

State Bar Court of California **Hearing Department** PUBLIC MATTER Los Angeles **ACTUAL SUSPENSION** Counsel For The State Bar For Court use only Case Number(s): 10-O-00362, 10-O-03291 Dane C. Dauphine Supervising Trial Counsel 1149 South Hill St. Los Angeles, CA 90015-2299 (213) 765-1293 FEB 16 2011 STATE BAR COURT Bar # 121606 CLERK'S OFFICE LOS ANGELES In Pro Per Respondent William E. Levin P.O. Box 4140 Laguna Beach, CA 92652 (949) 233-1216 Submitted to: Assigned Judge STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND Bar # 104631 DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING In the Matter of: William Edward Levin **ACTUAL SUSPENSION** PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED Bar # 104631

Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.

A. Parties' Acknowledgments:

A Member of the State Bar of California

- Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted December 3, 1982.
- (2) The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
- (3) All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 11 pages, not including the order.
- (4) A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."

(Effective January 1, 2011)

(Respondent)

Actual Suspension

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(5)	Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".			
(6)	The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."			
(7)	No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.			
(8)	(8) Payment of Disciplinary Costs—Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086. 6140.7. (Check one option only):			
		Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 5.130, Rules of Procedure. Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: 2012 and 2013. (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs". Costs are entirely waived.		
F	rofe	avating Circumstances [for definition, see Standards for Attorney Sanctions for essional Misconduct, standard 1.2(b)]. Facts supporting aggravating circumstances equired.		
(1)		Prior record of discipline [see standard 1.2(f)]		
	(a)	State Bar Court case # of prior case		
	(b)	☐ Date prior discipline effective		
	(c)	Rules of Professional Conduct/ State Bar Act violations:		
	(d)	☐ Degree of prior discipline		
	(e)	If Respondent has two or more incidents of prior discipline, use space provided below.		
(2)		Dishonesty: Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by or followed by bad faith, dishonesty, concealment, overreaching or other violations of the State Bar Act or Rules of Professional Conduct.		
(3)		Trust Violation: Trust funds or property were involved and Respondent refused or was unable to account to the client or person who was the object of the misconduct for improper conduct toward said funds or property.		
(4)	\boxtimes	Harm: Respondent's misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public or the administration of justice. Respondent's improper withdrawal from representation of client Hollywood Hair, Inc., was a factor in the dismissal of its cause of action.		
(5)	Indifference: Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for the consequences of his or her misconduct.			

(DO II	ot write	above this line.)		
(6)		Lack of Cooperation: Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims of his/her misconduct or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation or proceedings.		
(7)		Multiple/Pattern of Misconduct: Respondent's current misconduct evidences multiple acts of wrongdoing or demonstrates a pattern of misconduct.		
(8)		No aggravating circumstances are involved.		
Add	ition	al aggravating circumstances:		
	_	ating Circumstances [see standard 1.2(e)]. Facts supporting mitigating imstances are required.		
(1)		No Prior Discipline: Respondent has no prior record of discipline over many years of practice coupled with present misconduct which is not deemed serious.		
(2)		No Harm: Respondent did not harm the client or person who was the object of the misconduct.		
(3)		Candor/Cooperation: Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and cooperation with the victims of his/her misconduct and to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation and proceedings. Respondent was candid and cooperative with the State Bar in entering into this stipulation regarding his misconduct.		
(4)		Remorse: Respondent promptly took objective steps spontaneously demonstrating remorse and recognition of the wrongdoing, which steps were designed to timely atone for any consequences of his/her misconduct.		
(5)		Restitution: Respondent paid \$ on in restitution to without the threat or force of disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings.		
(6)		Delay: These disciplinary proceedings were excessively delayed. The delay is not attributable to Respondent and the delay prejudiced him/her.		
(7)		Good Faith: Respondent acted in good faith.		
(8)		Emotional/Physical Difficulties: At the time of the stipulated act or acts of professional misconduct Respondent suffered extreme emotional difficulties or physical disabilities which expert testimony would establish was directly responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities were not the product of any illegal conduct by the member, such as illegal drug or substance abuse, and Respondent no longer suffers from such difficulties or disabilities. In January 2009, Respondent was sufficient from depression and generalized anxiety apparently due to his contested divorce, custody battle, and financial problems.		
(9)	\boxtimes	Severe Financial Stress: At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered from severe financial stress which resulted from circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond his/her control and which were directly responsible for the misconduct. Respondent has had financial difficulties following the dissolution of a law partnership in 2004 and his marital dissolution proceedings. In or about November 2009, Respondent's home was foreclosed.		

