State Bar Court of California
Hearing Department
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING DISBARMENT; ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE
ENROLLMENT
DISBARMENT
Case Number(s): 12-O-10714; 12-O-17802; 12-O-17925;
13-O-11071; 13-O-11546; 13-O-13550; 13-O-13900; 13-O-14543; 13-O-16078
In the Matter of: KRISTIN LYNN DAY, Bar # 269679, A Member
of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Suzan J. Anderson, Bar # 160559,
Counsel for Respondent: Kristin Lynn Day, Bar # 269679,
Submitted to: Settlement Judge.
Filed: November 18, 2013.
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION
REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any
additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be
set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g.,
"Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law,"
"Supporting Authority," etc.
A. Parties' Acknowledgments:
1.
Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted June 1,
2010.
2.
The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained
herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the
Supreme Court.
3.
All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption
of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed
consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under
"Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 13 pages, not including
the order.
4.
A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or
causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5.
Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts
are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6.
The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level
of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7.
No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent
has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not
resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8.
Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of
Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
checked. Costs are awarded to the
State Bar.
<<not>> checked. Costs
are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial
Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs
are entirely waived.
9.
ORDER OF INACTIVE ENROLLMENT:
The parties are aware that if this stipulation is approved, the judge will
issue an order of inactive enrollment under Business and Professions Code
section 6007, subdivision (c)(4), and Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, rule
5.111(D)(1).
B. Aggravating Circumstances [for definition, see Standards for Attorney
Sanctions for Professional Misconduct, standard 1.2(b)]. Facts supporting
aggravating circumstances are required.
<<not>> checked. (1) Prior
record of discipline
<<not>> checked. (a) State Bar Court case # of prior case .
<<not>> checked. (b) Date prior discipline effective .
<<not>> checked. (c) Rules of Professional Conduct/ State
Bar Act violations:
<<not>> checked. (d) Degree of prior discipline
<<not>> checked. (e) If Respondent has two or more incidents
of prior discipline, use space provided below. .
<<not>> checked. (2) Dishonesty:
Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by or followed by bad faith,
dishonesty, concealment, overreaching or other violations of the State Bar Act
or Rules of Professional Conduct.
<<not>> checked. (3) Trust
Violation: Trust funds or property were involved and Respondent refused or was
unable to account to the client or person who was the object of the misconduct
for improper conduct toward said funds or property.
checked. (4) Harm: Respondent's
misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public or the administration of
justice. Please see stipulation page 9.
checked. (5) Indifference:
Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for
the consequences of his or her misconduct. Please see stipulation page 9.
<<not>> checked. (6) Lack of
Cooperation: Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims
of his/her misconduct or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation or
proceedings.
checked. (7) Multiple/Pattern of
Misconduct: Respondent's current misconduct evidences multiple acts of
wrongdoing or demonstrates a pattern of misconduct. Please see stipulation page
9.
<<not>> checked. (8) No
aggravating circumstances are involved.
Additional aggravating circumstances: .
C. Mitigating Circumstances [see standard 1.2(e)]. Facts supporting
mitigating circumstances are required.
<<not>> checked. (1) No Prior Discipline: Respondent has no prior record
of discipline over many years of practice coupled with present misconduct which
is not deemed serious.
<<not>>
checked. (2) No Harm: Respondent did not harm the client or person who was
the object of the misconduct.
<<not>>
checked. (3) Candor/Cooperation: Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and
cooperation with the victims of his/her misconduct and to the State Bar during
disciplinary investigation and proceedings.
<<not>>
checked. (4) Remorse: Respondent promptly took objective steps spontaneously
demonstrating remorse and recognition of the wrongdoing, which steps were
designed to timely atone for any consequences of his/her misconduct.
<<not>>
checked. (5) Restitution: Respondent paid $ on in restitution to without
the threat or force of disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings.
