Case Number(s): 09-O-16931
In the Matter of: Diddo Clark, Bar # 79876, A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Susan I, Kagan, Deputy Trial Counsel
180 Howard Street
San Francisco, CA 94105
(415) 538-2037
Bar # 214209,
Counsel for Respondent: Carol M. Langford, 100 Pringle Ave #570
Walnut Creek, CA 94596
(925) 938-3870
Bar # 124812,
Submitted to: Settlement Judge – State Bar Court Clerk’s Office San Francisco.
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted June 23, 1978.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 10 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
<<not>> checked. Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 5.130, Rules of Procedure.
checked. Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: 2012 and 2013. (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
<<not>> checked. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs are entirely waived.
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Facts
1. In 2005, respondent filed a complaint against her mother, Louise Clark, in the matter, Clark v. Clark, Contra Costa Superior Court Case No. C05-02007. On April 27, 2007, the court entered a judgment in Case No. C05-02007. After the judgment was entered, respondent filed a motion JNOV which was granted, in part, by the court. Thereafter, respondent’s mother filed an appeal of the post-judgment order granting the partial JNOV in Clark v. Clark, California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District A118811.
2. On October 21, 2008, respondent filed an application for extension of time to the file the appellate brief. On or about October 21, 2008, the court granted the extension and ordered her to file the brief by November 24, 2008. Soon thereafter, respondent received the court’s order. On November 24, 2008, respondent filed a second application for extension of time to file the brief. On December 1, 2008, the court granted the second extension and ordered her to file the brief by December 24, 2008. Soon thereafter, respondent received the court’s order, but failed to file the brief by December 24, 2008, and failed to file an application for an extension of time to file the brief.
3. On December 29, 2008, five days after the due date, the court received respondent’s brief for filing. On January 7, 2009, the court issued an order directing the clerk not to file the brief and to return it to respondent as a consequence of her noncompliance with the Rules of Court. The court ordered respondent to file a corrected brief by January 21, 2009. Soon thereafter, respondent received the court’s January 7, 2009 order, but failed to file a corrected brief by January 21, 2009, and failed to file an application for an extension of time to file the brief.
4. On January 23, 2009, respondent sent a letter to the clerk of court by facsimile. In the January 23, 2009 letter, respondent falsely stated as follows:
"I mailed my brief, with supplementary pleadings, by Priority Mail. I hope that you have received it and that it is deemed timely.
There were 2 envelopes. I screwed up the bar code / zip code on one of them so I bound the 2 together with rubber bands. I hope that that was not a problem for the Post Office or for your office. I so, I apologized [sic]."
5. In truth and in fact, as of January 23, 2009, respondent had not mailed the brief to the court. In truth and in fact, as of January 23, 2009, respondent had not completed the brief. At the time of making the statement in her January 23, 2009 letter, respondent knew her statement was false.
6. On January 27, 2009, the clerk of the court left a voicemail message for respondent advising that the court had not yet received her corrected brief. Soon thereafter, respondent received the voicemail message. On January 28, 2009, respondent sent a letter to the clerk of the court by facsimile. In the January 28, 2009 letter, respondent admitted to lying about mailing the brief and apologized for lying to the court. She also requested additional time to file the brief. Respondent’s request for an extension was later denied by the court.
Conclusions of Law
1. By making knowingly false statements to the clerk of the court in her letter of January 23, 2009, respondent sought to mislead the judge or judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law in willful violation of section 6068(d) of the Business and Professions Code.
2. By making knowingly false statements to the clerk of the court in her letter of January 23, 2009, respondent intentionally or by gross negligence, committed an act or acts involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, in willful violation of section 6106 of the Business and Professions Code.
PENDING PROCEEDINGS
The disclosure date referred to on page two, paragraph A (7) was October 25, 2010.
STATE BAR ETHICS SCHOOL
Because respondent has agreed to attend ,State Bar Ethics School as part of this stipulation, respondent may receive Minimum Continuing Legal Education credit upon the satisfactory completion of State Bar Ethics School.
COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
Respondent acknowledges that the State Bar has informed respondent that as of October 25, 2010, the estimated prosecution costs in this matter are approximately $1,983.00. Respondent acknowledges that this figure is an estimate only and that it does not include State Bar Court costs which will be included in any final cost assessment. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.
FACTS SUPPORTING AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
There are no aggravating circumstances.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Standard 1.2(e)(i). Respondent has been practicing law since 1978, and has no prior record of discipline.
Standard 1.2(e)(v). Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and cooperation to the State Bar during the disciplinary proceedings.
Standard 1.2(e)(vi). Respondent demonstrated good character.
Standard 1.2(e)(vii). Respondent displayed remorse for her misconduct.
Respondent claims that she is the victim of hostile siblings who have misappropriated all of her assets and rendered her indigent with post-traumatic stress disorder.
SUPPORTING AUTHORITY
Standard 2.3 requires an actual suspension or disbarment for a respondent that has committed an act of moral turpitude.
Standard 2.6(a) requires that a violation of Business and Professions Code section 6068(d) shall result in disbarment or suspension depending on the gravity of the offense or harm, if any, to the victim, with due regard to the purpose of imposing discipline set forth in standard 1.3
The proper discipline for a violation of section 6068(d) is a period of actual suspension. (See Drociak v. State Bar (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1085 [30 days’ actual suspension; no prior record of discipline]; Bach v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 848 [60 days’ actual suspension; prior public reproval]; see also In the Matter of Chesnut (Review Dept. 2000) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 166 [six months’ actual suspension; prior record of discipline]; In the Matter of Farrell (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 490 [six months’ actual suspension; prior record of discipline].)
Based on the mitigation and lack of aggravating circumstances in this matter, a 30-day actual suspension is appropriate.
Case Number(s): 09-O-16931
In the Matter of: Diddo Clark
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: Diddo Clark
Date: November 2, 2010
Respondent’s Counsel: Carol Langford
Date: November 3, 2010
Deputy Trial Counsel: Susan I. Kagan
Date: November 18, 2010
Case Number(s): 09-O-16931
In the Matter of: Diddo Clark
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 135(b), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Lucy Armendariz
Date: November 28, 2010
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and
County of San Francisco, on November 29, 2010, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at San Francisco, California, addressed as follows:
CAROL LANGFORD
100 PRINGLE AVE #570
WALNUT CREEK, CA 94596
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
SUSAN I. KAGAN, Enforcement, San Francisco
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on November 29, 2010.
Signed by:
Bernadette C.O. Molina
Case Administrator
State Bar Court