

ORIGINAL

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State Bar Court of California Hearing Department Los Angeles DISBARMENT		
Counsel For The State Bar Kimberly G. Anderson Senior Trial Counsel 1149 S. Hill Street Los Angeles, CA 90015 (213)765-1083 Bar # 150359	Case Number(s): 12-O-14087-DFM 12-O-14580 13-O-10574-INV#	For Court use only <div style="text-align: center;"> FILED APR 26 2013 <i>YJC</i> STATE BAR COURT CLERK'S OFFICE LOS ANGELES </div>
In Pro Per Respondent Aaron Michael Ellis Bar # 248862	<h1 style="margin: 0;">PUBLIC MATTER</h1>	
In the Matter of: Aaron Michael Ellis 12361 Penn Street Whittier, CA 90602 (562)248-6660 Bar # 248862 A Member of the State Bar of California (Respondent)	Submitted to: Settlement Judge STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING; ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE ENROLLMENT DISBARMENT <input type="checkbox"/> PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED	

Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.

A. Parties' Acknowledgments:

- (1) Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted May 28, 2007.
- (2) The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
- (3) All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of (13) pages, not including the order.

(Effective January 1, 2011)

Disbarment



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- (4) A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
- (5) Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law."
- (6) The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
- (7) No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
- (8) Payment of Disciplinary Costs—Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
 - Costs to be awarded to the State Bar.
 - Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
 - Costs are entirely waived.
- (9) ORDER OF INACTIVE ENROLLMENT:
The parties are aware that if this stipulation is approved, the judge will issue an order of inactive enrollment under Business and Professions Code section 6007, subdivision (c)(4), and Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, rule 5.111(D)(1).

B. Aggravating Circumstances [for definition, see Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct, standard 1.2(b)]. Facts supporting aggravating circumstances are required.

- (1) **Prior record of discipline**
 - (a) State Bar Court case # of prior case 11-O-18098, 11-O-18136, 12-O-10265, 12-O-10588 and 12-O-11469
 - (b) Date prior discipline effective September 27, 2012
 - (c) Rules of Professional Conduct/ State Bar Act violations: Rules 3-110(A), 3-700(D)(2), 4-100(B)(3), 4-100(B)(4) and Business and Professions Code, section 6068(m). See Stipulation Attachment at page 9 for additional details regarding Respondent's actual suspension.
 - (d) Degree of prior discipline One year stayed suspension and three years' probation with conditions including a six-month actual suspension.
 - (e) If respondent has two or more incidents of prior discipline, use space provided below:
- (2) **Dishonesty:** Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by or followed by bad faith, dishonesty, concealment, overreaching or other violations of the State Bar Act or Rules of Professional Conduct.
- (3) **Trust Violation:** Trust funds or property were involved and respondent refused or was unable to account to the client or person who was the object of the misconduct for improper conduct toward said funds or property.

(Effective January 1, 2011)

Disbarment

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- (4) **Harm:** Respondent's misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public or the administration of justice. See Stipulation Attachment at page 10.
- (5) **Indifference:** Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for the consequences of his or her misconduct.
- (6) **Lack of Cooperation:** Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims of his/her misconduct or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation or proceedings.
- (7) **Multiple/Pattern of Misconduct:** Respondent's current misconduct evidences multiple acts of wrongdoing or demonstrates a pattern of misconduct. See Stipulation Attachment at page 10.
- (8) **No aggravating circumstances** are involved.

Additional aggravating circumstances:

C. Mitigating Circumstances [see standard 1.2(e)]. Facts supporting mitigating circumstances are required.

- (1) **No Prior Discipline:** Respondent has no prior record of discipline over many years of practice coupled with present misconduct which is not deemed serious.
- (2) **No Harm:** Respondent did not harm the client or person who was the object of the misconduct.
- (3) **Candor/Cooperation:** Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and cooperation with the victims of his/her misconduct and to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation and proceedings.
- (4) **Remorse:** Respondent promptly took objective steps spontaneously demonstrating remorse and recognition of the wrongdoing, which steps were designed to timely atone for any consequences of his/her misconduct.
- (5) **Restitution:** Respondent paid \$ _____ on _____ in restitution to _____ without the threat or force of disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings.
- (6) **Delay:** These disciplinary proceedings were excessively delayed. The delay is not attributable to respondent and the delay prejudiced him/her.
- (7) **Good Faith:** Respondent acted in good faith.
- (8) **Emotional/Physical Difficulties:** At the time of the stipulated act or acts of professional misconduct respondent suffered extreme emotional difficulties or physical disabilities which expert testimony would establish was directly responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities were not the product of any illegal conduct by the member, such as illegal drug or substance abuse, and respondent no longer suffers from such difficulties or disabilities.
- (9) **Severe Financial Stress:** At the time of the misconduct, respondent suffered from severe financial stress which resulted from circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond his/her control and which were directly responsible for the misconduct.
- (10) **Family Problems:** At the time of the misconduct, respondent suffered extreme difficulties in his/her personal life which were other than emotional or physical in nature.

