State Bar Court of California **Hearing Department** Los Angeles DISBARMENT For Court use only Counsel For The State Bar Case Number(s): 11-0-15178 AGUSTIN HERNANDEZ 11-0-15397 PUBLICIATIER Deputy Trial Counsel 11-0-16183 1149 South Hill Street Los Angeles, CA 90015-2299 (213) 765-1713 Bar # 161625 NOV 09 2011 In Pro Per Respondent STATE BAR COURT CLERK'S OFFICE SAN FRANCISCO MOSES SHELDON HALL 2651 E. Chapman Ave., #110 Fullerton, CA 92831-3738 (714) 738-4830 Submitted to: Assigned Judge STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND Bar # 153759 DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING; ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE ENROLLMENT In the Matter of: MOSES SHELDON HALL DISBARMENT PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED Bar # 153759 A Member of the State Bar of California (Respondent)

Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.

A. Parties' Acknowledgments:

- (1) Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted July 15, 1991.
- (2) The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
- (3) All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of (14) pages, not including the order.
- (4) A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."

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(5)				
	Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law."			
(6)	The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."			
(7)	No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.			
(8)	Payment of Disciplinary Costs—Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):			
		Co	sts to be awarded to the State Bar. sts are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs". sts are entirely waived.	
(9)	ORDER OF INACTIVE ENROLLMENT: The parties are aware that if this stipulation is approved, the judge will issue an order of inactive enrollment under Business and Professions Code section 6007, subdivision (c)(4), and Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, rule 5.111(D)(1).			
	B. Aggravating Circumstances [for definition, see Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct, standard 1.2(b)]. Facts supporting aggravating circumstances are required.			
(1)	\boxtimes	Prio	r record of discipline	
	(a)	\boxtimes	State Bar Court case # of prior case 92-O-14193.	
	(b)	\boxtimes	Date prior discipline effective December 7, 1993.	
	(c)		Rules of Professional Conduct/ State Bar Act violations: Business and Professions Code, sections 6068(d) and 6068(m).	
	(d)	\boxtimes	Degree of prior discipline Public Reproval.	
	(e)		If respondent has two or more incidents of prior discipline, use space provided below:	
(2)		Dist	nonesty: Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by or followed by bad faith, dishonesty, cealment, overreaching or other violations of the State Bar Act or Rules of Professional Conduct.	
(3)		to th	st Violation: Trust funds or property were involved and respondent refused or was unable to account be client or person who was the object of the misconduct for improper conduct toward said funds or perty.	
(4)		As c mor	m: Respondent's misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public or the administration of justice. It result of Respondent's instructions to Aleman and to the Davidsons to stop making their transparents to their lenders, their respective homes were sold in foreclosure sales. (See agraphs 7 and 37 of the Attachment.)	

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(5)		Indifference: Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for the consequences of his or her misconduct.	
(6)		Lack of Cooperation: Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims of his/her misconduct or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation or proceedings.	
(7)		Multiple/Pattern of Misconduct: Respondent's current misconduct evidences multiple acts of wrongdoing or demonstrates a pattern of misconduct.	
(8)		No aggravating circumstances are involved.	
Addi	tiona	al aggravating circumstances:	
C. Mitigating Circumstances [see standard 1.2(e)]. Facts supporting mitigating circumstances are required.			
(1)		No Prior Discipline: Respondent has no prior record of discipline over many years of practice coupled with present misconduct which is not deemed serious.	
(2)		No Harm: Respondent did not harm the client or person who was the object of the misconduct.	
(3)		Candor/Cooperation: Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and cooperation with the victims of his/her misconduct and to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation and proceedings.	
(4)		Remorse: Respondent promptly took objective steps spontaneously demonstrating remorse and recognition of the wrongdoing, which steps were designed to timely atone for any consequences of his/her misconduct.	
(5)		Restitution: Respondent paid \$ on in restitution to without the threat or force of disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings.	
(6)		Delay: These disciplinary proceedings were excessively delayed. The delay is not attributable to respondent and the delay prejudiced him/her.	
(7)		Good Faith: Respondent acted in good faith.	
(8)		Emotional/Physical Difficulties: At the time of the stipulated act or acts of professional misconduct respondent suffered extreme emotional difficulties or physical disabilities which expert testimony would establish was directly responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities were not the product of any illegal conduct by the member, such as illegal drug or substance abuse, and respondent no longer suffers from such difficulties or disabilities.	
(9)		Severe Financial Stress: At the time of the misconduct, respondent suffered from severe financial stress which resulted from circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond his/her control and which were directly responsible for the misconduct.	
(10)		Family Problems: At the time of the misconduct, respondent suffered extreme difficulties in his/her personal life which were other than emotional or physical in nature.	
(11)		Good Character: Respondent's good character is attested to by a wide range of references in the legal and general communities who are aware of the full extent of his/her misconduct.	

