State Bar Court of California
Hearing Department
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING DISBARMENT; ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE
ENROLLMENT
DISBARMENT
Case Number(s): 11-O-17579-PEM; 11-O-18810-PEM;
13-O-10878-PEM
In the Matter of: PHYLLIS DIANNE-LASATER LOYA, Bar # 111767,
A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Heather E. Abelson, Bar #243691,
Counsel for Respondent: Phyllis Dianne-Lasater Loya, Bar #111767,
Submitted to: Assigned Judge.
Filed: April 16, 2013.
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION
REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any
additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be
set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g.,
"Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law,"
"Supporting Authority," etc.
A. Parties' Acknowledgments:
1.
Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted December
12, 1983.
2.
The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained
herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the
Supreme Court.
3.
All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption
of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed
consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under
"Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 13 pages, not including
the order.
4.
A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or
causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5.
Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts
are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6.
The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level
of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7.
No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent
has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not
resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8.
Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of
Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
checked. Costs are awarded to the
State Bar.
<<not>> checked. Costs
are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial
Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs
are entirely waived.
9.
ORDER OF INACTIVE ENROLLMENT:
The parties are aware that if this stipulation is approved, the judge will
issue an order of inactive enrollment under Business and Professions Code
section 6007, subdivision (c)(4), and Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, rule
5.111(D)(1).
B. Aggravating Circumstances [for definition, see Standards for Attorney
Sanctions for Professional Misconduct, standard 1.2(b)]. Facts supporting
aggravating circumstances are required.
<<not>> checked. (1) Prior
record of discipline
checked. (a) State Bar Court case # of prior case 00-O-13147-PEM
[01-O-00099; 01-O-00530; 01-O-01903; 01-O-04020; 01-O-04852; 02-O-11361].
checked. (b) Date prior discipline effective February 20,
2009.
checked. (c) Rules of Professional Conduct/ State Bar Act
violations: Rules of Professional Conduct, rules 4-100(B)(3) and 3-300, and
Business and Professions Code, section 6068(m).
checked. (d) Degree of prior discipline Public Reproval
after successful completion of ADP program.
checked. (e) If Respondent has two or more incidents of
prior discipline, use space provided below.
08-O-14780-PEM -Respondent stipulated to a one-year stayed suspension,
effective September 2, 2010, for violation of Business and Professions Code,
section 6068(i). This case also involved an uncharged violation of rule 1-110
that was considered an aggravating circumstance.
<<not>> checked. (2) Dishonesty:
Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by or followed by bad faith, dishonesty,
concealment, overreaching or other violations of the State Bar Act or Rules of
Professional Conduct.
<<not>> checked. (3) Trust
Violation: Trust funds or property were involved and Respondent refused or was
unable to account to the client or person who was the object of the misconduct
for improper conduct toward said funds or property.
checked. (4) Harm: Respondent's
misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public or the administration of
justice. See "Facts Supporting Aggravating Circumstances" in the
attachment hereto.
<<not>> checked. (5) Indifference:
Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for
the consequences of his or her misconduct.
<<not>> checked. (6) Lack of
Cooperation: Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims
of his/her misconduct or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation or
proceedings.
checked. (7) Multiple/Pattern of
Misconduct: Respondent's current misconduct evidences multiple acts of
wrongdoing or demonstrates a pattern of misconduct. See "Facts Supporting
Aggravating Circumstances" in the attachment hereto.
<<not>> checked. (8) No
aggravating circumstances are involved.
Additional aggravating circumstances: .
C. Mitigating Circumstances [see standard 1.2(e)]. Facts supporting
mitigating circumstances are required.
<<not>> checked. (1) No Prior Discipline: Respondent has no prior record
of discipline over many years of practice coupled with present misconduct which
is not deemed serious.
<<not>>
checked. (2) No Harm: Respondent did not harm the client or person who was
the object of the misconduct.
<<not>>
checked. (3) Candor/Cooperation: Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and
cooperation with the victims of his/her misconduct and to the State Bar during
disciplinary investigation and proceedings.
<<not>>
checked. (4) Remorse: Respondent promptly took objective steps spontaneously
demonstrating remorse and recognition of the wrongdoing, which steps were
designed to timely atone for any consequences of his/her misconduct.