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- (11) **Good Character:** Respondent's good character is attested to by a wide range of references in the legal and general communities who are aware of the full extent of his/her misconduct.
- (12) **Rehabilitation:** Considerable time has passed since the acts of professional misconduct occurred followed by convincing proof of subsequent rehabilitation.
- (13) **No mitigating circumstances** are involved.

Additional mitigating circumstances:

See Stipulation Attachment at page 10.

D. Discipline: Disbarment.

E. Additional Requirements:

- (1) **Rule 9.20, California Rules of Court:** Respondent must comply with the requirements of rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 calendar days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court's Order in this matter.

- (2) **Restitution:** Respondent must make restitution to _____ in the amount of \$ _____ plus 10 percent interest per year from _____. If the Client Security Fund has reimbursed _____ for all or any portion of the principal amount, respondent must pay restitution to CSF of the amount paid plus applicable interest and costs in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6140.5. Respondent must pay the above restitution and furnish satisfactory proof of payment to the State Bar's Office of Probation in Los Angeles no later than _____ days from the effective date of the Supreme Court order in this case.

- (3) **Other:**

ATTACHMENT TO
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION

IN THE MATTER OF: Aaron Michael Ellis

CASE NUMBERS: 12-O-14087-DFM, 12-O-14580 and 13-O-10674

FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that he is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct.

Case No. 12-O-14087 (Complainant: Jeffrey Beck)

FACTS:

1. On July 23, 2010, Jeffrey Beck ("Beck") employed Respondent to represent him in an uncontested marital dissolution from his then wife, Daria Halkides ("Halkides"). On July 23, 2010, Beck paid Respondent \$2,100 in advanced fees and \$400 for filing fees. Respondent represented to Beck that his marital dissolution matter would be completed within six months.
2. On August 13, 2010, Beck provided Respondent with all necessary paperwork to file and complete the marital dissolution case.
3. On September 11, 2010, Beck emailed Respondent to ask if Respondent needed any more documentation from him. Respondent received the email.
4. On September 13, 2010, Respondent replied to Beck's September 11, 2010 email, stating he did not require any additional documentation from Beck and promising to contact Beck as soon as the paperwork had been finalized and sent to Halkides.
5. Between September 2010 and December 2010, Beck sent Respondent several emails asking whether Respondent had filed the petition for marital dissolution. Respondent received each of the emails.
6. On December 9, 2010, Respondent filed the petition for marital dissolution in the case entitled *Jeffrey Michael Beck v. Daria Jean Halkides*, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. GD046776 ("the dissolution case.").
7. On February 16, 2011, after receiving several more emails from Beck, Respondent served Halkides with the petition in the dissolution case.
8. On June 17, 2011, Respondent sent an email to Halkides with copies of paperwork he told her she needed to sign to complete the dissolution case. On June 23, 2011, Halkides signed the documents and returned them to Respondent so that he could file them with the court.

9. On July 1, 2011, Respondent submitted a Request for Entry of Default and a Declaration For Default or Uncontested Dissolution and a Judgment for Dissolution in the dissolution case.

10. On July 1, 2011, the court clerk entered default against Halkides in the dissolution case.

11. On October 27, 2011, the court in the dissolution case sent Respondent notice that the court was returning the judgment because of the following deficiencies: Respondent had failed to submit Judicial Council form FL-141- Declaration Regarding Service of Declaration of Disclosure and Income and Expense Declarations from both Beck and Halkides. Respondent received the notice of deficiencies, but did not correct the deficiencies with the court at any time.

12. On February 3, 2012, Respondent represented in an email to Beck that there had been deficiencies with the initial paperwork he had presented to the court on July 1, 2011, but he falsely represented that he had corrected the deficiencies. At the time Respondent represented that he had corrected the deficiencies, he knew the deficiencies had not been corrected.

13. In March 2012, Respondent closed his law office and effectively terminated his representation of Beck without having completed the dissolution case.

