Case Number(s): 11-O-19314-RAH; 12-O-12959
In the Matter of: Raymond Carl Prospero, Bar # 238087, A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Mia R. Ellis, Deputy Trial Counsel.
1 i49 South Hill Street
Los Angeles, CA 90015
Bar # 228235
Counsel for Respondent: In Pro Per Respondent
Raymond Carl Prospero
P.O. Box 2950
Corona, CA 92878
Bar # 238087
Submitted to: Settlement Judge State Bar Court Clerk’s Office Los Angeles
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted November 22, 2005.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 16 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
checked. Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 5.130, Rules of Procedure.
<<not>> checked. Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
<<not>> checked. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs are entirely waived.
See Stipulation Attachment at Page 13.
Case Number(s) 11-O-19314 and 12-O-12959
In the Matter of: Raymond Carl Prospero
checked. Respondent must pay restitution (including the principal amount, plus interest of 10% per annum) to the payee(s) listed below. If the Client Security Fund (“CSF”) has reimbursed one or more of the payee(s) for all or any portion of the principal amount(s) listed below, Respondent must also pay restitution to CSF in the amount(s) paid, plus applicable interest and costs.
1. Payee: April Hunter
Principal Amount: $2,500.00
Interest Accrues From: September 24, 2008
2. Payee: Mary Lena Rilloraza
Principal Amount: $6,275.61
Interest Accrues From: October 22, 2009
Interest Accrues From:
Interest Accrues From:
<<not>> checked. Respondent must pay above-referenced restitution and provide satisfactory proof of payment to the Office of Probation not later than
<<not>> checked. Respondent must pay the above-referenced restitution on the payment schedule set forth below. Respondent must provide satisfactory proof of payment to the Office of Probation with each quarterly probation report, or as otherwise directed by the Office of Probation. No later than 30 days prior to the expiration of the period of probation (or period of reproval), Respondent must make any necessary final payment(s) in order to complete the payment of restitution, including interest, in full.
1. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
Payment Frequency quarterly
2. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
3. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
4. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
<<not>> checked If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
1. If Respondent possesses client funds at any time during the period covered by a required quarterly report, Respondent must file with each required report a certificate from Respondent and/or a certified public accountant or other financial professional approved by the Office of Probation, certifying that:
a. Respondent has maintained a bank account in a bank authorized to do business in the State of California, at a branch located within the State of California, and that such account is designated as a “Trust Account” or “Clients’ Funds Account”;
b. Respondent has kept and maintained the following:
i. A written ledger for each client on whose behalf funds are held that sets forth:
1. the name of such client;
2. the date, amount and source of all funds received on behalf of such client;
3. the date, amount, payee and purpose of each disbursement made on behalf of such client; and,
4. the current balance for such client.
ii. a written journal for each client trust fund account that sets forth:
1. the name of such account;
2. the date, amount and client affected by each debit and credit; and,
3. the current balance in such account.
iii. all bank statements and cancelled checks for each client trust account; and,
iv. each monthly reconciliation (balancing) of (i), (ii), and (iii), above, and if there are any differences between the monthly total balances reflected in (i), (ii), and (iii), above, the reasons for the differences.
c. Respondent has maintained a written journal of securities or other properties held for clients that specifies:
i. each item of security and property held;
ii. the person on whose behalf the security or property is held;
iii. the date of receipt of the security or property;
iv. the date of distribution of the security or property; and,
v. the person to whom the security or property was distributed.
2. If Respondent does not possess any client funds, property or securities during the entire period covered by a report, Respondent must so state under penalty of perjury in the report filed with the Office of Probation for that reporting period. In this circumstance, Respondent need not file the accountant’s certificate described above.
3. The requirements of this condition are in addition to those set forth in rule 4-100, Rules of Professional Conduct.
checked. Within one (1) year of the effective date of the discipline herein, Respondent must supply to the Office of Probation satisfactory proof of attendance at a session of the Ethics School Client Trust Accounting School, within the same period of time, and passage of the test given at the end of that session.
IN THE MATTER OF: RAYMOND CARL PROSPERO
CASE NUMBER(S): 11-O-19314 and 12-O-12959
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Respondent admits that the following facts are e and that he is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct.