<<not>>
checked. (5) Restitution: Respondent paid $ on in restitution to without
the threat or force of disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings.
<<not>>
checked. (6) Delay: These disciplinary proceedings were excessively
delayed. The delay is not attributable to Respondent and the delay prejudiced
him/her.
<<not>>
checked. (7) Good Faith: Respondent acted in good faith.
<<not>>
checked. (8) Emotional/Physical Difficulties: At the time of the stipulated
act or acts of professional misconduct Respondent suffered extreme emotional
difficulties or physical disabilities which expert testimony would establish
was directly responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities
were not the product of any illegal conduct by the member, such as illegal drug
or substance abuse, and Respondent no longer suffers from such difficulties or
disabilities.
<<not>>
checked. (9) Severe Financial Stress: At the time of the misconduct,
Respondent suffered from severe financial stress which resulted from
circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond his/her control
and which were directly responsible for the misconduct.
<<not>>
checked. (10) Family Problems: At the time of the misconduct, Respondent
suffered extreme difficulties in his/her personal life which were other than
emotional or physical in nature.
<<not>>
checked. (11) Good Character: Respondent's good character is attested to by a
wide range of references in the legal and general communities who are aware of
the full extent of his/her misconduct.
<<not>>
checked. (12) Rehabilitation: Considerable time has passed since the acts of
professional misconduct occurred followed by convincing proof of subsequent
rehabilitation.
checked.
(13) No mitigating circumstances are involved.
Additional
mitigating circumstances:
D. Discipline: Disbarment.
E. Additional Requirements:
(1) Rule 9.20,
California Rules of Court: Respondent must comply with the requirements of
rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in
subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 calendar days,
respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court's Order in this
matter.
checked. (2) Restitution: Respondent
must make restitution to Lorenza Perez in the amount of $ 2500.00 plus 10
percent interest per year from December 7, 2006 . If the Client Security Fund
has reimbursed Lorenza Perez for all or any portion of the principal amount,
respondent must pay restitution to CSF of the amount paid plus applicable
interest and costs in accordance with Business and Professions Code section
6140.5. Respondent must pay the above restitution and furnish satisfactory
proof of payment to the State Bar's Office of Probation in Los Angeles no later
than thirty (30) days from the effective date of the Supreme Court order in
this case..
<<not>> checked. (3) Other: .
Attachment language (if any):.
ATTACHMENT TO
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION
IN THE MATTER OF: PHYLLIS DIANNE-LASATER LOYA, State Bar No. 111767
STATE BAR COURT CASE NUMBER: 11-O-17579-PEM; 11-O-18810-PEM;
13-0-10878-PEM
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that she is
culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional
Conduct.
Case No. 11-O-17579-PEM (Complainant: Rosa Mendoza)
FACTS:
1. Before October 6, 2007, Rosa Mendoza (hereinafter "Mendoza")
employed respondent to substitute in as counsel on her behalf in a pending
marital dissolution action filed in Contra Costa County Superior Court,
entitled Rosa Mora v. Louis A. Mora, Jr., Case No. MSD06-01368.
2. In June 2009, the parties in the marital dissolution action entered into
a Marital Settlement Agreement.
3. Between May 2010 and January 2011, Mendoza terminated respondent’s
services and made several requests by letter and telephone for return of her
client file and refund of $600.00 in advanced attorney’s fees. Respondent
received Mendoza’s requests for return of her client file. On one occasion,
Mendoza went to respondent’s home office to request the return of her file and
a refund of fees.
4. Respondent did not return Mendoza’s file to her.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
5. By failing to give Mendoza her file after services were terminated and
upon Mendoza’s request respondent failed to release promptly, upon termination
of employment, to the client, at the request of the client, all the client
papers and property, in wilful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule
3-700(D)(1).
Case No. 11-O-18810-PEM (Complainant: Lorenza Perez)
FACTS:
6. On December 7, 2006, Lorenza Perez (hereinafter "Perez")
employed respondent to represent her in paternity and marital dissolution
matters. On the same day, Perez paid respondent $2,500.00 in advanced
attorney’s fees.
7. On September 30, 2008, respondent filed a Petition to Establish
Parentage in the matter entitled Lorenza Perez v. Francisco J. Perez, Contra
Costa County Superior Court, Case No. D08-04628 ("paternity matter").