14. On March 9, 2012, Beck demanded an accounting from Respondent. Respondent received Beck's request for an accounting.

15. To date, Respondent has failed to provide Beck with a proper accounting.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

16. By failing to correct the deficiencies in the paperwork filed with the court at any time between October 27, 2011 and March 9, 2012, by failing to complete the dissolution case between July 2010 and March 2012 when he promised the case would be completed within six months, and by closing his law practice and terminating his representation of Beck without completing the dissolution case, Respondent intentionally, recklessly or repeatedly failed to perform competent legal services in willful violation of rule 3-110(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

17. By terminating his representation of Beck in March 2012, and by closing his law practice without informing Beck and without having completed the dissolution case for Beck, Respondent failed, upon termination of employment, to take reasonable steps to avoid reasonably foreseeable prejudice to his client in willful violation of rule 3-700(A)(2) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

18. By failing to provide Beck with a proper accounting for the \$2,500 at any time between March 9, 2012 and the present, Respondent failed to render appropriate accounts to a client regarding all funds coming into Respondent's possession in willful violation of rule 4-100(B)(3) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

19. By falsely representing to Beck on February 3, 2012 that he had corrected the deficiencies with the initial paperwork he had presented to the court on July 1, 2011, when he knew the deficiencies had not been corrected, Respondent committed an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.

Case No. 12-O-14580 (Complainant: Daniel Fierros)

FACTS:

20. On July 27, 2010, Caine and Webber Company, Inc. ("Caine and Webber") filed a lawsuit against Skyrise Construction, Gabriel Fierros ("Gabriel") and Daniel Fierros ("Daniel") in Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 10C03096 ("the civil case"). At all relevant times, Gabriel and Daniel were co-owners of Skyrise Construction.

21. On October 4, 2010, Caine and Webber obtained a default judgment in the civil case against Skyrise Construction, Gabriel and Daniel in the amount of \$16,958.

22. On November 11, 2010, Gabriel and Daniel hired Respondent to set aside the default judgment in the civil case because they had never been properly served and they hired Respondent to defend them and Skyrise against the claims of Caine and Webber.

23. On May 10, 2011, the court set aside the default judgment in the civil case and set the case for a status conference on June 28, 2011.

24. On June 28, 2011, the court in the civil case set the trial date for September 15, 2011.

25. On September 15, 2011, the court in the civil case continued the trial date to October 13, 2011.

26. On October 13, 2011, the parties in the civil case stipulated to a continuance of the trial date and the court ordered the trial date continued to December 8, 2011. Respondent had actual knowledge of the December 8, 2011 trial date but did not tell Gabriel and Daniel of the trial date even though he knew the testimony of Gabriel and Daniel was necessary to defend the case.

27. On December 8, 2011, approximately ten minutes before the trial was to begin in the civil case, Respondent called Daniel and Gabriel from the courthouse to tell them he needed them as witnesses. Both Daniel and Gabriel were too far away to get to the courthouse for the trial. The trial went forward without Daniel and Gabriel, and Respondent was unable to present any defense.

28. On February 29, 2012, the court in the civil case entered judgment in favor of Caine and Webber and against Skyrise, Gabriel and Daniel in the amount of \$17,391.97.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

29. By failing to advise his clients of the December 8, 2011 trial date until approximately ten minutes before the trial was to begin on December 8, 2011, Respondent intentionally, recklessly or repeatedly failed to perform competent legal services in willful violation of rule 3-110(A) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

FACTS:

30. On August 28, 2012, the California Supreme Court filed disciplinary Order No. S203663 (State Bar Court Case Nos. 11-O-18098 et. al.) (hereinafter "9.20 Order"). The 9.20 Order required Respondent to comply with rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, by performing the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) within 30 and 40 days, respectively, after the effective date of the 9.20 Order.

31. On August 28, 2012, the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the State of California properly served upon Respondent a copy of the 9.20 Order. Respondent received the 9.20 Order.

32. The 9.20 Order became effective on September 27, 2012, thirty days after the 9.20 Order was filed, and at all times thereafter remained in full force and effect. Thus Respondent was ordered to comply with subdivision (a) of rule 9.20 no later than October 27, 2012, and was ordered to file a Compliance Declaration with the Clerk of the State Bar Court no later than November 6, 2012.

33. On October 26, 2012, Respondent filed with the State Bar Court his Compliance Declaration stating under penalty of perjury that he had complied with subdivision (a) of rule 9.20.

