Case Number(s): 12-O-13198
In the Matter of: Leah Singer-Lamstein, Bar # 161413, A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Christine Souhrada, Deputy Trial Counsel
180 Howard Street
San Francisco, CA 94105
Tel: (415) 538-2183
Bar # 228256
Counsel for Respondent: Ethan A. Balogh, Coleman & Balogh LLP
744 Montgomery Street, 5th Floor
San Francisco, CA 94111
Tel: (415) 391-0440
Bar # 172224
Submitted to: Settlement Judge State Bar Court Clerk’s Office San Francisco
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted December 4, 1992.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 10 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
<<not>> checked. Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 5.130, Rules of Procedure.
checked. Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: two billing cycles following the effective date of the Supreme Court order. (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
<<not>> checked. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs are entirely waived.
See Attachment
IN THE MATTER OF: Leah Singer-Lamstein
CASE NUMBER(S): 12-O-13198
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that she is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct.
Case No. 12-O-13198 (State Bar Investigation)
FACTS:
1. In order to remain as an active member of the State Bar, Respondent was required to complete 25 hours of minimum continuing legal education ("MCLE") during the period of February 1, 2008, through January 31, 2011 (the "compliance period").
2. On January 25, 2011, Respondent reported to the State Bar that she was in compliance with the MCLE requirements, and, in particular, that she had completed her MCLE during the compliance period.
3. In fact, Respondent had not completed her required MCLE courses within the compliance period.
4. When Respondent reported to the State Bar that she was in compliance with the MCLE requirements, Respondent knew or was grossly negligent in not knowing that she had not completed the MCLE during the compliance period as required.
5. Respondent took additional MCLE courses necessary to come into compliance after being contacted by Membership Services regarding an audit of MCLE compliance.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
6. By reporting to the State Bar that she was in compliance with the MCLE requirements when she knew or was grossly negligent in not knowing that she was not in compliance with the MCLE requirements, Respondent intentionally or by gross negligence committed an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty and corruption in wilful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.
ADDITIONAL FACTS RE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
Although the misconduct is serious, Respondent has no prior record of discipline since her admission to the State Bar in 1992. See In The Matter of Stamper (Rev. Dept. 1990) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 96, fn 13; and In the Matter of Riordan (Rev. Dept. 2007) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr 41, 49.
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.
The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct provide a "process of fixing discipline" pursuant to a set of written principles to "better discharge the purposes of attorney discipline as announced by the Supreme Court." (Rules Proc. of State Bar, fit. IV, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof: Misconduct, Introduction (all further references to standards are to this source).) The primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings and of the sanctions imposed are "the protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; the maintenance of high professional standards by attorneys and the preservation of public confidence in the legal profession." (ln re Morse (1995) 11 Cal. 4th 184, 205; std 1.3.)
Although not binding, the standards are entitled to "great weight" and should be followed "whenever possible" in determining level of discipline. (ln re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal.4th 8.1, 92, quoting In re Brown (1995) 12 Cal. 4th 205, 220 and In re Young (1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 267, fn. 11 .) Adherence to the standards in the great majority of cases serves the valuable purpose of eliminating disparity and assuring consistency, that is, the imposition of similar attorney discipline for instances of similar attorney misconduct. (ln re Naney (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 190.) Any discipline recommendation different from that set forth in the applicable standards should clearly explain the reasons for the deviation. (Blair v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 762, 776, fn. 5.)
Standard 2.3 provides that "Culpability of a member of an act of moral turpitude, fraud, or intentional dishonesty toward a court, client, or another person ... shall result in actual suspension or disbarment depending upon the extent to which the victim of the misconduct is harmed or misled and depending upon the magnitude of the act of misconduct and the degree to which it relates to the member’s acts within the practice of law."
Whether made through gross negligence or intentional dishonesty, Respondent’s false statement regarding her MCLE compliance is serious and constitutes an act of dishonesty directly relating to the practice of law.
