Case Number(s): 11-O-18420, 12-O-15329, 12-O-15874, 12-O-17820, 12-O-18121
In the Matter of: LYNDSEY MICHELLE HELLER, Bar # 188234, A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Erin McKeown Joyce, Bar # 149946,
Counsel for Respondent: Steve Henry Lorber, Bar # 97287,
Submitted to: Settlement Judge.
Filed: November 26, 2013.
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted June 5, 1997.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 16 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
<<not>> checked. Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 5.130, Rules of Procedure.
checked. Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: two (2) billing cycles immediately following the effective date of the Supreme Court Order in this matter. (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
<<not>> checked. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs are entirely waived.
Attachment language (if any):.
FINANCIAL CONDITIONS
Case Number(s): 11-O-18420, 12-O-15329, 12-O-15874, 12-O-17820, 12-O-18121
In the Matter of: LYNDSEY MICHELLE HELLER
a. Restitution
checked. Respondent must pay restitution (including the principal amount, plus interest of 10% per annum) to the payee(s) listed below. If the Client Security Fund (“CSF”) has reimbursed one or more of the payee(s) for all or any portion of the principal amount(s) listed below, Respondent must also pay restitution to CSF in the amount(s) paid, plus applicable interest and costs.
1. Payee: See Attachment page 15.
Principal Amount:
Interest Accrues From:
2. Payee:
Principal Amount:
Interest Accrues From:
3. Payee:
Principal Amount:
Interest Accrues From:
4. Payee:
Principal Amount:
Interest Accrues From:
<<not>> checked. Respondent must pay above-referenced restitution and provide satisfactory proof of payment to the Office of Probation not later than .
b. Installment Restitution Payments
<<not>> checked. Respondent must pay the above-referenced restitution on the payment schedule set forth below. Respondent must provide satisfactory proof of payment to the Office of Probation with each quarterly probation report, or as otherwise directed by the Office of Probation. No later than 30 days prior to the expiration of the period of probation (or period of reproval), Respondent must make any necessary final payment(s) in order to complete the payment of restitution, including interest, in full.
1. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
Payment Frequency
2. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
Payment Frequency
3. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
Payment Frequency
4. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
Payment Frequency
<<not>> checked. If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
c. Client Funds Certificate
<<not>> checked.
1. If Respondent possesses client funds at any time during the period covered by a required quarterly report, Respondent must file with each required report a certificate from Respondent and/or a certified public accountant or other financial professional approved by the Office of Probation, certifying that:
a. Respondent has maintained a bank account in a bank authorized to do business in the State of California, at a branch located within the State of California, and that such account is designated as a “Trust Account” or “Clients’ Funds Account”;
b. Respondent has kept and maintained the following:
i. A written ledger for each client on whose behalf funds are held that sets forth:
1. the name of such client;
2. the date, amount and source of all funds received on behalf of such client;
3. the date, amount, payee and purpose of each disbursement made on behalf of such client; and,
4. the current balance for such client.
ii. a written journal for each client trust fund account that sets forth:
1. the name of such account;
2. the date, amount and client affected by each debit and credit; and,
3. the current balance in such account.
iii. all bank statements and cancelled checks for each client trust account; and,
iv. each monthly reconciliation (balancing) of (i), (ii), and (iii), above, and if there are any differences between the monthly total balances reflected in (i), (ii), and (iii), above, the reasons for the differences.
c. Respondent has maintained a written journal of securities or other properties held for clients that specifies:
i. each item of security and property held;
ii. the person on whose behalf the security or property is held;
iii. the date of receipt of the security or property;
iv. the date of distribution of the security or property; and,
v. the person to whom the security or property was distributed.
2. If Respondent does not possess any client funds, property or securities during the entire period covered by a report, Respondent must so state under penalty of perjury in the report filed with the Office of Probation for that reporting period. In this circumstance, Respondent need not file the accountant’s certificate described above.
3. The requirements of this condition are in addition to those set forth in rule 4-100, Rules of Professional Conduct.
d. Client Trust Accounting School
<<not>> checked. Within one (1) year of the effective date of the discipline herein, Respondent must supply to the Office of Probation satisfactory proof of attendance at a session of the Ethics School Client Trust Accounting School, within the same period of time, and passage of the test given at the end of that session.