34. However, Respondent had not complied with subdivision (a) of rule 9.20 because he had not notified all opposing counsel of his suspension. Specifically, at the time of his suspension, Respondent was the attorney of record for the Petitioner in a marital dissolution case entitled *Theresa Marie Trospen v. Alan Gregory Trospen*, Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. YD058083 ("the Trospen case"). At no time did Respondent notify the opposing counsel in the Trospen case, Richard Cherry ("Cherry"), that he had been suspended and was not entitled to practice law.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

35. By failing to notify opposing counsel Cherry in the Trospen case that he had been suspended and was not entitled to practice law, Respondent failed to comply with the 9.20 Order and willfully violated rule 9.20, subdivision (a), California Rules of Court.

36. By filing his rule 9.20(c) Compliance Declaration on October 26, 2012 in which he stated under penalty of perjury that he had complied with rule 9.20, subdivision (a), when in fact Respondent had not notified opposing counsel Cherry that he had been suspended and was not entitled to practice law, Respondent committed an act of moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.

ADDITIONAL FACTS RE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

Prior Record of Discipline (Std. 1.2(b)(i)): Respondent committed thirteen acts of professional misconduct in five client matters between approximately August 2011 and February 2012. The misconduct involved three violations of rule 3-700(D)(2), three violations of rule 3-110(A), three violations of rule 3-700(B)(3), one violation of rule 4-100(B)(4), and three violations of Business and Professions Code section 6068(m). Respondent received a one-year stayed suspension and three years' of probation, with conditions including a six-month actual suspension.

Harm (Std. 1.2(b)(iv)): Respondent caused substantial delay to Beck and Halkides in completing their uncontested dissolution case. Respondent's failure to perform competently for Daniel and Gabriel Fierros resulted in their being deprived of a right to defend the case against them and Skyrise Construction in court.

Multiple Acts of Misconduct (Std. 1.2(b)(ii)): Respondent's misconduct in the current matter involves six acts of professional misconduct in three different matters.

ADDITIONAL FACTS RE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

Additional Mitigating Circumstances: Respondent agreed to enter into a full and complete stipulation as to facts, legal conclusions and disposition of this matter prior to the trial in this matter, thereby saving the State Bar the time and resources of having to conduct a trial in this matter. (See, *In the Matter of Riordan* (Review Dept. 2007) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 41, 50.)

AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.

The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct provide a "process of fixing discipline" pursuant to a set of written principles to "better discharge the purposes of attorney discipline as announced by the Supreme Court." (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, Introduction (all further references to standards are to this source).) The primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings and of the sanctions imposed are "the protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; the maintenance of high professional standards by attorneys and the preservation of public confidence in the legal profession." (*In re Morse* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 184, 205; std. 1.3.)

Although not binding, the standards are entitled to "great weight" and should be followed "whenever possible" in determining level of discipline. (*In re Silvertown* (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 92, quoting *In re Brown* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 205, 220 and *In re Young* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 267, fn. 11.) Adherence to the standards in the great majority of cases serves the valuable purpose of eliminating disparity and assuring consistency, that is, the imposition of similar attorney discipline for instances of similar attorney misconduct. (*In re Naney* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 190.) Any discipline recommendation different from that set forth in the applicable standards should clearly explain the reasons for the deviation. (*Blair v. State Bar* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 762, 776, fn. 5.)

Respondent admits to committing six acts of professional misconduct. Standard 1.6 (a) requires that where a Respondent acknowledges two or more acts of misconduct, and different sanctions are prescribed by the standards that apply to those acts, the sanction imposed shall be the more or most severe prescribed in the applicable standards.

The most severe sanction applicable to Respondent's misconduct is found in standard 2.3, which applies to Respondent's violation of Business and Professions Code section 6106.

Standard 2.3 provides that:

Culpability of a member of an act of moral turpitude, fraud, or intentional dishonesty toward a court, client or another person or of concealment of a material fact to a court, client or another person shall result in actual

suspension or disbarment depending upon the extent to which the victim of the misconduct is harmed or misled and depending upon the magnitude of the act of misconduct and the degree to which it relates to the member's acts within the practice of law.

Standard 1.7(a) states:

If a member is found culpable of professional misconduct in any proceeding in which discipline may be imposed and the member has a record of one prior imposition of discipline...the degree of discipline imposed in the current proceeding shall be greater than that imposed in the prior proceeding unless the prior discipline was so remote in time to the current proceeding and the offense for which it was imposed was so minimal in severity that imposing greater discipline in the current proceeding would be manifestly unjust.

