State Bar Court of California
Hearing Department
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING DISBARMENT; ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE
ENROLLMENT
DISBARMENT
Case Number(s): 12-O-14637, 12-O-15347, 12-O-15548,
12-O-16379, 12-O-16600
12-O-17070, 13-O-10500
In the Matter of: PAUL ERIC St. AMANT, Bar # 236141, A
Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Ashod Mooradian, Bar # 194283,
Counsel for Respondent: Paul Eric St. Amant, Bar #236141,
Submitted to: Assigned Judge.
Filed: December 4, 2013.
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION
REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any
additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be
set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g.,
"Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law,"
"Supporting Authority," etc.
A. Parties' Acknowledgments:
1.
Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted May 24,
2005.
2.
The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained
herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the
Supreme Court.
3.
All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption
of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed
consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under
"Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 23 pages, not including
the order.
4.
A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or
causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5.
Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts
are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6.
The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level
of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7.
No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent
has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not
resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8.
Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of
Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
checked. Costs are awarded to the
State Bar.
<<not>> checked. Costs
are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial
Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs
are entirely waived.
9.
ORDER OF INACTIVE ENROLLMENT:
The parties are aware that if this stipulation is approved, the judge will
issue an order of inactive enrollment under Business and Professions Code
section 6007, subdivision (c)(4), and Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, rule
5.111(D)(1).
B. Aggravating Circumstances [for definition, see Standards for Attorney
Sanctions for Professional Misconduct, standard 1.2(b)]. Facts supporting aggravating
circumstances are required.
<<not>> checked. (1) Prior
record of discipline
<<not>> checked. (a) State Bar Court case # of prior case .
<<not>> checked. (b) Date prior discipline effective .
<<not>> checked. (c) Rules of Professional Conduct/ State
Bar Act violations:
<<not>> checked. (d) Degree of prior discipline
<<not>> checked. (e) If Respondent has two or more incidents
of prior discipline, use space provided below. .
<<not>> checked. (2) Dishonesty:
Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by or followed by bad faith, dishonesty,
concealment, overreaching or other violations of the State Bar Act or Rules of
Professional Conduct.
<<not>> checked. (3) Trust
Violation: Trust funds or property were involved and Respondent refused or was
unable to account to the client or person who was the object of the misconduct
for improper conduct toward said funds or property.
checked. (4) Harm: Respondent's
misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public or the administration of justice.
See Attachment at page 19.
<<not>> checked. (5) Indifference:
Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for
the consequences of his or her misconduct.
<<not>> checked. (6) Lack of
Cooperation: Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims
of his/her misconduct or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation or
proceedings.
checked. (7) Multiple/Pattern of
Misconduct: Respondent's current misconduct evidences multiple acts of wrongdoing
or demonstrates a pattern of misconduct. See Attachment at page 19.
<<not>> checked. (8) No
aggravating circumstances are involved.
Additional aggravating circumstances: None.
C. Mitigating Circumstances [see standard 1.2(e)]. Facts supporting mitigating
circumstances are required.
<<not>> checked. (1) No Prior Discipline: Respondent has no prior record
of discipline over many years of practice coupled with present misconduct which
is not deemed serious.
<<not>>
checked. (2) No Harm: Respondent did not harm the client or person who was
the object of the misconduct.
<<not>>
checked. (3) Candor/Cooperation: Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and
cooperation with the victims of his/her misconduct and to the State Bar during
disciplinary investigation and proceedings.
<<not>>
checked. (4) Remorse: Respondent promptly took objective steps spontaneously
demonstrating remorse and recognition of the wrongdoing, which steps were
designed to timely atone for any consequences of his/her misconduct.
<<not>>
checked. (5) Restitution: Respondent paid $ on in restitution to without
the threat or force of disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings.
<<not>>
checked. (6) Delay: These disciplinary proceedings were excessively
delayed. The delay is not attributable to Respondent and the delay prejudiced
him/her.
<<not>>
checked. (7) Good Faith: Respondent acted in good faith.