<<not>>
checked. (6) Delay: These disciplinary proceedings were excessively
delayed. The delay is not attributable to Respondent and the delay prejudiced
him/her.
<<not>>
checked. (7) Good Faith: Respondent acted in good faith.
<<not>>
checked. (8) Emotional/Physical Difficulties: At the time of the stipulated
act or acts of professional misconduct Respondent suffered extreme emotional
difficulties or physical disabilities which expert testimony would establish
was directly responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities
were not the product of any illegal conduct by the member, such as illegal drug
or substance abuse, and Respondent no longer suffers from such difficulties or
disabilities.
<<not>>
checked. (9) Severe Financial Stress: At the time of the misconduct,
Respondent suffered from severe financial stress which resulted from
circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond his/her control
and which were directly responsible for the misconduct.
<<not>>
checked. (10) Family Problems: At the time of the misconduct, Respondent
suffered extreme difficulties in his/her personal life which were other than
emotional or physical in nature.
<<not>>
checked. (11) Good Character: Respondent's good character is attested to by a
wide range of references in the legal and general communities who are aware of
the full extent of his/her misconduct.
<<not>>
checked. (12) Rehabilitation: Considerable time has passed since the acts of
professional misconduct occurred followed by convincing proof of subsequent
rehabilitation.
<<not>>
checked. (13) No mitigating circumstances are involved.
Additional
mitigating circumstances: Prefiling Stipulation - see stipulation pages 9 and
10. Good Character- see stipulation pages 9 and 10.
D. Discipline: Disbarment.
E. Additional Requirements:
(1) Rule 9.20,
California Rules of Court: Respondent must comply with the requirements of
rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in
subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 calendar days,
respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court's Order in this
matter.
<<not>> checked. (2) Restitution:
Respondent must make restitution to in the amount of $ plus 10 percent
interest per year from . If the Client Security Fund has reimbursed for all
or any portion of the principal amount, respondent must pay restitution to CSF
of the amount paid plus applicable interest and costs in accordance with
Business and Professions Code section 6140.5. Respondent must pay the above
restitution and furnish satisfactory proof of payment to the State Bar's Office
of Probation in Los Angeles no later than days from the effective date of the
Supreme Court order in this case..
checked. (3) Other: See
"Restitution" in stipulation pages 11 and 12..
Attachment language (if any):.
ATTACHMENT TO
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION
IN THE MATTER OF: KRISTIN LYNN DAY, State Bar No. 269679
STATE BAR COURT CASE NUMBER: 12-O-10714; 12-O-17802; 12-O-17925;
13-O-11071; 13-O-11546; 13-O-13550; 13-O-13900; 13-O-14543; 13-O-16078
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that she is
culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional
Conduct.
Case Nos. 12-O-10704 (Complainants: Marlene and Carlos Obando); 12-O-17802
(Complainants: Celeste and John Olivarez); 12-O-17925 (Complainants: Robert and
Lynn Ervin); 13-O-11071 (Complainant: Ronald Spataccino); 13-O-11546 (State Bar
Investigation); 13-O-13550 (Complainants: Carol and Steven Herr); 13-O-13900
(Complainant: Debra Bernabe); 13-O-14543 (Complainant: Nancy Perez); 13-O-16078
(Complainant: Angilberto Salazar)
FACTS:
1. In February 2011, Respondent and non-attorney Brandon Hintz
("Hintz") formed a partnership named, United Foreclosure Attorney
Network ("UFAN"). The purported business purpose for UFAN was to
provide mortgage litigation and other debt related services to borrowers and
property owners. At all relevant times, Respondent knew that Hintz was not
licensed to practice law.
2. As named owner of UFAN, Respondent signed at least (30) Independent
Contract Agreements with non-attorney entities ("Legal Assistants").