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(10) 🛛	Family Problems: At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered extreme difficulties in his/her personal life which were other than emotional or physical in nature. During the time of his misconduct, Respondent was involved in his own marital dissolution and child custody disputes which caused him emotional difficulties and depression.		
(11)	Good Character: Respondent's good character is attested to by a wide range of references in the legal and general communities who are aware of the full extent of his/her misconduct.		
(12)	Rehabilitation: Considerable time has passed since the acts of professional misconduct occurred followed by convincing proof of subsequent rehabilitation.		
(13)	No r	nitiga	ting circumstances are involved.
Addition	al mit	igatin	g circumstances:
D. Disc	iplin	e:	
(1)	Stay	red Su	Ispension:
(a)	\boxtimes	Resp	pondent must be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.
	i.		and until Respondent shows proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of rehabilitation and present fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the law pursuant to standard 1.4(c)(ii) Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.
. F	ii.		and until Respondent pays restitution as set forth in the Financial Conditions form attached to this stipulation.
	iii.		and until Respondent does the following:
(b)		The	above-referenced suspension is stayed.
(2)	Prol	bation	:
Re dat	espondent must be placed on probation for a period of two (2) years, which will commence upon the effective te of the Supreme Court order in this matter. (See rule 9.18, California Rules of Court)		
(3)	Act	ual Su	spension:
(a)	\boxtimes		pondent must be actually suspended from the practice of law in the State of California for a period airty (30) days.
	i.		and until Respondent shows proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of rehabilitation and present fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the law pursuant to standard 1.4(c)(ii), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct
	ii.		and until Respondent pays restitution as set forth in the Financial Conditions form attached to this stipulation.
	iii.		and until Respondent does the following:
E. Add	ition	al Co	onditions of Probation:

(Do uc	(Do not write above this line.)					
(1)		If Respondent is actually suspended for two years or more, he/she must remain actually suspended until he/she proves to the State Bar Court his/her rehabilitation, fitness to practice, and learning and ability in the general law, pursuant to standard 1.4(c)(ii), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.				
(2)	. 🛛	During the probation period, Respondent must comply with the provisions of the State Bar Act and Rules of Professional Conduct.				
(3)	\boxtimes	Within ten (10) days of any change, Respondent must report to the Membership Records Office of the State Bar and to the Office of Probation of the State Bar of California ("Office of Probation"), all changes of information, including current office address and telephone number, or other address for State Bar purposes, as prescribed by section 6002.1 of the Business and Professions Code.				
(4)		Within thirty (30) days from the effective date of discipline, Respondent must contact the Office of Probation and schedule a meeting with Respondent's assigned probation deputy to discuss these terms and conditions of probation. Upon the direction of the Office of Probation, Respondent must meet with the probation deputy either in-person or by telephone. During the period of probation, Respondent must promptly meet with the probation deputy as directed and upon request. Respondent must submit written quarterly reports to the Office of Probation on each January 10, April 10, July 10, and October 10 of the period of probation. Under penalty of perjury, Respondent must state whether Respondent has complied with the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and all conditions of probation during the preceding calendar quarter. Respondent must also state whether there are any proceedings pending against him or her in the State Bar Court and if so, the case number and current status of that proceeding. If the first report would cover less than 30 days, that report must be submitted on the next quarter date, and cover the extended period.				
à.		In addition to all quarterly reports, a final report, containing the same information, is due no earlier than twenty (20) days before the last day of the period of probation and no later than the last day of probation.				
(6)		Respondent must be assigned a probation monitor. Respondent must promptly review the terms and conditions of probation with the probation monitor to establish a manner and schedule of compliance. During the period of probation, Respondent must furnish to the monitor such reports as may be requested, in addition to the quarterly reports required to be submitted to the Office of Probation. Respondent must cooperate fully with the probation monitor.				
(7)	\boxtimes	Subject to assertion of applicable privileges, Respondent must answer fully, promptly and truthfully any inquiries of the Office of Probation and any probation monitor assigned under these conditions which are directed to Respondent personally or in writing relating to whether Respondent is complying or has complied with the probation conditions.				
(8)	\boxtimes	Within one (1) year of the effective date of the discipline herein, Respondent must provide to the Office of Probation satisfactory proof of attendance at a session of the Ethics School, and passage of the test given at the end of that session.				
		No Ethics School recommended. Reason:				
(9)		Respondent must comply with all conditions of probation imposed in the underlying criminal matter and must so declare under penalty of perjury in conjunction with any quarterly report to be filed with the Office of Probation.				
(10)		The following conditions are attached hereto and incorporated:				
		☐ Substance Abuse Conditions ☐ Law Office Management Conditions				
		☐ Medical Conditions ☐ Financial Conditions				

