

(Do not write above this line.)

<b>State Bar Court of California</b> <b>Hearing Department</b> <b>Los Angeles</b> <b>ACTUAL SUSPENSION</b>		
<b>Counsel For The State Bar</b>  Dane C. Dauphine Supervising Trial Counsel 1149 South Hill St. Los Angeles, CA 90015-2299 (213) 765-1293  Bar # 121606	<b>Case Number(s):</b> 09-O-18768, 10-O-00828, 10-O-03109, 10-O-03145, 10-O-03527, 10-O-06075, 10-O-06211, 10-O-06345, 10-O-06944, 10-O-07996, 10-O-09238, 11-O-12791, 11-O-13238, 11-O-13491	<b>For Court use only</b>  <div style="text-align: center; font-size: 1.5em; font-weight: bold;">PUBLIC MATTER</div>  <div style="text-align: center;"> <div style="font-size: 1.5em; font-weight: bold;">FILED</div>  JUN 21 2011  STATE BAR COURT  CLERK'S OFFICE  LOS ANGELES </div>
<b>Counsel For Respondent</b>  Arthur L. Margolis Margolis & Margolis 2000 Riverside Dr. Los Angeles, CA 90039 (323) 953-8996  Bar # 57703	Submitted to: <b>Assigned Judge</b>  STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING  <b>ACTUAL SUSPENSION</b>  <input type="checkbox"/> PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED	
<b>In the Matter of:</b> Roger Dale Stacy  Bar # 208500  A Member of the State Bar of California (Respondent)		

**Note:** All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.

### A. Parties' Acknowledgments:

- (1) Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted October 28, 2000.
- (2) The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
- (3) All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 22 pages, not including the order.



- (4) A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
- (5) Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
- (6) The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
- (7) No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
- (8) Payment of Disciplinary Costs—Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
  - ☐ Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 5.130, Rules of Procedure.
  - ☒ Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: 2012, 2013, and 2014. (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
  - ☐ Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
  - ☐ Costs are entirely waived.

**B. Aggravating Circumstances [for definition, see Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct, standard 1.2(b)]. Facts supporting aggravating circumstances are required.**

- (1) ☐ **Prior record of discipline** [see standard 1.2(f)]
  - (a) ☐ State Bar Court case # of prior case
  - (b) ☐ Date prior discipline effective
  - (c) ☐ Rules of Professional Conduct/ State Bar Act violations:
  - (d) ☐ Degree of prior discipline
  - (e) ☐ If Respondent has two or more incidents of prior discipline, use space provided below.
- (2) ☐ **Dishonesty:** Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by or followed by bad faith, dishonesty, concealment, overreaching or other violations of the State Bar Act or Rules of Professional Conduct.
- (3) ☐ **Trust Violation:** Trust funds or property were involved and Respondent refused or was unable to account to the client or person who was the object of the misconduct for improper conduct toward said funds or property.
- (4) ☐ **Harm:** Respondent's misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public or the administration of justice.

- (5) ☐ **Indifference:** Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for the consequences of his or her misconduct.
- (6) ☐ **Lack of Cooperation:** Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims of his/her misconduct or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation or proceedings.
- (7) ☒ **Multiple/Pattern of Misconduct:** Respondent's current misconduct evidences multiple acts of wrongdoing or demonstrates a pattern of misconduct. The misconduct involved 10 separate client matters.
- (8) ☐ **No aggravating circumstances** are involved.

**Additional aggravating circumstances:**

**C. Mitigating Circumstances [see standard 1.2(e)]. Facts supporting mitigating circumstances are required.**

- (1) ☐ **No Prior Discipline:** Respondent has no prior record of discipline over many years of practice coupled with present misconduct which is not deemed serious.
- (2) ☐ **No Harm:** Respondent did not harm the client or person who was the object of the misconduct.
- (3) ☐ **Candor/Cooperation:** Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and cooperation with the victims of his/her misconduct and to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation and proceedings.
- (4) ☒ **Remorse:** Respondent promptly took objective steps spontaneously demonstrating remorse and recognition of the wrongdoing, which steps were designed to timely atone for any consequences of his/her misconduct. See additional mitigating circumstances below.
- (5) ☐ **Restitution:** Respondent paid \$        on        in restitution to        without the threat or force of disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings.
- (6) ☐ **Delay:** These disciplinary proceedings were excessively delayed. The delay is not attributable to Respondent and the delay prejudiced him/her.
- (7) ☐ **Good Faith:** Respondent acted in good faith.
- (8) ☐ **Emotional/Physical Difficulties:** At the time of the stipulated act or acts of professional misconduct Respondent suffered extreme emotional difficulties or physical disabilities which expert testimony would establish was directly responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities were not the product of any illegal conduct by the member, such as illegal drug or substance abuse, and Respondent no longer suffers from such difficulties or disabilities.
- (9) ☐ **Severe Financial Stress:** At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered from severe financial stress which resulted from circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond his/her control and which were directly responsible for the misconduct.
- (10) ☐ **Family Problems:** At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered extreme difficulties in his/her personal life which were other than emotional or physical in nature.
- (11) ☐ **Good Character:** Respondent's good character is attested to by a wide range of references in the legal and general communities who are aware of the full extent of his/her misconduct.

- (12) ☐ **Rehabilitation:** Considerable time has passed since the acts of professional misconduct occurred followed by convincing proof of subsequent rehabilitation.
- (13) ☐ **No mitigating circumstances** are involved.

**Additional mitigating circumstances:**

Respondent has no prior record of discipline since his admission on October 28, 2000.

