State Bar Court of California
Hearing Department
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING DISBARMENT; ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE
ENROLLMENT
DISBARMENT
Case Number(s): 11-C-18679
In the Matter of: KENNETH LEE ROSEN, Bar # 128279, A Member
of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Kimberly G. Anderson, Bar #150359,
Counsel for Respondent: Kenneth Lee Rosen, Bar #128279,
Submitted to: Assigned Judge.
Filed: June 13, 2013.
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION
REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any
additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be
set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g.,
"Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law,"
"Supporting Authority," etc.
A. Parties' Acknowledgments:
1.
Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted June 17,
1987.
2.
The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained
herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the
Supreme Court.
3.
All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption
of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed
consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under
"Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 10 pages, not including
the order.
4.
A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or
causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5.
Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts
are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6.
The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level
of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7.
No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent
has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not
resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8.
Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of
Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
checked. Costs are awarded to the
State Bar.
<<not>> checked. Costs
are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial
Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs
are entirely waived.
9.
ORDER OF INACTIVE ENROLLMENT:
The parties are aware that if this stipulation is approved, the judge will
issue an order of inactive enrollment under Business and Professions Code
section 6007, subdivision (c)(4), and Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, rule
5.111(D)(1).
B. Aggravating Circumstances [for definition, see Standards for Attorney
Sanctions for Professional Misconduct, standard 1.2(b)]. Facts supporting
aggravating circumstances are required.
<<not>> checked. (1) Prior
record of discipline
<<not>> checked. (a) State Bar Court case # of prior case .
<<not>> checked. (b) Date prior discipline effective .
<<not>> checked. (c) Rules of Professional Conduct/ State
Bar Act violations:
<<not>> checked. (d) Degree of prior discipline
<<not>> checked. (e) If Respondent has two or more incidents
of prior discipline, use space provided below. .
<<not>> checked. (2) Dishonesty:
Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by or followed by bad faith, dishonesty,
concealment, overreaching or other violations of the State Bar Act or Rules of
Professional Conduct.
<<not>> checked. (3) Trust
Violation: Trust funds or property were involved and Respondent refused or was
unable to account to the client or person who was the object of the misconduct
for improper conduct toward said funds or property.
<<not>> checked. (4) Harm:
Respondent's misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public or the
administration of justice.
<<not>> checked. (5) Indifference:
Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for
the consequences of his or her misconduct.
<<not>> checked. (6) Lack of
Cooperation: Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims
of his/her misconduct or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation or
proceedings.
<<not>> checked. (7) Multiple/Pattern
of Misconduct: Respondent's current misconduct evidences multiple acts of
wrongdoing or demonstrates a pattern of misconduct.
checked. (8) No aggravating
circumstances are involved.
Additional aggravating circumstances: .
C. Mitigating Circumstances [see standard 1.2(e)]. Facts supporting
mitigating circumstances are required.
<<not>> checked. (1) No Prior Discipline: Respondent has no prior record
of discipline over many years of practice coupled with present misconduct which
is not deemed serious.
<<not>>
checked. (2) No Harm: Respondent did not harm the client or person who was
the object of the misconduct.
<<not>>
checked. (3) Candor/Cooperation: Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and
cooperation with the victims of his/her misconduct and to the State Bar during
disciplinary investigation and proceedings.
<<not>>
checked. (4) Remorse: Respondent promptly took objective steps spontaneously
demonstrating remorse and recognition of the wrongdoing, which steps were
designed to timely atone for any consequences of his/her misconduct.
<<not>>
checked. (5) Restitution: Respondent paid $ on in restitution to without
the threat or force of disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings.
<<not>>
checked. (6) Delay: These disciplinary proceedings were excessively
delayed. The delay is not attributable to Respondent and the delay prejudiced
him/her.
<<not>>
checked. (7) Good Faith: Respondent acted in good faith.
<<not>>
checked. (8) Emotional/Physical Difficulties: At the time of the stipulated
act or acts of professional misconduct Respondent suffered extreme emotional
difficulties or physical disabilities which expert testimony would establish
was directly responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities
were not the product of any illegal conduct by the member, such as illegal drug
or substance abuse, and Respondent no longer suffers from such difficulties or
disabilities.