ATTACHMENT TO
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION
IN THE MATTER OF: LYNDSEY MICHELLE HELLER, State Bar No. 188234
STATE BAR COURT CASE NUMBER: 11-O-18420,12-O-15329,12-O-15874,
12-O-17820, 12-O-18121
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that she is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and Rules of Professional Conduct.
FACTS:
Case No. 11-O-18420 (Complainant: Judi Wexler)
1. On May 7, 2010, Judi Wexler hired Respondent to perform residential mortgage loan modification legal services and paid Respondent $2,500 in advanced attorney fees for those services.
2. Respondent was unsuccessful in obtaining a loan modification acceptable to Wexler.
3. To date, Respondent has not refunded any part of the fee paid to her by Wexler.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
4. By collecting an advanced fee to perform mortgage loan modification services on behalf of Wexler in violation of Civil Code section 2944.7, Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3.
Case No. 12-O-15329 (Complainant: Teresa Lindenmeier)
FACTS:
5. On March 5, 2011, Teresa Lindenmeier hired Respondent to perform residential mortgage loan modification legal services and paid Respondent $3,500 in advanced attorney fees for those services.
6. Respondent was unsuccessful in obtaining a loan modification acceptable to Lindenmeier.
7. On June 10, 2011, Lindenmeier hired Respondent to file a lawsuit against her lender. Later that month, Respondent filed a lawsuit against Lindenmeier’s lender.
8. On September 22, 2011, the lender filed a demurrer. Respondent received notice of the demurrer. The demurrer hearing was scheduled for November 18, 2011. Respondent received notice of the hearing on the demurrer.
9. Respondent did not file an opposition and she did not otherwise respond to the demurrer. Instead, Respondent filed a substitution of attorney in Lindenmeier’s lawsuit against her lender on November 8, 2011, substituting in Lindenmeier to represent herself in propria persona. Thereafter, the court sustained the demurrer.
10. To date, Respondent has not refunded any part of the fee paid to her by Lindenmeier.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
11. By collecting an advanced fee to perform mortgage loan modification services on behalf of Lindenmeier in violation of Civil Code section 2944.7, Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3.
12. By failing to file an opposition or response to the demurrer in Lindenmeier’s lawsuit, Respondent intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence in wilful violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 3-110(A).
Case No. 12-O-15874 (Complainant: Pat Magoon)
FACTS:
13. In September 2010, Patricia Magoon hired Respondent to perform residential mortgage loan modification legal services and paid Respondent $2,950 in advanced attorney fees for those services.
14. Respondent was unsuccessful in obtaining a loan modification acceptable to Magoon.
15. On October 7, 2010, Magoon paid Respondent approximately $9,000 in additional advanced fees to file and pursue a lawsuit against Magoon’s lender.
16. On October 25, 2010, Respondent filed a lawsuit against Magoon’s lender. Respondent filed a first amended complaint on February 3,2011, and a second amended complaint on June 30, 2011.
17. On August 11, 2011, the lender filed a demurrer to Magoon’s lawsuit. The demurrer hearing was scheduled for October 4, 2011. Respondent received notice of the demurrer and of the hearing on the demurrer.
18. On October 5, 2011, based on the parties’ stipulation, Respondent filed a request to continue the hearing on the demurrer to November 18, 2011. The court granted the request and continued the matter to November 18, 2011. Respondent received notice of the continued hearing date for the demurrer.
19. At no time did Respondent file an opposition or otherwise respond to the demurrer on behalf of Magoon.
20. Respondent did not appear at the November 18, 2011 hearing, and she did not otherwise provide any representation for Magoon at the hearing.
21. On November 18, 2011, as a result of Respondent’s non-appearance at the hearing and her failure to respond to the demurrer, the court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend.
22. To date, Respondent has not refunded any part of the fee paid to her by Magoon.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
23. By collecting an advanced fee to perform mortgage loan modification services on behalf of Magoon in violation of Civil Code section 2944.7, Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3.
24. By failing to file an opposition or response to the demurrer in Magoon’s lawsuit, and failing to appear at the continued hearing on the demurrer, Respondent intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence in wilful violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 3-110(A).
Case No. 12-O-17820 (Complainant: Dorcas Peralta)
FACTS:
25. On December 27, 2011, Dorcas Peralta, a resident of New York State, hired Respondent to perform loan modification legal services related to the mortgage on her home located in New York. Peralta paid Respondent $8,000 in advanced attorney fees.