In late 2009 and early 2010, Respondent took numerous steps to rectify problems that he became aware of in his law office. Respondent recognized that his practice had grown too large, too fast, creating problems with the level of customer service that he wished to provide. Respondent closed his satellite offices in Orange County, Calexico and Chula Vista. He created a new business plan and hired a new office manager. Most of the original staff were terminated, and Respondent replaced them with more able and qualified personnel. Respondent hired attorneys to make court appearances and assist him in the office and stopped using "appearance" attorneys. Respondent instituted new and improved office systems to handle telephone calls, documents, and client concerns. He also instituted an "open door" policy where most clients can drop in during normal working hours to address their cases. Respondent reopened a Los Angeles area office in Downey, California, that is staffed with full time attorneys; Respondent and his office manager spend at least one or two days a week supervising the Downey office. The San Diego office is now fully staffed with more qualified personnel and cases from the Imperial Valley and Chula Vista are serviced by the San Diego office. Respondent has also hired a family law paralegal who maintains the family law calendar and who has assisted Respondent in finishing all but a handful of family law cases. Respondent states that he is unaware of any issues regarding missed hearings or other calendar issues since the Santiago case. Respondent has moved from an active counsel role to a managerial and supervisory role to keep the firm in compliance with rules and provides better client service and communication. The caseload being handled by the firm is approximately 50% of what it was in early 2010. Respondent estimates that 40% of new cases are now coming from client referrals, a strong indication that the changes made in the firm have been successful. Ongoing training and improvements in law office management are Respondent's main priorities at his time. Respondent seeks constant input from his staff attorneys and clients to further improve operations, including the use of a "suggestion box" where employees can post ideas.

**D. Discipline:**

- (1) ☒ **Stayed Suspension:**
- (a) ☒ Respondent must be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
- i. ☐ and until Respondent shows proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of rehabilitation and present fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the law pursuant to standard 1.4(c)(ii) Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.
- ii. ☐ and until Respondent pays restitution as set forth in the Financial Conditions form attached to this stipulation.
- iii. ☐ and until Respondent does the following:
- (b) ☒ The above-referenced suspension is stayed.
- (2) ☒ **Probation:**

Respondent must be placed on probation for a period of two (2) years, which will commence upon the effective date of the Supreme Court order in this matter. (See rule 9.18, California Rules of Court)

(3) ☒ **Actual Suspension:**

- (a) ☒ Respondent must be actually suspended from the practice of law in the State of California for a period of one (1) year.
- i. ☐ and until Respondent shows proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of rehabilitation and present fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the law pursuant to standard 1.4(c)(ii), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct
- ii. ☐ and until Respondent pays restitution as set forth in the Financial Conditions form attached to this stipulation.
- iii. ☐ and until Respondent does the following:

**E. Additional Conditions of Probation:**

- (1) ☐ If Respondent is actually suspended for two years or more, he/she must remain actually suspended until he/she proves to the State Bar Court his/her rehabilitation, fitness to practice, and learning and ability in the general law, pursuant to standard 1.4(c)(ii), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.
- (2) ☒ During the probation period, Respondent must comply with the provisions of the State Bar Act and Rules of Professional Conduct.
- (3)\* ☒ Within ten (10) days of any change, Respondent must report to the Membership Records Office of the State Bar and to the Office of Probation of the State Bar of California ("Office of Probation"), all changes of information, including current office address and telephone number, or other address for State Bar purposes, as prescribed by section 6002.1 of the Business and Professions Code.
- (4) ☒ Within thirty (30) days from the effective date of discipline, Respondent must contact the Office of Probation and schedule a meeting with Respondent's assigned probation deputy to discuss these terms and conditions of probation. Upon the direction of the Office of Probation, Respondent must meet with the probation deputy either in-person or by telephone. During the period of probation, Respondent must promptly meet with the probation deputy as directed and upon request.
- (5) ☒ Respondent must submit written quarterly reports to the Office of Probation on each January 10, April 10, July 10, and October 10 of the period of probation. Under penalty of perjury, Respondent must state whether Respondent has complied with the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and all conditions of probation during the preceding calendar quarter. Respondent must also state whether there are any proceedings pending against him or her in the State Bar Court and if so, the case number and current status of that proceeding. If the first report would cover less than 30 days, that report must be submitted on the next quarter date, and cover the extended period.

In addition to all quarterly reports, a final report, containing the same information, is due no earlier than twenty (20) days before the last day of the period of probation and no later than the last day of probation.

- (6) ☐ Respondent must be assigned a probation monitor. Respondent must promptly review the terms and conditions of probation with the probation monitor to establish a manner and schedule of compliance. During the period of probation, Respondent must furnish to the monitor such reports as may be requested, in addition to the quarterly reports required to be submitted to the Office of Probation. Respondent must cooperate fully with the probation monitor.
- (7) ☒ Subject to assertion of applicable privileges, Respondent must answer fully, promptly and truthfully any inquiries of the Office of Probation and any probation monitor assigned under these conditions which are

directed to Respondent personally or in writing relating to whether Respondent is complying or has complied with the probation conditions.

- (8) ☒ Within one (1) year of the effective date of the discipline herein, Respondent must provide to the Office of Probation satisfactory proof of attendance at a session of the Ethics School, and passage of the test given at the end of that session.

☐ No Ethics School recommended. Reason: .

- (9) ☐ Respondent must comply with all conditions of probation imposed in the underlying criminal matter and must so declare under penalty of perjury in conjunction with any quarterly report to be filed with the Office of Probation.