<<not>>
checked. (9) Severe Financial Stress: At the time of the misconduct,
Respondent suffered from severe financial stress which resulted from
circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond his/her control
and which were directly responsible for the misconduct.
<<not>>
checked. (10) Family Problems: At the time of the misconduct, Respondent
suffered extreme difficulties in his/her personal life which were other than
emotional or physical in nature.
<<not>>
checked. (11) Good Character: Respondent's good character is attested to by a
wide range of references in the legal and general communities who are aware of
the full extent of his/her misconduct.
<<not>>
checked. (12) Rehabilitation: Considerable time has passed since the acts of
professional misconduct occurred followed by convincing proof of subsequent
rehabilitation.
<<not>>
checked. (13) No mitigating circumstances are involved.
Additional
mitigating circumstances: See Attachment at page 8.
D. Discipline: Disbarment.
E. Additional Requirements:
(1) Rule 9.20,
California Rules of Court: Respondent must comply with the requirements of
rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in
subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 calendar days,
respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court's Order in this
matter.
<<not>> checked. (2) Restitution:
Respondent must make restitution to in the amount of $ plus 10 percent
interest per year from. If the Client Security Fund has reimbursed for all or
any portion of the principal amount, respondent must pay restitution to CSF of
the amount paid plus applicable interest and costs in accordance with Business
and Professions Code section 6140.5. Respondent must pay the above restitution
and furnish satisfactory proof of payment to the State Bar's Office of Probation
in Los Angeles no later than days from the effective date of the Supreme Court
order in this case.
<<not>> checked. (3) Other: .
Attachment language (if any):.
ATTACHMENT TO
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION
IN THE MATTER OF: Kenneth Lee Rosen, State Bar No. 128279
STATE BAR COURT CASE NUMBER: 11-C-18679
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that he is culpable
of engaging in conduct which involved moral turpitude.
Case No. 11-C-18679 (Conviction Proceedings)
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND IN CONVICTION PROCEEDING:
1. This is a proceeding pursuant to sections 6101 and 6102 of the Business
and Professions Code and rule 9.10 of the California Rules of Court.
2. On September 13, 2011, Respondent was convicted of violating Title 18
United States Code sections 2252A(a)(5)(B) and 2252A(b)(2) [Possession of Child
Pornography], a felony. Respondent was sentenced, his conviction is final, and
the time for appeal has passed.
3. On November 19, 2012, the Review Department of the State Bar Court
issued an order referring the matter to the Hearing Department for a hearing
and decision recommending the discipline to be imposed in the event that the
Hearing Department finds that the facts and circumstances surrounding the
felony conviction of Title 18 United States Code sections 2252A(a)(5)(B) and
2252A(b)(2) [Possession of Child Pornography] involved moral turpitude or other
misconduct warranting discipline.
FACTS:
4. On May 2009, an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
("FBI") lawfully used peer-to-peer file-sharing software to download
child pornography from Respondent’s computer.
5. Prior to July 2009, Respondent used his computer to search the Internet
for child pornography. Specifically, Respondent used peer-to-peer file-sharing
software to collect child pornography. Respondent saved his child pornography
collection onto his computer, and also onto compact disks and DVDs. Some of
this child pornography was made available to others via peer-to-peer
file-sharing software.
6. On July 8, 2009, the FBI lawfully searched Respondent’s home. The FBI
search revealed that Respondent possessed more than 3,000 images and videos of
child pornography, as defined by Title 18 United States Code sections 2256(8)(a),
on his computer. Some of the images and videos possessed by Respondent depicted
prepubescent children, children under the age of twelve, being subjected to
sadistic sexual acts.
7. By way of example, one of the videos possessed by Respondent is titled
"######## <####>(#)##13)ml 2yo 3yo 4yo 5yo 6yo 7yo 8yo pthc pedo -
legs tied and fucked in the ass and cunt.mpg." The video is approximately
1:29 in length and depicts a prepubescent female, approximately 8 to 10 years
of age, with her legs spread and suspended by having white pieces of cloth tied
around her ankles. There is a black cloth covering her upper torso and face.
