Case Number(s): 11-O-19637-DFM
In the Matter of: Bryan D. Sampson, Bar # 143143, A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Eli D. Morgenstern, Senior Trial Counsel
Office of the Chief Trial Counsel
1149 S. Hill Street
Los Angeles, CA 90015
213-765-1334
Bar # 190560
Counsel for Respondent: Susan L. Margolis, Margolis & Margolis LLP
2000 Riverside Dr
Los Angeles, CA 90039
(323) 953-8996
Bar # 104629
Submitted to: Settlement Judge State Bar Court Clerk’s Office Los Angeles
checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted December 11, 1989.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 12 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
checked. Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 5.130, Rules of Procedure.
<<not>> checked. Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: . (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
<<not>> checked. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs are entirely waived.
See page 9 for discussion re: Additional mitigating circumstances.
IN THE MATTER OF: BRYAN D. SAMPSON
CASE NUMBER: 11-O-19637-DFM
WAIVER OF VARIANCE BETWEEN NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY CHARGES AND STIPULATED FACTS AND CULPABILITY.
The parties waive any variance between the Notice of Disciplinary Charges filed on July 5, 2012, and the facts and/or conclusions of law contained in this stipulation and waive the issuance of an Amended Notice of Disciplinary Charges.
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that he is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct.
Case No. 11-O-19637 (Complainant: Julie Goler and Alissa Goler-Chariton)
Facts:
1. At all times relevant to the stipulated facts herein, Respondent was the attorney of record for MP BHC Hotel, LLC ("MP BHC Hotel") in a deficiency matter titled, MP BHC Hotel, LLC v. Morris Ostrowiecki, et. al., Los Angeles County Superior Court case no. SC 11989 (the "deficiency matter"). The deficiency matter involved an alleged deficiency following the non-judicial foreclosure of hotel property in Bullhead City, Arizona.
2. The law of Arizona governed the deficiency matter. Under Arizona law, the statutory deadline for filing the complaint in the deficiency matter was March 7, 2011.
3. On March 25, 2011, Respondent signed a Complaint for Breach of Contract ("Original Complaint") in the deficiency matter; and on March 28, 2011, outside of the statutory deadline, Respondent caused the Original Complaint to be filed in Los Angeles County Superior Court.
4. On March 28, 2011, Respondent caused the Summons of the Complaint in the deficiency matter to be filed in Los Angel.es County Superior Court.
5. On April 26, 2011, Respondent’s legal assistant, at Respondent’s direction, mailed a copy of the Summons and a copy of the Complaint to Kenneth Gregory, an Arizona attorney. Mr. Gregory represented Julie Goler and Alissa Goler-Chariton, two of the defendants in the deficiency matter, in an Arizona lawsuit which was related to the deficiency matter. The file stamp appearing on the face of the copy of the Summons mailed to Gregory bore a date of March 2, 2011; and the file stamp appearing on the face of the copy of the Complaint mailed to Gregory bore a date of March 2, 2011. The signature page of the copy of the Complaint mailed to Gregory was also different from the signature page of the Original Complaint which was filed with the court: the signature was different and the date next to the signature was March 2, 2011, not March 25, 2011.
6. Respondent was responsible for the altered filing stamps on the copies of the Summons and Complaint and the signature block on the copy of the Complaint, and was responsible for having those altered documents mailed to Mr. Gregory in order to conceal that the original Complaint had been filed beyond the statutory filing deadline.
7. On May 1 and 2, 2011, at Respondent’s direction, copies of the Summons and Complaint in the deficiency matter, with the altered file date stamps, as well as the altered signature page on the Complaint, were served on four separate defendants in the case: Julie Goler, Anna Deutch, Morris Ostrowiecki, and Alissa Goler-Chariton.
Conclusions of Law:
8. By altering the copies of the Summons and the Complaint in the deficiency action, and by causing the altered documents to be mailed to Mr. Gregory and served upon the defendants in the deficiency matter, Respondent committed an act of moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption in violation of Business and Professions Code section 6106.