- (10) ☒ The following conditions are attached hereto and incorporated:

☐ Substance Abuse Conditions

☐ Law Office Management Conditions

☐ Medical Conditions

☒ Financial Conditions

#### F. Other Conditions Negotiated by the Parties:

- (1) ☒ **Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination:** Respondent must provide proof of passage of the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination ("MPRE"), administered by the National Conference of Bar Examiners, to the Office of Probation during the period of actual suspension or within one year, whichever period is longer. **Failure to pass the MPRE results in actual suspension without further hearing until passage. But see rule 9.10(b), California Rules of Court, and rule 5.162(A) & (E), Rules of Procedure.**

☐ No MPRE recommended. Reason:

- (2) ☒ **Rule 9.20, California Rules of Court:** Respondent must comply with the requirements of rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 calendar days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court's Order in this matter.

- (3) ☐ **Conditional Rule 9.20, California Rules of Court:** If Respondent remains actually suspended for 90 days or more, he/she must comply with the requirements of rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 120 and 130 calendar days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court's Order in this matter.

- (4) ☐ **Credit for Interim Suspension [conviction referral cases only]:** Respondent will be credited for the period of his/her interim suspension toward the stipulated period of actual suspension. Date of commencement of interim suspension:

- (5) ☐ **Other Conditions:**

In the Matter of: Roger Dale Stacy, no. 208500	Case Number(s): 09-O-18768, 10-O-00828, 10-O-03109, 10-O-03145, 10-O-03527, 10-O-06075, 10-O-06211, 10-O-06345, 10-O-06944, 10-O-07996, 10-O-09238, 11-O-12791, 11-O-13238, 11-O-13491
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## Financial Conditions

### a. Restitution

- ☒ Respondent must pay restitution (including the principal amount, plus interest of 10% per annum) to the payee(s) listed below. If the Client Security Fund ("CSF") has reimbursed one or more of the payee(s) for all or any portion of the principal amount(s) listed below, Respondent must also pay restitution to CSF in the amount(s) paid, plus applicable interest and costs.

Payee	Principal Amount	Interest Accrues From
Amalia Oviedo	\$1,000	06/01/10
Margarita Salguero	\$1,300	08/01/09
Marciano Ibarra	\$2,774	01/01/10
Javier Osuna-Ruiz	\$1,099	05/01/10
Luz Rosas	\$1,000	04/01/10
Nelson Mahecha	\$2,199	04/08/11
Elizabeth White	\$2,577	02/02/10
Adelina Acevedo	\$3,874	05/24/11

- ☒ Respondent must pay above-referenced restitution and provide satisfactory proof of payment to the Office of Probation not later than six (6) months following the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein. Respondent shall provide to the Probation Department satisfactory proof of the partial refund already made to Ms. White and will receive credit for that amount..

### b. Installment Restitution Payments

- ☐ Respondent must pay the above-referenced restitution on the payment schedule set forth below. Respondent must provide satisfactory proof of payment to the Office of Probation with each quarterly probation report, or as otherwise directed by the Office of Probation. No later than 30 days prior to the expiration of the period of probation (or period of reprobation), Respondent must make any necessary final payment(s) in order to complete the payment of restitution, including interest, in full.

Payee/CSF (as applicable)	Minimum Payment Amount	Payment Frequency

- ☐ If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.

**c. Client Funds Certificate**

- ☐ 1. If Respondent possesses client funds at any time during the period covered by a required quarterly report, Respondent must file with each required report a certificate from Respondent and/or a certified public accountant or other financial professional approved by the Office of Probation, certifying that:
- a. Respondent has maintained a bank account in a bank authorized to do business in the State of California, at a branch located within the State of California, and that such account is designated as a "Trust Account" or "Clients' Funds Account";



b. Respondent has kept and maintained the following:

- i. A written ledger for each client on whose behalf funds are held that sets forth:
  1. the name of such client;
  2. the date, amount and source of all funds received on behalf of such client;
  3. the date, amount, payee and purpose of each disbursement made on behalf of such client; and,
  4. the current balance for such client.
- ii. a written journal for each client trust fund account that sets forth:
  1. the name of such account;
  2. the date, amount and client affected by each debit and credit; and,
  3. the current balance in such account.
- iii. all bank statements and cancelled checks for each client trust account; and,
- iv. each monthly reconciliation (balancing) of (i), (ii), and (iii), above, and if there are any differences between the monthly total balances reflected in (i), (ii), and (iii), above, the reasons for the differences.

c. Respondent has maintained a written journal of securities or other properties held for clients that specifies:

- i. each item of security and property held;
- ii. the person on whose behalf the security or property is held;
- iii. the date of receipt of the security or property;
- iv. the date of distribution of the security or property; and,
- v. the person to whom the security or property was distributed.

2. If Respondent does not possess any client funds, property or securities during the entire period covered by a report, Respondent must so state under penalty of perjury in the report filed with the Office of Probation for that reporting period. In this circumstance, Respondent need not file the accountant's certificate described above.
3. The requirements of this condition are in addition to those set forth in rule 4-100, Rules of Professional Conduct.

d. **Client Trust Accounting School**

- ☒ Within one (1) year of the effective date of the discipline herein, Respondent must supply to the Office of Probation satisfactory proof of attendance at a session of the Ethics School Client Trust Accounting School, within the same period of time, and passage of the test given at the end of that session.