During the video, she is raped and sodomized by an adult male.
8. Respondent knowingly possessed the child pornography, and he knew that
the photographs were visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit
conduct. Respondent knew that the production of such visual depictions involved
the use of a minor in sexually explicit conduct. The photographs Respondent
possessed had been electronically mailed, shipped, or transported via the
Internet, which is a means and facility of interstate or foreign commerce.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
9. The facts and circumstances surrounding Respondent’s criminal conviction
for violating Title 18 United States Code sections 2252A(a)(5)(B) and
2252A(b)(2) [Possession of Child Pornography] involved moral turpitude.
ADDITIONAL FACTS RE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
No Prior Discipline: Respondent was admitted to practice law in California
on June 17, 1987, and had been practicing law for almost 22 years without prior
discipline prior to the commencement of the misconduct herein (May 2009).
Although Respondent’s misconduct is serious, the fact that he has no prior
record of discipline is entitled to some weight in mitigation. (In the Matter
of Riordan (Review Dept. 2007) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 41, 49.) Cooperation:
Pre-trial Stipulation. In In the Matter of Downey (Review Dept. 2009) 5 Cal.
State Bar Ct. Rptr, 151,156, the court found that Downey was entitled to
mitigation for cooperating with the State Bar by entering into a fairly
comprehensive pretrial stipulation of facts. Although the stipulated facts were
not difficult to prove, and Downey did not admit culpability, the stipulation
was relevant and assisted the State Bar’s prosecution of the case. The court
accorded Downey limited mitigation under standard 1.2(e)(v). Here, Respondent
is entitled to limited mitigation for entering into a full stipulation with the
Office of Chief Trial Counsel prior to trial in case no. 11-C- 18679, thereby
saving the State Bar Court time and resources. (Id; In the Matter of Van Sickle
(Review Dept. 2006) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 980, 993-94.)
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.
The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct provide a
"process of fixing discipline" pursuant to a set of written
principles to "better discharge the purposes of attorney discipline as
announced by the Supreme Court." (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds.
for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, Introduction (all further references
to standards are to this source).) The primary purposes of disciplinary
proceedings and of the sanctions imposed are "the protection of the
public, the courts and the legal profession; the maintenance of high
professional standards by attorneys and the preservation of public confidence
in the legal profession." (In re Morse (1995) 11 Cal.4th 184, 205; std.
1.3.)
Although not binding, the standards are entitled to "great
weight" and should be followed "whenever possible" in
determining level of discipline. (In re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 92,
quoting In re Brown (1995) 12 Cal.4th 205, 220 and In re Young (1989) 49 Cal.3d
257, 267, fn. 11.) Adherence to the standards in the great majority of cases
serves the valuable purpose of eliminating disparity and assuring consistency,
that is, the imposition of similar attorney discipline for instances of similar
attorney misconduct. (ln re Naney (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 190.) Any discipline
recommendation different from that set forth in the applicable standards should
clearly explain the reasons for the deviation. (Blair v. State Bar (1989) 49
Cal.3d 762, 776, fn. 5.)
Standard 3.2 states that a final conviction of a member of a crime which
involves moral turpitude, either inherently or in the facts and circumstances
surrounding the crime’s commission shall result in disbarment. Only if the most
compelling mitigating circumstances clearly predominate, shall disbarment not
be imposed. Here disbarment is warranted.
Respondent’s conviction for possession of child pornography involves such a
serious breach of duty owed to both children and to society and also involves
such flagrant disrespect for the law and societal norms that knowledge of
Respondent’s conduct is certainly likely to undermine public confidence in and
respect for the legal profession. Child pornography is repugnant because it
involves the sexual abuse and exploitation of children. The Supreme Court has
held, "[i]n the attorney discipline context, the term ’moral turpitude’
includes ’particular crimes that are extremely repugnant to accepted moral
standards such as... serious sexual offenses (ln re Boyd (1957) 48 Cal.2d 69
[307 P.2d 625]).’ [Citation omitted.]" (ln re Lesansky (2001) 25 Cal.4th
11, 17.)