The Legal Assistants were authorized to solicit, sign-up, and collect advanced
fees from new clients for UFAN. Respondent had no authority and was not
involved in evaluating or deciding whether or not to accept a new client on
behalf of UFAN. Pursuant to the Independent Contract Agreements, the Legal
Assistants did not report to UFAN but to another non-attorney owned entity,
Mitigation Professionals. The Independent Contract Agreements stated,
"UFAN has agreed to a total retainer price of $5,000 for joinder clients
and $3,500 initial payment for individual litigation clients." Delineated
in the Independent Contract Agreements were the amounts the Legal Assistants
would receive for each new client: up to $2,800 for joinder action clients; and
$1,500 for individual litigation clients. UFAN’s non-attorney Legal Assistants
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by conducting initial client
consultations, determining whether or not to accept clients for UFAN, and
providing legal advice without attorney supervision to all of UFAN’s clients.
3. Clients sought UFAN’s services to save their homes, many of which were
already in foreclosure. Many of the clients had already tried loan modification
and been denied. The Legal Assistants worked from a script. The clients were
advised by the Legal Assistants that litigation was their best option and that
they could receive a cash settlement, and a reduction of principal and
interest. The Legal Assistants also advised that the litigation could help with
foreclosure and reverse a foreclosure sale. Each client was advised of the same
information, there was no independent legal analysis prior to the client’s
retaining Respondent, and all the advice from the Legal Assistants was done
without any supervision from Respondent.
4. Respondent knowingly and willingly lent her name to the Legal Assistants
so they could continue to secure new clients for UFAN and engage in the
unauthorized practice of law under Respondent’s name. The Legal Assistants used
Respondent’s marketing materials, her retainer agreements and had the new
clients of UFAN deposit their advanced fees directly into Respondent’s General
Operating Account, knowing that the Legal Assistant’s portion of the advanced
fees would be paid back to them soon thereafter. Once the clients signed the
retainer agreement and paid the advanced fees to the Legal Assistants, the
money was wired to UFAN or checks were deposited into the UFAN general
operating account. Within a week of receipt, UFAN paid a percentage (from 60 to
70 percent) of the advanced fees collected to Mitigation Professionals. From
the end of May 2011, through mid-August 2011, Respondent paid Mitigation
Professionals over $378,000 from the advanced fees deposited into her general
operating account to be distributed to the Legal Assistants for the new clients
they obtained for UFAN. Mitigation Professionals would keep a portion of the
payment and then remit the remainder to the individual Legal Assistants.
5. Clients who resided in California and other states hired UFAN to provide
mortgage litigation and foreclosure protection services, often to stop the
foreclosure of their homes. Respondent did not perform any legal services of
value on behalf of any of UFAN’s clients. The Legal Assistants provided legal
advice without any supervision or oversight from Respondent. The non-attorney
Legal Assistants engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
6. UFAN’s clients paid advanced attorney fees as indicated below to
Respondent for mortgage litigation and for foreclosure protection services:
Case No. Complainant Date
of Hire Fees
12-O-10714 Marlene and Carlos Obando (CA) June
16, 2011 $6,000
12-O-17802 Celeste and John Olivarez (CA) August
11, 2011 $10,000
12-O-17925 Robert and Lynn Ervin (CA) June
27, 2012 $3,500
13-O-11071 Ronald Spataccino (PA)
September 21, 2011 $5,000
13-O-13550 Carol and Steven Herr (CA) May 2011 $5,000
13-O-13500 Debra Bernabe (CA) July
31,2011 $5,000
13-O-14543 Nancy Perez (CA) December
29, 2011 $5,000
13-O-16078 Angilberto Salazar (CA) December
23, 2011 $6,000
These advance fees were split between Respondent and non-attorneys Hintz,
the Legal Assistants and Mitigation Professionals.
7. Respondent failed to perform any legal services of value on behalf of
any of the eight clients listed in paragraph six and did not earn any portion
of the advanced fees paid by those clients. To date, Respondent has failed to
refund unearned fees to those eight clients.