In the Matter of: Roger Dale Stacy, no. 208500	Case Number(s): 09-O-18768, 10-O-00828, 10-O-03109, 10-O-03145, 10-O-03527, 10-O-06075, 10-O-06211, 10-O-06345, 10-O-06944, 10-O-07996, 10-O-09238, 11-O-12791, 11-O-13238, 11-O-13491
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### **Nolo Contendere Plea Stipulations to Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Disposition**

The terms of pleading nolo contendere are set forth in the Business and Professions Code and the Rules of Procedures of the State Bar. The applicable provisions are set forth below:

#### **Business and Professions Code § 6085.5 Disciplinary Charges; Pleas to Allegations**

There are three kinds of pleas to the allegations of a notice of disciplinary charges or other pleading which initiates a disciplinary proceeding against a member:

- (a) Admission of culpability.
- (b) Denial of culpability.
- (c) Nolo contendere, subject to the approval of the State Bar Court. The court shall ascertain whether the member completely understands that a plea of nolo contendere will be considered the same as an admission of culpability and that, upon a plea of nolo contendere, the court will find the member culpable. The legal effect of such a plea will be the same as that of an admission of culpability for all purposes, except that the plea and any admissions required by the court during any inquiry it makes as to the voluntariness of, or the factual basis for, the pleas, may not be used against the member as an admission in any civil suit based upon or growing out of the act upon which the disciplinary proceeding is based.

#### **Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, rule 5.56. Stipulations to Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Disposition**

“(A) **Contents.** A proposed stipulation to facts, conclusions of law, and disposition must comprise:

[1] . . . [1]

(5) a statement that the member either:


- (a) admits the truth of the facts comprising the stipulation and admits culpability for misconduct; or
- (b) pleads nolo contendere to those facts and misconduct;

[1] . . . [1]

“(B) **Plea of Nolo Contendere.** If the member pleads nolo contendere, the stipulation must also show that the member understands that the plea is treated as an admission of the stipulated facts and an admission of culpability.”

I, the Respondent in this matter, have read the applicable provisions of Business and Professions Code section 6085.5 and rule 5.56 of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar. I plead nolo contendere to the charges set forth in this stipulation and I completely understand that my plea will be considered the same as an admission of culpability except as stated in Business and Professions Code section 6085.5(c).

6-2-11  
Date

  
Respondent's Signature

Roger D. Stacy  
Print Name

**ATTACHMENT TO**  
**STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION**

IN THE MATTER OF:                      Roger Dale Stacy, no. 208500  
  
CASE NUMBER(S):                      09-O-18768, et al.

**FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.**

Respondent pleads nolo contendere to the following facts and violations. Respondent completely understands that the plea for nolo contendere shall be considered the same as an admission of the stipulated facts and of his culpability of the statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct specified herein.

Case No. 09-O-18768 (Complainant: Antonio Vargas Ramirez)

**FACTS:**

1. On January 14, 2009, Antonio Vargas Ramirez ("Ramirez") hired Respondent to file and handle to conclusion a bankruptcy petition. Ramirez agreed to pay a fee of \$1,099 and a filing fee of \$299 for filing of the petition and representation at the creditors' meeting as well as other services. Between approximately January 14, 2009, and May 11, 2009, inclusive, Ramirez paid Respondent sums totaling approximately \$1,400.
2. On August 3, 2009, Respondent filed a bankruptcy petition on behalf of Ramirez. A creditors' meeting was scheduled for September 16, 2009. Respondent received due notice of the meeting.
3. On September 16, 2009, Respondent did not attend the creditors' meeting. He made attempts on short notice to get coverage for that meeting with an attorney appearance service but was unable to do so. As a result, the creditors' meeting was rescheduled to September 25, 2009. Respondent was served by mail with notice of the continued hearing date.
4. On September 25, 2009, Respondent did not appear for the creditors' meeting. At that time, Ramirez represented himself.
5. On or about December 17, 2009, Respondent filed a reaffirmation agreement on behalf of Ramirez in his bankruptcy case. On April 6, 2010, Ramirez received a discharge of debts by the bankruptcy court.

**CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

6. By not attending the creditors' meeting on or about September 16, 2009, and September 25, 2009, Respondent intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A).

Case No. 10-O-00828 (Complainant: Blanca Martinez)

FACTS:

7. On or about January 5, 2009, Blanca Martinez ("Blanca") hired Respondent to file and handle to conclusion a bankruptcy petition on her behalf. During the month of January 2009, Blanca paid Respondent advanced attorney fees totaling approximately \$1,400.

8. On or about June 24, 2009, Respondent filed a bankruptcy petition on behalf of Blanca. The court scheduled the creditors' meeting for July 22, 2009. Respondent received notice of the hearing. Respondent did not inform Blanca of the July 22, 2009, creditors' meeting.

9. On or about July 22, 2009, Respondent did not appear at the creditors' meeting in Ramirez's bankruptcy case. As a result, the hearing was rescheduled to September 1, 2009. Respondent received notice of the hearing.

10. On or about September 1, 2009, shortly before the hearing was scheduled to begin, Respondent's office staff member informed Blanca that Respondent would not be appearing at the hearing and advised Blanca that she may appear without an attorney.

11. Respondent did not appear at the September 1, 2009, creditors' meeting. No other attorney appeared on behalf of Blanca at the hearing.

12. On October 31, 2009, Blanca received a discharge of debts.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

13. By not appearing at the July 22, 2009, and September 1, 2009, hearings, Respondent intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A).