8. Between December 2006 and November 2008, respondent did not communicate
with Perez regarding the paternity matter.
9. In November 2008, Perez consulted with another attorney H.F. Layton
(hereinafter "Layton"), about the paternity matter.
10. On November 26, 2008, Layton wrote a letter to respondent on behalf of
Perez and requested an accounting and the return of unearned fees on behalf of
Perez. Layton also requested respondent execute a substitution of attorney in
the paternity matter. Respondent received the letter shortly after it was sent.
11. Shortly after receiving Layton’s letter dated November 26, 2008,
respondent spoke to Perez and reiterated her intention to finish the paternity
matter filed on Perez’s behalf. Shortly thereafter, Perez decided to continue
with respondent’s legal representation in the paternity matter.
12. On February 27, 2009, a court hearing was held in the paternity matter.
Respondent failed to appear at the scheduled hearing and the court set an Order
to Show Cause ("OSC") hearing for April 22, 2009, against respondent
and Perez as to why this case should not be dismissed for failing to appear at
the February 27, 2009 hearing and for not serving the petition and prosecuting
the matter. Notice of the OSC was sent by the court to respondent’s official
membership records address.
13. On April 22, 20091 respondent appeared at the OSC hearing and dismissed
the paternity matter on behalf of Perez.
14. Respondent failed to inform Perez of the OSC hearing or of the
dismissal.
15. Respondent did not prosecute the paternity matter for Perez.
16. On December 24, 2009, respondent filed a Petition for Nullity of
Marriage on behalf of Perez in the matter entitled, Lorenza Perez v. Francisco
Perez, Contra Costa County Superior Court, Case No. D09-05944
("dissolution matter").
17. In May 2010, Perez retained Layton to take over the dissolution matter
because respondent had ceased communicating with Perez.
18. On May 5, 2010, Layton wrote to respondent and requested she execute a
substitution of attorney in the dissolution matter. Respondent received the
letter shortly after it was sent but did not respond.
19. On May 14, 2010, Layton sent respondent an e-mail requesting she
execute a substitution of attorney in the dissolution matter. Respondent
received the e-mail shortly after it was sent but did not respond.
20. On May 20, 2010, Layton filed a Notice of Motion for Substitution of
Attorney and sanctions against respondent in the dissolution matter. The Notice
of Motion was sent via U.S. Mail to respondent’s official membership records
address.
21. On July 1, 2010, a hearing was held on the Notice of Motion for
Substitution of Attorney filed by Perez. Respondent did not appear at the
hearing. The court substituted Layton in the place of respondent as the
attorney of record for Perez in the dissolution matter. The court ordered
respondent to deliver forthwith and without delay, all papers, records, and
property which pertain to the dissolution matter and which she has in her
possession, to Layton. Respondent received notice of the court order.
22. Respondent failed to return Perez’s client file in violation of the
court’s July 1, 2010 order.
23. Respondent did not prosecute the dissolution matter on behalf of Perez.
24. Respondent failed to perform any services of value on behalf of Perez
in both the paternity and dissolution matters.
25. Respondent did not earn any part of the $2,500 attorney fee she
received to represent Perez in the paternity and dissolution matters, and
respondent has never returned any part of that fee.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
26. By failing to serve the paternity petition on defendant and failing to
prosecute the paternity matter, by failing to appear at the February 27, 2009
hearing in the paternity matter, by failing to prosecute the dissolution
matter, by failing to execute the substitution of attorney despite requests on
May 5, 2010 and May 14, 2010, by Layton in the dissolution matter, respondent
intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly failed to perform legal services with
competence, in wilful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule
3-110(A).
27. By failing to deliver Perez’s client file to Layton as ordered by the
court on July 1, 2010, respondent willfully disobeyed or violated an order of
the court requiring her to do or forbear an act connected with or in the course
of respondent’s profession which she ought in good faith to do or forbear, in
wilful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6103.
28. By failing to inform Perez of the OSC hearing for failure to appear and
failure to prosecute action in the paternity matter, by failing to inform Perez
that respondent dismissed the paternity matter, respondent failed to keep a
client reasonably informed of significant developments in a matter in which
Respondent had agreed to provide legal services, in wilful violation of
Business and Professions Code, section 6068(m).