8. In case number 13-O-10714, Marlene and Carlos Obando paid Respondent
advanced fees of $6,000; $5,000 to cover the joinder lawsuit and $1,000 for
UFAN’s foreclosure protection plan which Respondent represented would stop
their lender from being able to foreclose on their home. Thereafter, Mr. and
Mrs. Obando lost their home to foreclosure. Of the $5,000 advanced fee,
Respondent retained $1,425 of the advanced fees and remitted $3,575 to
Mitigation Professionals. Respondent knew or was grossly negligent in not
knowing that the misrepresentation she made to Mr. and Mrs. Obando regarding
UFAN’s foreclosure protection plan was a false statement. On August 4, 2011,
Respondent made a partial refund of $3,921.50 to Mr. and Mrs. Obando.
9. In case number 13-O-16078, Angilberto Salazar paid Respondent advanced
fees of $6,000; $5,000 to cover the joinder lawsuit and $1,000 for UFAN’s
foreclosure protection plan which Respondent represented would stop his lender
from being able to foreclose on his home. Thereafter, Mr. Salazar lost his home
to foreclosure. Of the $5,000 advanced fee, Respondent retained $1,425 of the
advanced fees and remitted $3,575 to Mitigation Professionals. Respondent knew
or was grossly negligent in not knowing that the misrepresentation she made to
Mr. Salazar regarding UFAN’s foreclosure protection plan was a false statement.
10. In case no. 13-O-11071, Complainant Ronald Spataccino lives in
Pennsylvania and the property in dispute was in Pennsylvania. On September
21,2011, Spataccino hired UFAN for litigation against his mortgage holder. On
that date, Spataccino paid UFAN $5,000 as advanced fees. Pennsylvania Rule 5.5
of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides in pertinent part that no person
shall be permitted to practice as an attorney and counselor at law unless the
person has been admitted to the bar of Pennsylvania in compliance with its
prescribed and published rules. Respondent is not now, nor ever has been,
admitted to practice law in the state of Pennsylvania.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
11. By allowing the non-attorney Legal Assistants to engage in acts
constituting the practice of law, Respondent aided a person or entity in the
unauthorized practice of law, in willful violation of Rules of Professional
Conduct, rule 1-300(A).
12. By lending her name to be used by the non-attorney Legal Assistants to
engage in the unauthorized practice of law, Respondent lent her name to be used
as attorney by another person who was not an attorney, in willful violation of
Business and Professions Code section 6105.
13. By entering into a partnership with Hintz, a non-attorney, Respondent
formed a partnership where the activities of the partnership consisted of the
practice of law with a person that was not a lawyer, in willful violation of
Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-310.
14. By sharing legal fees with Hintz, the Legal Assistants, and Mitigation
Professionals, Respondent shared legal fees with a non-lawyer, in willful
violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-320(A).
15. By failing to perform any legal services of value to the seven
California clients identified in paragraph six, Respondent intentionally,
recklessly, or repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence, in
willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A).
16. By failing to refund all unearned advanced fees to the eight clients
identified in paragraph six, Respondent failed to refund unearned advanced
fees, in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(2).
17. By accepting employment by client Ronald Spataccino, a resident of
Pennsylvania, when she was not licensed or otherwise entitled to practice law
in Pennsylvania, respondent held herself out as entitled to practice law in
Pennsylvania and actually practiced law in Pennsylvania, in willful violation
of the regulations of the profession in Pennsylvania and thereby willfully
violated Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-300(B).
18. By entering into an agreement for, charging, and collecting fees from
client Ronald Spataccino of Pennsylvania, when she was not licensed to practice
law in that jurisdiction, Respondent entered into an agreement for, charged,
and collected an illegal fee, in willful violation of Rules of Professional
Conduct, rule 4-200(A).
19. By making misrepresentations regarding the foreclosure protection plan
offered by UFAN to clients, Marlene and Carlos Obando, and Angilberto Salazar,
Respondent willfully committed acts involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or
corruption, in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section
6106.