<<not>>
checked. (8) Emotional/Physical Difficulties: At the time of the stipulated
act or acts of professional misconduct Respondent suffered extreme emotional
difficulties or physical disabilities which expert testimony would establish
was directly responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities
were not the product of any illegal conduct by the member, such as illegal drug
or substance abuse, and Respondent no longer suffers from such difficulties or
disabilities.
<<not>>
checked. (9) Severe Financial Stress: At the time of the misconduct,
Respondent suffered from severe financial stress which resulted from
circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond his/her control
and which were directly responsible for the misconduct.
<<not>>
checked. (10) Family Problems: At the time of the misconduct, Respondent
suffered extreme difficulties in his/her personal life which were other than
emotional or physical in nature.
<<not>>
checked. (11) Good Character: Respondent's good character is attested to by a
wide range of references in the legal and general communities who are aware of
the full extent of his/her misconduct.
<<not>>
checked. (12) Rehabilitation: Considerable time has passed since the acts of
professional misconduct occurred followed by convincing proof of subsequent
rehabilitation.
<<not>>
checked. (13) No mitigating circumstances are involved.
Additional
mitigating circumstances: See Attachment at page 19.
D. Discipline: Disbarment.
E. Additional Requirements:
(1) Rule 9.20,
California Rules of Court: Respondent must comply with the requirements of
rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in
subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 calendar days,
respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court's Order in this
matter.
<<not>> checked. (2) Restitution:
Respondent must make restitution to in the amount of $ plus 10 percent
interest per year from . If the Client Security Fund has reimbursed for all
or any portion of the principal amount, respondent must pay restitution to CSF
of the amount paid plus applicable interest and costs in accordance with
Business and Professions Code section 6140.5. Respondent must pay the above
restitution and furnish satisfactory proof of payment to the State Bar's Office
of Probation in Los Angeles no later than days from the effective date of the
Supreme Court order in this case..
checked. (3) Other: Restitution
(See attachment pg. 21-22).
Attachment language (if any):.
ATTACHMENT TO
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION
IN THE MATTER OF: PAUL ERIC St. AMANT, State Bar No. 236141
STATE BAR COURT CASE NUMBER: 12-O-14637, 12-O-15347, 12-O-15548,
12-O-16379,12-O-16600, 12-O-17070, 13-O-10500
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that he is culpable
of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct.
Case Nos. 12-O-14637, 12-O-15347, 12-O-15548, 12-O-16379, 12-O-16600, 12-O-17070,
13-O-10500
FACTS COMMON TO ALL MATTERS:
1. On September 1, 2010, "Consumer Legal Centers, A Professional Law
Corporation"
("CLC") was registered with the California Secretary of State by
non-attorney Ruben Ernesto Vargas ("Vargas").
2. CLC is not, and has never been, a "professional law
corporation" registered pursuant to the laws of the State of California
and the State Bar Act, Business and Professions Code section 6000 et seq.
3. At all relevant times, CLC was not, and has never been, owned by an
attorney, or had any attorney shareholders. CLC was managed and owned by
Vargas, along with non-attorneys Charlie Hernandez, Eric Vargas, Giovanni Perez
and Neftali Garcia and/or other non-attorney CLC employees.
4. On February 1, 2011, Respondent entered into a contract with Vargas on
behalf of CLC, whereby CLC agreed to pay Respondent $5,000 each month provided
that he worked a minimum of 20 hours that month on CLC legal matters.
5. At the time Respondent entered into the employment contract with CLC,
Respondent knew that CLC had never been a "professional law
corporation," and that CLC was owned by a non-attorney or non-attorneys.
6. Between February 2011 and February 2012, Respondent kept regular office
hours at CLC.
7. Beginning on February 1, 2011, Respondent misrepresented to the public
and to clients that he was the managing attorney and/or owner of CLC. This was
not true.
8. Between February 2011 and February 2012, Vargas, Charlie Hernandez, Eric
Vargas, Giovanni Perez and Neftali Garcia and/or other non-attorney CLC
employees regularly informed clients that Respondent was the managing attorney
and/or owner of CLC and would be the attorney handling their legal matters.
