Case Number(s): 09-0-17747
In the Matter of: Carol V. Reed, Bar # 77860, A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Susan Chan, Bar # 233229, Deputy Trial Counsel, 180 Howard Street, San Francisco, CA 94104
Counsel for Respondent: Carol M. Langford, Law Office of Carol M. Langford, 100 Pringle Ave., Ste 570, Walnut Creek, CA 94596, Bar #124812
Submitted to: Settlement Judge, State Bar Court Clerk’s Office San Francisco
Filed: December 15, 2011
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted December 21, 1977
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 11 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
checked. Costs are added to membership fee for calendar year following effective date of discipline (public reproval).
<<not>> checked. Case ineligible for costs (private reproval).
<<not>> checked. Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
<<not>> checked. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs are entirely waived.
9. The parties understand that:
<<not>> checked. (a) A private reproval imposed on a respondent as a result of a stipulation approved by the Court prior to initiation of a State Bar Court proceeding is part of the respondent’s official State Bar membership records, but is not disclosed in response to public inquiries and is not reported on the State Bar’s web page. The record of the proceeding in which such a private reproval was imposed is not available to the public except as part of the record of any subsequent proceeding in which it is introduced as evidence of a prior record of discipline under the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar.
<<not>> checked. (b) A private reproval imposed on a respondent after initiation of a State Bar Court proceeding is part of the respondent’s official State Bar Membership records, is disclosed in response to public inquiries and is reported as a record of public discipline on the State Bar’s web page.
checked. (c) A public reproval imposed on a respondent is publicly available as part of the respondent’s official State Bar membership records, is disclosed in response to public inquiries and is reported as a record of public discipline on the State Bar’s web page.
No period of probation is attached to the public reproval, however, respondent must comply with the reproval condition on page 5, Section E., no. 8, Ethics School, within one year from the effective date of discipline. The terms of compliance are specifically listed under Section E., no. 8.
(Effective
January 1, 2011)
IN THE MATTER OF: Carol V. Reed
STATE BAR COURT CASE NUMBER: 09-O-17747
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Facts: Case No. 09-0-17747: Count One:
1. In 1989, Earl Blacksher established a testamentary trust, giving his daughter, Ida McQueen, who is mentally and physically disabled, a life estate in the family home located in Oakland, California ("Estepa Drive"). Earl Blacksher named his two brothers, Lee and Ray Blackshire, as co-trustees for Ida.
2. On or about March 1, 1990, Earl Blacksher died. Lee and Ray Blackshire were appointed as co-administrators of Earl Blacksher’s estate. Sometime thereafter, Lee died and Ray Blackshire hired respondent to obtain his appointment as sole administrator of the Blacksher estate.
3. The Order for Final Distribution of the Estate of Earl Blacksher was prepared by Respondent.( foot note number 1 )The Order for Final Distribution was filed and recorded in Alameda County on September 20, 1994(footnote number 2) The Order for Final Distribution formally created a life estate for MeQueen and designated the Estepa Drive home as the trust res and provided that the trustee was to pay the net income of the trust for McQueen’s care, comfort and support during her natural life.
4. By court order in 1994, respondent was to receive $3,321.93 for her attorney fees for services rendered to the Blacksher estate. Ray Blackshire was to receive $2,321.93 in
(Footnote number 1) Respondent’s father, Robert L. Veres (SBN 21395), was Earl Blacksher’s attorney who drafted the will.
(Footnote number 2) See Estate of Earl Blacksher, Deceased, Order Settling First and Final Account and Report of Administrator, For Allowance of Ordinary Fees and for Final Distribution, Alameda County Superior Court, Case No. 237355-9. executor fees. However, there was no money in the estate to pay the fees, and respondent took a lien against the trust res.
5. Between 1990 and 2000, McQueen remained in the family home with assistance from caregivers. In early 2000, McQueen was placed in a skilled nursing facility due to medical conditions despite her desire to remain in the family home.
6. On or about February 9, 2000, respondent and her brother, attorney Richard K. Veres
("Veres") visited McQueen in the nursing facility in order to have her sign a power of attorney, which respondent had prepared, appointing McQueen’s sister, Earline
Drumgoole, to act on McQueen’s behalf.
7. Respondent did not make an appointment to visit McQueen. McQueen did not have anyone with her to help her understand the purpose of the document. McQueen signed the power of attorney by making a mark "X" on the document (footnote number 3) The power of attorney was witnessed by respondent and Veres and notarized by Veres.
8. Respondent represented both McQueen and Drumgoole for purposes of obtaining the power of attorney that she presented to McQueen for signature.
9. Respondent did not disclose to McQueen or Drumgoole the actual and reasonably foreseeable adverse consequences the power of attorney would create between the parties. Respondent did not seek written consent from Drumgoole or McQueen for the representation.
10. On or about October 5, 2004, the Estepa Drive home was sold to a third party for $240,000 by the trustee. Respondent distributed the sale proceeds to the remaindermen of the trust.
11. Respondent collected attorneys fees in the amount of $3,321.93, previously approved by court order in 1994. Respondent did not receive additional attorneys fees for distributing the sale proceeds of the trust or for any other legal services provided to the
Blacksher estate.
12. In or around November 2004, the nursing facility learned that McQueen’s home had been sold without her knowledge or consent, and that McQueen had not received any proceeds from the sale of the Estepa Drive home.
(Footnote number 3) It is undisputed that McQueen is unable to read or write.