Case No. 11-O- 19314 (Complainant: April Hunter)
1. On September 24, 2008, April Hunter ("Hunter") retained Respondent to file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Hunter paid Respondent $2500 in advanced fees.
2. On December 3, 2008, Hunter participated in credit counseling from GreenPath, Inc., as required for the bankruptcy petition.
3. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §109(h)(1), an individual may not be a debtor unless during the 180-day period preceding the date of filing of the petition, the individual received credit counseling.
4. From December 4, 2008 to on or about May 16, 2010, Respondent did not perform legal services of value for Hunter and did not file Hunter’s bankruptcy petition,
5. On May 17, 2010, Respondent filed a bankruptcy petition on Hunter’s behalf in U.S. Bankruptcy Court Central District of California, case number 8:10-bk-16598-ES.
6. As part of the bankruptcy petition, Respondent filed a Statement of Compliance with Credit Counseling Requirement, which indicated that Hunter had received credit counseling during the 180-day period preceding the filing of her bankruptcy petition, Attached to the Statement of Compliance was the Certificate of Compliance without a completion date on the certificate.
7. On July 1, 2010, Hunter appeared at the 341(a) creditors meeting, Respondent did not appear but another attorney, Darbin Dawes, made a special appearance to represent her at the hearing.
8. On July 9, 2010, the United States Trustee filed and served Respondent with a Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss the petition on the grounds that Hunter failed to obtain credit counseling 180 days before filing her petition. Respondent received the motion but did not respond to the motion.
9. On July 9, 2010, the United States Trustee also filed and served Respondent with a Notice of Motion and Motion to Determine Whether Compensation. Paid to Counsel Was Excessive because Respondent failed to ensure that Hunter timely complied with the requirements of 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(b)(1) and 109(h) by filing a Credit Counseling Certificate without a completion date on the certificate. Under the circumstances, the U.S. Trustee submitted that Respondent’s fee provided no benefit to Hunter and it should, be disgorged. Respondent received the motion but did not respond.
10 On September 24,:2010, the Bankruptcy Court filed an order granting the motion to disgorge fees, It ordered that Respondent shall disgorge the sum of $2,500,00 for services rendered in connection with the bankruptcy case, no later than 50 days from entry date of order. Respondent received the order.
11. Respondent did not perform legal services of value on Hunter’s behalf and did not earn the $2,500.
12. On March 5, 2012, Respondent sent Hunter a letter acknowledging that he owed her a refund of fees. Respondent enclosed a check to Hunter for $250. Hunter received the check.
13. To date, Respondent has failed to disgorge the entire amount.
14. Respondent is .making monthly payments to Hunter in the amount of $250.
15. From on or about June 30, 2010 to on .or about July 1.5, 2010, Hunter left voicemails for Respondent and sent two emails regarding the status of her bankruptcy petition. Respondent received the voicemails and emails but did not respond to Hunter.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
16. By delaying in filing the bankruptcy petition, filing the petition without a correct or complete certificate of counseling, failing to respond to the motion to dismiss and motion to determine whether compensation paid to counsel was excessive, and failing to ensure that Hunter timely complied with the requirements of 11 U.S.C. §§ 521(i)(1) and 109(h),Respondent intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence in wilful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A).
17. By causing the Statement of Compliance with Credit Counseling Requirement and the Certificate of Compliance to be. filed with the Bankruptcy Court indicating that Hunter completed credit counseling within 180 days of Respondent filing the bankruptcy petition, when he knew she had not, Respondent knew or should have know that it would mislead the judge, in willful violation of Business and Professions Code section 6068(d).
18. By failing to respond to Hunter’s voicemails and emails regarding the status of her bankruptcy petition, Respondent failed to respond promptly to reasonable status inquiries of a client in a matter in which Respondent had agreed to provide legal services, in willful violation of Business and Professions Code section 6068(m).
19. By failing to refund the unearned fees, Respondent failed to refund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that had not been earned, in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(2).