OTHER FACTS IN CONSIDERATION.
On May 31, 2011, the attorney for Ms. Goler and Ms. Goler-Chariton (collectively, "the Golers") filed an Answer to the Complaint in the deficiency action. At the time that the attorney filed the Answer, he believed that the Complaint had been timely filed on March 2, 2011. The attorney did not know that the Original Complaint was actually filed on March 28, 2011.
In or about mid-June 2011, after reviewing the original Complaint in the court file, Ms. Deutsch’s attorney informed the attorney for the Golers that the Complaint in the deficiency matter had actually been filed on March 28, 2011.
On July 6, 2011, Ms. Deutsch’s attorney served an Answer to the Complaint and a Demurrer to the Complaint on her behalf on all parties raising, among other things, that the complaint was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, as well as the issue of the altered dates.
On July 6, 2011, the attorney for the Golers faxed a letter to Respondent informing him of the discrepancy in the filing stamps on the Original Complaint and the copies served on the Golers and requesting that the deficiency matter be dismissed on the grounds that the Original Complaint was not timely filed. Respondent acknowledged that the Original Complaint was filed on March 28, 2011. Respondent stated that he -would not dismiss the Complaint at that time, explained that he believed the filing date was tolled by certain provisions in the statute, and stated that he would wait for the court’s ruling on the toiling issue when the Court ruled on Deutch’s demurrer.
When asked, Respondent never denied that the Complaint was filed on March 28.2011. Respondent granted extensions of time to file an answer to the complaint to the attorneys for the Golers, Mrs. Deutch, and Mr. Ostrowiecki, respectively.
On or about July 13, 2011, Respondent prepared a stipulation to consolidate the Case Management Conference ("CMC") and Ms. Deutsch’s demurrer in order to have the statute of limitations issue resolved. The stipulation was signed by all counsel and filed with the Court and the Court then set the CMC and the hearing on the demurrer for October 18, 2011.
On July 15, 2011, Respondent filed a Case Management Conference Statement which stated that the filing date of the Complaint was March 28, 2011.
On September 23, 2011, the attorney for the Golers filed a motion for summary judgment.
On October 18, 2011, at a hearing on the demurrer, the Court rejected Respondent’s tolling arguments and granted Ms. Deutsch’s demurrer.
Thereafter, Respondent filed a request for dismissal of the case with prejudice as against Mr. Ostrowiecki on October 31, 2011.
On November 29, 2011, Respondent filed a request for dismissal of the case with prejudice as against Julie and Alissa Goler.
ADDITIONAL MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
1. No Prior Record of Discipline
Respondent was admitted to the State Bar on December 11, 1989, and has no prior record of discipline. The misconduct in this matter is serious. However, some mitigating credit for no prior record of discipline may be given even where the underlying misconduct is found to be serious or significant. (ln the Matter of Stamper (Review Dept. 1990) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 96, 106, ft. 13.)
2. Cooperation
Respondent is entitled to mitigation for entering into this stipulation. (See, In the Matter of Spaith (Review Dept. 1996) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 511, 521.)
3. Good Character
Respondent has furnished evidence of an exemplary record of involvement in bar association and community service activities that demonstrate his good moral character and his commitment to the legal profession and the community. (See, Calvert v. State Bar (1991) 54 Cal. 3d 765,785.)
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.
1. Standards
The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct ("Standard") provide a "process of fixing discipline" pursuant to a set of written principles to "better discharge the purposes of attorney discipline as announced by the Supreme Court." (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, Introduction (all further references to standards are to this source).) The primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings and of the sanctions imposed are "the protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; the maintenance of high professional standards by attorneys and the preservation of public confidence in the legal profession." (In re Morse (1995) 11 Cal.4th 184, 205; std 1.3.)