Case No. 10-O-03109 (Complainant: Juan B. Martinez)

FACTS:

14. On or about May 22, 2009, Juan B. Martinez ("Juan") went to Respondent's law office in the City of Orange and hired Respondent to file and pursue a bankruptcy petition on his behalf. Respondent charged Juan \$1,099 as attorney's fees and \$299 as filing fees. Respondent agreed to accept payment in installments. Between approximately May 22, 2009, and July 6, 2009, Juan made two installments of advanced attorney's fees, totaling approximately \$800.

15. Thereafter, Respondent closed his law office in Orange but did not inform Juan where Respondent could be reached. In or about August 2009, Juan discovered that Respondent had vacated his law office, and Juan could not reach Respondent by telephone or by any other means.

16. Juan later discovered Respondent's law office in San Diego, and he contacted Respondent to request a refund of fees. On or about April 14, 2010, Respondent paid Juan \$800, as a refund of the advanced attorney's fees. On that date, Juan met with a member of Respondent's staff who requested that Juan sign a written release of liability in consideration of the refund of unearned attorney's fees.

Respondent's staff did not inform Juan, orally or in writing, that he may seek another lawyer's advice about the release and give Juan an opportunity to seek that advice.

#### CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

17. By not informing Juan that Respondent had closed his law office in Orange and could be reached at his San Diego office, Respondent failed to keep a client reasonably informed of significant developments in a matter in which Respondent had agreed to provide legal services in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(m).

18. By obtaining a release of liability from Juan without advising him in writing to seek independent counsel and giving him time to do so, Respondent settled a potential claim for Respondent's liability to the client for Respondent's professional malpractice without informing the client in writing that the client may seek the advice of an independent lawyer of the client's choice regarding the settlement and giving the client a reasonable opportunity to seek that advice in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-400(B).

#### Case No. 10-O-03145 (Complainant: Amelia Murillo)

#### FACTS:

19. On or about May 22, 2009, Amelia Murillo ("Murillo") hired Respondent to file and pursue a bankruptcy petition on her behalf. Respondent charged Murillo \$1,099 as attorney's fees and \$299 as filing fees. Respondent agreed to accept payment in installments. Between approximately May 22, 2009, and July 6, 2009, Murillo made two installments of advanced attorney's fees, totaling approximately \$800.

20. Thereafter, Respondent closed his law office in Orange but did not inform Murillo where Respondent could be reached. In or about August 2009, Murillo discovered that Respondent had vacated his law office, and Murillo could not reach Respondent by telephone or by any other means.

21. Murillo later discovered Respondent's law office in San Diego, and she contacted Respondent to request a refund of fees. On or about April 14, 2010, Respondent paid Murillo \$800 as a refund of the advanced attorney's fees. On that date, Murillo met with a member of Respondent's staff who requested that Murillo sign a written release of liability in consideration of the refund of unearned attorney's fees. Respondent's staff did not inform Murillo, orally or in writing, that she may seek another lawyer's advice about the release and give Murillo an opportunity to seek that advice.

#### CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

22. By not informing Murillo that Respondent had closed his law office in Orange and could be reached at his San Diego office, Respondent failed to keep a client reasonably informed of significant developments in a matter in which Respondent had agreed to provide legal services in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(m).

23. By obtaining a release of liability from Murillo without advising her in writing to seek independent counsel and giving her time to do so, Respondent settled a claim or potential claim for Respondent's liability to the client for Respondent's professional malpractice, without informing the client in writing that the client may seek the advice of an independent lawyer of the client's choice

regarding the settlement and giving the client a reasonable opportunity to seek that advice willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-400(B).

Case No. 10-O-03527 (Complainant: Amalia Oviedo)

FACTS:

24. On July 3, 2007, Amalia Oviedo ("Oviedo") went to Respondent's office and employed Respondent to prepare a petition for dissolution of marriage for her. This visit to Respondent's office was the only time that Oviedo ever met with Respondent. At that time, she paid Respondent \$500 in cash towards a fee of \$1,000 for his legal services and received a receipt. Oviedo, who is not fluent in English, informed Respondent's staff that she did not want to represent herself in court. Nevertheless, Respondent's staff had her sign a fee agreement written in English which she could not read that stated that the attorney's services would not include litigation.

25. On August 25, 2007, Oviedo returned to Respondent's office and paid a further \$500 in cash for Respondent's services and received a receipt. At that time, Respondent's staff presented her with a petition for marital dissolution and related documents which were prepared in English for her to represent herself. Oviedo signed the petition, which she could not read, and Respondent's staff told her they would file the petition. At no time did Respondent or his staff file a petition for dissolution on behalf of Oviedo in court.

26. During the period from August 2007 to March 2009, Oviedo telephoned Respondent's office repeatedly and left messages asking that someone return her call. No one returned her call. During that time period, Oviedo also visited Respondent's office approximately 10 times inquiring into the status of her case, and each time she was told that Respondent was unavailable. When Oviedo requested an appointment, Respondent's staff took her name and number and told her someone would call to schedule the appointment. No one called Oviedo to schedule an appointment.

27. On February 25, 2009, Oviedo's husband filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in the San Diego County Superior Court, case no. D514507. After Oviedo was served with the petition, she went to Respondent's office in March 2009 and met with his staff. Respondent's staff told Oviedo that Respondent would handle it, and she left the petition with Respondent's office.

28. Thereafter, Oviedo did not hear from Respondent. In January 2010, she returned to Respondent's office and found that it was closed. She then located a new office address for Respondent. In June 2010, she sent Respondent a letter requesting a refund of the fees paid to him. Respondent has not refunded any of the \$1,000 in fees received from Oviedo.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

29. By not responding to Oviedo's inquiries about her case, Respondent failed to respond promptly to reasonable status inquiries of a client in a matter in which Respondent had agreed to provide legal services in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(m).

