Case Number(s): 12-H-15739-DFM
In the Matter of: Oscar Arturo Ruiz DeChavez, Bar # 108605, A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Lara Bairamian, Deputy Trial Counsel
1149 S. Hill Street
Los Angeles, CA 90015
(213)765-1338
Bar # 253056
Counsel for Respondent: In Pro Per Respondent
Oscar Arturo Ruiz DeChavez
PO Box 711204
Santee, CA 92072
(619) 987-9273
Bar # 108605
Submitted to: Settlement Judge State Bar Court Clerk’s Office Los Angeles
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted June 3, 1983
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 10 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
<<not>> checked. Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 5.130, Rules of Procedure.
checked. Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: two (2) billing cycles following the effective date of the Supreme Court order. (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
<<not>> checked. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs are entirely waived.
See Attachment at page 8.
IN THE MATTER OF: Oscar Arturo Ruiz DeChavez
CASE NUMBER(S): 12-H-15739
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that he is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct.
Case No. 12-H-15739 (’State Bar Investigation
FACTS:
1. On February 16, 2012, the Hearing Department of the State Bar Court of California filed an order in case numbers 10-O-11314 and 1 I-O-13943 imposing a private reproval on Respondent.
2. On March 8, 2012, the private reproval became effective.
3. As a condition of the private reproval, Respondent was ordered to contact the Office of Probation within thirty (30) days from the effective date of discipline or April 7, 2012, to schedule a meeting with the probation deputy.
4. Respondent failed to contact the Office of Probation within thirty (30) days from the effective date of discipline or April 7, 2012, to schedule a meeting with the probation deputy. Respondent held the meeting with the probation deputy on November 19, 2012.
5. As a condition of the private reproval, Respondent was required to submit written quarterly reports to the Office of Probation on each January 10, April 10, July 10 and October 10 of the condition period attached to the reproval.
6. Respondent failed to timely submit quarterly reports for the quarters ending July 10, 2012 and October 10, 2012. Respondent belatedly submitted the July 10, 2012 and October 10, 2012 quarterly reports on January 14, 2013.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
7. By failing to contact the Office of Probation within thirty (30) days of the effective date of the Reproval Order and failing to timely submit the July 10, 2012 and October 10, 2012 quarterly reports to the Office of Probation, Respondent failed to comply with conditions attached to the private reproval in wilful violation of rule 1-110 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
ADDITIONAL FACTS RE PRIOR RECORD OF DISCIPLINE.
In State Bar case no. 10-O-11314, Respondent was disciplined after stipulating to one count of misconduct for his failure to timely cooperate and participate in State Bar disciplinary proceedings in violation of Business and Professions Code sections 6068(i).
In State Bar case no. 11-O-13943, Respondent was disciplined after stipulating to one count of misconduct in a personal injury matter involving a single client in violation of Rules of Professional Conduct rule 3-110(A).
Respondent received a private reproval in case nos. 10-O- 11314 and 11-O- 13943, effective March 8, 2012.
ADDITIONAL FACTS RE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
Multiple Acts. Respondent’s present misconduct involves the failure to timely contact the Office of Probation and timely submit quarterly reports to the Office of Probation. Respondent engaged in multiple acts of misconduct by failing to timely submit two quarterly reports and failing to timely meet with the probation deputy. (Standard 1.2(b)(ii).)
ADDITIONAL FACTS RE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
Pre-trial Stipulation. In In the Matter of Downey (Review Dept. 2009) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr, 151, 156, the court found that Respondent was entitled to mitigation for cooperating with the State Bar by entering into a fairly comprehensive pretrial stipulation of facts. Although the stipulated facts were not difficult to prove, and Respondent did not admit culpability, the stipulation was relevant and assisted the State Bar’s prosecution of the case. The court accorded Respondent limited mitigation under standard 1.2(e)(v). Respondent is entitled to limited mitigation for entering into a full stipulation with the Office of Chief Trial Counsel prior to trial in case no. 12-H-15739, thereby saving the State Bar Court time and resources. (Id.; In the Matter of Van Sickle (Review Dept. 2006) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 980, 993-94.)
