Case Number(s): 11-O-12353
In the Matter of: Kulvinder Singh, Bar # 182109 , A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Trcva R. Stewart
Deputy Trial Counsel
180 Howard Street
San Francisco, CA 94105
(415) 538-2452
Bar # 239829
Counsel for Respondent: In Pro Per Respondent
Kulvinder Singh
12 Castaic Court
Roseville, CA 95678
(916) 939-5151
Bar# 182109
Submitted to: Settlement Judge – State Bar Court Clerk’s Office San Francisco.
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted June 3, 1996.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 12 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
<<not>> checked. Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 5.130, Rules of Procedure.
checked. Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: 2013, 2014. (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
<<not>> checked. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs are entirely waived.
At the time of the misconduct, Respondent had no record of discipline during approximately fourteen years of practice.
IN THE MATTER OF: Kulvinder Singh, State Bar No. 182109
STATE BAR COURT CASE NUMBER: 11-O-12353
I. PROCEDURAL STATEMENT
A. Procedural Statement
1. On November 22, 2011, the State Bar of California filed a Notice of Disciplinary Charges ("NDC") which alleged that respondent violated Business & Professions Code §§ 6106, 6068(g) and 6068(b).
2. On December 6, 2011, respondent filed his response to the NDC.
3. On February 6, 2012, the State Bar Court granted the State Bar’s motion to strike respondent’s December 6, 2011 response and ordered respondent to file an amended response by February 13, 2012.
4. On February 13, 2012, respondent filed an amended response to the NDC.
II. FACTS AND LEGAL CONCLUSIONS
A. Factual Statement
1. On August 10, 2009, respondent filed a complaint against Keegan & Myers, PC ("Keegan & Myers"), F. Patrick Keegan ("F. Keegan"), Sandra R. Myers ("S. Myers"), Harleen Sodhi ("Sodhi"), Rachel Malerbi ("Malerbi"), and Veer Bahadur Singh ("Veer Singh"), in the proceeding of Kulvinder Singh Sahansra v. Eugene Roeder et al., Superior Court of California, County of Placer, Case No. M-CV-0040859 (Case No. M-CV-0040859).
2. On September 30, 2009, an Anti-SLAPP motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16 was filed on behalf of Keegan & Myers, F. Keegan, S. Myers, and Sodhi. Following the filing of the Anti-SLAPP motion, Robert Sinclair ("Sinclair") substituted into the case as counsel for defendants.
3. On January 27, 2010, the court granted the Anti-SLAPP motion, dismissing all causes of action against Keegan & Myers, F. Keegan, S. Myers, and Sodhi and awarded defendants’ attorney’s fees.
4. On February 18, 2010, Keegan & Myers, F. Keegan, S. Myers, and Sodhi each filed a memorandum of costs in the amount of $17,665.
5. On March 5, 2010, Respondent filed a motion to tax costs. The hearing for the motion to tax costs was set for October 26, 2010.
6. On March 26, 2010, Sinclair, as counsel for Keegan & Myers, F. Keegan, S. Myers, and Sodhi, filed a motion for attorney’s fees on behalf of Keegan & Myers, F. Keegan, S. Myers, Sodhi, Malerbi and Veer Singh as provided by Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16 (o). The amount sought was $9395.00 as to Keegan & Myers, F. Keegan and S. Myers, $9990 as to Malerbi and Veer Singh and $19,735 as to Sodhi. The motion re, quested an increase of $3200 per moving party if respondent opposed the motion.
7. On April 9, 2010, respondent filed a dismissal without prejudice as to all defendants in case no. M-CV-0040859 ("April 9, 2010 dismissal"). The dismissal was entered.
8. On April 22, 2010, respondent entered into a settlement agreement with Keegan & Myers, F. Keegan, S. Myers, and Sodhi. Among other terms, the settlement agreement required that respondent pay the defendants $21,650.00, withdraw his motion to tax costs, and dismiss the complaint with prejudice. In exchange, the defendants agreed to withdraw their motions for attorney’s fees. Respondent was required to provide Sinclair, by April 30, 2010, an endorsed filed copy of the dismissal with prejudice and a copy of his request to withdraw his motion to tax costs.
