Case Number(s): 12-O-10262-RAH; 12-O-11155; 12-O-11926; 12-O-13437
12-O-13523; 12-O-14139; 12-O-14205; 12-O-15682; 12-O-17836; 13-O-10458
13-O-10599; 13-O-10615; 13-O-10793 (Inv); 13-O-12059 (Inv); 13-O-12639
In the Matter of: ARMEN JANIAN, Bar # 102747, A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Erin McKeown Joyce, Bar #149946,
Counsel for Respondent: Arthur L. Margolis, Bar #57703,
Submitted to: Settlement Judge.
Filed: July 11, 2013.
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted June 10, 1982.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 20 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
<<not>> checked. Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 5.130, Rules of Procedure.
checked. Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: two (2) billing cycles immediately following the effective date of the Supreme Court Order in this matter. (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
<<not>> checked. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs are entirely waived.
Attachment language (if any):
FINANCIAL CONDITIONS
Case Number(s): 12-O-10262,12-O-11155,12-O-11926,
12-O-13437,12-O-13523,12-O-14139,
12-O-14205,12-O-15682,12-O-17836,
13-O-10458,13-O-10599,13-O-10615
13-O-10793,13-O-12059,13-O-12639
In the Matter of: ARMEN JANIAN
a. Restitution
checked. Respondent must pay restitution (including the principal amount, plus interest of 10% per annum) to the payee(s) listed below. If the Client Security Fund (“CSF”) has reimbursed one or more of the payee(s) for all or any portion of the principal amount(s) listed below, Respondent must also pay restitution to CSF in the amount(s) paid, plus applicable interest and costs.
1. Payee: Attachment pages 18 and 19.
Principal Amount:
Interest Accrues From:
2. Payee:
Principal Amount:
Interest Accrues From:
3. Payee:
Principal Amount:
Interest Accrues From:
4. Payee:
Principal Amount:
Interest Accrues From:
<<not>> checked. Respondent must pay above-referenced restitution and provide satisfactory proof of payment to the Office of Probation not later than
Pursuant to the actual suspension provision on page 4, Respondent will remain suspended until he pays full restitution.
b. Installment Restitution Payments
<<not>> checked. Respondent must pay the above-referenced restitution on the payment schedule set forth below. Respondent must provide satisfactory proof of payment to the Office of Probation with each quarterly probation report, or as otherwise directed by the Office of Probation. No later than 30 days prior to the expiration of the period of probation (or period of reproval), Respondent must make any necessary final payment(s) in order to complete the payment of restitution, including interest, in full.
1. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
Payment Frequency
2. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
Payment Frequency
3. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
Payment Frequency
4. Payee/CSF (as applicable)
Minimum Payment Amount
Payment Frequency
<<not>> checked. If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
c. Client Funds Certificate
<<not>> checked.
1. If Respondent possesses client funds at any time during the period covered by a required quarterly report, Respondent must file with each required report a certificate from Respondent and/or a certified public accountant or other financial professional approved by the Office of Probation, certifying that:
a. Respondent has maintained a bank account in a bank authorized to do business in the State of California, at a branch located within the State of California, and that such account is designated as a “Trust Account” or “Clients’ Funds Account”;
b. Respondent has kept and maintained the following:
i. A written ledger for each client on whose behalf funds are held that sets forth:
1. the name of such client;
2. the date, amount and source of all funds received on behalf of such client;
3. the date, amount, payee and purpose of each disbursement made on behalf of such client; and,
4. the current balance for such client.
ii. a written journal for each client trust fund account that sets forth:
1. the name of such account;
2. the date, amount and client affected by each debit and credit; and,
3. the current balance in such account.
iii. all bank statements and cancelled checks for each client trust account; and,
iv. each monthly reconciliation (balancing) of (i), (ii), and (iii), above, and if there are any differences between the monthly total balances reflected in (i), (ii), and (iii), above, the reasons for the differences.
c. Respondent has maintained a written journal of securities or other properties held for clients that specifies:
i. each item of security and property held;
ii. the person on whose behalf the security or property is held;
iii. the date of receipt of the security or property;
iv. the date of distribution of the security or property; and,
v. the person to whom the security or property was distributed.
