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State Bar Court of California Hearing Department San Francisco DISBARMENT		
Counsel For The State Bar Heather E. Abelson Deputy Trial Counsel 180 Howard Street San Francisco, CA 94105-1639 (415) 538-2357 Bar # 243691	Case Number(s): 11-O-17579-PEM 11-O-18810-PEM 13-O-10878-PEM	For Court use only PUBLIC MATTER FILED <i>ef</i> APR 16 2013 STATE BAR COURT CLERK'S OFFICE SAN FRANCISCO
In Pro Per Respondent Phyllis Dianne-Lasater Loya 5359 Fallbrook Ave Woodland Hills, CA 91367 (925) 949-3762 Bar # 111767	Submitted to: Assigned Judge STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING; ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE ENROLLMENT DISBARMENT <input type="checkbox"/> PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED	
In the Matter of: PHYLLIS DIANNE-LASATER LOYA Bar # 111767 A Member of the State Bar of California (Respondent)		

Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.

A. Parties' Acknowledgments:

- (1) Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted December 12, 1983.
- (2) The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
- (3) All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of (13) pages, not including the order.

(Effective January 1, 2011)



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- (4) A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
- (5) Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law."
- (6) The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
- (7) No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
- (8) Payment of Disciplinary Costs—Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
 - Costs to be awarded to the State Bar.
 - Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
 - Costs are entirely waived.
- (9) **ORDER OF INACTIVE ENROLLMENT:**
The parties are aware that if this stipulation is approved, the judge will issue an order of inactive enrollment under Business and Professions Code section 6007, subdivision (c)(4), and Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, rule 5.111(D)(1).

B. Aggravating Circumstances [for definition, see Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct, standard 1.2(b)]. Facts supporting aggravating circumstances are required.

- (1) **Prior record of discipline**
 - (a) State Bar Court case # of prior case 00-O-13147-PEM [01-O-00099; 01-O-00530; 01-O-01903; 01-O-04020; 01-O-04852; 02-O-11361].
 - (b) Date prior discipline effective February 20, 2009
 - (c) Rules of Professional Conduct/ State Bar Act violations: Rules of Professional Conduct, rules 4-100(B)(3) and 3-300, and Business and Professions Code, section 6068(m).
 - (d) Degree of prior discipline Public Reprimand after successful completion of ADP program.
 - (e) If respondent has two or more incidents of prior discipline, use space provided below:

08-O-14780-PEM – Respondent stipulated to a one-year stayed suspension, effective September 2, 2010, for violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(i). This case also involved an uncharged violation of rule 1-110 that was considered an aggravating circumstance.
- (2) **Dishonesty:** Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by or followed by bad faith, dishonesty, concealment, overreaching or other violations of the State Bar Act or Rules of Professional Conduct.
- (3) **Trust Violation:** Trust funds or property were involved and respondent refused or was unable to account to the client or person who was the object of the misconduct for improper conduct toward said funds or property.

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- (4) **Harm:** Respondent's misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public or the administration of justice. See "Facts Supporting Aggravating Circumstances" in the attachment hereto.
- (5) **Indifference:** Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for the consequences of his or her misconduct.
- (6) **Lack of Cooperation:** Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims of his/her misconduct or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation or proceedings.
- (7) **Multiple/Pattern of Misconduct:** Respondent's current misconduct evidences multiple acts of wrongdoing or demonstrates a pattern of misconduct. See "Facts Supporting Aggravating Circumstances" in the attachment hereto.
- (8) **No aggravating circumstances** are involved.

Additional aggravating circumstances:

C. Mitigating Circumstances [see standard 1.2(e)]. Facts supporting mitigating circumstances are required.

- (1) **No Prior Discipline:** Respondent has no prior record of discipline over many years of practice coupled with present misconduct which is not deemed serious.
- (2) **No Harm:** Respondent did not harm the client or person who was the object of the misconduct.
- (3) **Candor/Cooperation:** Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and cooperation with the victims of his/her misconduct and to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation and proceedings.
- (4) **Remorse:** Respondent promptly took objective steps spontaneously demonstrating remorse and recognition of the wrongdoing, which steps were designed to timely atone for any consequences of his/her misconduct.
- (5) **Restitution:** Respondent paid \$ _____ on _____ in restitution to _____ without the threat or force of disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings.
- (6) **Delay:** These disciplinary proceedings were excessively delayed. The delay is not attributable to respondent and the delay prejudiced him/her.
- (7) **Good Faith:** Respondent acted in good faith.
- (8) **Emotional/Physical Difficulties:** At the time of the stipulated act or acts of professional misconduct respondent suffered extreme emotional difficulties or physical disabilities which expert testimony would establish was directly responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities were not the product of any illegal conduct by the member, such as illegal drug or substance abuse, and respondent no longer suffers from such difficulties or disabilities.
- (9) **Severe Financial Stress:** At the time of the misconduct, respondent suffered from severe financial stress which resulted from circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond his/her control and which were directly responsible for the misconduct.
- (10) **Family Problems:** At the time of the misconduct, respondent suffered extreme difficulties in his/her personal life which were other than emotional or physical in nature.

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- (11) **Good Character:** Respondent's good character is attested to by a wide range of references in the legal and general communities who are aware of the full extent of his/her misconduct.
- (12) **Rehabilitation:** Considerable time has passed since the acts of professional misconduct occurred followed by convincing proof of subsequent rehabilitation.
- (13) **No mitigating circumstances** are involved.

Additional mitigating circumstances:

D. Discipline: Disbarment.

E. Additional Requirements:

- (1) **Rule 9.20, California Rules of Court:** Respondent must comply with the requirements of rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 calendar days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court's Order in this matter.
- (2) **Restitution:** Respondent must make restitution to Lorenzo Perez in the amount of \$ 2500.00 plus 10 percent interest per year from December 7, 2006. If the Client Security Fund has reimbursed Lorenzo Perez for all or any portion of the principal amount, respondent must pay restitution to CSF of the amount paid plus applicable interest and costs in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6140.5. Respondent must pay the above restitution and furnish satisfactory proof of payment to the State Bar's Office of Probation in Los Angeles no later than thirty (30) days from the effective date of the Supreme Court order in this case.
- (3) **Other:**

7. On September 30, 2008, respondent filed a Petition to Establish Parentage in the matter entitled *Lorenza Perez v. Francisco J. Perez*, Contra Costa County Superior Court, Case No. D08-04628 (“paternity matter”).

8. Between December 2006 and November 2008, respondent did not communicate with Perez regarding the paternity matter.

9. In November 2008, Perez consulted with another attorney H.F. Layton (hereinafter “Layton”), about the paternity matter.

10. On November 26, 2008, Layton wrote a letter to respondent on behalf of Perez and requested an accounting and the return of unearned fees on behalf of Perez. Layton also requested respondent execute a substitution of attorney in the paternity matter. Respondent received the letter shortly after it was sent.

11. Shortly after receiving Layton’s letter dated November 26, 2008, respondent spoke to Perez and reiterated her intention to finish the paternity matter filed on Perez’s behalf. Shortly thereafter, Perez decided to continue with respondent’s legal representation in the paternity matter.

12. On February 27, 2009, a court hearing was held in the paternity matter. Respondent failed to appear at the scheduled hearing and the court set an Order to Show Cause (“OSC”) hearing for April 22, 2009, against respondent and Perez as to why this case should not be dismissed for failing to appear at the February 27, 2009 hearing and for not serving the petition and prosecuting the matter. Notice of the OSC was sent by the court to respondent’s official membership records address.

13. On April 22, 2009, respondent appeared at the OSC hearing and dismissed the paternity matter on behalf of Perez.

14. Respondent failed to inform Perez of the OSC hearing or of the dismissal.

15. Respondent did not prosecute the paternity matter for Perez.

16. On December 24, 2009, respondent filed a Petition for Nullity of Marriage on behalf of Perez in the matter entitled, *Lorenza Perez v. Francisco Perez*, Contra Costa County Superior Court, Case No. D09-05944 (“dissolution matter”).

17. In May 2010, Perez retained Layton to take over the dissolution matter because respondent had ceased communicating with Perez.

18. On May 5, 2010, Layton wrote to respondent and requested she execute a substitution of attorney in the dissolution matter. Respondent received the letter shortly after it was sent but did not respond.

19. On May 14, 2010, Layton sent respondent an e-mail requesting she execute a substitution of attorney in the dissolution matter. Respondent received the e-mail shortly after it was sent but did not respond.

20. On May 20, 2010, Layton filed a Notice of Motion for Substitution of Attorney and sanctions against respondent in the dissolution matter. The Notice of Motion was sent via U.S. Mail to respondent's official membership records address.