20. By exploiting her clients for personal gain without the intent to
perform services of value, Respondent engaged in a scheme to defraud her
clients and committed acts of moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, in
willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
Harm (Std. 1.2(b)(iv)): The current misconduct caused significant harm to
at least eight clients. In each of these cases, Respondent’s clients were
desperate to save their homes and sought Respondent’s assistance at critical
junctures in their lives. Respondent’s failure to refund advanced fees has
deprived them of their money for one to two years.
Pattern of Misconduct (Std. 1.2(b)(ii)): Respondent engaged in a scheme to
defraud her clients. Respondent’s misconduct which included forming a
partnership with a non-attorney, aiding nonattorneys in engaging in the
unauthorized practice of law, fee splitting with non-attorneys, and repeatedly
falling to perform legal services of value for her clients. Respondent’s
misconduct was widespread and took place over two years, constituting a
habitual disregard of her clients. (See Lebbos v. State Bar (1991) 53 Cal. 3d
37, 45 [Multiple acts of misconduct involving moral turpitude and dishonesty
warrant disbarment. (citing Std 2.3 and Dixon v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d
728, 739, 740.)]; In the Matter of Berg (Review Dept. 1997) 3 Cal. State Bar
Ct. Rptr. 725, 737 [pattern of misconduct found where misconduct occurred over
a span of 10 months]; In the Matter of Lenard (Review Dept. 2013) 5 Cal. State
Bar Ct. Rptr. 250, 260).
Indifference (Std. 1.2(b)(v): Other than the partial refund made to Mr. and
Mrs. Obando, to date, Respondent has not made full restitution to the eight
clients listed in paragraph six.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
Prefiling Stipulation: Respondent is entitled to mitigation for entering
into a full stipulation with the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel prior to the
filing of disciplinary charges, thereby saving the State Bar court time and
resources. (Silva-Vidor v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1071, 1079 [where mitigative
credit was given for entering into a stipulation as to facts and culpability].)
Good Character: Respondent is entitled to some mitigation for providing
several letters attesting to her good character. (In the Matter of Kreitenberg
(Review Dept. 2002) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 469, 477 [limited weight in
mitigation where witnesses are not aware of the full extent of respondent’s
misconduct and do not address disciplinary concerns].)
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.
The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct provide a
"process of fixing discipline" pursuant to a set of written
principles to "better discharge the purposes of attorney discipline as
announced by the Supreme Court." (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds.
for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, Introduction .(all further references
to standards are to this source).) The primary purposes of disciplinary
proceedings and of the sanctions imposed are "the protection of the
public, the courts and the legal profession; the maintenance of high
professional standards by attorneys and the preservation of public confidence
in the legal profession." (In re Morse (1995) 11 Cal.4th 184, 205; std.
1.3.)
Although not binding, the standards are entitled to "great
weight" and should be followed "whenever possible" in
determining level of discipline. (In re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 92,
quoting In re Brown (1995) 12 Cal 4th 205, 220 and In re Young (1989) 49 Cal.3d
257, 267, fn. 11.) Adherence to the standards in the great majority of cases
serves the valuable purpose of eliminating disparity and assuring ¯
consistency, that is, the imposition of similar attorney discipline for
instances of similar attorney misconduct. (In re Naney (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186,
190.) Any discipline recommendation different from that set forth in the
applicable standards should clearly explain the reasons for the deviation.
(Blair v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 762, 776, fn. 5.)
Respondent admits to committing multiple acts of professional misconduct involving
at least eight client matters. Standard 1.6 (a) requires that where a
Respondent acknowledges two or more acts of misconduct, and different sanctions
are prescribed by the standards that apply to those acts, the sanction imposed
shall be the more or most severe prescribed in the applicable standards.