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(12)		Rehabilitation: Considerable time has passed since the acts of professional misconduct occurred followed by convincing proof of subsequent rehabilitation.
(13)	\boxtimes	No mitigating circumstances are involved.
Additional mitigating circumstances:		

D. Discipline:

Disbarment.

E. Additional Requirements:

- (1) Rule 9.20, California Rules of Court: Respondent must comply with the requirements of rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 calendar days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court's Order in this matter.
- Restitution: Respondent must make restitution to in the amount of \$ plus 10 percent interest per year from . If the Client Security Fund has reimbursed for all or any portion of the principal amount, respondent must pay restitution to CSF of the amount paid plus applicable interest and costs in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6140.5. Respondent must pay the above restitution and furnish satisfactory proof of payment to the State Bar's Office of Probation in Los Angeles no later than days from the effective date of the Supreme Court order in this case.
- (3) Other: Respondent must make restitution as described below, plus 10% interest from the date indicated. If the Client Security Fund ("CSF") has reimbursed Francisca Aleman, Maria Velazquez or Clifford and Tracy Davidson for all or any portion of the principal amount, Respondent must pay restitution to CSF of the amount paid plus applicable interest and costs in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6140.5. Respondent must pay the above restitution and furnish satisfactory proof of payment to the State Bar's Office of Probation in Los Angles no later than six months from the effective date of the Supreme Court order in this case.

Payee:	Principal Amount:	Date Interest Begins to Accrue:
Francisca Aleman Maria Velazquez	\$11,507.46 \$15,903.44	March 29, 2010 February 1, 2010
Clifford and Tracy Davidson	\$22,262.02	June 1, 2010

Respondent waives the right to object to any other claims made to CSF by his former clients in any other matter, and agrees to pay restitution to CSF of the amount paid plus applicable interest and costs in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6140.5.

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Attachment language (if any):

ATTACHMENT TO STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION

IN THE MATTER OF:

MOSES SHELDON HALL

CASE NUMBERS:

11-O-15178, 11-O-15397 & 11-O-16183

FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that he is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct.

Case No. 11-O-15178 (Complainant: Francisca Aleman):

FACTS:

- 1. On June 26, 2008, Francisca Aleman ("Aleman") hired Respondent to provide loan modification services on a first and second mortgage secured by her residential property. Respondent agreed to provide the necessary loan modification services for a flat fee of \$3,495. On June 26, 2008, Aleman paid Respondent \$3,495 for the loan modification services.
- 2. On June 26, 2008, when Aleman hired Respondent, she was current on her payments for both her first and second mortgage. On June 26, 2008, Respondent told Aleman to stop making payments on her mortgages because lenders were only approving loan modifications on mortgages where the borrowers were delinquent in their payments.
- 3. On June 26, 2008, Respondent told Aleman that he would determine what Aleman's reduced mortgage payments should be based on presumed mortgage loan modifications. Respondent told Aleman that when he determined what her reduced monthly mortgage payments should be, Aleman was to send these reduced payments to Respondent and not to the lender. Respondent told Aleman that he would hold these funds in trust and that he would remit these funds to the lender when the loan modifications were approved because the bank will request a payment to bring the mortgages current.
- 4. On March 4, 2009, Respondent sent Aleman a letter telling her that her combined payments for both mortgages based on the presumed loan modifications should be \$779.42. In this letter, Respondent instructed Aleman to send to his office monthly payments of \$779.42 made payable to the "Trust Account of the Law Offices of Moses S. Hall."
- 5. Based on Respondent's instructions, in February 2009, Aleman stopped sending her mortgage payments to the bank and instead started sending the reduced mortgage payments to Respondent. Thereafter, Aleman's lender served her with two notices indicating that her home would be foreclosed if she did not make her payments. Aleman immediately informed Respondent of these foreclosure notices.

- 6. On March 2, 2010, Aleman received a third Notice of Trustee Sale informing her that her home would be sold at a public auction on March 29, 2010, because she was in default due to her failure to make her mortgage payments. Aleman immediately informed Respondent of this foreclosure notice.
- 7. On March 29, 2010, Aleman's home was sold in a foreclosure sale.
- 8. From February 2009 through March 2010, Respondent received the following payments from Aleman which Respondent was required to hold in trust:

Date:	Amount:
02/10/09	\$1,000.00
02/10/09	\$375.00
03/06/09	\$779.42
04/03/09	\$779.42
05/01/09	\$779.42
06/01/09	\$779.42
07/01/09	\$779.42
08/01/09	\$779.42
09/01/09	\$779.42
10/01/09	\$779.42
11/01/09	\$779.42
12/01/09	\$779.42
01/01/10	\$779.42
02/01/10	\$779.42
03/01/10	\$779.42
Total:	\$11,507.46

- 9. After vacating her home because it was sold in a foreclosure sale, Aleman requested that Respondent return the \$11,507.46 that Respondent was supposed to be holding in trust.
- 10. At all relevant times, Respondent maintained a client trust account.
- 11. At all relevant times, Respondent was required to maintain \$11,507.46 in his client trust account on behalf of Aleman.
- 12. Respondent failed to maintain \$11,507.46 in trust on behalf of Aleman.
- 13. Respondent dishonestly or with gross negligence misappropriated \$11,507.46 of Aleman's funds for his own use and purposes.
- 14. To date, Respondent has failed to disburse any portion of the \$11,507.46 to Aleman.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

- 15. By instructing Aleman to stop making her mortgage payments to the lender which resulted in her home being sold in a foreclosure sale, Respondent intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence, in willful violation of rule 3-110(A), Rules of Professional Conduct.
- 16. By not maintaining a balance of \$11,507.46 on behalf of Aleman in his client trust account, Respondent failed to maintain the balance of funds received for the benefit of a client and deposited in a bank account labeled "Trust Account," "Client's Funds Account" or words of similar import, in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(A).
- 17. By misappropriating \$11,507.46 of Aleman's funds, Respondent committed an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.

Case No. 11-O-15397 (Complainant: Maria Velazquez):

FACTS:

- 18. On April 13, 2009, Maria Velazquez ("Velazquez") hired Respondent to provide loan modification services on a mortgage secured by her residential property. Respondent agreed to provide the necessary loan modification services for a flat fee of \$1,500. On April 13, 2009, Velazquez paid Respondent \$1,500 for the loan modification services.
- 19. On April 13, 2009, Respondent told Velazquez that based on a presumed mortgage loan modification and a reassessed value of her home, her mortgage payment should be \$1,987.93. On April 13, 2009, when Velazquez hired Respondent, she was current on her mortgage payments. On April 13, 2009, Respondent told Velazquez to stop making payments on her mortgage. On April 13, 2009, Respondent told Velazquez to send these reduced mortgage payments to Respondent and not to the lender. Respondent told Velazquez that he would hold these funds in trust and that he would remit these funds to the lender when the loan modification was approved.
- 20. On May 4, 2009, Respondent sent Velazquez a letter telling her that her mortgage payment based on the presumed loan modification should be \$1,987.93. In this letter, Respondent instructed Velazquez to send to his office monthly payments of \$1,987.93 made payable to the "Trust Account of the Law Offices of Moses S. Hall."
- 21. Based on Respondent's instructions, in May 2009, Velazquez stopped sending her mortgage payments to the bank and instead started sending the reduced mortgage payments to Respondent. Thereafter, Velazquez's lender served her with notices indicating that her home would be foreclosed if she did not make her payments. Velazquez immediately informed Respondent of these foreclosure notices.

22. From May 2009 through January 2010, Respondent received the following payments from Velazquez which Respondent was required to hold in trust:

Date:	Amount:
05/05/09	\$1,987.93
06/02/09	\$1,987.93
07/01/09	\$1,987.93
08/02/09	\$1,987.93
09/01/09	\$1,987.93
10/02/09	\$1,987.93
12/10/09	\$1,987.93
01/12/10	\$1,987.93
Total:	\$15,903.44

- 23. In February 2010, after continuing to receive foreclosure notices, Velazquez terminated Respondent and requested that Respondent return the \$15,903.44 that he was supposed to be holding in trust.
- 24. At all relevant times, Respondent maintained a client trust account.
- 25. At all relevant times, Respondent was required to maintain \$15,903.44 in his client trust account on behalf of Velazquez.
- 26. Respondent failed to maintain \$15,903.44 in trust on behalf of Velazquez.
- 27. Respondent dishonestly or with gross negligence misappropriated \$15,903.44 of Velazquez's funds for his own use and purposes.
- 28. To date, Respondent has failed to disburse any portion of the \$15,903.44 to Velazquez.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

- 29. By instructing Velazquez to stop making her mortgage payments to the lender, Respondent intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence, in willful violation of rule 3-110(A), Rules of Professional Conduct.
- 30. By not maintaining a balance of \$15,903.44 on behalf of Velazquez in his client trust account, Respondent failed to maintain the balance of funds received for the benefit of a client and deposited in a bank account labeled "Trust Account," "Client's Funds Account" or words of similar import, in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(A).
- 31. By misappropriating \$15,903.44 of Velazquez's funds, Respondent committed an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.

Case No. 11-O-16183 (Complainants: Clifford Davidson and Tracy Davidson):

FACTS:

- 32. On December 24, 2008, Clifford Davidson and Tracy Davidson (the "Davidsons") hired Respondent to provide loan modification services on a mortgage secured by their residential property. Respondent agreed to provide the necessary loan modification services for a flat fee of \$3,000. On December 24, 2008, the Davidsons paid Respondent \$1,500 toward the \$3,000 fee. On January 13, 2009, the Davidsons paid Respondent the remaining balance of \$1,500 toward the \$3,000 fee.
- 33. On December 24, 2008, when the Davidsons hired Respondent, they were current on their mortgage payments. On December 24, 2008, Respondent told the Davidsons that they will have to stop making payments on their mortgage because lenders were only approving loan modifications on mortgages where the borrowers were delinquent in their payments.
- 34. On December 24, 2008, Respondent told the Davidsons that he would determine what their reduced mortgage payment should be based on a presumed mortgage loan modification and a reassessed value of their home. Respondent told the Davidsons that when he determined what their reduced monthly mortgage payment should be, they were to send these reduced payments to Respondent and not to the lender. Respondent told the Davidsons that he would hold these funds in trust. Respondent told the Davidsons that by making these payments to Respondent, it would demonstrate to the lender that they could afford to make the monthly payments based on the current value of the house, and that he would remit these funds to the lender when the loan modifications were approved.
- 35. On June 17, 2009, Respondent sent the Davidsons a letter telling them that their mortgage payment based on the presumed loan modification should be \$2,023.82. In this letter, Respondent instructed the Davidsons to send to his office monthly payments of \$2,023.82 made payable to the "Trust Account of the Law Offices of Moses S. Hall."
- 36. Based on Respondent's instructions, in June 2009, the Davidsons stopped sending their mortgage payment to the bank and instead started sending the reduced mortgage payments to Respondent.
- 37. Thereafter, the Davidsons' home was sold in a foreclosure sale because the Davidsons were in default due to their failure to make their mortgage payments.
- 38. From June 2009 through May 2010, Respondent received the following payments from the Davidsons which Respondent was required to hold in trust:

Date:	Amount:
06/22/09	\$2,023.82
07/25/09	\$2,023.82
08/24/09	\$2,023.82
09/24/09	\$2,023.82
10/30/09	\$2,023.82
11/30/09	\$2,023.82

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12/30/09	\$2,023.82
01/30/10	\$2,023.82
02/23/10	\$2,023.82
03/22/10	\$2,023.82
05/01/10	\$2,023.82
Total:	\$22,262.02

- 39. After their home was sold in a foreclosure sale, the Davidsons requested that Respondent return the \$22,262.02 that Respondent was supposed to be holding in trust.
- 40. At all relevant times, Respondent maintained a client trust account.
- 41. At all relevant times, Respondent was required to maintain \$22,262.02 in his client trust account on behalf of the Davidsons.
- 42. Respondent failed to maintain \$22,262.02 in trust on behalf of the Davidsons.
- 43. Respondent dishonestly or with gross negligence misappropriated \$22,262.02 of the Davidsons' funds for his own use and purposes.
- 44. To date, Respondent has failed to disburse any portion of the \$22,262.02 to the Davidsons.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

- 45. By instructing the Davidsons to stop making their mortgage payments to the lender which resulted in their home being sold in a foreclosure sale, Respondent intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence, in willful violation of rule 3-110(A), Rules of Professional Conduct.
- 46. By not maintaining a balance of \$22,262.02 on behalf of the Davidsons in his client trust account, Respondent failed to maintain the balance of funds received for the benefit of a client and deposited in a bank account labeled "Trust Account," "Client's Funds Account" or words of similar import, in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(A).
- 47. By misappropriating \$22,262.02 of the Davidsons' funds, Respondent committed an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.

SUPPORTING AUTHORITY.

Standards

Standard 1.3, Title IV, Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct, provides that the primary purposes of the disciplinary system are: "the protection of the public, the courts and the legal

profession; the maintenance of high professional standards by attorneys and the preservation of public confidence in the legal profession."

Standard 2.2(a) states that "[c]ulpability of a member of wilful misappropriation of entrusted funds or property shall result in disbarment. Only if the amount of funds or property misappropriated is insignificantly small or if the most compelling mitigating circumstances clearly predominate, shall disbarment not be imposed. In those latter cases, the discipline shall not be less than a one-year actual suspension, irrespective of the mitigating circumstances."

Standard 1.6(a) states that "[i]f two or more acts of professional misconduct are found or acknowledged in a single disciplinary proceeding, and different sanctions are prescribed by these standards for said acts, the sanction imposed shall be the more or most severe of the different applicable sanctions."

Standard 2.4(b) provides that "[c]ulpability of a member of wilfully failing to perform services in an individual matter or matters not demonstrating a pattern of misconduct or culpability of a member of wilfully failing to communicate with a client shall result in reproval or suspension depending upon the extent of the misconduct and the degree of harm to the client."

Standard 1.7(a) provides that if a member has a prior imposition of discipline, "the degree of discipline imposed in the current proceeding shall be greater than that imposed in the prior proceeding unless the prior discipline imposed was so remote in time to the current proceeding and the offense for which it was imposed was so minimal in severity that imposing greater discipline in the current proceeding would be manifestly unjust."