21. On July 1, 2010, a hearing was held on the Notice of Motion for Substitution of Attorney filed by Perez. Respondent did not appear at the hearing. The court substituted Layton in the place of respondent as the attorney of record for Perez in the dissolution matter. The court ordered respondent to deliver forthwith and without delay, all papers, records, and property which pertain to the dissolution matter and which she has in her possession, to Layton. Respondent received notice of the court order.

22. Respondent failed to return Perez's client file in violation of the court's July 1, 2010 order.

23. Respondent did not prosecute the dissolution matter on behalf of Perez.

24. Respondent failed to perform any services of value on behalf of Perez in both the paternity and dissolution matters.

25. Respondent did not earn any part of the \$2,500 attorney fee she received to represent Perez in the paternity and dissolution matters, and respondent has never returned any part of that fee.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

26. By failing to serve the paternity petition on defendant and failing to prosecute the paternity matter, by failing to appear at the February 27, 2009 hearing in the paternity matter, by failing to prosecute the dissolution matter, by failing to execute the substitution of attorney despite requests on May 5, 2010 and May 14, 2010, by Layton in the dissolution matter, respondent intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence, in wilful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A).

27. By failing to deliver Perez's client file to Layton as ordered by the court on July 1, 2010, respondent willfully disobeyed or violated an order of the court requiring her to do or forbear an act connected with or in the course of respondent's profession which she ought in good faith to do or forbear, in wilful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6103.

28. By failing to inform Perez of the OSC hearing for failure to appear and failure to prosecute action in the paternity matter, by failing to inform Perez that respondent dismissed the paternity matter, respondent failed to keep a client reasonably informed of significant developments in a matter in which Respondent had agreed to provide legal services, in wilful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(m).

29. By failing to communicate with Perez regarding the status of her representation from December 2006 through November 2008 in the paternity matter, by failing respond to Perez's inquiries from April 2009 through July 2010 in the dissolution matter, Respondent failed to respond promptly to reasonable status inquiries of a client in a matter in which Respondent had agreed to provide legal services, in wilful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(m).

30. By failing to refund any part of the \$2,500 advanced fee, respondent failed to refund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that has not been earned, in wilful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(2).

Case No. 13-O-10878-PEM (State Bar Investigation)

FACTS:

31. On March 15, 2010, respondent signed a stipulation in State Bar Case Number 08-O-14780 in which she agreed to receive a one-year stayed suspension including a two-year probation with conditions. By signing the stipulation, respondent promised to comply with the probation conditions set forth in the stipulation.

32. On April 5, 2010, the stipulation and order approving were filed with the State Bar Court Clerk's office.

33. Soon after April 5, 2010, respondent received a copy of the stipulation and order.

34. Shortly after April 5, 2010, respondent had actual knowledge that the stipulation and order approving had been filed.

35. On August 3, 2010, the Supreme Court of California issued Order S183802 (State Bar Case No. 08-O-14780), suspending respondent from the practice of law for one year, stayed, and placing Respondent on probation for a period of two years subject to respondent's compliance "with the conditions of probation recommended by the Hearing Department of the State Bar Court in its Order Approving Stipulation filed on April 5, 2010[.]"

36. On August 17, 2010, the Office of Probation of the State Bar sent respondent a letter which attached a copy of Supreme Court Order S183802, filed on August 3, 2010. In the letter, the Office of Probation set forth the terms of respondent's probation including scheduling a meeting with the Office of Probation within 30 days from the effective date of discipline, and filing quarterly reports. Respondent received the August 17, 2010 letter, which attached the Supreme Court Order, and was aware of its contents.

37. The stayed suspension order and probation conditions became effective on or about September 2, 2010.

38. QUARTERLY REPORTING CONDITION

- a) One of the conditions of probation required respondent to submit reports as follows:
"Respondent must submit written quarterly reports to the Office of Probation on each January 10, April 10, July 10, and October 10 of the period of probation. Under penalty of perjury, Respondent must state whether Respondent has complied with the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and all conditions of probation during the preceding calendar quarter. Respondent must also state whether there are any proceedings pending against him or her in the State Bar Court and if so, the case number and current status of that proceeding. If the first report would cover less than 30 days, that report must be submitted on the next quarter date, and cover the extended period.