The most severe sanction applicable to Respondent’s misconduct is found in
standard 2.3, which applies to Respondent’s violations of Business and
Professions Code section 6106 by engaging in acts of moral turpitude associated
with Respondent’s scheme to defraud homeowners through UFAN. Standard 2.3
provides that culpability of an act of moral turpitude shall result in actual
suspension or disbarment depending upon the extent to which the victim of the misconduct
is harmed or misled and depending upon the magnitude of the act of misconduct
and the degree to which it relates to the member’s acts within the practice of
law.
Here, Respondent’s misconduct is directly related to the practice of law.
Further, the magnitude of Respondent’s misconduct is significant as the
misconduct involves at least eight separate client matters and spans a period
of over two years. Respondent admits that her misconduct is not limited to the
eight complainants in this matter and that she committed similar misconduct in
connection with each of the approximately 200 clients who employed UFAN. The
clients involved in all of these cases retained Respondent in desperate
attempts to save their homes. Each client paid for legal services, but
Respondent provided no legal services of value for the clients and failed to
refund unearned fees. Respondent also misled two of the clients about her
foreclosure protection plan. Although the clients paid the required advanced
fee for the plan, they ultimately lost their homes to foreclosure. Accordingly,
Respondent’s misconduct significantly harmed the clients.
Further, standard 2.4 requires disbarment for a pattern of willfully
falling to perform services demonstrating the member’s abandonment of the
causes in which she was retained. Client neglect is serious misconduct that
constitutes a breach of the fiduciary duty owed by an attorney to the client
and, accordingly, warrants substantial discipline. ( Farnham v. State Bar 47
Cal.3d 429, 446.) It is well recognized that habitual disregard by an attorney
of the interests of clients is ground for disbarment. Even when such neglect is
grossly negligent or careless, rather than willful and dishonest, it is an act
of moral turpitude and professional misconduct, justifying disbarment. (Id. at
p. 446.)
While Respondent is entitled to some mitigation credit for admitting her
misconduct, providing several letters attesting to her good character, and
cooperating with the State Bar in resolving these matters by stipulation, the
mitigation is far outweighed by the nature and scope of Respondent’s misconduct
as well as the harm caused by Respondent’s scheme to defraud. Additionally,
Respondent is entitled to no mitigation for her lack of a prior record of
discipline. Respondent was admitted to the State Bar in June 2010, and her
misconduct started less than a year later in February 2011. Accordingly,
pursuant to Standard 2.3, Respondent must be disbarred in order to protect the
public, the courts and the integrity of the legal profession.
Disbarment is also consistent with case law. Habitual disregard by an
attorney of the interests of her clients justifies disbarment. (Twohy v. State
Bar (1989) 48 Cal.3d 502).
COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.
Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has
informed respondent that as of November 6, 2013, the prosecution costs in this
matter are $10,389. Respondent further acknowledges that should this
stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the
costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.
RESTITUTION.
Respondent must make restitution to Marlene and Carlos Obando in the amount
of $2,078.50 plus 10 percent interest per year from June 16, 2011. If the
Client Security Fund ("CSF") has reimbursed Marlene and Carlos Obando
for all or any portion of the principal amount, Respondent must also pay
restitution to CSF in the amount paid, plus applicable interest and costs in
accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6140.5.
Respondent must make restitution to Celeste and John Olivarez in the amount
of $10,000 plus 10 percent interest per year from August 11, 2011. If the
Client Security Fund ("CSF") has reimbursed Celeste and John Olivarez
for all or any portion of the principal amount, Respondent must also pay
restitution to CSF in the amount paid, plus applicable interest and costs in
accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6140.5.
Respondent must make restitution to Robert and Lynn Ervin in the amount of
$3,500 plus 10 percent interest per year from June 27, 2012. If the Client
Security Fund ("CSF") has reimbursed Robert and Lynn Ervin for all or
any portion of the principal amount, Respondent must also pay restitution to
CSF in the amount paid, plus applicable interest and costs in accordance with
Business and Professions Code section 6140.5.