29. By failing to communicate with Perez regarding the status of her
representation from December 2006 through November 2008 in the paternity
matter, by falling respond to Perez’s inquiries from April 2009 through July
2010 in the dissolution matter, Respondent failed to respond promptly to
reasonable status inquiries of a client in a matter in which Respondent had
agreed to provide legal services, in wilful violation of Business and
Professions Code, section 6068(m).
30. By failing to refund any part of the $2,500 advanced fee, respondent
failed to refund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that has not been
earned, in wilful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(2).
Case No. 13-O-10878-PEM (State Bar Investigation)
FACTS:
31. On March 15, 2010, respondent signed a stipulation in State Bar Case
Number 08-O-14780 in which she agreed to receive a one-year stayed suspension
including a two-year probation with conditions. By signing the stipulation,
respondent promised to comply with the probation conditions set forth in the
stipulation.
32. On April 5, 2010, the stipulation and order approving were filed with
the State Bar Court Clerk’s office.
33. Soon after April 5, 2010, respondent received a copy of the stipulation
and order.
34. Shortly after April 5, 2010, respondent had actual knowledge that the
stipulation and order approving had been filed.
35. On August 3, 2010, the Supreme Court of California issued Order S183802
(State Bar Case No. 08-O-14780), suspending respondent from the practice of law
for one year, stayed, and placing Respondent on probation for a period of two
years subject to respondent’s compliance "with the conditions of probation
recommended by the Hearing Department of the State Bar Court in its Order
Approving Stipulation filed on April 5, 2010 [. ]”
36. On August 17, 2010, the Office of Probation of the State Bar sent
respondent a letter which attached a copy of Supreme Court Order S183802, filed
on August 3, 2010. In the letter, the Office of Probation set forth the terms
of respondent’s probation including scheduling a meeting with the Office of
Probation within 30 days from the effective date of discipline, and filing
quarterly reports. Respondent received the August 17, 2010 letter, which
attached the Supreme Court Order, and was aware of its contents.
37. The stayed suspension order and probation conditions became effective
on or about September 2, 2010.
38. QUARTERLY REPORTING CONDITION
a) One of the conditions of probation required respondent to submit reports
as follows: "Respondent must submit written quarterly reports to the
Office of Probation on each January 10, April 10, July 10, and October 10 of
the period of probation. Under penalty of perjury, Respondent must state
whether Respondent has complied with the State Bar Act, the Rules of
Professional Conduct, and all conditions of probation during the preceding
calendar quarter. Respondent must also state whether there are any proceedings
pending against him or her in the State Bar Court and if so, the case number
and current status of that proceeding. If the first report would cover less
than 30 days, that report must be submitted on the next quarter date, and cover
the extended period.
In addition to all quarterly reports, a final report, containing the same
information, is due no earlier than twenty (20) days before the last day of the
period of probation and no later than the last day of probation."
b) Respondent violated this condition by failing to timely submit the
quarterly report that was due no later than January 10, 2011, failing to submit
the quarterly reports that were due no later than April 10, July 10 and
October. 10, 2011, failing to submit the quarterly reports that were due no
later than January 10, April 10, and July 10, 2012, and by failing to submit
the final report that was due no later than September 2, 2012.
39. CONTACT OFFICE OF PROBATION
a) Another probation condition required respondent to contact the Office of
Probation as follows:
"Within thirty (30) days from the effective date of discipline,
Respondent must contact the Office of Probation and schedule a meeting with
Respondent’s assigned probation deputy to discuss these terms and conditions of
probation. Under the direction of the Office of Probation, Respondent must meet
with the probation deputy either in-person or by telephone. During the period
of probation, Respondent must promptly meet with the probation deputy as
directed and upon request."
b) Respondent violated this condition by failing to timely contact the
Office of Probation and schedule a meeting by October 2, 2010.
40. On August 22, 2011, the Office of Probation sent a letter to respondent
reminding her of the terms and conditions of her probation. The letter further stated
that the Office of Probation had not received the quarterly reports due April
10 and July 10, 2011. Respondent received the August 22, 2011 letter, and was
aware of its contents.