26. The NY Judiciary Law Section 478, provides, in pertinent part, that "it shall be unlawful for any natural person to practice or appear as an attorney-at-law or as an attorney and counselor-at-law for a person other than himself in a court of record in this state, or to furnish attorneys or counsel or an attorney and counsel to render legal services, or to hold himself out to the public as being entitled to practice law ... without having first been duly and regularly licensed and admitted to practice law in the courts of record of this state[.]"
27. Respondent has never been admitted to practice law in New York.
28. The loan modification services that Respondent undertook to perform on behalf of Peralta in New York constitute the practice of law in New York.
29. To date, Respondent has not refunded any part of part of the fee paid to her by Peralta.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
30. By rendering legal services to Peralta, a resident of New York, regarding her home located in New York without being licensed as an attorney in New York, Respondent practiced law in a jurisdiction where to do so is in violation of the regulations of the profession in that jurisdiction, in wilful violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 1-300(B).
Case No. 12-O-18121 (Complainants: David and Vickie Wagner)
FACTS:
31. On March 28, 2011, David and Vickie Wagner hired Respondent to perform residential mortgage loan modification legal services and paid Respondent $4,500 in advanced attorney fees for those services.
32. Respondent was unsuccessful in obtaining a loan modification acceptable to the Wagners.
33. To date, Respondent has not refunded any part of the fee paid to her by the Wagners.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
34. By collecting an advanced fee to perform mortgage loan modification services on behalf of the Wagners in violation of Civil Code section 2944.7, Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Multiple Acts of Misconduct (Standard 1.2(b)ii): Respondent collected advanced fees for loan modification services from five clients (one of whom was a resident of New York), and failed to perform with competence in lender litigation for two of the clients. Respondent thereby engaged in multiple acts of misconduct, which constitutes an aggravating circumstance. (In the Matter of Peterson (Review Dept. 1990) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 139.)
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
No Prior Discipline: Respondent was admitted in June 1997, over 13 years before the onset of the misconduct. Even where the underlying misconduct is deemed serious, over 13 years of discipline-free practice should be afforded mitigating weight. (In the Matter of Conner (Review Dept. 2008) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 93) (mitigating credit given for over 12 years of discipline-free practice despite seriousness of misconduct); In the Matter of Davis (Review Dept. 2003) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 576 (mitigation acknowledged for absence of prior record of discipline in 12 years of practice despite wilful misappropriation of over $29,000.)
Emotional/Physical Difficulties (Standard 1.2(e)(iv)): At the time of the stipulated acts of misconduct, Respondent suffered extreme physical and emotional difficulties stemming from her debilitating back pain which resulted from a traumatic injury. Respondent suffered from the extreme back pain for several years before agreeing to surgery, since the surgery posed significant health risks and would require a long period of recovery and disability following the surgery during which Respondent could not work. Her constant pain in the time period from 2010 through 2011 distracted her from her practice, and led her to neglect the two lender lawsuits she filed for Lindenmeier and Magoon.
Respondent underwent surgery in late 2012. Respondent’s successful treatment for her medical condition, and the passage of time have restored her to the practice of law without further adverse impact from this stress. Mitigating weight may be given even where no expert evidence is given to establish an emotional difficulty or physical disability was "directly responsible" for the misconduct, where there are facts supporting that that condition impaired the respondent’s judgment and affected her ability to deal appropriately with the stress created. (ln re Brown (1995) 12 Cal.4th 205,222.)
Good Character (Standard 1.2(e)(vi)): Respondent’s good character has been attested by a wide range of references from the legal and general communities who are fully aware of Respondent’s misconduct in connection with these matters. Respondent submitted the character letters of two reputable attorneys and six community members familiar with her misconduct. (See In the Matter of Field (Review Dept. 2010) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 171.) Respondent has established that she is entitled to mitigating credit for her demonstration of good character.
Pretrial Stipulation: Respondent met with the State Bar trial counsel, admitted her misconduct, and entered this stipulation fully resolving these matters. Respondent’s cooperation has saved the State Bar significant resources and time. Respondent’s stipulation to the facts, culpability, and discipline is a mitigating circumstance. (See In the Matter of Spaith (Review Dept. 1996) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 511,521; Silva-Fidor v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1071, 1079 (where mitigating credit was given for entering into a stipulation as to facts and culpability).)