Although there is no California case addressing an attorney’s misrepresentation concerning MCLE compliance, we can look to other states for guidance. In the Matter of Diggs (S.C. 2001) 544 S.E. 2d 628, details the importance of continuing legal education and of attorneys’ honesty in reporting their MCLE compliance.
"Truthful representations on CLE compliance reports are essential to the successful operation of the South Carolina CLE program. Our CLE program operates on an honor system. The Commission does not check the accuracy of every attorney’s CLE compliance report.... In order for the CLE program to be successful, and provide the public with competent, educated attorneys, South Carolina attorneys must complete the required number of CLE hours." (Id. at 631-632.)
These policy reasons for requiring attorneys to take continuing legal education apply to California.
Respondent’s misconduct is analogous to Drociak v. State Bar, (Cal. 1991) 52 Cal. 3d 1085. In Drociak, the attorney used his client’s presigned verification to respond to discovery without first consulting with his client to ensure the veracity of assertions of fact in the discovery responses in violation of Business and Professions Code sections 6106 and 6068(d), and former rule 7-105(1). The attorney, who had no prior record of discipline in 25 years of practice, received a 30-day actual suspension. In imposing the 30-day actual suspension, the Supreme Court specifically cited to Standard 2.3, noting that "The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct ... make violation of section 6106 punishable by disbarment or actual suspension" and further noted that "[p]etitioner’s prior ’clean’ record is commendable, but it does not render the recommended 30-day actual suspension inappropriate." (ld. at 1090-1091.)
See also: Bach v. State Bar, 43 Cal. 3d 848 (Cal. 1987) [attorney, who had previously been publically reproved and who made false statements to a court about events that had occurred at a hearing before another judge and about receiving a court order, received an actual suspension of 60 days after the Supreme Court found the behavior involved moral turpitude.]
Although Respondent’s misconduct does not involve a misrepresentation to a court, it is clearly behavior that undermines the public’s confidence in the legal profession. Reporting of CLE compliance is on the honor-system. The State Bar relies on an attorney’s word when reporting compliance. When an attorney takes advantage of an honor-system to lie, it undermines the public’s confidence in the legal profession. Thus, although Respondent did not lie to a court, her misconduct is still serous and warrants actual suspension.
Standard 2.3 clearly applies to the present case. However, since there is no harm to a client, since the matter involves only a single act of misconduct, and in light of Respondent’s lack of prior misconduct, a level of discipline at the low-end range of discipline, pursuant to standard 2.3, is consistent with the purposes of attorney sanctions. As the present case is most analogous to Drociak, in that Respondent made a misrepresentation in order to circumvent requirements imposed for important policy reasons, an equal level of discipline is appropriate. Thus 30 days’ actual suspension is appropriate in this matter.
PENDING PROCEEDINGS.
The disclosure date referred to, on page 2, paragraph A(7), was January 17, 2013.
COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.
Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has informed respondent that as of January 17, 2013, the prosecution costs in this matter are $5,308. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.
EXCLUSION FROM MCLE CREDIT
Pursuant to rule 3201, Respondent may not receive MCLE credit for completion of State Bar Ethics School to be ordered as a condition of reproval or suspension. (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 3201.)
Case Number(s): 12-O-13198
In the Matter of: Leah Singer-Lamstein (SBN 16143)
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: Leah Singer-Lamstein
Date: 1/26/2013
Respondent’s Counsel: Ethan A. Balogh
Date: 1/28/13
Deputy Trial Counsel: Christine Souhrada
Date: 1/29/13
Case Number(s): 12-O-13198
In the Matter of: Leah Singer-Lamstein (SBN 161413)
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58 (E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Lucy Armendariz
Date: February 1, 2013
[Rule 62(b), Rules Proc.; Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of San Francisco, on February 1, 2013, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at San Francisco, California, addressed as follows:
ETHAN A. BALOGH
COLEMAN & BALOGH LLP
744 MONTGOMERY ST 5TH FL
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94111
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
Christine Souhrada, Enforcement, San Francisco
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California on February 1, 2013.
Signed by:
George Hue
Case Administrator
State Bar Court