41. On September 1, 2011, the Office of Probation sent an email to respondent
regarding the August 22, 2011 letter, and the missing quarterly reports dated
April 10 and July 10, 2011. Respondent received the September 1, 2011 email,
and was aware of its contents.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
42. By failing to timely submit the quarterly report that was due no later
than January 10, 2011, failing to submit the quarterly reports that were due no
later than April 10, July 10 and October 10, 2011, failing to submit the
quarterly reports that were due no later than January 10, April 10, and July
10, 2012, failing to submit the final report that was due no later than
September 2, 2012, and failing to timely contact the Office of Probation to
schedule a meeting within thirty (30) days from the effective date of
discipline, respondent failed to comply with all conditions attached to any
disciplinary probation, in wilful violation of Business and Professions Code,
section 6068(k).
ADDITIONAL FACTS RE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
Prior Record of Discipline (Std. 1.2(b)(i)): Respondent was previously
disciplined by the State Bar on two prior occasions. In State Bar Case No. 08-O-14780,
respondent stipulated to a one-year stayed suspension, effective September 2,
2010, for violations of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(i). In
State Bar Case No. 00-O-13147 et al., respondent stipulated to a public
reproval, effective February 20, 2009, for violations of Rules of Professions
Conduct, roles 4-100(B)(3) and 3-300, and Business and Professions Code,
section 6068(m), in six client matters. Respondent’s two prior disciplinary
matters constitute an aggravating circumstance pursuant to standard 1.2(b)(i).
Multiple Acts of Misconduct (Std. 1.2(b)(ii)): Respondent violated Rules of
Professional Conduct, roles 3-700(D)(1) [two counts], 3-700(D)(2), 3-110(A),
and Business and Professions Code, sections 6103, 6068(m) [two counts] and
6068(k). Respondent’s multiple acts of misconduct constitute an aggravating
circumstance pursuant to standard 1.2(b)(ii).
Harm (Std. 1.2(b)(iv)): Respondent substantially harmed Mendoza by failing
to return her client file which prevented Mendoza from being able to draft a
QDRO. Respondent substantially harmed Perez by failing to refund unearned fees.
Respondent harmed the administration of justice by failing to adhere to the court
order requiring her to return Perez’s client file. The substantial harm caused
by Respondent constitutes an aggravating circumstances pursuant to standard
1.2(b)(iv).
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.
The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct provide a
"process of fixing discipline" pursuant to a set of written
principles to "better discharge the purposes of attorney discipline as
announced by the Supreme Court." Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds.
for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, Introduction (all further references
to standards are to this source). The primary purposes of disciplinary
proceedings and of the sanctions imposed are "the protection of the
public, the courts and the legal profession; the maintenance of high
professional standards by attorneys and the preservation of public confidence
in the legal profession." In re Morse (1995) 11 Cal.4th 84, 205; std.
1.3.
Although not binding, the standards are entitled to "great
weight" and should be followed "whenever possible" in
determining level of discipline. In re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 92,
quoting In re Brown (1995) 12 Cal.4th 205, 220 and In re Young (1989) 49 Cal.3d
257, 267, fn. 11. Adherence to the standards in the great majority of cases
serves the valuable purpose of eliminating disparity and assuring consistency,
that is, the imposition of similar attorney discipline for instances of similar
attorney misconduct. In re Naney (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 190. Any discipline
recommendation different from that set forth in the applicable standards should
clearly explain the reasons for the deviation. Blair v. State Bar (1989) 49
Cal.3d 762, 776, fn. 5.
Respondent admits to committing eight acts of professional misconduct.
Standard 1.6 (a) requires that where a respondent acknowledges two or more acts
of misconduct, and different sanctions are prescribed by the standards that
apply to those acts, the sanction imposed shall be the more or most severe
prescribed in the applicable standards.
The most severe sanction applicable to respondent’s misconduct is found in
standard 1.7, which applies because respondent has been disciplined by the
State Bar on two prior occasions. Standard 1.7 provides that "[i]f a
member is found culpable of professional misconduct in any proceeding in which
discipline may be imposed and the member has a record of two prior impositions
of discipline as defined by Standard 1.2(0, the degree of discipline in the
current proceedings shall be disbarment unless the most compelling mitigating
circumstances clearly predominate.”
Here, there is no mitigation, let alone compelling mitigation, or
extraordinary circumstances to warrant deviation from standard 1.7(b).