2. If Respondent does not possess any client funds, property or securities during the entire period covered by a report, Respondent must so state under penalty of perjury in the report filed with the Office of Probation for that reporting period. In this circumstance, Respondent need not file the accountant’s certificate described above.
3. The requirements of this condition are in addition to those set forth in rule 4-100, Rules of Professional Conduct.
d. Client Trust Accounting School
<<not>> checked. Within one (1) year of the effective date of the discipline herein, Respondent must supply to the Office of Probation satisfactory proof of attendance at a session of the Ethics School Client Trust Accounting School, within the same period of time, and passage of the test given at the end of that session.
ATTACHMENT TO
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION
IN THE MATTER OF: ARMEN JANIAN, State Bar No. 102747
STATE BAR COURT CASE NUMBER: 12-O-10262,12-O-11155,12-O-11926,12-O-13437; 12-O-13523,12-O-14139,12-O-14205,12-O-15682
12-O-17836,13-O-10458,13-O-10599,13-O-10615
13-O-10793,13-O-12059,13-O-12639
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that he is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and Rules of Professional Conduct.
General Background
1. In 2009, Respondent set up a loan modification practice in his law firm.
2. After the effective date of Civil Code section 2944.7 in October 2009, which prohibits accepting advanced fees for loan modification services, Respondent continued to take on loan modification clients for advanced fees up to August 2010. In August 2010 Respondent stopped accepting any new loan modification clients.
3. After August 2010, Respondent continued to service his existing loan modification clients for no additional fees.
Case No. 12-O-10262 (Complainants: Dennis and Kimberly Newcombe)
FACTS:
4. On March 2, 2010, Dennis and Kimberly Newcombe hired Respondent for a mortgage loan modification on their home and paid Respondent an advanced fee of $2,900.
5. Respondent performed substantial legal services for the Newcombes, but was unsuccessful in obtaining a loan modification acceptable to his clients.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
6. By collecting an advanced fee to perform mortgage loan modification services on behalf of the Newcombes in violation of Civil Code section 2944.7, Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3.
Case No. 12-O-11155 (Complainant: Patrick Schur)
FACTS:
7. On April 1, 2010, Patrick Schur hired Respondent for mortgage loan modifications on two of his properties and paid Respondent an advanced fee of $3,000 for each property, for a total of $6,000.
8. Respondent performed substantial legal services for Schur, but was unsuccessful in obtaining a loan modification acceptable to his client.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
9. By collecting an advanced fee to perform mortgage loan modification services on behalf of Schur in violation of Civil Code section 2944.7, Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3,
Case No. 12-O-11926 (Complainant: Elizabeth Irwin)
FACTS:
10. On April 9, 2010, Elizabeth Irwin hired Respondent for a mortgage loan modification on her home and paid Respondent an advanced fee of $2,000.
11. Respondent performed substantial legal services for Irwin, but was unsuccessful in obtaining a loan modification acceptable to his client.
12. Respondent subsequently provided a full refund to Irwin.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
13. By collecting an advanced fee to perform mortgage loan modification services on behalf of Irwin in violation of Civil Code section 2944.7, Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3.
Case No. 12-O-13437 (Complainant: Barbara Plocica)
FACTS:
14. On June 4, 2010, Barbara Plocica hired Respondent for a mortgage loan modification on her home and paid Respondent an advanced fee of $2,500.
15. Respondent performed substantial legal services for Plocica, but was unsuccessful in obtaining a loan modification acceptable to his client.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
16. By collecting an advanced fee to perform mortgage loan modification services on behalf of Plocica in violation of Civil Code section 2944.7, Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3.
Case No. 12-O-13523: (Complainants Isaac and Rebecca Trevino)
FACTS:
17. In March 2010, Isaac and Rebecca Trevino hired Respondent for a mortgage loan modification on their home and paid Respondent an advanced fee of $2,900.
18. Respondent performed substantial legal services for the Trevinos, but was unsuccessful in obtaining a loan modification acceptable to his clients.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
19. By collecting an advanced fee to perform mortgage loan modification services on behalf of the Trevinos in violation of Civil Code section 2944.7, Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3.
Case No. 12-O-14139 (Complainant: Mohammed Fata)
FACTS:
20. On March 2, 2010, Mohammed Fata hired Respondent for a mortgage loan modification on his home and paid Respondent an advanced fee of $3,000.