Respondent's prior discipline was a six month actual suspension, so pursuant to standard 1.7(a), the current discipline must be greater than six months' actual suspension. Given that Respondent's misconduct involves three aggravating factors and one mitigating factor, and the misconduct involves a wide range of types of misconduct evidencing Respondent's inability to conform his conduct to the high ethical standards required of attorneys, disbarment is warranted. Respondent's misconduct harmed each of his clients in that he delayed completion of an uncontested dissolution matter for his client Beck and his failure to perform competently on behalf of the Fierros Brothers resulted in depriving the Fierros from their right to defend themselves in court. In each of these cases, Respondent's conducted directly related to the practice of law. Therefore, taking into consideration standards 2.3 and 1.7(a), disbarment is the appropriate discipline.

The State Bar acknowledges that there is some overlap in the misconduct in the client matters involving Beck and the Fierros Brothers which overlaps with the time frame of Respondent's prior discipline in Case No. S203663 (State Bar Court Case Nos. 11-O-18098 et. al.). However, Respondent's misconduct in Beck matter and in the rule 9.20 matter extended beyond the date he entered into the prior disciplinary stipulation and beyond the date the disciplinary order became effective. Therefore, the prior record of discipline should be treated as aggravation. The analysis in *In the Matter of Sklar* (Review Dept. 1993) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 602, 619, which permits the court to reweigh overlapping disciplinary matters as if they were a single disciplinary matter, is not applicable where new misconduct occurred after the filing of formal charges in the prior case. (*Barnum v. State Bar* (1990) 52 Cal.3d 104, 111-112.)

Rule 9.20(d) also provides support for the fact that Respondent should be disbarred. It states: "A suspended member's willful failure to comply with the provisions of this rule is a cause for disbarment or suspension and for revocation of any pending probation. ..." The fact that Respondent failed to comply with this Court's 9.20 Order in Case No. S203663 (State Bar Court Case Nos. 11-O-18098 et. al.) so quickly after entering into the stipulation for discipline in that matter, and the fact that the misconduct surrounding the violation included dishonesty, suggests that Respondent is not amenable to a further grant of probation at this time.

Case law also supports a disbarment recommendation.

In *Farnham v. State Bar* (1988) 47 Cal.3d 429, the attorney was found to have committed misconduct in seven client matters, which included failing to perform competent legal services, failing to respond to client inquiries, misrepresenting the status of client cases, failing to return unearned fees and client papers. The attorney was disbarred.

Disbarment is also the presumptive sanction for a former rule 955 and current rule 9.20 violation. (See, *Lydon v. State Bar* (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1181.)

PENDING PROCEEDINGS.

The disclosure date referred to on page 2, paragraph A(7), was April 15, 2013.

DISMISSALS.

<u>Case No.</u>	<u>Count</u>	<u>Violation</u>
12-O-14087	Four	Rule 3-700(D)(2), Rules of Professional Conduct

COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.


Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has informed respondent that as of April 15, 2013, the prosecution costs in this matter are approximately \$8,785.32. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.


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In the Matter of: Aaron Michael Ellis	Case number(s): 12-O-14087-DFM, 12-O-14580 and 13-O-10574
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SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES

By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitations and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Disposition.

4/15/13  Aaron Ellis
Date Respondent's Signature Print Name

4/15/13  KIMBERLY G. Anderson
Date Deputy Trial Counsel's Signature Print Name

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In the Matter of: Aaron Michael Ellis	Case Number(s): 12-O-14087-DFM, 12-O-14580, 13-O-10574
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DISBARMENT ORDER

Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any, is GRANTED without prejudice, and:

- The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
- The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
- All Hearing dates are vacated.

The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58(E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) **The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)**

Respondent _____ is ordered transferred to involuntary inactive status pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6007, subdivision (c)(4). Respondent's inactive enrollment will be effective three (3) calendar days after this order is served by mail and will terminate upon the effective date of the Supreme Court's order imposing discipline herein, or as provided for by rule 5.111(D)(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California, or as otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court pursuant to its plenary jurisdiction.

Date 4/24/13 _____
RICHARD A. HONN
Judge of the State Bar Court

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on April 26, 2013, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING; ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE ENROLLMENT - DISBARMENT

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:

- by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:

**AARON M. ELLIS
12361 PENN ST
WHITTIER, CA 90602**

- by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

KIMBERLY ANDERSON, Enforcement, Los Angeles

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on April 26, 2013.



Tammy Cleaver
Case Administrator
State Bar Court