Respondent’s prior discipline notwithstanding, respondent’s present misconduct
is actually substantially aggravated by her multiple acts of misconduct and the
harm she caused.
In the Matter of Esau (Review Dept. 2007) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 131,
also supports disbarment in this matter. In Esau, the Review Department of the
State Bar Court disbarred respondent for a single violation of Business and
Professions Code, section 6103. ld. at 140. The Review Department stated that
this "matter illustrates the serious consequences of an attorney’s
extended inattention to State Bar disciplinary proceedings and his repeated
disregard of Supreme Court orders." ld. at 133. Respondent’s prior
disciplinary actions included a private reproval with conditions, and
subsequent violations of those conditions, including failing to submit
quarterly reports. Id. at 134. The Review Department noted that respondent’s
first disciplinary proceeding did not result in "serious discipline"
and that his failure to comply with his probation conditions did not result in
client harm. Id. at 140. Notwithstanding these facts, the Review Department
recommended disbarment because "[a]ttorneys who engage in this extended
practice of inattention to official actions, as respondent did, should not be
allowed to create the risk that it will extend to clients resulting in inevitable
and grievous harm to them." ld.
Here, as in Esau, respondent has a history of not paying adequate attention
to State Bar disciplinary proceedings. As in Esau, respondent violated the
Supreme Court’s order from her prior disciplinary proceeding by not adhering to
all of the terms of her probation. Because respondent has demonstrated an
inability to adequately communicate with both the State Bar and her clients,
there is a genuine risk that respondent will harm future clients. Thus,
disbarment is warranted.
PENDING PROCEEDINGS.
The disclosure date referred to on page 2, paragraph A(7), was March 27,
2013.
COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.
Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has
informed respondent that as March 27, 2013, the prosecution costs in these
matters are $11,243.50. Respondent further acknowledges that should this
stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the
costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.
SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES
Case Number(s): 11-O-17579-PEM; 11-O-15810; 13-O-10878-PEM
In the Matter of: PHYLLIS DIANNE-LASATER LOYA
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable,
signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and
conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: PHYLLIS DIANNE-LASATER LOYA
Date: 4/4/13
Respondent’s Counsel:
Date:
Deputy Trial Counsel: Heather E. Abelson
Date: 4/8/13
DISBARMENT ORDER
Case Number(s): 11-O-17579-PEM; 11-O-18810; 13-O-10878-PEM
In the Matter of: PHYLLIS DIANNE-LASATER LOYA
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately
protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of
counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the
DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are
APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to
the Supreme Court.
checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to
withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this
order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved
stipulation. (See rule 5.58 (E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective
date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order
herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California
Rules of Court.)
Respondent PHYLLIS DIANNE-LASATER LOYA is ordered transferred to
involuntary inactive status pursuant to Business and Professions Code section
6007, subdivision (c)(4). Respondent’s inactive enrollment will be effective
three (3) calendar days after this order is served by mail and will terminate
upon the effective date of the Supreme Court’s order imposing discipline
herein, or as provided for by rule 5.111(D)(2) or the Rules of Procedure of the
State Bar of California, or as otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court pursuant
to its plenary jurisdiction.
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Lucy Armendariz
Date: 4/16/13
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over
the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to
standard court practice, in the City and County of San Francisco, on April 16,
2013, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND
ORDER APPROVING; ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE ENROLLMENT
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through
the United States Postal Service at San Francisco, California, addressed as
follows:
PHYLLIS DIANNE-LASATER LOYA
5359 FALLBROOK AVE
WOODLAND HILLS, CA 91367
<<not>> checked. by certified mail, No. , with return receipt
requested, through the United States Postal Service at , California, addressed
as follows:
<<not>> checked. by overnight mail at , California, addressed
as follows:
<<not>> checked. by fax transmission, at fax number . No error
was reported by the fax machine that I used.
<<not>> checked. By personal service by leaving the documents
in a sealed envelope or package clearly labeled to identify the attorney being
served with a receptionist or a person having charge of the attorney’s office,
addressed as follows:
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the
State Bar of California addressed as follows:
Heather Abelson, Enforcement, San Francisco
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San
Francisco, California, on April 16, 2013.
Signed by:
George Hue
Case Administrator
State Bar Court