Although not binding, the standards are entitled to "great weight" and should be followed "whenever possible" in determining level of discipline. (ln re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 92, quoting In re Brown (1995) 12 Cal.4th 205, 220 and In re Young (1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 267, fn. 11.) Adherence to the standards in the great majority of cases serves the valuable purpose of eliminating disparity and assuring consistency, that is, the imposition of similar attorney discipline for instances of similar attorney misconduct. (In re Naney (1990) 51 Cal. 3d 186, 190.) Any discipline recommendation different from that set forth in the applicable standards should clearly explain the reasons for the deviation. (Blair v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 762, 776, fn. 5.)
Here, Respondent admits to committing act(s) of moral turpitude. Accordingly, Standard 2.3 applies. Standard 2.3 provides that culpability of a member of an act of moral turpitude, fraud, or intentional dishonesty towards a court, client, or another person shall result in actual suspension or disbarment depending upon the extent to which the victim of the misconduct is harmed or misled and depending upon the magnitude of the act of misconduct and the degree to which it relates to the member’s acts within the practice of law.
2. Case Law
There is no case exactly like this one. However, similar cases provide guidance as to the appropriate discipline. (In re Morse (1995) 11 Cal.4th 184, 207-208; Snyder v. State Bar (1990) 49 Cal.3d 1302, 1310-1311.)
In Maltaman v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal. 3d 924, the attorney, in one matter, ignored court orders directing him to surrender property in a probate matter in which he had been removed as administrator due to a conflict of interest (decedent had turned over property to the attorney as a result of undue influence). In a second matter, the attorney deliberately prepared a false order for a judge’s signature that misstated everything the judge had ruled. In addition, the attorney failed to comply with a sanction order.
The Supreme Court ordered, as part of a five-year probation, that the attorney be actually suspended for one year.
DISCUSSION.
Respondent’s misconduct herein relates directly to the practice of law. Respondent’s dishonesty caused Mr. Gregory, Ms. Deutsch, Ms. Goler, and Ms. Goler-Chariton to be initially misled as to the actual date that the Original Complaint in the deficiency matter was filed. (See, Coppock v. State Bar (1988) 44 Cal. 3d 665, 679-680, quoting Tomlinson v. State Bar (1975) 13 Cal. 3d 567, 577 (Acts of dishonesty manifest an "abiding disregard of ’the fundamental rule of ethics-that of common honesty-without which the profession is worse than valueless in the place it holds in the administration of justice.’").)
However, ultimately the defendants in the deficiency action were dismissed from the lawsuit and received monetary settlements. In addition, Respondent’s many years of discipline-free practice, his contributions to the legal profession and the community, and his willingness to admit to the misconduct herein, when considered together, constitute substantial mitigation.
In consideration of the appropriate standard of discipline, the mitigating circumstances that are present, and the pertinent case law, a discipline consisting of a two-year suspension, stayed, and two years probation with conditions including a one-year actual suspension is warranted and complies with the purposes of attorney discipline.
PENDING PROCEEDINGS.
The disclosure date referred to on page 2, paragraph A(7), was October 18, 2012.
COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.
Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has informed him that as of October 18, 2012, the prosecution costs in this matter are approximately $3,349. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.
EXCLUSION FROM MCLE CREDIT
Pursuant to rule 3201, Respondent may not receive MCLE credit for completion of State Bar Ethics School. (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 3201.)
Case Number(s): 11-O-19637-2
In the Matter of: Bryan D. Sampson
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: Brian D. Sampson
Date: 10/25/12
Respondent’s Counsel: Susan L. Margolis
Date: 10/23/12
Deputy Trial Counsel: Eli D. Morgenstern
Date: 10/23/12
Case Number(s): 11-O-19637-2
In the Matter of: Bryan D. Sampson
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
Page 4 – Section D, (1) (b) – Place check mark in box.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58 (E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Richard A. Platel
Date: 10-29-2012
[Rule 62(b), Rules Proc.; Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on October 29, 2012, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:
SUSAN LYNN MARGOLIS
MARGOLIS & MARGOLIS LLP
2000 RIVERSIDE DR
LOS ANGELES, CA 90039
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
ELI MORGENSTERN, Enforcement, Los Angeles
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California on October 29, 2012.
Signed by:
Rose M. Luthi
Case Administrator
State Bar Court