In addition to all quarterly reports, a final report, containing the same information, is due no earlier than twenty (20) days before the last day of the period of probation and no later than the last day of probation.”

- b) Respondent violated this condition by failing to timely submit the quarterly report that was due no later than January 10, 2011, failing to submit the quarterly reports that were due no later than April 10, July 10 and October 10, 2011, failing to submit the quarterly reports that were due no later than January 10, April 10, and July 10, 2012, and by failing to submit the final report that was due no later than September 2, 2012.

39. CONTACT OFFICE OF PROBATION

- a) Another probation condition required respondent to contact the Office of Probation as follows:

“Within thirty (30) days from the effective date of discipline, Respondent must contact the Office of Probation and schedule a meeting with Respondent’s assigned probation deputy to discuss these terms and conditions of probation. Under the direction of the Office of Probation, Respondent must meet with the probation deputy either in-person or by telephone. During the period of probation, Respondent must promptly meet with the probation deputy as directed and upon request.”

- b) Respondent violated this condition by failing to timely contact the Office of Probation and schedule a meeting by October 2, 2010.

40. On August 22, 2011, the Office of Probation sent a letter to respondent reminding her of the terms and conditions of her probation. The letter further stated that the Office of Probation had not received the quarterly reports due April 10 and July 10, 2011. Respondent received the August 22, 2011 letter, and was aware of its contents.

41. On September 1, 2011, the Office of Probation sent an email to respondent regarding the August 22, 2011 letter, and the missing quarterly reports dated April 10 and July 10, 2011. Respondent received the September 1, 2011 email, and was aware of its contents.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

42. By failing to timely submit the quarterly report that was due no later than January 10, 2011, failing to submit the quarterly reports that were due no later than April 10, July 10 and October 10, 2011, failing to submit the quarterly reports that were due no later than January 10, April 10, and July 10, 2012, failing to submit the final report that was due no later than September 2, 2012, and failing to timely contact the Office of Probation to schedule a meeting within thirty (30) days from the effective date of discipline, respondent failed to comply with all conditions attached to any disciplinary probation, in wilful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(k).

ADDITIONAL FACTS RE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

Prior Record of Discipline (Std. 1.2(b)(i)): Respondent was previously disciplined by the State Bar on two prior occasions. In State Bar Case No. 08-14780, respondent stipulated to a one-year stayed

suspension, effective September 2, 2010, for violations of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(i). In State Bar Case No. 00-O-13147 et al., respondent stipulated to a public reproof, effective February 20, 2009, for violations of Rules of Professions Conduct, rules 4-100(B)(3) and 3-300, and Business and Professions Code, section 6068(m), in six client matters. Respondent's two prior disciplinary matters constitute an aggravating circumstance pursuant to standard 1.2(b)(i).

Multiple Acts of Misconduct (Std. 1.2(b)(ii)): Respondent violated Rules of Professional Conduct, rules 3-700(D)(1) [two counts], 3-700(D)(2), 3-110(A), and Business and Professions Code, sections 6103, 6068(m) [two counts] and 6068(k). Respondent's multiple acts of misconduct constitute an aggravating circumstance pursuant to standard 1.2(b)(ii).

Harm (Std. 1.2(b)(iv)): Respondent substantially harmed Mendoza by failing to return her client file which prevented Mendoza from being able to draft a QDRO. Respondent substantially harmed Perez by failing to refund unearned fees. Respondent harmed the administration of justice by failing to adhere to the court order requiring her to return Perez's client file. The substantial harm caused by Respondent constitutes an aggravating circumstances pursuant to standard 1.2(b)(iv).

AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.

The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct provide a "process of fixing discipline" pursuant to a set of written principles to "better discharge the purposes of attorney discipline as announced by the Supreme Court." Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, Introduction (all further references to standards are to this source). The primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings and of the sanctions imposed are "the protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; the maintenance of high professional standards by attorneys and the preservation of public confidence in the legal profession." *In re Morse* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 184, 205; std. 1.3.

Although not binding, the standards are entitled to "great weight" and should be followed "whenever possible" in determining level of discipline. *In re Silverton* (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 92, quoting *In re Brown* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 205, 220 and *In re Young* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 267, fn. 11. Adherence to the standards in the great majority of cases serves the valuable purpose of eliminating disparity and assuring consistency, that is, the imposition of similar attorney discipline for instances of similar attorney misconduct. *In re Naney* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 190. Any discipline recommendation different from that set forth in the applicable standards should clearly explain the reasons for the deviation. *Blair v. State Bar* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 762, 776, fn. 5.