21. Respondent performed substantial legal services for Fata, but was unsuccessful in obtaining a loan modification acceptable to his client.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
22. By collecting an advanced fee to perform mortgage loan modification services on behalf of Fata in violation of Civil Code section 2944.7, Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3.
Case No. 12-O-14205 (Complainant: Kazim Rajabi)
FACTS:
1. On December 7, 2009, Kazim Rajabi hired Respondent for a mortgage loan modification on his home and paid Respondent an advanced fee of $3,000.
2. Respondent performed substantial legal services for Rajabi, but was unsuccessful in obtaining a loan modification acceptable to his client.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
3. By collecting an advanced fee to perform mortgage loan modification services on behalf of Rajabi in violation of Civil Code section 2944.7, Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3.
Case No. 12-O-15682 (Complainant: Filomena Correia)
FACTS:
4. On January 28, 2010, Filomena Correia hired Respondent for a mortgage loan modification on her home and paid Respondent an advanced fee of $2,900.
5. Respondent performed substantial legal services for Correia, but was unsuccessful in obtaining a loan modification acceptable to his client.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
6. By collecting an advanced fee to perform mortgage loan modification services on behalf of Correia in violation of Civil Code section 2944.7, Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3.
Case No. 12-O-17836 (Complainant: Corey Narog)
FACTS:
7. On July 9, 2010, Corey Narog hired Respondent for a mortgage loan modification on his home and paid Respondent an advanced fee of $3,000.
8. Respondent performed substantial legal services for Narog, but was unsuccessful in obtaining a loan modification acceptable to his client.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
9. By collecting an advanced fee to perform mortgage loan modification services on behalf of Narog in violation of Civil Code section 2944.7, Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3.
Case No. 13-O-10458 (Complainant: Brenda Longalong)
FACTS:
10. On July 27, 2010, Brenda Longalong hired Respondent for a mortgage loan modification on her home and paid Respondent an advanced fee of $3,000.
11. Respondent performed substantial legal services for Longalong, but was unsuccessful in obtaining a loan modification acceptable to his client.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
12. By collecting an advanced fee to perform mortgage loan modification services on behalf of Longalong in violation of Civil Code section 2944.7, Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3.
Case No. 13-O-10599 (Complainant: Sandra Dos Santos)
FACTS:
13. On May 6, 2010, Sandra Dos Santos hired Respondent for a mortgage loan modification on her home and paid Respondent an advanced fee of $3,030.
14. Respondent performed substantial legal services for Dos Santos, but was unsuccessful in obtaining a loan modification acceptable to his client.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
15. By collecting an advanced fee to perform mortgage loan modification services on behalf of Dos Santos in violation of Civil Code section 2944.7, Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3.
Case No. 13-O-10615 (Complainants: Atrun and Vijendra Prasad)
FACTS:
16. On January 29, 2010, Atrun and Vijendra Prasad hired Respondent for a mortgage loan modification on their home and paid Respondent an advanced fee of $3,500.
17. Respondent performed substantial legal services for the Prasads, but was unsuccessful in obtaining a loan modification acceptable to his clients.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
18. By collecting an advanced fee to perform mortgage loan modification services on behalf of the Prasads in violation of Civil Code section 2944.7, Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3.
Case No. 13-O-10793 (Complainant: Wayne Elliot)
FACTS:
19. On April 4, 2010, Wayne Elliott hired Respondent for a mortgage loan modification on his home and paid Respondent an advanced fee of $2,500.
20. Respondent performed substantial legal services for Elliott, but was unsuccessful in obtaining a loan modification acceptable to his client.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
21. By collecting an advanced fee to perform mortgage loan modification services on behalf of Elliott in violation of Civil Code section 2944.7, Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3.
Case No. 13-O-12059 (Complainant: Aaron Molyneux)
FACTS:
22. On November 30, 2009, Aaron Molyneux hired Respondent for a mortgage loan modification on his home and paid Respondent an advanced fee of $2,900.
23. Respondent performed substantial legal services for Molyneux, but was unsuccessful in obtaining a loan modification acceptable to his client.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
24. By collecting an advanced fee to perform mortgage loan modification services on behalf of Molyneux in violation of Civil Code section 2944.7, Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3.