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE
The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct provide a "process of fixing discipline" pursuant to a set of written principles to "better discharge the purposes of attorney discipline as announced by the Supreme Court." (Rules of Procedure of State Bar, title IV, Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct, Introduction (all further references to standards are to this source).) The primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings and of the sanctions imposed are "the protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; the maintenance of high professional standards by attorneys and the preservation of public confidence in the legal profession." (In re Morse (1995) 11 Cal.4th 184, 205; standard 1.3.)
Although not binding, the standards are entitled to "great weight" and should be followed "whenever possible" in determining level of discipline. (In re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 92, quoting In re Brown (1995) 12 Cal.4th 205,220 and In re Young (1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 267, fn. 11.) Adherence to the standards in the great majority of cases serves the valuable purpose of eliminating disparity and assuring consistency, that is, the imposition of similar attorney discipline for instances of similar attorney misconduct. (ln re Naney (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 190.)
The gravamen of Respondent’s misconduct is her repeated violation of Business and Professions Code section 6106.3 - collecting advanced fees for loan modification services. Additionally in the Peralta matter, Respondent engaged in the practice of law in a state in which she was not entitled to practice, and in the Lindenmeier and Magoon matters, Respondent failed to perform with competence in her clients’ lender litigation.
Respondent has acknowledged four violations of Business and Professions Code section 6106.3, one violation of Rule of Professional Conduct 1-300(B), and two violations of Rule of Professional Conduct 3-110(A). She committed seven acts of professional misconduct in five client matters. Standard 1.6 (a) requires that where a Respondent acknowledges two or more acts of misconduct, and different sanctions are prescribed by the standards that apply to those acts, the sanction imposed shall be the most severe prescribed in the applicable standards.
The most severe sanction applicable to Respondent’s misconduct is found in Standard 2.10, which applies to Respondent’s repeated violations of Business and Professions Code section 6106.3. Under Standard 2.10, which provides the level of discipline range for offenses involving a violation of the Business and Professions Code or Rules of Professional Conduct not specified in any other standard, "[c]ulpability ... shall result in reproval or suspension according to the gravity of the offense or the harm, if any, to the victim, with due regard to the purposes of imposing discipline set forth in standard 1.3."
In considering the extent of the misconduct, Respondent’s misconduct spanned a 20-month period from May 2010 to December 2011, and involved five clients. Moreover, Respondent’s misconduct is serious. Respondent has repeatedly violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3 by accepting advanced fees for loan modification services in violation of Civil Code section 2944.7. All of the loan modification clients hired Respondent substantially after the effective date of Civil Code section 2944.7, October 11, 2009.
In considering the degree of harm to the clients, the four California clients who hired Respondent for loan modification services have not received refunds of the advanced fees collected by Respondent in violation of Business and Profession Code section 6106.3, and Peralta has not received a refund of the advanced fees he paid for legal services that Respondent was not entitled to perform. Thus, the extent of misconduct is great and the harm to the clients has been significant.
The aggravating and mitigating circumstances must also be considered. In aggravation are Respondent’s multiple acts of misconduct. In mitigation, Respondent’s misconduct relating to her mishandling of the two lender litigation matters began at the time of significant stress in Respondent’s personal life, since she was suffering from debilitating back pain which eventually required surgery and lengthy period of recovery during which she could not work. Because to the risks of the surgery and expected period of disability, Respondent delayed the surgery, but continued to suffer significant pain which interfered with her ability to practice during the time period of the misconduct.
Respondent has also demonstrated good character, which is recognized mitigation under Standard 1.2(e)(iv). Moreover, Respondent has fully cooperated with the State Bar to resolve these matters with this stipulation. Further, even though the misconduct here is serious, before all the misconduct considered here began, Respondent had no record of discipline in over 13 years of practice.
In a recent Review Department case, In the Matter of Taylor (Review Dept. 2012) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 221, the respondent attorney was found culpable of violating Civil Code section 2944.7 and collecting illegal and unconscionable fees in eight client matters, and was suspended for six months. In Taylor, the respondent attorney had not paid full refunds to any of the clients. He was found to have engaged in multiple acts of misconduct, causing significant harm to his clients and displaying indifference toward rectification or atonement for his misconduct. By contrast, Respondent’s misconduct was more limited than the misconduct of the respondent attorney in Taylor, and less serious. Respondent has established substantial mitigation for good character, a pretrial stipulation and extreme physical difficulties. Accordingly, a level of discipline lower than that imposed in Taylor is appropriate.