9. Respondent signed the written settlement agreement and paid Keegan & Myers $21,650. The signatures of the other parties to the agreement are dated April 22, 2010 and April 28, 2010.
10. On April 29, 2010, respondent’s request for dismissal with prejudice was rejected for entering due to the April 9, 2010 dismissal. Respondent took no action to set aside the April 9, 2010 dismissal nor made any further effort to have a dismissal with prejudice
entered.
11. On April 30, 2010, respondent sent Sinclair a copy of his letter addressed to the court re, questing that his motion to tax costs be removed from the calendar. ("April 30, 2010 letter"). The letter stated: "we request the motion to strike/tax costs hearing date of October 26, 2010 be dropped from the calendar as moot." Respondent never sent the letter to the court.
12. On May 10, 2010, Sinclair caused an email to be sent to the court requesting to drop the June 10, 2010 hearing on the motion for attorney’s fees. Respondent was copied on the e-maiI request. On that same date, in response to the court’s query regarding the status of the hearing on the motion to tax costs, Sinclair caused respondent’s April 30, 2010 letter to be forwarded to the court via email.
13. On November 15, 2010, respondent wrote Judge Pineschi a letter demand.ing that his motion to tax costs remain on calendar. In his letter, respondent wrote: "On or about Oct. 20th, I got a message from Ryan in legal research asking if the motion was still on. I called him and said yes. Apparently Jana is his boss or colleague, and she said to me on Nov. 12th that she was told I wrote a letter dropping it. I said it was a subject of a settlement, but the motion was going forward since I did not send in the letter."
14. Also on November 15, 2010, respondent wrote Judge Garboline a letter and stated that he never withdrew his motion to tax costs and wanted to proceed with it: "I never agreed to drop the motion to tax costs..."
15. On December 1, 2010 Sinclair filed an opposition to the motion to tax costs, which included as exhibits, a copy of respondent’s April 30, 2010 letter and a copy of the fully executed settlement agreement.
On January 13, 2011, respondent’s motion to tax costs was heard. During the hearing, respondent told the court that the first time that he saw the pages of the settlement agreement preceding the signature page was when he reviewed the opposition to the motion to tax costs.
17. On Febru.ary 1, 2011, the court denied respondent’s motion to tax costs as moot because Respondent entered into a settlement agreement. Also, the court found that Respondent intentionally misled opposing counsel into thinking Respondent had withdrawn the motion to tax costs.
B. Conclusions Of Law And Supporting Authority
Respondent committed an act of moral turpitude in violation of Business & Professions Code § 6106 by entering into the settlement agreement and thereafter not withdrawing his motion to tax costs, intentionally misleading Sinclair concerning the withdrawal of the motion, arguing that the motion should proceed, and misleading the court at the hearing on the motion by claiming he had never seen the pages of the settlement agreement other than the page he signed.
Respondent misled the court by an artifice or false statement of fact in violation of Business & Professions Code § 6068(b) by entering into the settlement agreement and thereafter writing the court arguing that his motion to tax costs should proceed to hearing and misleading to the court at the hearing on the motion by claiming he had never seen the pages of the settlement agreement other than the page he signed.
Supporting Authority
Standard 2.3 requires an actual suspension for dishonest conduct: "Culpability of a member of an act of moral turpitude, fraud, or intentional dishonesty toward a court, client or another person or of concealment of a material fact to a court, client or another person shall result in actual suspension or disbarment depending upon the extent to which the victim of the misconduct is harmed or misled and depending upon the magnitude of the act of misconduct and the degree to which it relates to the member’s acts within the practice of law."
The Supreme Court in Bach v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 848 ordered an actual sixty-day suspension of Mr. Bach, who had one instance of prior discipline, for misleading a judge as to whether a court had ordered Mr. Bach to have his client attend mediation. The court held: "...the validity of the orders as to which he made misrepresentations is irrelevant. Whether or not Bach believed he had colorable arguments against the orders’ enforceability, he was duty bound not to mislead or attempt to mislead the court about their existence." (Id. at 855.)