Respondent admits to committing eight acts of professional misconduct. Standard 1.6 (a) requires that where a respondent acknowledges two or more acts of misconduct, and different sanctions are prescribed by the standards that apply to those acts, the sanction imposed shall be the more or most severe prescribed in the applicable standards.

The most severe sanction applicable to respondent's misconduct is found in standard 1.7, which applies because respondent has been disciplined by the State Bar on two prior occasions. Standard 1.7 provides that "[i]f a member is found culpable of professional misconduct in any proceeding in which discipline may be imposed and the member has a record of two prior impositions of discipline as defined by Standard 1.2(f), the degree of discipline in the current proceedings shall be disbarment unless the most compelling mitigating circumstances clearly predominate."

Here, there is no mitigation, let alone compelling mitigation, or extraordinary circumstances to warrant deviation from standard 1.7(b). Respondent's prior discipline notwithstanding, respondent's present misconduct is actually substantially aggravated by her multiple acts of misconduct and the harm she caused.

In the Matter of Esau (Review Dept. 2007) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 131, also supports disbarment in this matter. In *Esau*, the Review Department of the State Bar Court disbarred respondent for a single violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6103. *Id.* at 140. The Review Department stated that this "matter illustrates the serious consequences of an attorney's extended inattention to State Bar disciplinary proceedings and his repeated disregard of Supreme Court orders." *Id.* at 133. Respondent's prior disciplinary actions included a private reproof with conditions, and subsequent violations of those conditions, including failing to submit quarterly reports. *Id.* at 134. The Review Department noted that respondent's first disciplinary proceeding did not result in "serious discipline" and that his failure to comply with his probation conditions did not result in client harm. *Id.* at 140. Notwithstanding these facts, the Review Department recommended disbarment because "[a]ttorneys who engage in this extended practice of inattention to official actions, as respondent did, should not be allowed to create the risk that it will extend to clients resulting in inevitable and grievous harm to them." *Id.*

Here, as in *Esau*, respondent has a history of not paying adequate attention to State Bar disciplinary proceedings. As in *Esau*, respondent violated the Supreme Court's order from her prior disciplinary proceeding by not adhering to all of the terms of her probation. Because respondent has demonstrated an inability to adequately communicate with both the State Bar and her clients, there is a genuine risk that respondent will harm future clients. Thus, disbarment is warranted.

PENDING PROCEEDINGS.

The disclosure date referred to on page 2, paragraph A(7), was March 27, 2013.

COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.

Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has informed respondent that as March 27, 2013, the prosecution costs in these matters are \$11,243.50. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.

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In the Matter of: PHYLLIS DIANNE-LASATER LOYA (SBN 111767)	Case Number(s): 11-O-17579-PEM; 11-O-18810; 13-O-10878-PEM
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DISBARMENT ORDER

Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any, is GRANTED without prejudice, and:

- The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
- The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
- All Hearing dates are vacated.

The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58(E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) **The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)**

Respondent PHYLLIS DIANNE-LASATER LOYA is ordered transferred to involuntary inactive status pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6007, subdivision (c)(4). Respondent's inactive enrollment will be effective three (3) calendar days after this order is served by mail and will terminate upon the effective date of the Supreme Court's order imposing discipline herein, or as provided for by rule 5.111(D)(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California, or as otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court pursuant to its plenary jurisdiction.

April 16, 2013
Date

Lucy Armendariz
LUCY ARMENDARIZ
Judge of the State Bar Court

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of San Francisco, on April 16, 2013, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING; ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE ENROLLMENT

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:

by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at San Francisco, California, addressed as follows:

PHYLLIS DIANNE-LASATER LOYA
5359 FALLBROOK AVE
WOODLAND HILLS, CA 91367

by certified mail, No. , with return receipt requested, through the United States Postal Service at , California, addressed as follows:

by overnight mail at , California, addressed as follows:


by fax transmission, at fax number . No error was reported by the fax machine that I used.

By personal service by leaving the documents in a sealed envelope or package clearly labeled to identify the attorney being served with a receptionist or a person having charge of the attorney's office, addressed as follows:

by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

Heather Abelson, Enforcement, San Francisco

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on April 16, 2013.


George Hue
Case Administrator
State Bar Court