F. Other Conditions Negotiated by the Parties:

(1)	Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination: Respondent must provide proof of passage of the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination ("MPRE"), administered by the National Conference of Bar Examiners, to the Office of Probation during the period of actual suspension or within one year, whichever period is longer. Failure to pass the MPRE results in actual suspension without further hearing until passage. But see rule 9.10(b), California Rules of Court, and rule 5.162(A) & (E), Rules of Procedure.
	☐ No MPRE recommended. Reason:
(2)	Rule 9.20, California Rules of Court: Respondent must comply with the requirements of rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 calendar days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court's Order in this matter.
(3)	Conditional Rule 9.20, California Rules of Court: If Respondent remains actually suspended for 90 days or more, he/she must comply with the requirements of rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 120 and 130 calendar days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court's Order in this matter.
(4)	Credit for Interim Suspension [conviction referral cases only]: Respondent will be credited for the period of his/her interim suspension toward the stipulated period of actual suspension. Date of commencement of interim suspension:
(5)	Other Conditions: Respondent shall indemnify Hollywood Hair for any sum it has paid of the \$3,200 sanctions awarded to Richard Farrell for his attorney's fees; Respondent shall report to the Office of Probation with each quarterly report whether he has been contacted by Joe Schwartz and/or Hollywood Hair, Inc., or counsel for Richard Farrell regarding the payment of the sanctions; and Respondent shall reimburse any payment by Joe Schwartz and/or Hollywood Hair, Inc., no later than 60 days prior to the conclusion of probation and provide satisfactory proof thereof to the Office of Probation no later than 30 days prior to the conclusion of probation.

ATTACHMENT TO

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION

IN THE MATTER OF:

WILLIAM EDWARD LEVIN

CASE NUMBER(S):

10-O-00362, 10-O-03291

FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that he is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct.

Case No. 10-O-00362 (The Vega Matter)

FACTS:

- 1. On November 20, 2008, Carlos Vega ("Vega") employed the Respondent to handle an intellectual property case related to his shoe design which was being copied by a competitor. Vega informed Respondent that time was of the essence to stop the competitor from beginning production of its copied product.
- 2. On November 24, 2008, Vega paid Respondent \$15,000 as an advanced fee. Although Respondent sent Vega an e-mail attaching a fee agreement, Vega did not sign and return the agreement. Respondent intended to provide a billing for his fees to Vega after he had filed Vega's civil action. Vega never returned a signed fee agreement to Respondent.
- 3. From in or about November 2008 to on or about February 17, 2009, Vega, by e-mail, urged Respondent to work on his matter and to file a lawsuit. He specifically reminded Respondent of his concern about the passage of time. On February 17, 2009, in an e-mail message, Respondent acknowledged Vega's patience and promised to file a lawsuit.
- 4. During the months of March and April 2009, Vega sent additional e-mails to Respondent urging action. Thereafter, Respondent did not file a lawsuit or take any action with regard to Vega's matter.
- 5. On April 29, 2009, Vega sent an email to Respondent terminating the representation and requesting a refund of his advanced fees. On or about July 2, 2009, and September 29, 2009, Vega sent subsequent e-mail requests to Respondent for a refund of his advanced fees. Respondent did not provide an accounting to Vega for the advanced fees until November 4, 2010, when he provided an invoice containing a detailed accounting of work done to support his claim that the fees received were fully earned.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

6. By not providing a prompt accounting to Vega in response to his client's request, Respondent failed to render appropriate accounts to a client regarding all funds coming into Respondent's possession in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(B)(3).