13. On or about December 15, 2005, Fessha Taye was appointed limited conservator of the estate of Ida McQueen.
14. On or about June 9, 2006, Conservator Fesha Taye filed a lawsuit on behalf of conservatee Ida McQueen ("McQueen"), against several of McQueen’s family members and respondent, in the matter entitled Limited Conservatorship of the Estate of Ida McQueen, by and through Fessha Taye, Conservator v. Earlene Drumgoole; Earl Blackshire, Jr.; Burke Blacksher; Ray Blackshire; Alonzo Balcksher; Carol V. Reed; Richard K. Veres; Carlos Lozada; Jeffetta Calloway; Ralph Percelle; Maggie Cainl and Does 1 through 60, inclusive, Alameda County Superior Court, Case No. HP05237122.
15. Respondent and the other defendants contended that McQueen was not injured because her medical condition prevented her from returning to the house and if the sales proceeds were invested to provide her an income, she would lose her SSI benefits dollar for dollar. However, the trial court ruled that the collateral source rule applied and the jury was instructed that they could not consider any loss of SSI benefits. There was no California authority on point whether the collateral source rule applied to SSI benefits.
16. On or about March 5, 2009, the jury returned their verdict and found respondent aided and abetted in the conversion of McQueen’s property; assisted in the taking of
McQueen’s property; committed financial abuse of an elder and committed a breach of fiduciary duty (attorney’s duty) but found in favor of respondent as to allegations of breach of fiduciary duty (duty of reasonable case and duty of loyalty), intentional misrepresentation and concealment. The jurors found that respondent drafted the trust that named McQueen as a trust beneficiary, and in so doing, owed a duty of loyalty to McQueen. The court awarded McQueen $99,000.00 to be paid by respondent, Ray Blaekshire and Earline Drumgoole. The court also ordered respondent to pay attorneys fees and costs in the amount of $302,492.00.
17. Judgment was entered on September 11, 2009, after respondent’s motion for a new trial was denied. The judgment was affirmed on appeal on March 14, 2011.
18. On April 22, 2011, respondent filed a petition for review in the California Supreme
Court. The California Supreme Court denied the petition for review and decertified the appellate decision (S192507).
19. Respondent has paid the judgment in full.
Conclusions of Law: Case No. 09-0-17747: Count One:
By drafting the power of attorney appointing Earline Drumgoole to act on behalf of
McQueen; by simultaneously representing McQueen and Drumgoole in connection with the power of attorney without disclosing the potential and foreseeable conflicts the power of attorney would create between Drumgoole and McQueen; by failing to disclose the relevant circumstances and the actual and reasonably foreseeable adverse consequences to McQueen of respondent’s representation of Drumgoole, respondent accepted, without the informed written consent of the clients, representation of more than one client in a matter in which the interests of the clients potentially conflicted in violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-310(C)(1).
PENDING PROCEEDINGS.
The disclosure date referred to, on page two, paragraph A.(7), was December 5,2011.
COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.
Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has informed respondent that as of December 5, 2011, the estimated prosecution costs in this matter are approximately $2,906.38. Respondent acknowledges that this figure is an estimate only and that it does not include State Bar Court costs which will be included in any final cost assessment. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.
Standard 2.10 states in pertinent part "Culpability of a member of a violation of any provision of the Business and Professions Code not specified in these standards or of a wilful violation of any Rule of Professional Conduct not specified in these standards shall result in reproval or suspension according to the gravity of the offense or the harm, if any, to the victim .... " Lydon v. State Bar (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1181, "willfulness does not require actual knowledge of the provision violated." In the Matter of Taggart (Review Dept. 2001) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 302, 309, "Thus, the term willful does not require a showing that respondent intended the consequences of his acts or omissions, it simply requires proof that he intended the act or omission itself."
STATE BAR ETHICS SCHOOL.
Because respondent has agreed to attend State Bar Ethics School as part of this stipulation, respondent may receive Minimum Continuing Legal Education credit upon the satisfactory completion of State Bar Ethics School.
OTHER CONDITIONS NEGOTIATED BY THE PARTIES.
1. See page 5, Section F. for terms of compliance regarding Ethics School.
Case Number(s): 09-O-17747
In the Matter of: Carol V. Reed
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by: Carol V. Reed, Carol M. Langford, Susan Chan
Respondent: Carol V. Reed
Date: 12/07/2011
Respondent’s Counsel: Carol M. Langford
Date: 12/07/2011
Deputy Trial Counsel: Susan Chan
Date:
12/08/2011
Case Number(s): 09-0-17747
In the Matter of: Carol V. Reed
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any, is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AND THE REPROVAL IMPOSED.
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the REPROVAL IMPOSED.
checked. All court dates in the Hearing Department are vacated.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58 (E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) Otherwise the stipulation shall be effective 15 days after service of this order.
Failure to comply with any conditions attached to this reproval man constitute cause for a separate proceeding for willful breach of rule 1-110, Rules of Professional Conduct.
Signed by: Lucy Armendariz
Judge of the State Bar Court: Lucy Armendariz
Date: December 15, 2011
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and
County of San Francisco, on, December 15, 2011. I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND
ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:
CAROL LANGFORD
100 PRINGLE AVE #570
WALNUT CREEK, CA 94596
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
SUSAN CHAN, Enforcement, San Francisco
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on December 15, 2011.
Signed by: Bernadette C.O. Molina
Case Administrator: Bernadette C.O. Molina
State Bar Court