30. By failing to supervise his staff who informed Oviedo that Respondent would file her petition for dissolution and not filing the petition for dissolution on behalf of Oviedo, Respondent intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A).

Case No. 10-O-06075 (Investigation re the Santiago Case)

FACTS:

31. In April 2009, Respondent filed a marital dissolution petition on behalf of Trinidad B. Santiago ("Santiago") in the San Diego County Superior Court, case no. D515404. At all pertinent times herein, Respondent was the attorney of record for Santiago.

32. The court scheduled a Case Management Conference ("CMC") in Santiago's case for December 21, 2009. Respondent received due notice of the CMC. Respondent did not appear at the CMC. As a result, the court rescheduled the CMC to February 8, 2010. The court also issued an Order to Show Cause (OSC) requiring Respondent to appear and show why sanctions should not be imposed for his failure to appear at the CMC on December 21, 2009. Respondent received due notice of the OSC.

33. On or about February 8, 2010, Respondent informed the court that he had hired an attorney appearance service to make a special appearance for him at the CMC on December 21, 2009. The court ordered Respondent to file by May 3, 2010, a written declaration attesting that he hired an attorney appearance service to make the appearance at the CMC. The court also scheduled another hearing on May 3, 2010. Respondent received due notice of the hearing and of the order.

34. On May 3, 2010, Respondent did not appear in court for the OSC. Also, Respondent did not file the declaration as ordered by the court. As a result, the court ordered that Respondent pay sanctions of \$1,000 to the court and indicated that the sanctions would be reported to the State Bar. Respondent received due notice of the sanctions.

35. Respondent did not report the sanctions to the State Bar. Respondent erroneously believed that the reporting by the court was sufficient to meet all reporting obligations.

36. Respondent did not pay the sanctions promptly. On October 19, 2010, Respondent paid the sanctions to the court.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

37. By not filing the court-ordered declaration, not appearing for the OSC, and not paying the sanctions promptly as ordered by the court, Respondent willfully disobeyed or violated an order of the court requiring him to do or forbear an act connected with or in the course of Respondent's profession which he ought in good faith to do or forbear in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6103.

38. By not reporting the sanctions imposed on him by the court on May 3, 2010, Respondent failed to report to the agency charged with attorney discipline, in writing, within 30 days of the time Respondent had knowledge of the imposition of any judicial sanctions against Respondent in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(o)(3).

Case No. 10-O-06211 (Complainant: Margarita Salguero)

FACTS:

39. On January 17, 2009, Margarita Salguero ("Salguero") employed Respondent to prepare and file a bankruptcy petition for her. At that time, Salguero agreed to pay Respondent \$1,099 in fees prior to the filing of the petition and a filing fee of \$299. On that date, she paid Respondent \$300 towards the fees.

40. During the months from February through June 2009, Salguero paid Respondent additional sums totaling \$1,000 in advanced fees. In July 2009, Salguero went to Respondent's office to make a final payment and discovered that the office was closed.

41. At no time did Respondent provide any legal services to Salguero. Respondent did not earn the fees advanced by Salguero. Respondent has not refunded the fees to Salguero.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

42. By not informing Salguero that he had moved his office and where he could be reached, Respondent failed to keep a client reasonably informed of significant developments in a matter in which Respondent had agreed to provide legal services in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(m).

43. By not refunding the \$1,300 in unearned fees to Salguero after moving his office without informing her, Respondent failed to refund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(2).

Case No. 10-O-06345 (Complainant: Marciano Ibarra)

FACTS:

44. On December 4, 2009, Marciano Ybarra ("Ybarra") employed Respondent to file a bankruptcy petition on his behalf. Ybarra spoke to Respondent's staff and did not meet with Respondent. At that time, Ybarra paid Respondent \$2,500 in advanced fees for the legal services. Ybarra also paid Respondent \$274 as advanced costs. Respondent deposited all funds received from Ybarra in his business account and did not deposit the advanced costs in a trust account.

45. Later in the month of December 2009, Ybarra went to Respondent's office and informed Respondent's staff that he did not want to proceed with the bankruptcy petition. Ybarra requested a refund of the fees, but Respondent's staff told him that the fees were non-refundable.

46. At no time did Respondent provide any legal services to Ybarra. Respondent did not earn the fees advanced by Ybarra. Respondent has not refunded the fees to Ybarra.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

47. By depositing the \$274 in advanced costs received from Ybarra in his business account and not in a trust account, Respondent failed to deposit funds received for the benefit of a client in a trust account in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(A).



48. By not refunding the \$2,500 to Ybarra in December 2009, Respondent failed to refund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(2).

Case No. 10-O-06944 (Complainant: Javier Osuna-Ruiz)

FACTS:

49. On July 24, 2009, Javier Osuna-Ruiz ("Osuna-Ruiz") visited Respondent's office seeking legal representation in filing a bankruptcy petition. Osuna-Ruiz spoke to Respondent's staff and did not meet with Respondent. Respondent's staff informed Osuna-Ruiz that he qualified for a Chapter 7 bankruptcy and advised Osuna-Ruiz that he must complete a credit counseling course and bring certain documents needed to complete the petition.

50. On August 21, 2009, Osuna-Ruiz completed a credit counseling course. On August 22, 2009, Osuna-Ruiz returned to Respondent's office. Again, he did not meet with Respondent, and he was told by Respondent's staff that Respondent was in a meeting. At that time, Osuna-Ruiz signed a fee agreement and paid Respondent \$1,099 in advanced fees for the legal services. He also left with Respondent's staff the documents he had been instructed to bring, including the certificate of completion of credit counseling.