Case No. 13-O-12639 (Complainants: Wilkie and Tracey Lemieux)
FACTS:
25. On December 28, 2009, Wilkie and Tracey Lemieux hired Respondent for a mortgage loan modification on their home and paid Respondent an advanced fee of $3,000.
26. Respondent performed substantial legal services for the Lemieuxes, but was unsuccessful in obtaining a loan modification acceptable to his clients.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
27. By collecting an advanced fee to perform mortgage loan modification services on behalf of the Lemieuxes in violation of Civil Code section 2944.7, Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3.
ADDITIONAL FACTS RE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Prior Record of Discipline (Std. 1.2(b)(i)): Effective June 21, 2012, Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for one year, which was stayed, stemming from four violations of Business and Professions Code section 6106.3, for collecting advanced fees in loan modification cases in the time period from the end of 2009 through March 2010.
Multiple Acts of Misconduct (Std. 1.2(b)(ii)): Respondent’s conduct in the matters comprising this disciplinary stipulation, and his conduct in the four client matters which were the basis of the prior discipline, which all occurred during the same time period as the present misconduct, evidence multiple acts of misconduct. Standard 1.2(b)(ii). (In the Matter of Peterson (Review Dept. 1990) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 139.)
ADDITIONAL FACTS RE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Emotional/Physical Difficulties (Std. 1.2(e)(iv)): At the time of the stipulated acts of misconduct, Respondent suffered extreme emotional difficulties stemming from his diagnosis of prostate cancer in February 2009. Respondent underwent multiple invasive medical tests from February 2009 until September 2009, to diagnose his condition, which initially was diagnosed as prostate cancer. Later, in September 2009 Respondent underwent a surgical procedure to correct what was finally determined to be a right inguinal hernia. He was later cleared of having prostate cancer, and correctly diagnosed with a bacterial infection which responded to a month long course of strong antibiotics.
Respondent’s emotional difficulties stemming from his incorrect cancer diagnosis distracted him from his practice and contributed to his failure to comply with California Civil Code section 2944.7 when it was initially implemented. Respondent modified his attorney client agreements in response to the new law in late 2009 to provide for payment of advanced fees in phases, which he acknowledges did not comply with the law. By August 2010, the full implication of Civil Code section 2944.7 were clear to Respondent, and he ceased his loan modification operation in its entirety, but continued to service his existing clients for no additional fees to help them obtain loan modifications.
Respondent’s successful treatment for his medical conditions once properly diagnosed, and the passage of time have restored him to the practice of law without further adverse impact from this stress. Mitigating weight may be given even where no expert evidence is given to establish an emotional difficulty or physical disability was "directly responsible" for the misconduct, where there are facts supporting that that condition impaired the respondent’s judgment and affected his ability to deal appropriately with the stress created. (In re Brown (1995) 12 Cal.4th 205, 222.)
Good Character (Std. 1.2(e)(vi)): Respondent provided evidence of multiple awards he has received from a variety of government agencies and civic organizations which have recognized Respondent for his dedicated service to the community, including the County of Los Angeles, the City of Glendale, the California State Legislature, Congressman Adam B. Schiff, the YMCA, the California Assembly, the Armenian Chamber of Commerce, the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, the City of Los Angeles, the Armenian American Chamber of Commerce, the Armenian Bone Marrow Donor Registry Charitable Trust and Glendale Adventist Hospital.
Respondent has spent hundreds of hours volunteering for different agencies and community organizations both in the legal field and in the wider community. He served on the Community –Police Partnership Advisory Committee of the City of Glendale, the board of the Glendale Memorial Hospital Foundation, the City of Glendale Community Development Block Grant Committee, the board of the Glendale Chamber of Commerce, the Armenian American Political Action Committee, the board of the Armenian Relief Center and the board of the Armenian American Chamber of Commerce.
Respondent’s good character has also been attested by a wide range of distinguished members of the legal and general communities who are fully aware of Respondent’s misconduct in connection with his loan modification operation. (See In the Matter of Field (Review Dept. 2010) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 171 .) Respondent has established that he is entitled to mitigating credit for an extraordinary demonstration of good character.