Case No. 10-O-03291 (The Schwartz Matter)

FACTS:

- 7. On October 24, 2008, Joe Schwartz ("Schwartz"), President of Hollywood Hair, Inc., employed Respondent to represent the company in a trademark and trade name infringement suit against Richard Farrell ("Farrell"). Respondent estimated that his fees would be approximately \$40,000 which he wanted Schwartz to pay in advance. Instead, Schwartz agreed to pay Respondent a monthly payment of \$5,000 in advanced fees.
- 8. On December 18, 2008, Respondent filed a complaint on behalf of Hollywood Hair, Inc., against Farrell in the United States District Court, Central District of California, case no. 8:08-cv-01424-CJC-RNB ("Hollywood Hair case").
- 9. On April 17, 2009, Farrell filed a counterclaim in the Hollywood Hair case against Hollywood Hair, Inc. Although Respondent drafted a response to the counterclaim and provide a copy to Schwartz, Respondent did not file any response on behalf of Hollywood Hair, Inc., to the counterclaim in the Hollywood Hair case.
- 10. During the period from on or about October 24, 2008, to August 7, 2009, Schwartz paid Respondent a total of \$35,500 in fees. Respondent provided Schwartz with only one invoice for his legal services for the period from October through December 2008 that billed \$15,555 in fees and costs for Respondent's legal services. In June 2009, however, Schwartz asked Respondent if he could reduce his monthly payment of fees to \$2,500 because his business was slow, and he paid only \$5,000 to Respondent for the period from June to August 2009.
- 11. In or about November 2009, Farrell's counsel served written discovery on Respondent. On November 10, 2009, Respondent mailed the discovery requests to Schwartz. By electronic mail, Respondent advised Schwartz that he had to have the responses to him by November 27, 2009, to be finalized and served by the due date of December 7, 2009.
- 12. On November 13, 2009, Schwartz acknowledged receipt of the discovery requests and advised Respondent by electronic mail, in part, that he needed assistance with the discovery responses. Respondent received the email.
- 13. On November 17, 2009, Schwartz again asked for some help in responding to the discovery and otherwise inquired about the status of the underlying case. On or about the same date, Respondent replied that he needed the answers and information, that he would revise them, and that the deadline was December 7, 2009. Respondent also required a payment of advanced fees from Schwartz since Schwartz had stopped making the agreed monthly payments to Respondent.
- 14. On November 19, 2009, Schwartz sent another e-mail to Respondent again asking for help with responding to the discovery as well as inquiring about other aspects of the Hollywood Hair case. Respondent received the email. Respondent did not respond.
- 15. On November 25, 2009, Schwartz sent another e-mail to Respondent advising that he had been waiting to hear from the Respondent and asking other questions about the Hollywood Hair case. Respondent received the email. Respondent did not respond.



