Case Number(s): 10-O-00362, 10-O-03291
In the Matter of: Williams Edward Levin , Bar # 104631 , A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Dane C, Dauphine, Supervising Trial Counsel, 1149 South Hill St., Los Angeles, CA 90015-2299, (213) 765-1293, Bar# 121606
Counsel for Respondent: In Pro Per Respondent, William E. Levin, P.O. Box 4140, Laguna Beach, CA 92652, (949) 233-1216, Bar# 104631
Submitted to: Assigned Judge – State Bar Court Clerk’s Office Los Angeles.
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted December 3, 1982.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 11 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
<<not>> checked. Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 5.130, Rules of Procedure.
checked. Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: 2012 and 2013. (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
<<not>> checked. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs are entirely waived.
Respondent shall indemnify Hollywood Hair for any sum it has paid of the $3,200 sanctions awarded to Richard Farrell for his attorney’s fees; Respondent shall report to the Office of Probation with each quarterly report whether he has been contacted by Joe Schwartz and/or Hollywood Hair, Inc., or counsel for Richard Farrell regarding the payment of the sanctions; and Respondent shall reimburse any payment by Joe Schwartz and/or Hollywood Hair, Inc., no later than 60 days prior to the conclusion of probation and provide satisfactory proof thereof to the Office of Probation .no later than 30 days prior to the conclusion of probation.
IN THE MATTER OF: WILLIAM EDWARD LEVIN, State Bar No. 104631
STATE BAR COURT CASE NUMBER: 10-O-00362, 10-O-03291
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that he is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct.
Case No. 10-O-00362 (The Vega Matter)
FACTS:
1. On November 20, 2008, Carlos Vega ("Vega") employed the Respondent to handle an intellectual property case related to his shoe design which was being copied by a competitor. Vega informed Respondent that time was of the essence to stop the competitor from beginning production of its copied product.
2. On November 24, 2008, Vega paid Respondent $15,000 as an advanced fee. Although Respondent sent Vega an e-mail attaching a fee agreement, Vega did not sign and return the agreement. Respondent intended to provide a billing for his fees to Vega after he had filed Vega’s civil action. Vega never returned a signed fee agreement to Respondent.
3. From in or about November 2008 to on or about February 17, 2009, Vega, by e-mail, urged Respondent to work on his matter and to file a lawsuit. He specifically reminded Respondent of his concern about the passage of time. On February 17, 2009, in an e-mail message, Respondent acknowledged Vega’s patience and promised to file a lawsuit.
4. During the months of March and April 2009, Vega sent additional e-mails to Respondent urging action. Thereafter, Respondent did not file a lawsuit or take any action with regard to Vega’s matter.
5. On April 29, 2009, Vega sent an email to Respondent terminating the representation and requesting a refund of his advanced fees. On or about July 2, 2009, and September 29, 2009, Vega sent subsequent e-mail requests to Respondent for a refund of his advanced fees. Respondent .did not provide an accounting to Vega for the advanced fees until November 4, 2010, when he provided an invoice containing a detailed accounting of work done to support his claim that the fees received were fully earned.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
6. By not providing a prompt accounting to Vega in response to his client’s request, Respondent failed to render appropriate accounts to a client regarding all funds coming into Respondent’s possession in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(B)(3).
Case No. 10-O-03291 (The Schwartz Matter)
FACTS:
7. On October 24, 2008, Joe Schwartz ("Schwartz"), President of Hollywood Hair, Inc., employed Respondent to represent the company in a trademark and trade name infringement suit against Richard Farrell ("Farrell"). Respondent estimated that his fees would be approximately $40,000 which he wanted Schwartz to pay in advance. Instead, Schwartz agreed to pay Respondent a monthly payment of $5,000 in advanced fees.
8. On December 18, 2008, Respondent filed a complaint on behalf of Hollywood Hair, Inc., against Farrell in the United States District Court, Central District of California, case no. 8:08-cv-01424-CJC-RNB ("Hollywood Hair ease").
9. On April 17, 2009, Farrell filed a counterclaim in the Hollywood Hair case against Hollywood Hair, Inc. Although Respondent drafted a response to the counterclaim and provide a copy to Schwartz, Respondent did not file any response on behalf of Hollywood Hair, Inc., to the counterclaim in the Hollywood Hair case.
10. During the period from on or about October 24, 2008, to August 7, 2009, Schwartz paid Respondent a total of $35,500 in fees. Respondent provided Schwartz with only one invoice for his legal services for the period from October through December 2008 that billed $15,555 in fees and costs for Respondent’s legal services. In June 2009, however, Schwartz asked Respondent if he could reduce his monthly payment of fees to $2,500 because his business was slow, and he paid only $5,000 to Respondent for the period from June to August 2009.
11. In or about November 2009, Farrell’s counsel served written discovery on Respondent. On November 10, 2009, Respondent mailed the discovery requests to Schwartz. By electronic mail, Respondent advised Schwartz that he had to have the responses to him by November 27, 2009, to be finalized and served by the due date of December 7, 2009.
12. On November 13, 2009, Schwartz acknowledged receipt of the discovery requests and advised Respondent by electronic mail, in part, that he needed assistance with the discovery responses. Respondent received the email.
13. On November 17, 2009, Schwartz again asked for some help in responding to the discovery and otherwise inquired about the status of the underlying case. On or about the same date, Respondent replied that he needed the answers and information, that he would revise them, and that the deadline was December 7, 2009. Respondent also required a payment of advanced fees from Schwartz since Schwartz had stopped making the agreed monthly payments to Respondent.