Pretrial Stipulation: Respondent met with the State Bar, admitted his misconduct, and entered this stipulation fully resolving these matters. Respondent’s cooperation at this early stage has saved the State Bar significant resources and time. Respondent’s stipulation to the facts, his culpability, and discipline is a mitigating circumstance. (In the Matter of Spaith (Review Dept. 1996) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 511,521; Silva-Vidor v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1071, 1079 [where mitigative credit was given for entering into a stipulation as to facts and culpability].)
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE
The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct provide a "process of fixing discipline" pursuant to a set of written principles to "better discharge the purposes of attorney discipline as announced by the Supreme Court." (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, Introduction (all further references to standards are to this source).) The primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings and of the sanctions imposed are "the protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; the maintenance of high professional standards by attorneys and the preservation of public confidence in the legal profession." (ln re Morse (1995) 11 Cal.4th 184, 205; std. 1.3.)
Although not binding, the standards are entitled to "great weight" and should be followed "whenever possible" in determining level of discipline. (In re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 92, quoting In re Brown (1995) 12 Cal.4th 205, 220 and In re Young (1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 267, fn. 11.) Adherence to the standards in the great majority of cases serves the valuable purpose of eliminating disparity and assuring consistency, that is, the imposition of similar attorney discipline for instances of similar attorney misconduct. (In re Naney (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 190.) Any discipline recommendation different from that set forth in the applicable standards should clearly explain the reasons for the deviation. (Blair v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 762, 776, fn. 5.)
Generally, the Standards are applied to only the misconduct in the current matters to determine the appropriate level of discipline; however, in certain situations, the misconduct from the prior discipline and the misconduct in the current matters should be considered together in determining discipline.
The reasoning for considering the prior discipline and the current misconduct together to determine the appropriate level of discipline is set forth in In the Matter of Sklar (Review Dept. 1993) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 602. In Sklar, the attorney had prior discipline and was involved in a second disciplinary proceeding involving misconduct which occurred during the same time period as his prior discipline. The court acknowledged that "... part of the rationale for considering a prior discipline as having an aggravating impact is that it is indicative of a recidivist attorney’s inability to conform his or her conduct to ethical norms [citation]. It is therefore appropriate to consider the fact that the misconduct involved here was contemporaneous with the misconduct in the prior case." (In the Matter of Sklar, supra, 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. at 619.) Sklar concluded that it was appropriate to consider the totality of the misconduct in the attorney’s prior discipline and the pending matters to determine what discipline was appropriate had all the misconduct been brought together rather than separately.
A similar rationale and application is appropriate here. Respondent’s misconduct in the current matters occurred at the same time as the misconduct in his prior discipline. Rather than considering a strict application of the standards to the current misconduct as if it was subsequent and further misconduct committed by an attorney displaying an inability to conform his conduct to ethical norms, it is appropriate to consider the current misconduct together with his prior misconduct which all occurred during the same time period.
The gravamen of Respondent’s misconduct is his repeated violation of Business and Professions Code section 6106.3 - collecting advanced fees for loan modification services. Respondent stopped all loan modification work no later than August 2010.
The appropriate Standard to employ to assess Respondent’s misconduct is Standard 2.10. Under Standard 2.10, which provides the level of discipline range for offenses involving a violation of the Business and Professions Code not specified in any other standard, "[c]ulpability of a member of a violation of an provision of the Business and Professions Code not specified in these standards.., shall result in reproval or suspension according to the gravity of the offense or the harm, if any, to the victim, with due regard to the purposes of imposing discipline set forth in standard 1.3."
In considering the extent of the misconduct, Respondent’s misconduct occurred in the limited time span of late 2009 through August 2010, when he ceased his loan modification operation in its entirety. After that time period, Respondent collected no additional fees from his loan modification clients, but continued to work on their cases to obtain loan modifications for his clients.
It is acknowledged that Respondent’s misconduct is serious. Respondent has repeatedly violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3 by accepting advanced fees ranging from $2,000 to $7,000 for loan modification services in violation of Civil Code section 2944.7. All of the clients hired Respondent after the effective date of Civil Code section 2944.7, October 11, 2009.
