Do not write above this line.)

In the Matter of:
THOMAS GEORGE KEY

Case number(s):
09-O-15204-PEM (09-O-16853; 09-O-19370; 10-O-00254;
10-O-00977) 10-O-03819 JAL

SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES

By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitations and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Disposition.

8/31/2011
Date


Respondent's Signature

Thomas G. Key
Print Name

Date

Respondent's Counsel Signature

Print Name

9/7/2011
Date

Jessica A. Lienau
Deputy Trial Counsel's Signature

Jessica A. Lienau
Print Name

(Do not write above this line.)

In the Matter of:
THOMAS GEORGE KEY

Case Number(s):
09-O-15204-PEM (09-O-16853; 09-O-19370; 10-O-00254; 10-O-00977; 10-O-03819)

DISBARMENT ORDER

Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any, is GRANTED without prejudice, and:


- ☒ The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
- ☐ The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
- ☒ All Hearing dates are vacated.

The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58(E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) **The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)**

Respondent Thomas George Key is ordered transferred to involuntary inactive status pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6007, subdivision (c)(4). Respondent's inactive enrollment will be effective three (3) calendar days after this order is served by mail and will terminate upon the effective date of the Supreme Court's order imposing discipline herein, or as provided for by rule 5.111(D)(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California, or as otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court pursuant to its plenary jurisdiction.

Date

10-7-11


RICHARD A. HONN
Judge of the State Bar Court

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of San Francisco, on October 11, 2011, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):


STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND
ORDER APPROVING; ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE ENROLLMENT

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:

- ☒ by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at San Francisco, California, addressed as follows:
- THOMAS G. KEY
360 E 1ST ST #739
TUSTIN, CA 92780
- ☐ by certified mail, No. , with return receipt requested, through the United States Postal Service at , California, addressed as follows:
- ☐ by overnight mail at , California, addressed as follows:
- ☐ by fax transmission, at fax number . No error was reported by the fax machine that I used.
- ☐ By personal service by leaving the documents in a sealed envelope or package clearly labeled to identify the attorney being served with a receptionist or a person having charge of the attorney's office, addressed as follows:
- ☒ by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

Jessica A. Lienau, Enforcement, Los Angeles

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on October 11, 2011.


George Hue
Case Administrator
State Bar Court