Respondent must make restitution to Ronald Spataccino in the amount of
$5,000 plus 10 percent interest per year from September 21, 2011. If the Client
Security Fund ("CSF") has reimbursed Ronald Spataccino for all or any
portion of the principal amount, Respondent must also pay restitution to CSF in
the amount paid, plus applicable interest and costs in accordance with Business
and Professions Code section 6140.5.
Respondent must make restitution to Carol and Steven Herr in the amount of
$5,000 plus 10 percent interest per year from May 2011. If the Client Security
Fund ("CSF") has reimbursed Carol and Steven Herr for all or any
portion of the principal amount, Respondent must also pay restitution to CSF in
the amount paid, plus applicable interest and costs in accordance with Business
and Professions Code section 6140.5.
Respondent must make restitution to Debra Bernabe in the amount of $5,000
plus 10 percent interest per year from July 31,2011. If the Client Security
Fund ("CSF") has reimbursed Debra Bernabe for all or any portion of
the principal amount, Respondent must also pay restitution to CSF in the amount
paid, plus applicable interest and costs in accordance with Business and
Professions Code section 6140.5.
Respondent must make restitution to Nancy Perez in the amount of $5,000
plus 10 percent interest per year from December 29, 2011. If the Client
Security Fund ("CSF") has reimbursed Nancy Perez for all or any
portion of the principal amount, Respondent must also pay restitution to CSF in
the amount paid, plus applicable interest and costs in accordance with Business
and Professions Code section 6140.5.
Respondent must make restitution to Angilberto Salazar in the amount of
$6,000 plus 10 percent interest per year from December 23,2011. If the Client
Security Fund ("CSF") has reimbursed Angilberto Salazar for all or
any portion of the principal amount, Respondent must also pay restitution to
CSF in the amount paid, plus applicable interest and costs in accordance with
Business and Professions Code section 6140.5.
SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES
Case Number(s): 12-O-10714; 12-O-17802; 12-O-17925; 13-O-11071; 13-O-11546;
13-O-13550; 13-O-13900; 13-O-14543; 13-O-16078
In the Matter of: KRISTIN LYNN DAY
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable,
signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and
conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: KRISTIN LYNN DAY
Date: 11/6/13
Respondent’s Counsel:
Date:
Deputy Trial Counsel: Suzan J. Anderson
Date: 11/6/13
DISBARMENT ORDER
Case Number(s): 12-O-10714; 12-O-17802; 12-O-17925; 13-O-11071; 13-O-11546;
13-O-13550; 13-O-13900; 13-O-14543; 13-O-16078
In the Matter of: KRISTIN LYNN DAY
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately
protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of
counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the
DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are
APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to
the Supreme Court.
checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to
withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this
order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved
stipulation. (See rule 5.58 (E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective
date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order
herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California
Rules of Court.)
Respondent KRISTIN LYNN DAY is ordered transferred to involuntary inactive
status pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6007, subdivision
(c)(4). Respondent’s inactive enrollment will be effective three (3) calendar
days after this order is served by mail and will terminate upon the effective
date of the Supreme Court’s order imposing discipline herin, or as provided for
by rule 5.111(D)(2) or the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California,
or as otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court pursuant to its plenary
jurisdiction.
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Lucy Armendariz
Date: 11/18/13
DECLARATION OF SERVICE
by
U.S. FIRST-CLASS MAIL/U.S. CERTIFIED MAIL/OVERNIGHT
DELIVERY/FACSIMILE-ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION
CASE NUMBER(s): 12-O-10714; 12-O-17802; 12-O-17925; 13-O-11071; 13-O-11546;
13-O-13550; 13-O-13900; 13-O-14543; 13-O-16078
l, the undersigned, am over the age of eighteen (18) years and not a party
to the within action, whose business address and place of employment is the
State Bar of
California, 180 Howard Street, San Francisco, California 94105, declare
that:
on the date shown below, I caused to be
served a true copy of the within document described as follows:
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION
AND ORDER APPROVING DISBARMENT; ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE ENROLLMENT
checked. By U.S. First.Class Mail: (CCP §§ 1013 and 1013(a))
<<not>> checked. By U.S. Certified Mail: (CCP §§ 1013 and
1013(a))
• in accordance with the practice of the
State Bar of California for collection and processing of mail, I deposited or
placed for collection and mailing in the City and County of Los Angeles.