In the four matters in the prior discipline, Respondent stipulated to violating Business and Professions Code section 6106.3 by accepting advanced fees ranging from approximately $3,500 to $4,500 after the effective date of Civil Code section 2944.7 for loan modification services. Respondent refunded all advanced fees to the clients in the first discipline. In Case No. 10-O-11007, Venus Pagsuberon hired Respondent in March 2010. In Case No. 11-O-11995, Rick Schoonover hired Respondent in October 2009 (after the effective date of Civil Code section 2944.7). In Case No. 11-O-14653, Timothy Infanger hired Respondent in October 2009 (after the effective date of Civil Code section 2944.7). In Case No. 11-O-18086, Rhonda Gower hired Respondent in January 2010.
The fifteen clients in the current stipulation all hired Respondent in the time period from October 2009 (after the effective date of Civil Code section 2944.7) through July 2010. Respondent stopped taking on new loan modification clients after August 2010. The number of affected clients is significant and the misconduct is serious.
In considering the degree of harm to the clients, in the prior discipline matters all clients received full refunds, so the harm to those clients was significantly mitigated. In the current matters however, all of the clients except Irwin are awaiting refunds. So even though Respondent performed significant services for all of his clients, the harm resulting from improperly collecting advanced fees from these clients is serious. The extent of the misconduct was limited to a discrete time period, but the harm to the clients is significant.
The aggravating and mitigating circumstances must also be considered. In aggravation are Respondent’s multiple acts and his prior discipline. Prior discipline should be considered in aggravation "[w]henever discipline is imposed." (Lewis v. State Bar (1973) 9 Cal.3d 704, 715.) However, for the reasons previously set forth, the weight of the prior discipline is diminished in these matters.
In mitigation, Respondent’s misconduct began at the time of significant stress in Respondent’s personal life, since he had been wrongly diagnosed as having prostate cancer and was undergoing treatment from February 2009 through September 2009. Respondent has also demonstrated extraordinary service to his community and good character, which is recognized mitigation under Standard 1.2(e)(iv).
Moreover, Respondent has fully cooperated with the State Bar to resolve these matters with a stipulation. Further, even though the misconduct here is serious, before all the misconduct considered here began, Respondent had no record of discipline in over twenty six years of practice.
In a recent Review Department case, In the Matter of Taylor (Review Dept. 2012) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 221, the respondent attorney was found culpable of violating Civil Code section 2944.7 and collecting illegal and unconscionable fees in eight client matters, and was suspended for six months. In Taylor, the respondent attorney had not paid full refunds to any of the clients. He was found to have engaged in multiple acts of misconduct, causing significant harm to his clients and displaying indifference toward rectification or atonement for his misconduct. By contrast, Respondent spontaneously closed down his loan modification practice in August 2010, when the full implication of Civil Code section 2944.7 was clear to him. He continued to work on his existing clients’ matters without additional payment of fees. He provided refunds to many of his clients. His misconduct was limited to the time period from the end of October 2009 to August 2010. His misconduct is less serious than the misconduct of the respondent attorney in In the Matter of Taylor and the respondent attorney in In the Matter of Taylor was found culpable of sixteen additional charges. Respondent has established substantial mitigation for good character, a pretrial stipulation and extreme emotional difficulties. Accordingly, a level of discipline similar to that imposed in Taylor is appropriate notwithstanding the fact that there are more client matters in this stipulation than were involved in the Taylor decision.
Following Standard 2.10 and considering the totality of the misconduct considered in the prior and current matters, particularly in light of the extent of the misconduct and degree of harm to the clients, and considering the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the appropriate level of discipline is six (6) months actual suspension for all of Respondent’s misconduct in these matters and the prior discipline. Imposition of a six month actual suspension will be sufficient to protect the public, the courts and the legal profession under Standard 1.3, and falls squarely within the Standards for discipline in these matters.
FINANCIAL CONDITIONS
These financial conditions are continued from the Financial Conditions form (pages 7 and 8). Respondent must pay the following restitution on the same terms as set forth on the Financial Conditions page 7 to the following payees:
1. Dennis and Kimberly Newcombe, $2,900, with interest accruing from March 2, 2010. 2. Patrick Schur, $6,000, with interest accruing from April 1, 2010.