The facts and circumstances surrounding Respondent’s felony conviction
involve moral turpitude. Respondent knowingly possessed more than 3,000 images
and videos of child pornography. The images and videos possessed by Respondent
depicted prepubescent children, children under the age of twelve, being
subjected to sadistic sexual acts. Under the applicable Standard, disbarment is
the appropriate level of discipline. No compelling mitigating circumstances
clearly predominate. In Lesansky, the Supreme Court ruled that attempted child
molestation involved moral turpitude because the crime is "extremely
repugnant to accepted moral standards." (Id.) Like the child molestation
prohibition involved in Lesansky, the child pornography laws reflect the moral
imperative against causing harm to children. Possession of child pornography
involves moral turpitude because it too is a crime that is "extremely
repugnant to accepted moral standards," and which is part of a trade which
preys on, and harms, the most vulnerable. In Lesansky, the Supreme Court stated
that:
Criminal conduct not committed in the practice of law or against a client
reveals moral turpitude if it shows a deficiency in any character trait
necessary for the practice of law (such as trustworthiness, honesty, fairness,
candor, and fidelity to fiduciary duties) or if it involves such a serious
breach of a duty owed to another or to society, or such a flagrant disrespect
for the law or for societal norms, that knowledge of the attorney’s conduct
would be likely to undermine public confidence in and respect for the legal
profession.
(Lesansky, supra, 25 Cal. 4th at 16 (emphasis added).)
PENDING PROCEEDINGS.
The disclosure date referred to on page 2, paragraph A(7), was April 12,
2013.
COST OF DISCIPLINARY CHARGES.
Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has
informed Respondent that as of April 12, 2013 the costs in this matter are
approximately $2,343. Respondent further acknowledges that should this
stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the
costs in this matter may increase due to costs of further proceedings.
SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES
Case Number(s): 11-C-18679
In the Matter of: KENNETH LEE ROSEN
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable,
signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and
conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: KENNETH LEE ROSEN
Date: 5/7/13
Respondent’s Counsel:
Date:
Deputy Trial Counsel: Elizabeth Gonzalez
Date: 5/17/13
DISBARMENT ORDER
Case Number(s): 11-C-18679
In the Matter of: KENNETH LEE ROSEN
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately
protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of
counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the
DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED
AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the
Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to
withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this
order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved
stipulation. (See rule 5.58 (E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective
date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order
herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California
Rules of Court.)
Respondent Kenneth Lee Rosen is ordered transferred to involuntary inactive
status pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6007, subdivision (c)(4).
Respondent’s inactive enrollment will be effective three (3) calendar days
after this order is served by mail and will terminate upon the effective date
of the Supreme Court’s order imposing discipline herin, or as provided for by
rule 5.111(D)(2) or the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California, or
as otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court pursuant to its plenary jurisdiction.
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Richard A. Honn
Date: 6/11/13
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over
the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to
standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on June 13,
2013, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND
ORDER APPROVING; ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE ENROLLMENT
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through
the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as
follows:
KENNETH LEE ROSEN #61454-112
FCI SEAGOVILLE
P.O. BOX 9000
SEAGOVILLE, TX 75159-9000
<<not>> checked. by certified mail, No. , with return receipt
requested, through the United States Postal Service at , California, addressed
as follows:
<<not>> checked. by overnight mail at , California, addressed
as follows:
<<not>> checked. by fax transmission, at fax number . No error
was reported by the fax machine that I used.
<<not>> checked. By personal service by leaving the documents
in a sealed envelope or package clearly labeled to identify the attorney being
served with a receptionist or a person having charge of the attorney’s office,
addressed as follows:
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the
State Bar of California addressed as follows:
Kimberly G. Anderson, Enforcement, Los Angeles
Elizabeth Gonzalez, Enforcement, Los Angeles
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los
Angeles, California, on June 13, 2013.
Signed by:
Paul Barona
Case Administrator
State Bar Court