- 16. In December 2009, Respondent called Schwartz who was too busy to talk to him. Thereafter, Respondent ceased during further legal work for Schwartz because Schwartz was not making monthly payments of advanced fees to Respondent. Respondent remained counsel of record in the Hollywood Hair case and did not make a motion to withdraw from representation.
- 17. On February 12, 2010, Farrell's counsel filed motions in the Hollywood Hair case to compel responses to discovery requests and for monetary and evidentiary sanctions. At that time, Farrell's counsel served Respondent by mail to his address of record in the Hollywood Hair case giving Respondent notice of a hearing on the motions. Thereafter, Respondent did not file any opposition to the motions. At no time did Respondent inform Schwartz of the motions or his failure to file any opposition.
- 18. On March 4, 2010, the court granted the motions and ordering that Hollywood Hair, Inc., and Respondent pay sanctions of \$3,200 as discovery sanctions to Farrell's counsel within fourteen days.
- 19. On March 16, 2010, the court issued an order for Hollywood Hair, Inc., to show cause why its claims should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute and why default should not be entered. The court ordered that Hollywood Hair file any opposition by April 5, 2010, for a hearing scheduled on April 19, 2010. The court also ordered that Farrell file a response by April 12, 2010. The court clerk served a copy of the order on Respondent by mail to his address of record. Thereafter, Respondent did not inform Schwartz of the order to show cause or file any opposition.
- 20. On April 12, 2010, Farrell's attorneys filed a response to the order to show cause requesting that the court dismiss the claims of Hollywood Hair, Inc., and served a copy of the motion on Respondent at his address of record.
- 21. On April 14, 2010, the court vacated the hearing on the order to show cause since no opposition had been filed by Hollywood Hair, Inc., and ordered that its complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
- 22. On May 20, 2010, Farrell dismissed his counterclaim. On June 3, 2010, an abstract of judgment was issued in favor of Farrell and against Hollywood Hair, Inc., for attorney's fees of \$3,200 which had been imposed as a discovery sanction. To date, there has been no attempt to collect the judgment.
- 23. Although Respondent had withdrawn from representation, Respondent did not provide a prompt accounting to Schwartz to show what amount Respondent had earned of the remaining \$19,945 received from Schwartz in advanced fees until November 2010. At that time, Respondent sent an invoice with a detailed accounting showing a balance owed to Respondent of over \$23,000 which to date has not been paid.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

24. By withdrawing from representation of Schwartz in the Hollywood Hair case without informing his client with the result that his client's case was dismissed, Respondent failed, upon termination of employment, to take reasonable steps to avoid reasonably foreseeable prejudice to his client in willful violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(A)(2).

25. By not providing a prompt accounting to Schwartz for the remaining \$19,945 received from Schwartz in advanced fees upon withdrawing from representation in November 2009 until November 2010, Respondent failed to render a timely accounting to a client regarding all funds coming into Respondent's possession in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(B)(3).

PENDING PROCEEDINGS.

The disclosure date referred to, on page 2, paragraph A(7), was January 11, 2010.

AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.

The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct (the "Standards"):

Culpability for failure to perform in matters not demonstrating a pattern shall result in reproval or suspension depending upon the extent of the misconduct and the degree of harm to the client. (Standard 2.4.)

Case Law

Failure to perform and abandonment of clients (not establishing a pattern) has resulted in stayed or a short actual suspension even with no prior record of discipline. See *Layton v. State Bar* (1991) 50 Cal.3d 889 (30 day actual suspension for abandonment of a trust/estate matter; no prior discipline in 30 years); *Harris v. State Bar* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1082 (90 days actual for abandonment of single client matter; no prior discipline in 10 years); *Van Sloten v. State Bar* (1989) 48 Cal.3d 921 (stayed suspension, no actual, for abandonment of a single client matter; no prior discipline); *Wren v. State Bar* (1983) 34 Cal.3d 81 (45 days actual suspension for failing to perform in a single client matter with misrepresentation to client; no prior discipline in 22 years); *In the Matter of Aguiluz* (Review Dept. 1992) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 32 (stayed suspension, no actual, for abandonment of client and failure to release client file; no prior discipline).

The stipulated discipline of 30 days actual suspension is within the range of discipline under the standards and the case law.

In the Matter of: William Edward Levin, #104631	Case number(s): 10-O-00362, 10-O-03291	

	SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIE	ES	
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitations and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Disposition.			
	NNym & Clow	William E. Levin	
Date	Respondent's Signature	Print Name	
February 1. 24/1	Paral Daughory		
Date J /	Respondent's Counsel Signature	Print Name	
2-1-11	Dane C Daugher	Dane C. Dauphine	
Date	Deputy Trial Counsel's Signature	Print Name	

ACTUAL SUSPENSION ORDER

Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any, is GRANTED without prejudice, and:

The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.

The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.

All Hearing dates are vacated.

1. On page 4, paragraph D.(1)(b), the box should be checked.

The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58(E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after file date (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)

2/16/11

Date

Judge of the State Bar Court

RICHARD A. HONN

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on February 16, 2011, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:

by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:

WILLIAM EDWARD LEVIN ESQ LEVIN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GROUP PO BOX 4140 LAGUNA BEACH, CA 92652

by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

Dane C. Dauphine, Enforcement, Los Angeles

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on February 16, 2011.

Julieta E. Gonzales

Case Administrator

State Bar Court