3. Barbara Plocica, $2,500, with interest accruing from June 4, 2010.
4. Isaac and Rebecca Trevino, $2,900, with interest accruing from March 1, 2010.
5. Mohammed Fata, $3,000, with interest accruing from March 2, 2010.
6. Kazim Rajabi, $3,000, with interest accruing from December 7, 2009.
7. Filomena Correia, $2,900, with interest accruing from January 28, 2010.
8. Corey Narog, $3,000, with interest accruing from July 9, 2010.
9. Brenda Longalong, $3,000, with interest accruing from July 27, 2010.
10. Sandra Dos Santos, $3,030, with interest accruing from May 6, 2010.
11. Atrun and Vijendra Prasad, $3,500, with interest accruing from January 29, 2010.
12. Wayne Elliott, $2,500, with interest accruing from April 4, 2010.
13. Aaron Molyneux, $2,900, with interest accruing from November 30, 2009.
14. Wilkie and Tracy Lemieux, $3,000, with interest accruing from December 28, 2009.
COSTS
Respondent acknowledges that the Office of Chief Trial Counsel has informed him that as of June 6, 2013, the estimated costs in this matter are $19,000. Respondent further acknowledges that, should this Stipulation by rejected or should relief from the Stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.
SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES
Case Number(s): 12-O-10262, 12-O-11155, 12-O-11926, 12-O-13437,
12-O-135231, 12-O-14139, 12-O-14205, 12-O-15682,
12-O-17836, 13-O-10458, 13-O-10599, 13-O-10615,
13-O-10793, 13-O-12059, 13-O-12639
In the Matter of: ARMEN JANIAN
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: Armen Janian
Date: 6/13/13
Respondent’s Counsel: Arthur L. Margolis
Date: 6/17/13
Deputy Trial Counsel: Erin McKeown Joyce
Date: 6/19/13
ACTUAL SUSPENSION ORDER
Case Number(s): 12-O-10262, 12-O-11155, 12-O-11926,
12-O-13437, 12-O-13523, 12-O-14139,
12-O-14205, 12-O-15682, 12-O-17836,
13-O-10458, 13-O-10599, 13-O-10615
13-O-10793, 13-O-12059, 13-O-12639
In the Matter of: Armen Janian
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
Please see attached modifications to stipulation
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58 (E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Richard A. Platel
Date: 7/10/13
Armen Janian
Case No. 12-O-10262, et al.
MODIFICATIONS TO STIPULATION
Page 5 - Section E. (1) - Place check mark in box.
Page 5. - Section E. (8) - Remove check mark from box.
Insert check mark in box "No Ethics School Required."
Insert after "Reason"-
"Respondent is required to provide proof of his attendance
and successful completion of the State Bar Ethics School
as a condition of the two-year disciplinary probation that was
was imposed on him in his prior disciplinary matter (i.e., Supreme
Court case number S199678 [State Bar Court case number
10-O-11007, et al.]) If Respondent fails to comply with that
Probation condition he is subject to further discipline.
Page 6 - Section F. (1) - Remove check mark from box.
Insert check mark in box "No MPRE Recommended."
Insert after "Reason"-
"In Respondent’s prior disciplinary matter (Supreme Court case
number S199678), the Supreme Court ordered Respondent
to take and pass the MPRE within one year after the
effective date of its May 22, 2012, order. If Respondent
fails to pass the MPRE within that time period, he will
be suspended from the practice of law until he does. (See
Segretti v. State Bar (1976) 15 Cal.3d 878, 891, fn. 8: but see
also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.10(b); Rules of Proc. of State
Bar, rule 5.162.)
Page 6 - Section F.(5) - Delete check mark in box.
Delete text below "Other Conditions."
-X-X-X
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on July 11, 2013, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND
ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:
ARTHUR LEWIS MARGOLIS ESQ
MARGOLIS & MARGOLIS LLP
2000 RIVERSIDE DR.
LOS ANGELES, CA 90039
<<not>> checked. by certified mail, No. , with return receipt requested, through the United States Postal Service at , California, addressed as follows:
<<not>> checked. by overnight mail at , California, addressed as follows:
<<not>> checked. by fax transmission, at fax number . No error was reported by the fax machine that I used.
<<not>> checked. By personal service by leaving the documents in a sealed envelope or package clearly labeled to identify the attorney being served with a receptionist or a person having charge of the attorney’s office, addressed as follows:
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
Erin M. Joyce, Enforcement, Los Angeles
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on July 11, 2013.
Signed by:
Julieta Gonzales
Case Administrator
State Bar Court