20. By failing to disgorge the $2500 within thirty days, Respondent willfully disobeyed or violated an order of the Court requiring him to do or forbear an act connected with or in the course of Respondent’s profession which he ought in good faith to do or forbear,, in violation of Business and Professions Code Section 6103,.
Case No. 120-12959 (Complainant: M Lena Rilloraza)
21. On October 22, 2009, Mary Lena Rilloraza (Rilloraza) retained Respondent to assist in a home loan modification and stay foreclosure proceedings against her property.
22. On October 27, 2009, Rilloraza paid Respondent $2,895.
23. On November 10, 2009, Respondent filed a lawsuit against Rilloraza’s lender entitled Mary Lena Rilloraza v, US. Bank National Association, KC0572359 ("lender litigation").
24. On December 142 2009, Rilloraza received a notice to vacate her property,
25. On December 21, 2009, the lender filed an unlawful detainer ("UD action") action against Rilloraza, entitled U.S. Bank National Association v. Mary Lena Rilloraza, CIT09U02339. Respondent filed a demurrer and an answer to the UD action. Judgment was entered against Rilloraza and she was ordered to vacate the property.
26. On April 7, 2010, Respondent filed a motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) in the lender litigation, which was initially granted. As a condition of the TRO, Rilloraza had to deposit $1237.61 one monthly mortgage payment, with Respondent. Rilloraza gave Respondent a check for $ 1237.61, which Respondent received and deposited into his client trust account.
27. Between March 25, 2010 and April 16, 20 i 0, Rilloraza paid Respondent $2,143 in additional fees and costs.
28. Between April 2010 and June 2010, Rilloraza called Respondent several times regarding the status of her eases. She left messages with Respondent’s staff. Respondent received the messages but did not return Rilloraza’s calls.
29. On June 10, 2012, the Court dismissed the lender litigation because Respondent failed to properly serve U.S. Bank National Association, failed to appear at a case management conference and failed to diligently prosecute the matter,
30. Respondent did not earn all $5038 of fees paid.
31. Respondent did not provide Rilloraza with an accounting.
32, Respondent did not return the $1237.61 Rilloraza paid Respondent toward the mortgage payment; upon Rilloraza’s request.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
33. By failing to respond to Rilloraza’s calls, Respondent failed to respond promptly to reasonable status inquiries era client in a matter in which Respondent had agreed to provide legal services, in willful Violation of Business and Professions Code section 6068(m).
34. By failing to refund $5038 to Rilloraza in unearned fees, Respondent failed to refund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that had not :been earned, in willful violation, of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(2),
35. By failing to properly serve U.S. Bank National Association in the lender litigation, failing to appear at the case management conference for the lender litigation and failing to diligently prosecute the lender litigation, Respondent intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence in wilful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A).
36, By failing to provide Rilloraza with an accounting, Respondent failed to render appropriate accounts to a client regarding all funds coming into Respondent’s possession, in violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(B)(3).
37. By not returning the $1237.61 mortgage payment Rilloraza paid Respondent, Respondent failed to pay promptly, as requested by a client, any funds in Respondent’s possession which the client is entitled to received in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-10003)(4).
ADDITIONAL FACTS RE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
Prior Record of Discipline: Respondent has a prior record of discipline. Effective June 16, 2012, (case numbers 10-O-08238 et.al. (12 client matters)), Respondents stipulated to violating Business and Professions Code: Sections 6068(m)(3 counts), 6106.3(1 count), 6103 (1 count), 6106( 2 counts), 6068(a) (1 count), .and Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules 3,700(D)(2)(7 counts), 3-700(A)(2) (3 counts), 4-100(B)(3)(2 counts), 4.10003)(4) (2 counts), 3-110(A)(5--counts), 3-700(D)(1)(1 count). The misconduct occurred between August 28, 2009 and March 7, 2011, Respondent’s misconduct included his failures to perform and failures to make appearances related to civil and bankruptcy matters, and refund unearned fees related to that representation. Respondent stipulated to four (4) years suspension, stayed, four (4) years probation, and two (2)years actual and until Respondent pays restitution and complies with Standard 1.4(c)(2). The discipline includes restitution and substance abuse conditions. The parties stipulated that Respondent abused alcohol and then from June 30, 2010 to August 15, 2010. Respondent was out of the office obtaining medical treatment and counseling for alcohol addiction. Standard 1.2(b)(i)
The misconduct in the present matters, occurred between September 24, 2008 and September 24 2010. As the misconduct in the current matter also surrounded Respondent’s bankruptcy and civil practice, fit is nearly identical to the misconduct that occurred in the prior imposition of discipline. Therefore, the aggravation of a prior discipline in diminished. (In the Matter of Sklar (Review Dept. 1993) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr: 602,619) The level of discipline that Respondent should have received for all case numbers 110-O-08238 et. al, and 11-O-19314 et. al is analyzed below.