Case Law

The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of the standards and has held that great weight should be given to the application of the standards in determining the appropriate level of discipline. (In re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal. 4th 81.) The standards must be followed unless there is a compelling reason justifying a deviation from the standards. (In the Matter of Bouyer (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 404.) The Supreme Court has held that unless it has "grave doubts as to the propriety of the recommended discipline," it will uphold the application of the standards. In re Silverton, supra, 36 Cal. 4th at p. 91-92.

"Misappropriation is more than a grievous breach of professional ethics. It violates basic notions of honesty and endangers public confidence in the legal profession. [Citations.] In all but the most exceptional of cases, it requires the imposition of the harshest discipline. [Citations.] The seriousness of the offense and the propriety of disbarment as the appropriate discipline have long been recognized by this court [Citation] and are reflected in the standards. Standard 2.2(a) provides that wilful misappropriation of entrusted funds shall result in disbarment unless the amounts are insignificant or the most compelling mitigating circumstances clearly predominate." (Grim v. State Bar (1991) 53 Cal.3d 21, 29.)

An attorney was disbarred after misappropriating nearly \$40,000. The attorney represented a widow and her minor children after her husband was killed in an automobile accident. Spaith withdrew nearly \$40,000 belonging to the client from his trust account to pay office expenses, and then mislead the client for about

one year about the status of the funds. (In the Matter of Spaith, (Review Dept. 1996), 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 511.)

Another respondent was also disbarred for misappropriating approximately \$66,000 from a client and then also lied to the client over an 18-month period to conceal his theft. This respondent had no record of prior discipline. (In re Kueker (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 583.)

An attorney was disbarred after misappropriating approximately \$29,000. The respondent was a partner in a large California law firm. Between February and September 1985, he deposited 24 checks totaling approximately \$29,000, payable to the law firm into his personal account. When confronted by the managing partner, the respondent repeatedly denied knowledge of the missing checks. He then admitted taking some of the checks but offered untruthful excuses for needing the money. Kaplan also misrepresented to the State Bar that he needed the money to finance medical care for his mother-in-law. He finally admitted that he used the money to purchase gifts for his wife and to maintain a standard of living beyond his means. Kaplan had no record of prior discipline. (Kaplan v. State Bar (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1067.)

There is no compelling reason or anything in mitigation that would justify a deviation from the standards.

Given the seriousness of the misconduct and the large amount of money that was misappropriated by Respondent, disbarment is the appropriate level of discipline and the only way to adequately protect the public.

PENDING PROCEEDINGS:

The disclosure date referred to on page 2, s	section A.(7), was on October 21, 2011.
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SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES

By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitations and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Disposition.

10/27 //1 Date	Moss S. Hall	MOSES SHELDON HALL
Date	Respondent's Signature	Print Name
Date	Respondent's Counsel Signature	Print Name
10/28/((Date	y the	AGUSTIN HERNANDEZ
Date '	Deputy Trial Counsel's Signature	Print Name

The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58(E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)

Respondent is ordered transferred to involuntary inactive status pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6007, subdivision (c)(4). Respondent's inactive enrollment will be effective three (3) calendar days after this order is served by mail and will terminate upon the effective date of the Supreme Court's order imposing discipline herein, or as provided for by rule 5.111(D)(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California, or as otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court pursuant to its plenary jurisdiction.

Nov. 9, 2011

Judge of the State Bar Court

LUCY ARMENDARIZ

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of San Francisco, on November 9, 2011, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING; ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE ENROLLMENT

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:

by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at San Francisco, California, addressed as follows:

MOSES S. HALL LAW OFC MOSES S HALL 2651 E CHAPMAN AVE #110 FULLERTON, CA 92831 - 3738

by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

AGUSTIN HERNANDEZ, Enforcement, Los Angeles

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on November 9, 2011.

Laine Silber

Case Administrator

State Bar Court