In the Matter of Chesnut (Review Dept. 2000) 4 Cal State Bar Ct. Rptr. 166 presented the circumstance of a respondent who lied to two courts concerning whether he had served a party. Mr. Chesnut had a prior record of discipline, which included a fifteen-day actual suspension. The Review Department recommended two-years stayed suspension conditioned on six-months actual suspension and other probationary terms. In Coviello v. State Bar of California (1955) 45 Cal.2d 57, Mr. Coviello inserted or caused to be inserted the name of his client as grantee in each deed. Then, Mr. Coviello presented the deeds to opposing counsel to gain an advantage in litigation. Mr. Coviello had been suspended thirty days for a prior instance of discipline, and the court suspended him six months for the most recent conduct.
III. DISMISSALS
The parties respectfully request the Court to dismiss the following alleged violations in the interest of justice:
Case No.: 11-O-12353, Count: Two, Alleged Violation: Business & Professions Code Section 6068(g)
IV. WAIVERS
The parties waive all variances between the facts and conclusions of law asserted in the NDC and the facts and conclusions of law contained in this stipulation.
PENDING DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
There are not any other disciplinary proceedings pending against respondent as of February 13, 2012. The disclosure date referenced in the Stipulation For Actual Suspension, subdivision A, paragraph (7) is February 13, 2012.
VI. COST OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has informed respondent that as of February 13, 2012, the prosecution costs in this matter are approximately $3,269.00. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter might increase due to the cost of further proceedings.
VII. STATE BAR ETHICS SCHOOL.
Because respondent has agreed to attend State Bar Ethics School as part of this stipulation, respondent may receive Minimum Continuing Legal Education credit upon the satisfactory completion of State Bar Ethics School.
Case Number(s): 11-O-12353
In the Matter of: Kulvinder Singh
The terms of pleading nolo contendere are set forth in the Business and Professions Code and the Rules of Procedures of the State Bar. The applicable provisions are set forth below:
There are three kinds of pleas to the allegations of a notice of disciplinary charges or other pleading which initiates a disciplinary proceeding against a member:
(a) Admission of culpability.
(b) Denial of culpability.
(c) Nolo contendere, subject to the approval of the State Bar Court. The court shall ascertain whether the member completely understands that a plea of nolo contendere will be considered the same as an admission of culpability and that, upon a plea of nolo contendere, the court will find the member culpable. The legal effect of such a plea will be the same as that of an admission of culpability for all purposes, except that the plea and any admissions required by the court during any inquiry it makes as to the voluntariness of, or the factual basis for, the pleas, may not be used against the member as an admission in any civil suit based upon or growing out of the act upon which the disciplinary proceeding is based.
“(A) Contents. A proposed stipulation to facts, conclusions of law, and disposition must comprise:
[¶] . . . [¶]
(5) a statement that the member either:
(a) admits the truth of the facts comprising the stipulation and admits culpability for misconduct; or
(b) pleads nolo contendere to those facts and misconduct;
[¶] . . . [¶]
(B) Plea of Nolo Contendere. If the member pleads nolo contendere, the stipulation must also show that the member understands that the plea is treated as an admission of the stipulated facts and an admission of culpability.”
I, the Respondent in this matter, have read the applicable provisions of Business and Professions Code section 6085.5 and rule 5.56 of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar. I plead nolo contendere to the charges set forth in this stipulation and I completely understand that my plea will be considered the same as an admission of culpability except as stated in Business and Professions Code section 6085.5(c).
Signed by:
Respondent: Kulvinder Singh
Date: March 12, 2012
SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES
Case Number(s): 11-O-12353
In the Matter of: Kulvinder Singh
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: Kulvinder Singh
Date: March 12, 2012
Respondent’s Counsel:
Date:
Deputy Trial Counsel: Treva R. Stewart
Date: March 15, 2012
Case Number(s): 11-O-12353
In the Matter of: Kulvinder Singh, State Bar No.: 182109
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
1. On page 4 of the stipulation, an “X” is inserted in box D(1)(b) so that the stipulation one-year suspension will be stayed.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58 (E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Patricia McRleoy
Date: March 27, 2012
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and
County of San Francisco, on March 27, 2012, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at San Francisco, California, addressed as follows:
KULVINDER SINGH
12 CASTAIC CT
ROSEVILLE, CA 95678
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
TREVA R. STEWART, Enforcement, San Francisco
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on March 27, 2012.
Signed by:
Mazie Yip
Case Administrator
State Bar Court