51. On September 10, 2009, Osuna-Ruiz returned to Respondent's office to sign the bankruptcy petition. Again, Respondent did not meet with Osuna-Ruiz who signed the petition in Respondent's office.

52. During the period from September 2009 through March 2010, Osuna-Ruiz called Respondent's office on multiple occasions asking for the status of his case or to schedule an appointment, but Respondent never returned his call. During that period, Osuna-Ruiz also visited Respondent's office on multiple dates, but he was always told that Respondent was not available.

53. On March 19, 2010, Respondent filed Osuna-Ruiz's bankruptcy petition by electronic filing, but he failed to file the certificate of completion of credit counseling. On March 23, 2010, the court mailed to Respondent's office a notice that the certificate of counseling was due.

54. On March 25, 2010, Osuna-Ruiz received a notice from the bankruptcy court that a meeting of creditors was scheduled for April 21, 2010. During the week of April 5, 2010, Respondent's staff called Osuna-Ruiz and scheduled an appointment. On April 12, 2010, Osuna-Ruiz met with Respondent who advised him not to attend the creditors' meeting, stating that a document had not been filed with the court and that he was going to file a motion to vacate. Respondent did not appear at the creditors' meeting in Osuna-Ruiz's case or file any motion regarding the matter.

55. On April 7, 2010, the bankruptcy court ordered that Osuna-Ruiz's petition be dismissed without prejudice for failure to file the certificate of counseling. On or about April 19, 2010, Respondent filed the certificate of counseling. Thereafter, he took no further action to vacate the dismissal of the case.

56. Respondent did not provide any services of value to Osuna-Ruiz and did not earn the fees received from him. Respondent has not refunded any of the \$1,099 in unearned fees to Osuna-Ruiz.

## CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

57. By not responding to Osuna-Ruiz's inquiries about his case, Respondent failed to respond promptly to reasonable status inquiries of a client in a matter in which Respondent had agreed to provide legal services in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(m).

58. By not filing Osuna-Ruiz's bankruptcy petition promptly and with the certificate of counseling and not taking action to get the case reinstated, Respondent intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A).

59. By not refunding the \$1,099 to Osuna-Ruiz after the dismissal of his case, Respondent failed to refund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(2).

### Case No. 10-O-07996 (Investigation re NSF checks)

## FACTS:

60. On or about June 18, 2010, check no. 1021 payable to Respondent in the sum of \$1,158 and drawn upon Respondent's client trust account at Bank of America was presented for payment when the balance in the account was approximately \$191. The bank returned the check due to insufficient funds.

61. On or about July 6, 2010, check no. 1024 payable to USBC in the sum of \$6,403 and drawn upon Respondent's client trust account at Bank of America was presented for payment when the balance in the account was approximately \$4,888. The bank returned the check due to insufficient funds.

62. Respondent did not maintain the required recordkeeping for the trust account and reconcile the account on a monthly basis. His failure to do so resulted in the issuance of checks drawn against insufficient funds.

## CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

63. By not keeping records for his trust account and reconcile the account on a monthly basis, Respondent failed to maintain, and to preserve for five years from final appropriate disposition, complete records of all client funds coming into Respondent's possession in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(B)(3).

### Case No. 10-O-09238 (Complainant: Luz Rosas)

## FACTS:

64. On February 5, 2010, Luz Rosas ("Rosas") employed Respondent at an office in Calexico, California, to prepare and file a bankruptcy petition on her behalf, and she signed a fee agreement agreeing to pay a fee of \$1,000 plus a filing fee of \$299 for Respondent's legal services. Rosas did not meet with Respondent and communicated only with his staff. At that time, Rosas paid Respondent \$500 in advanced fees.

65. On February 8, 2010, Rosas paid Respondent an additional \$500 in advanced fees. Again, she did not meet with Respondent and communicated only with his staff. In March 2010, Rosas learned that Respondent's Callexico office was closed.

66. Respondent did not provide any legal services to Rosas or inform her of the closing of his office or where he could be located. Respondent did not earn any of the \$1,000 in advanced fees. Respondent has not refunded any of the \$1,000 in fees to Rosas.

#### CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

67. By not taking action to complete Rosas's bankruptcy petition, Respondent intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A).

#### Case No. 11-O-12791 (Complainant: Michael A. Alfred obo Nelson Mahecha)

#### FACTS:

68. On or about April 24, 2009, Nelson Mahecha retained Respondent's law firm to, among other things, file a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy to strip away the lien of his second residential mortgage.

69. Mehacha paid Respondent \$2,199 for the Bankruptcy.

70. Respondent's firm filed for Bankruptcy for Mahecha, and, on May 25, 2010, Capital Alliance Funding Corporation, which was Mahecha's unsecured second mortgage holder, filed a Motion for Relief from Stay. Respondent's firm failed to file an Opposition to that Motion, and, on June 6, 2010, the Court granted an Order on Non-contested Motion for Relief from Automatic Stay.

#### CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

71. By not filing opposition to the motion for relief from stay, Respondent intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A).

#### Case No. 11-O-13238 (Complainant: Gregory A. Schnitzer obo Elizabeth White)

#### FACTS:

72. On or about August 13, 2009, Elizabeth White retained Respondent's law firm to represent her in filing a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy for the purpose of, among other things, obtaining a stay on foreclosure proceedings for her real property. White paid Respondent \$2,577 in advanced fees.