Harm: The current misconduct caused significant harm to Hunter and Rilloraza, as the clients were financially distressed and seeking bankruptcies and home loan modifications, Standard 1.2(b)(iv)
Multiple/Pattern of Misconduct: The current misconduct involves multiple acts of wrongdoing as there are nine counts of misconduct in two client matters. The instant case does not evidence a pattern of misconduct as it did not extend over a prolonged course of time. Young v. State Bar, (1990) 50 CaI. 3d 1204. Standard 1.2(b)(ii)
ADDITIONAL FACTS RE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
Additional Mitigating Circumstances: Respondent has been cooperative in stipulating to facts and conclusions of law in this matter Entering into a Stipulation deserves varying amounts of mitigation. (In the Matter of Connor (Review Dept, 2008) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 93, 107.) The greatest weight is afforded to those stipulations of facts not easily proven or stipulations to level of discipline. (ln the Matter of Silver (Review Dept. 1998) 3 Cal, State Bar Ct. Rptr. 902, 906.) The facts in the instant matters could have been proven by the testimony of the complaining witnesses and documentary evidence. Thus, Respondent’s cooperation is given some, but not great weight in mitigation.
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.
The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct provide a "process of fixing discipline" pursuant to a set of written principles to "better discharge the purposes of attorney discipline as announced by the Supreme Court." (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, Introduction (all further references to standards are to this source).) The primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings and of the sanctions imposed are "the protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; the maintenance of high professional standards by attorneys and the preservation of public confidence in the legal profession." (In re Morse (1995) 11 Cal. 4th 184, 205; std 1.3.)
Although not binding, the standards are entitled to "great weight" and should be followed "whenever possible in determining, level of discipline. (In re Silverton (2005):36 Cal, 4th 81, 92, quoting in re Brown (1995) 12 Cal. 4 205, 220 and In re Young (1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 267, fn. 11.) Adherence to the standards in the great majority of eases serves the valuable purpose of eliminating disparity and assuring consistency, that is, the imposition of similar attorney discipline for instances of similar attorney misconduct, (In re Naney (1990) 51 Cal. 3d 186, 190.) Any discipline recommendation different from that set forth in the applicable standards should clearly explain the reasons for the deviation. (Blair v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal3d 762, 776, fn. 5.)
Respondent admits to committing nine acts of professional misconduct. Standard 1.6 (a) requires that where a Respondent acknowledges two or more acts of misconduct, and different sanctions are prescribed by the standards that apply to those acts, the sanction imposed shall be the more or most severe prescribed in the applicable standards.
The most severe sanction applicable to Respondent’s misconduct is found in standard 2.2(b), which applies to Respondent’s violation(s) of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(B)(3) and 4-100(B)(4) as it requires actual suspension.
Standard 2.2(b) culpability of a member of commingling of entrusted, funds or property with personal property or the commission of another violation of rule 4-100, Rules of Professional Conduct, none of which offenses result in the wilful misappropriation of entrusted funds or property shall result in at least a three month, actual-suspension from the practice of law, irrespective of mitigating circumstances.