Following Standard 2.10 and considering the totality of the misconduct, particularly in light of the extent of the misconduct and degree of harm to the clients, and considering the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the appropriate level of discipline is 60 days of actual suspension, and until restitution is paid to Respondent’s clients. Imposition of a 60-day actual suspension will be sufficient to protect the public, the courts and the legal profession under Standard 1.3, and falls squarely within the Standards for discipline in these matters.
FINANCIAL CONDITIONS
These financial conditions are continued from the Financial Conditions form (pages 7 and 8). Respondent must pay the following restitution on the same terms as set forth on the Financial Conditions page 7 to the following payees:
1. Judi Wexler, $2,500 principal, with interest accruing from May 7, 2010.
2. Teresa Lindenmeier, $3,500 principal, with interest accruing from March 5,2011.
3. Patricia Magoon, $2,950 principal, with interest accruing from September 30, 2010.
4. Dorcas Peralta, $8,000 principal, with interest accruing from December 27, 2011.
5. David and Vickie Wagner, $4,500 principal, with interest accruing from March 28, 2011.
COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS
Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has informed respondent that as of October 3, 2013, the prosecution costs in this matter are $7,186. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.
EXCLUSION FROM MCLE CREDIT
Pursuant to Rule of Procedure 3201, Respondent may not receive MCLE credit for completion of State Bar Ethics School.
SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES
Case Number(s): 11-O-18420,12-O-15329,12-O-15874, 12-O-17820,12-O-18121
In the Matter of: LYNDSEY MICHELLE HELLER
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: LYNDSEY MICHELLE HELLER
Date: 10/30/13
Respondent’s Counsel: Steve Henry Lorber
Date: 10/30/13
Deputy Trial Counsel: Erin McKeown Joyce
Date: 10/31/13
ACTUAL SUSPENSION ORDER
Case Number(s): 11-O-18420,12-O-15329,12-O-15874, 12-O-17820,12-O-18121
In the Matter of: LYNDSEY MICHELLE HELLER
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
SEE ATTACHED MODIFICATION
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58 (E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Richard A. Honn
Date: 11/22/13
ATTACHMENT TO
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION
IN THE MATTER OF: LYNDSEY MICHELLE HELLER, State Bar No. 188234
STATE BAR COURT CASE NUMBER: 11-O-18420,12-O-15329,12-O-15874,
12-0-17820,12-0-18121
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
The following modifications to the Stipulation are recommended:
1. On page 12 of the Stipulation, "Multiple Acts of Misconduct (Standard 1.2(b)ii)," that the first sentence is modified (1) to change "five clients" to "four clients," and the word "matters" is inserted thereafter; and (2) to delete "(one of whom was a resident of New York)" so that the sentence will state that "Respondent collected advanced fees for loan modification services from four client matters .... "
2. On page 14, paragraph 7, line 3, the comma after "suspension" is deleted and in its place is inserted a period. In addition, at lines 3-4, "and until restitution is paid to Respondent’s clients" is deleted.
3. On page 15, under the heading "Exclusion From MCLE Credits," line 2, "or the MPRE" is added after "School.”
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on November 26, 2013, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND
ORDER APPROVING ACTUAL SUSPENSION
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:
STEVE HENRY LORBER
LORBER NELSON LLP
12526 HIGH BLUFF DR. STE. 300
SAN DIEGO, CA 92130
<<not>> checked. by certified mail, No. , with return receipt requested, through the United States Postal Service at , California, addressed as follows:
<<not>> checked. by overnight mail at , California, addressed as follows:
<<not>> checked. by fax transmission, at fax number . No error was reported by the fax machine that I used.
<<not>> checked. By personal service by leaving the documents in a sealed envelope or package clearly labeled to identify the attorney being served with a receptionist or a person having charge of the attorney’s office, addressed as follows:
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
ERIN JOYCE, Enforcement, Los Angeles
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on November 26, 2013.
Signed by:
Tammy Cleaver
Case Administrator
State Bar Court