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.
The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct provide a "process of fixing discipline" pursuant to a set of written principles to "better discharge the purposes of attorney discipline as announced by the Supreme Court." (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, Introduction (all further references to standards are to this source).) The primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings and of the sanctions imposed are "the protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; the maintenance of high professional standards by attorneys and the preservation of public confidence in the legal profession." (In re Morse (1995) 11 Cal.4th 184, 205; std 1.3.)
Although not binding, the standards are entitled to "great weight" and should be followed "whenever possible "in determining level of discipline. (ln re Silverton (2005)36 Cal.4th 81, 92, quoting In re Brown 1995 12 Cal. 4th 205, 220 and In re Young (1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 267, fn. 11.) Adherence to the standards in the great majority of cases serves the valuable purpose of eliminating disparity and assuring consistency, that is, the imposition of similar attorney discipline for instances of similar attorney misconduct. (ln re Naney (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 190.) Any discipline recommendation different from that set forth in the applicable standards should clearly explain the reasons for the deviation. (Blair v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 762, 776, fn. 5.)
The sanction applicable to Respondent’s misconduct is found in standard 2.9, which applies to Respondent’s violation(s) of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-110.
Standard 2.9 provides that culpability of a member of a willful violation of rule 1-110, Rules of Professional Conduct, shall result in suspension.
In Conroy v. State Bar (1990) 51 Cal. 3d 799, the Respondent was publicly reproved and then failed to take and pass the MPRE within one year as required. Respondent defaulted in the matter before the Hearing Department, but participated in the Review Department and Supreme Court proceedings. The court found Respondent’s subsequent passage of the MPRE was mitigating but was outweighed by aggravating factors. In aggravation the court considered Respondent’s prior discipline, Respondent’s default at the Hearing Department level and Respondent’s lack of remorse for the present violation. The discipline imposed in light of the aggravation was one year suspension, stayed, two years of probation and sixty-day actual suspension.
Similar to Conroy, Respondent belatedly complied with the conditions attached to his private reproval and has a prior record of discipline, including failing to cooperate in a State Bar investigation. Unlike Conroy, Respondent has participated in these proceedings and has not displayed a lack of remorse during the disciplinary proceedings. These mitigating factors suggest that unlike Conroy, a sixty-day actual suspension is not required.
In evaluating Respondent’s misconduct and assessing the level of discipline, the standards require suspension. Based on his prior record of discipline, progressive discipline is warranted. Although untimely, Respondent made efforts to satisfy the terms of his reproval. Respondent belatedly met with the probation deputy and submitted the July 10, 2012 and October 10, 2012 quarterly reports. Taking Respondent’s history into consideration, one year suspension, stayed, one year of probation and thirty-day actual suspension adequately serves the purpose of attorney discipline.
PENDING PROCEEDINGS.
The disclosure date referred to, on page 2, paragraph A(7), was January 14, 2013.
COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.
Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has informed respondent that as of January 14, 2013, the prosecution costs in this matter are $3,349. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.
EXCLUSION FROM MCLE CREDIT
Pursuant to rule 3201, Respondent may not receive MCLE credit for completion of State Bar Ethics School. (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 3201.)
Case Number(s): 12-H-15739-1
In the Matter of: Oscar Arturo Ruiz DeChavez
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: Oscar Arturo Ruiz DeChavez
Date: January 25, 2013
Respondent’s Counsel:
Date:
Deputy Trial Counsel: Lara Bairamian
Date: 1/29/13
Case Number(s): 12-H-15739
In the Matter of: Oscar Arturo Ruiz DeChavez
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58 (E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Donald F. Miles
Date: 2/19/13
[Rule 62(b), Rules Proc.; Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on February 20, 2013, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:
OSCAR ARTURO RUIZ DECHAVEZ
PO BOX 711204
SANTEE, CA 92072
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
Lara Bairamian, Enforcement, Los Angeles
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California on February 20, 2013.
Signed by:
Angela Carpenter
Case Administrator
State Bar Court