This was not true.
9. Between February 2011 and February 2012, Respondent permitted his name,
his law office name and his State Bar number to appear on CLC documents and
pleadings implying that Respondent was the managing attorney at CLC.
10. Between February 2011 and February 2012, Respondent knew that there was
no other attorney at CLC who was supervising Vargas, Charlie Hernandez, Eric
Vargas, Giovanni Perez and Neftali Garcia and/or other non-attorney CLC
employees.
11. Between February 2011 and February 2012, Respondent was the lawyer in
name only for CLC which was actually run by Vargas, Charlie Hernandez, Eric
Vargas, Giovanni Perez and Neftali Garcia and/or other non-attorney CLC
employees.
12. Between February 2011 and February 2012, Respondent took no steps to
stop Vargas, Charlie Hernandez, Eric Vargas, Giovanni Perez, Neftali Garcia
and/or other non-attorney CLC employees from using his name, his law office
name and his State Bar number in the day-to-day operations of CLC.
13. Respondent misled his clients, including but not limited to, Antonio
Sofia, Josefina and Benjamin Franco, Paulino and Merina Gonzalez, Teresa
Hermenegildo, Ruben Jauregui, Socorro Velazquez and Jose and Bertha Cruz
(collectively, the "CW clients") into believing that Respondent was
the managing attorney and/or owner of CLC and actually running CLC as his own
law office, when in truth and fact he was the managing attorney and/or owner of
CLC in name only.
14. Between February 2011 and February 2012, Vargas shared with Respondent
fees received from clients who retained Respondent through CLC.
15. Between February 2011 and February 2012, Respondent knowingly permitted
Vargas, Charlie Hernandez, Eric Vargas, Giovanni Perez and Neftali Garcia
and/or other non-attorney CLC employees to engage in the practice of law by,
among other things, meeting with potential clients including the CW clients,
providing legal advice to clients including the CW clients regarding their
respective legal matters, charging and collecting advanced fees from clients,
including the CW clients and entering into fee agreements for clients,
including the CW clients, that bore Respondent’s law office name and State Bar
number.
16. Between February 2011 and February 2012, Respondent failed to oversee
or supervise Vargas, Charlie Hernandez, Eric Vargas, Giovanni Perez, Neftali
Garcia and/or any other non-attorney CLC employees who were handling the legal
matters of Respondent’s clients who retained him through CLC.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
17. By permitting Vargas, Charlie Hernandez, Eric Vargas, Giovanni Perez,
Neftali Garcia and/or other non-attorney CLC employees to use his name, his law
office name and his State Bar number to appear on CLC documents and pleadings,
by taking no steps to stop Vargas, Charlie Hernandez, Eric Vargas, Giovanni
Perez, Neftali Garcia and/or other non-attorney CLC employees from using his
name, his law office name and his State Bar number in the day-to-day operations
of CLC and by allowing Vargas, Charlie Hernandez, Eric Vargas, Giovanni Perez,
Neftali Garcia and/or other non-attorney CLC employees to run CLC, Respondent
lent his name to be used as attorney by another person who was not an attorney
in wilful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6105.
18. By permitting Vargas, Charlie Hernandez, Eric Vargas, Giovanni Perez,
Neftali Garcia and/or other non-attorney CLC employees to use his name, his law
office name and his State Bar number, to meet with clients, to evaluate cases,
enter into retainer agreements with clients, to give legal advice to clients
about their cases, and to charge and collect advanced fees from clients,
including the CW clients, Respondent habitually disregarded his law practice
thereby committing an act or acts involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or
corruption in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.
19. By sharing with Vargas fees received from clients who retained
Respondent through CLC, Respondent shared legal fees with a person who is not a
lawyer in wilful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-320(A).