<< not>> checked. By Overnight Delivery: (CCP §§ 1013(c) and
1013(d))
• I am readily familiar with the State Bar
of California’s practice for collection and processing of correspondence for
overnight delivery by the United Parcel Service (’UPS’).
<< not>> checked. By Fax Transmission: (CCP §§ 1013(e) and
1013(0)
• Based on agreement of the parties to
accept service by fax transmission, I taxed the documents to the persons at the
fax numbers listed herein below. No error was reported by the fax machine that
I used. The original record of the fax transmission is retained on file and
available upon request.
<< not>> checked. By Electronic Service: (CCP § 1010.6)
• Based on a court order or an agreement of
the parties to accept service by electronic transmission, I caused the
documents to be sent to the person (s) at the electronic addresses listed
herein below. I did not receive, within a reasonable time after the
transmission, any electronic message or other indication that the transmission
was unsuccessful.
checked. (for U.S. First- Class Mail) in a sealed envelope placed for
collection and mailing at Los Angeles, addressed to: (see below)
<<not>> checked. (for Certified Mail) in a sealed envelope
placed for collection and mailing as certified mail, return receipt requested,
Article No.: at Los Angeles, addressed to: (see below)
<<not>> checked. (for Overnight Delivery) together with a copy
of this declaration, in an envelope, or package designated by UPS, Tracking
No.: addressed to: (see below)
Person Served: Kristin L. Day
Business-Residential Address: Kristin L. Day 1911 Douglas Blvd., Ste. 85
PMB 245, Roseville, CA 95661
Fax Number:
Electronic Address:
Courtesy Copy to:
<< not>> checked. via inter-office mail regularly processed and
maintained by the State Bar of California addressed to:
I am readily familiar with the State Bar of California’s practice for
collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States
Postal Service, and overnight delivery by the United Parcel Service (’UPS’). In
the ordinary course of the State Bar of California’s practice, correspondence
collected and processed by the State Bar of California would be deposited with the
United States Postal Service that same day, and for overnight delivery,
deposited with delivery fees paid or provided for, with UPS that same day.
I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid
if postal cancellation date or postage meter date on the envelope or package is
more than one day after date of deposit for mailing contained in the affidavit.
I declare under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the State of
California, that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at San Francisco,
California, on the date shown below.
DATED: November 6, 2013
SIGNED BY: Meagan McGowan
Declarant
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over
the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to
standard court practice, in the City and County of San Francisco, on November
18, 2013, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND
ORDER APPROVING; ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE ENROLLMENT
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through
the United States Postal Service at San Francisco, California, addressed as
follows:
KRISTIN L. DAY
DAY LEGAL SERVICES
1911 DOUGLAS BLVD
STE. 85 PMB 245
ROSEVILLE, CA 95661
<<not>> checked. by certified mail, No. , with return receipt
requested, through the United States Postal Service at , California, addressed
as follows:
<<not>> checked. by overnight mail at , California, addressed
as follows:
<<not>> checked. by fax transmission, at fax number . No error
was reported by the fax machine that I used.
<<not>> checked. By personal service by leaving the documents
in a sealed envelope or package clearly labeled to identify the attorney being
served with a receptionist or a person having charge of the attorney’s office,
addressed as follows:
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the
State Bar of California addressed as follows:
SUZAN J. ANDERSON, Enforcement, San Francisco
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San
Francisco, California, on November 18, 2013.
Signed by:
Mazie Yip
Case Administrator
State Bar Court