14. On November 19, 2009, Schwartz sent another e-mail to Respondent again asking for help with responding to the discovery as well as inquiring about other aspects of the Hollywood Hair case. Respondent received the email. Respondent did not respond.
15. On November 25, 2009, Schwartz sent another e-mail to Respondent advising that he had been waiting to hear from the Respondent and asking other questions about the Hollywood Hair case. Respondent received the email. Respondent did not respond.
16. In December 2009, Respondent called Schwartz who was too busy to talk to him. Thereafter, Respondent ceased during further legal work for Schwartz because Schwartz .was not making monthly payments of advanced fees to Respondent. Respondent remained counsel of record in the Hollywood Hair case and did not make a motion to withdraw from representation.
17. On February 12, 2010, Farrell’s counsel filed motions in the Hollywood Hair case to compel responses to discovery requests and for monetary and evidentiary sanctions. At that time, Farrel’s counsel served Respondent by mail to his address of record in the Hollywood Hair case giving Respondent notice of a hearing on the motions. Thereafter, Respondent did not file any opposition to the motions. At no time did Respondent inform Schwartz of the motions or his failure to file any opposition.
18. On March ,I, 2010, the court granted the motions and ordering that Hollywood Hair, Inc., and Respondent pay sanctions of $3,200 as discovery sanctions to Farrell’s counsel within fourteen days.
19. On March 16, 2010, the court issued an order for Hollywood Hair, Inc., to show cause why its claims should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute and why default should not be entered. The court ordered that Hollywood Hair file any opposition by April 5, 20 ! 0, for a hearing scheduled on April 19, 2010. The court also ordered that Farrell file a response by April 12, 2010. The court clerk served a copy of the order on Respondent by mail to his address of record. Thereafter, Respondent did not inform Schwartz of the order to show cause or file any opposition.
20. On April 12, 2010, Farrell’s attorneys filed a response to the order to show cause requesting that the court dismiss the claims of Hollywood Hair, Inc., and served a copy of the motion on Respondent at his address of record.
21. On April 14, 2010, the court vacated the hearing on the order to show cause since no opposition had been filed by Hollywood Hair, Inc., and ordered that its complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
22. On May 20, 2010, Farrell dismissed his counterclaim. On June 3, 2010, an abstract of judgment was issued in favor of Farrell and against Hollywood Hair, Inc., for attorney’s fees of $3,200 which had been imposed as a discovery sanction. To date, there has been no attempt to collect the judgment.
23. Although Respondent had withdrawn from representation, Respondent did not provide a prompt accounting to Schwartz to show what amount Respondent had earned of the remaining $19,945 received from Schwartz in advanced fees until November 2010. At that time, Respondent sent an invoice with a detailed accounting showing a balance owed to Respondent of over $23,000 which to date has not been paid.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
24. By withdrawing from representation of Schwartz in the Hollywood Hair case without informing his client with the result that his client’s case was dismissed, Respondent failed, upon termination of employment, to take reasonable steps to avoid reasonably foreseeable prejudice to his client in willful violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(A)(2).
25. By not providing a prompt accounting to Schwartz for the remaining $19,945 received from Schwartz in advanced fees upon withdrawing from representation in November 2009 until November 2010, Respondent failed to render a timely accounting to a client regarding all funds coming into Respondent’ s possession in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4100(B)(3).
PENDING PROCEEDINGS.
The disclosure date referred to, on page 2, paragraph A(7), was January 11, 2010.
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.
The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct (the ~"Standards"):
Culpability for failure to perform in matters not demonstrating a pattern shall result in reproval or suspension depending upon the extent of the misconduct and the degree of harm to the client. (Standard
2.4.)
Case Law
Failure to perform and abandonment of clients (not establishing a pattern) has resulted in stayed or a short actual suspension even with no prior record of discipline. See Layton v. State Bar (1991) 50 Cal.3d 889 (30 day actual suspension for abandonment of a trust/estate matter ; no prior discipline in 30 years); Harris v. State Bar (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1082 (90 days actual for abandonment of single client matter; no prior discipline in 10 years); Van Sloten v. State Bar (1989) 48 Cal.3d 921 (stayed suspension, no actual, for abandonment of a single client matter; no prior discipline); Wren v. State Bar (1983) 34 Cal.3d 81 (45 days actual suspension for failing to perform in a single client matter with misrepresentation to client; no prior discipline in 22 years); In the Matter of Aguiluz (Review Dept. 1992) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 32 (stayed suspension, no actual, for abandonment of client and failure to release client file; no prior discipline).
The stipulated discipline of 30 days actual suspension is within the range of discipline under the standards and the case law.
Case Number(s): 10-O-00362, 10-O-03291
In the Matter of: William Edward Levin; STATE BAR NO.: 104631
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: William Edward Levin
Date:
Respondent’s Counsel:
Date:
Deputy Trial Counsel: Dane C. Dauphine
Date: February 1, 2011
Case Number(s): 10-O-00362, 10-O-03291
In the Matter of: William Edward Levin, STATE BAR NO.: 104631
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
1. On page 4, paragraph D.(1)(b), the box should be checked.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58 (E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: RICHARD A. HONN
Date: February 16, 2011
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and
County of Los Angeles, on February 16, 2011, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:
WILLIAMS EDWARD LEVIN ESQ
LEVIN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GROUP
PO BOX 4140
LAGUNA BEACH, CA 92652
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
DANE C. DAUPHINE, Enforcement, Los Angeles
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on February 16, 2011.
Signed by:
Julieta E. Gonzales
Case Administrator
State Bar Court