20. By allowing or permitting non-attorneys, including but not limited to,
Ruben Vargas, Eric Vargas, Charlie Hernandez, Giovanni Perez, Neftali Garcia
and/or any other non-attorney CLC employees to practice law by, among other
things, meeting with clients, evaluating cases, entering into retainer
agreements with clients, giving legal advice to clients about their cases, and
charging and collecting advanced fees from clients, including the CW clients,
by allowing or permitting CLC to use Respondent’s law office name and State Bar
number on its fee agreements and by failing to oversee or supervise Vargas,
Charlie Hernandez, Eric Vargas, Giovanni Perez, Neftali Garcia and/or any other
nonattorney CLC employees who were handling the legal matters of Respondent’s
clients, Respondent aided a person or entity in the unauthorized practice of
law in wilful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-300(A)
Case No. 12-O-14637 (Complainant: Antonio Soria)
FACTS:
21. On December 7, 2011, Antonio Soria ("Soria") went to CLC
regarding the possible foreclosure of his property and met with non-attorney
CLC employees. At the conclusion of this meeting, Sofia signed a fee agreement
hiring Respondent to file a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.
22. On December 7, 2011 and in March 2012, pursuant to the fee agreement,
Soria paid Respondent, through CLC, $8,900 in advanced fees.
23. Respondent failed to prepare or file a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition
for Soria or to perform any legal service of value on Soria’s behalf.
24. Respondent did not earn the $8,900 in advance fees that Soria paid to
him.
25. To date, Respondent has failed to refund any portion of unearned
advanced fees paid by Soria.
26. On February 28, 2012, Respondent established California Litigation and
Arbitration
Services, A Professional Law Corporation ("CLA"). Respondent
thereafter hired former CLC employees, including Eric Vargas, to work at CLA.
27. In March 2012, Sofia contacted CLC about his case. Sofia was told to
contact Respondent at his CLA office regarding his case.
28. On March 20, 2012, Soria faxed a notice to CLA, to the attention of
Eric Vargas, terminating Respondent’s services and requesting a complete refund
of all advanced fees paid.
29. On April 9, 2012, Eric Vargas, on behalf of Respondent, sent Soria a
letter containing an itemized accounting of $5,732.13 for work allegedly
performed by Respondent, and agreeing to refund the "remaining
balance" to Soria "within 2-3 weeks."
30. Respondent knew that the April 9, 2012 letter included an itemized
accounting of the advanced fees paid by Soria for work allegedly performed by
Respondent.
31. The itemized accounting contained in the April 9, 2012 letter was false
because the services listed therein were not actually performed by Respondent
or any person working at his direction or at all.
32. Respondent knew or was grossly negligent in not knowing that the
itemized accounting included in the April 9, 2012 letter was false.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
33. By failing to prepare or file a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition for
Soria or to perform any legal service of value on Soria’s behalf, Respondent
intentionally failed to perform legal services with competence in willful
violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A).
34. By failing to refund any portion of the $8,900 in advanced fees paid by
Soda, Respondent failed to refund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance
that has not been earned in wilful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct,
rule 3-700(D)(2).
35. By allowing Eric Vargas to send the April 9, 2012 letter to Sofia which
included a false itemized accounting of the advanced fees paid by Soria for
work allegedly performed by Respondent when Respondent knew, or was grossly
negligent in not knowing, that the itemized accounting included in the April 9,
2012 letter was false, Respondent committed an act involving moral turpitude,
dishonesty or corruption in wilful violation of Business and Professions Code,
section 6106.
Case No. 12-O-15347 (Complainants: Josefina and Benjamin Franco)
FACTS:
36. On March 6, 2011, Josefina and Benjamin Franco (the
"Francos") hired Respondent to provide legal services in connection
with a home mortgage loan modification with Aurora Loan Services LLC
("Aurora").
37. Between March 25, 2011 and June 3, 2011, the Francos paid Respondent,
through CLC, $5,000 in advanced fees to Respondent.
38. On June 21, 2011, Respondent filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on
behalf of the Francos, in the United States Bankruptcy Court ("Franco
bankruptcy”).
39. Thereafter, the court set a creditor’s meeting and confirmation hearing
for August 3, 2011 in the Franco bankruptcy. Respondent had notice of the
creditor meeting and confirmation hearing.