As discussed above, Respondent has one prior record of discipline. The current misconduct occurred at nearly the exact time as the conduct underlying Respondent’s actual suspension in case numbers 10-O-08238 et, al. The parties stipulated in mitigation that Respondent abused alcohol and that from June 30, 2010 to August 15, 2010, Respondent was out of the office obtaining medical treatment and counseling for alcohol addiction. Further, the misconduct in the current matter is nearly identical to the misconduct in the prior imposition of discipline. Therefore, the aggravating weight of Respondent’s prior discipline is diminished. Rather, Respondent’s current misconduct must be analyzed with the most recent prior misconduct to determine what the level of discipline would have been .were these two matters resolved at the same time. (ln the Matter of Sklar (Review Dept. 1993) 2 Cal. State Bar Ctr. Rptr., 602, 619) The level of discipline that Respondent stipulated to in the prior matter, two years actual suspension, is not an appropriate level of discipline when including the current matter. The nine added acts of misconduct warrant a higher level of discipline consisting of one additional year actual suspension. (ln the Matter of Sklar (Review Dept. 1993) 2 Cal. State Bar Ctr. Rptr., 602, 619)
The applicable case law for the level of misconduct ranges from one year actual to disbarment. In the following cases, the Respondents did not have a prior record of discipline: In re Billings (1990) 50 Cal.3d 358: (15 cases of partial or complete abandonment; 1 conviction for DUI. Disbarment); Silva-Vidor v, State Bar (1989) 49 Cal. 3d 1071 (13 instances of failure to perform in 14 matters; 4 dishonest acts; 1 yr actual suspension with consideration given to mitigating factors of tragic personal calamities and proof of 2 or 3 yrs subsequent trouble-free conduct with recent practice representing the disadvantaged); Coombs v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 679 (13 matters of failure to perform with misrepresentation in 4 of the eases; 1 DUI conviction. Disbarment.); Pineda v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 753; (7 matters of failure to perform with failure to refund in 4 cases, 1 misappropriation and 1 misrepresentation;, 2 yrs actual suspension with consideration of mitigation given to the fact that misconduct occurred during stressful marriage breakup, and subsequent reforms to the practice were undertaken); Hawes v. State Bar (1990) 51 Cal.3d 587 (6 matters of failure to perform and communicate, to return unearned fees, and to cooperate with the State Bar, 3 yrs actual suspension with mitigation for mental issues resulting from bipolar disorder, and related alcoholism and drug abuse).
The misconduct in the instant action occurred during the same timeframe as the prior discipline. It also included similar misconduct related-to Respondent’s bankruptcy and civil practice. Respondent’s prior stipulation accounts for his alcohol abuse and his treatment-for alcohol addiction. The prior stipulation states that "Respondent’s abuse of alcohol was a contributing factor to much of his misconduct." One of the more egregious acts in the current matter is the violation of Business and Professions Code Section 6068(d) in which Respondent sought to mislead a judge by filing the Certificate of Counseling for Hunter which indicated that she had completed counseling within 180 days of Respondent filing the bankruptcy petition: Respondent knew that this was false. Given the number of cases in the prior and the similar current misconduct, including the charge of violating Business and Professions Code section 6068(d), taken as a whole, the level of discipline is consistent with the Standards and case law and serves the purpose of discipline.
The disclosure date referred to, on page 2, paragraph A(7), was November 19, 2012.
EXCLUSION FROM MCLE CREDIT
Pursuant to rule 3201, Respondent may not receive MCLE credit for completion of State Bar Ethics School or State Bar Client Trust Accounting School. (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 3201.)
COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS,
Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has informed respondent that as of November 19, 2012, the prosecution costs in this matter, are $4,358.10. Respondent further acknowledges that this cost is an estimate, and should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.
Case Number(s): 11-O-19314 and 12-O-12959
In the Matter of: Raymond Carl Prospero
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Respondent: Raymond C. Prospero
Deputy Trial Counsel: Mia Ellis
Case Number(s): 11-O-19314 and 12-O-12959
In the Matter of: Raymond Carl Prospero
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58 (E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)
Judge of the State Bar Court: Donald F. Miles
[Rule 62(b), Rules Proc.; Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on December 4, 2012, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:
RAYMOND C. PROSPERO
PO BOX 2950
CORONA, CA 92878
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
Mia R. Ellis, Enforcement, Los Angeles
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California on December 4, 2012.
Johnnie Lee Smith
State Bar Court