73. Respondent's firm filed a Chapter 13 Petition on behalf of Ms. White on August 13, 2009. However, a Certificate of Credit Counseling was not filed with the Petition, as required, and, therefore, the Court dismissed the case without prejudice on September 1, 2009.

74. On December 16, 2009, Respondent's firm filed a second Chapter 13 Petition on behalf of White while the first case was still pending. Due to the procedural posture of the case, no stay was

ordered. Although a Motion could have been brought to allow a stay, Respondent's firm failed to bring any such motion.

75. Motions for relief from stay were brought by creditors in both cases. Respondent's firm failed to oppose the Motions which were granted by the Court.

76. Respondent's firm filed yet another Chapter 13 Petition on behalf of Ms. White on January 5, 2010 while the previous case was still pending. Due to procedural issues, this case was dismissed on February 2, 2010. Respondent has made a partial refund of fees to Ms. White.

#### CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

77. By not filing the certificate of credit counseling and not filing opposition to the motion for relief from the stay, Respondent repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A).

#### Case No. 11-O-13491 (Complainant: Adelina Acevedo)

#### FACTS:

78. On September 29, 2010, Adelina Acevedo ("Acevedo") employed Respondent to file a chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on her behalf for a fee of \$3,600. By October 1, 2010, Acevedo paid Respondent the \$3,600 in fees as well as advanced costs of \$274 for the court filing fees.

79. During the next 4 months, Acevedo regularly contacted Respondent's office to check on the status of her case and was repeatedly told that other cases were prior to her case and to wait for staff to contact her. Around the beginning of March 2011, Acevedo learned that the staff person assigned to her case had been terminated, and she went in person to Respondent's office and met with a new attorney who was unfamiliar with her case and was assigned many other cases. Thereafter, no action was taken to file her bankruptcy petition.

80. On May 23, 2010, Acevedo informed Respondent's office in writing that she was terminating the representation and requesting a refund of fees and costs. On May 24, 2010, Respondent replied in writing that he would make a partial refund by three checks totaling \$2,974 within 30 days. Respondent has not yet refunded any fees or returned the advanced costs to Acevedo.

#### CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

81. By not acting promptly to file Acevedo's bankruptcy petition, Respondent intentionally, recklessly or repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A).

#### PENDING PROCEEDINGS.

The disclosure date referred to, on page 2, paragraph A(7), was June 2, 2011.

## **AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.**

According to Standard 2.4 of the Standards for Attorney Discipline, the appropriate discipline for culpability of a member of a pattern of wilfully failing to perform services demonstrating the member's abandonment of the causes in which he or she was retained shall result in disbarment. Such misconduct in an individual matter or in matters not demonstrating a pattern shall result in reproof or suspension.

In cases involving a pattern of misconduct not primarily intentional in nature, and in which the attorney has no prior record of discipline, suspension and not disbarment is most likely to be deemed adequate to protect the public. See *Silva-Vidor v. State Bar* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1071, where the Supreme Court imposed a one-year actual suspension for 14 matters of misconduct mitigated by several years of trouble-free practice following a series of tragic personal and health calamities.

Here, Respondent's misconduct involved ten client matters as well failure to maintain proper trust account records. The parties agree that the stipulated disposition is within the discipline called for by the standards.

(Do not write above this line.)

In the Matter of:  
Roger Dale Stacy, no. 208500

Case number(s):  
09-O-18768, 10-O-00828, 10-O-03109, 10-O-03145,  
10-O-03527, 10-O-06075, 10-O-06211, 10-O-06345,  
10-O-06944, 10-O-07996, 10-O-09238, 11-O-12791,  
11-O-13238, 11-O-13491

### SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES


By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitations and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Disposition.

6-2-11  
Date

  
Respondent's Signature


Roger D. Stacy  
Print Name

6/2/11  
Date

  
Respondent's Counsel Signature

Arthur L. Margolis  
Print Name

6-2-11  
Date

  
Deputy Trial Counsel's Signature

Dane C. Dauphine  
Print Name

In the Matter of: Roger Dale Stacy, no. 208500	Case Number(s): 09-O-18768, 10-O-00828, 10-O-03109, 10-O-03145, 10-O-03527, 10-O-06075, 10-O-06211, 10-O-06345, 10-O-06944, 10-O-07996, 10-O-09238, 11-O-12791, 11-O-13238, 11-O-13491
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### ACTUAL SUSPENSION ORDER

Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any, is GRANTED without prejudice, and:

- ☐ The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
- ☒ The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
- ☐ All Hearing dates are vacated.

The payee identified as "Marciano Ibarra" in paragraph a [Restitution] on page 7 of the stipulation is identified in the subsequent text of the stipulation as being "Marciano Ybarra." (See pages 16-17.) Whichever spelling is correct, respondent is obligated to pay restitution to that individual (and/or to the CSF), and provide proof of such payment, as otherwise set out in said paragraph.

The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58(E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) **The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)**

6/20/11  
Date

  
Judge of the State Bar Court

**DONALD F. MILES**

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on June 21, 2011, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND  
ORDER APPROVING

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:

- ☒ by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:

ARTHUR LEWIS MARGOLIS, ESQ.  
MARGOLIS & MARGOLIS LLP  
2000 RIVERSIDE DR  
LOS ANGELES, CA 90039

- ☒ by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

DANE DAUPHINE, ESQ., Enforcement, Los Angeles

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on June 21, 2011.



Rose Luthi  
Case Administrator  
State Bar Court