40. Respondent failed to submit necessary documents regarding the Franco
bankruptcy to the court and the bankruptcy Trustee in violation of applicable
statutes and local bankruptcy court rules.
41. On August 4, 2011, the court ordered the Franco bankruptcy dismissed
because Respondent failed to submit necessary documents to the court and the
bankruptcy trustee and ordered a 180-day bar against re-filing by the Francos.
Respondent had notice of the order dismissing the Franco bankruptcy.
42. On August 12, 2011, the Francos paid Respondent, through CLC, an
additional $1,500 in advanced fees despite the fact that the Franco bankruptcy
was already dismissed.
43. On September 28, 2011, Aurora obtained possession of the Francos’
property through an unlawful detainer proceeding where the Francos were
represented by Respondent.
44. Between March 25, 2011 and June 3, 2011, the Francos paid Respondent
$5,000 in advanced fees for a loan modification, pursuant to the fee agreement.
At the time, Respondent had not completed all of the loan modification services
he had agreed to perform.
45. In October, 2011, Respondent, through CLC staff, requested that the
Francos deposit $15,000 with CLC, for purposes of paying these funds as
settlement of all claims that Aurora had against the Francos.
46. On October 5, 2011, the Francos paid $10,000 to Respondent, through
CLC, for settlement of all claims that Aurora had against the Francos.
47. On October 21,2011, the Francos paid another $5,000 to Respondent,
through CLC, for settlement of all claims that Aurora had against the Francos.
48. At no time was any portion of the $15,000 deposited into Respondent’s
client trust account.
49. None of the $15,000 paid by the Francos to settle all claims that
Aurora had against the Francos was used for that purpose.
50. On October 5, 2011, Respondent dishonestly misappropriated $10,000 of
the Francos’ funds.
51. On October 21, 2011, Respondent dishonestly misappropriated $5,000 of
the Francos’ funds.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
52. By failing to submit necessary documents to the court and the
bankruptcy Trustee in violation of applicable statutes and local bankruptcy
court rules, resulting in the dismissal of the bankruptcy action as well as a
180-day bar against re-filing by the Francos, Respondent intentionally,
recklessly, or repeatedly failed to perform legal services with competence in
wilful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A).
53. By agreeing to negotiate a mortgage loan modification for the Francos
and collecting fees from them when he had not completed all loan modification
services he had agreed to perform, Respondent negotiated, arranged or otherwise
offered to perform a mortgage loan modification for a fee paid by the borrower,
and demanded, charged, collected or received such fee prior to fully performing
each and every service Respondent had contracted to perform or represented that
he would perform, in violation of Section 2944.7(a)(1) of the Civil Code, and
thereby wilfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3(a).
54. By failing to deposit the Francos’ $15,000 into his client trust
account, Respondent failed to deposit funds received for the benefit of a
client in a bank account labeled "Trust Account," "Client’s
Funds Account" or words of similar import in wilful violation of Rules of
Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(A).
55. By misappropriating $15,000 of the Francos’ funds, Respondent committed
an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption in wilful violation
of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.
Case No. 12-O-15548 (Complainant: Paulino and Merina Gonzalez)
FACTS:
56. In August 2011, CLC non-attorney employee "Yolanda" contacted
Paulino and Merina Gonzalez (the "Gonzalez’s") by phone, regarding
foreclosure proceedings against the Gonzalez’s home, and represented that
Respondent could assist the Gonzalez’s with keeping their home. Yolanda and CLC
non-attorney employee Sandra LaCruz subsequently solicited the Gonzalez’s at
their home. The Gonzalez’s had no family or prior professional relationship
with Respondent or CLC.
57. Prior to being contacted by agents of CLC, in August 2011, the
Gonzalez’s had not contacted Respondent or CLC, or requested a telephone call
from Respondent or any CLC employees regarding obtaining legal assistance
58. On August 15, 2011, the Gonzalez’s met with Ruben Vargas at the CLC
office. Vargas told the Gonzalez’s they must pay an initial advanced fee of
$5,000 before Respondent would begin working on their case, and $1,500 per
month thereafter.
59. On August 15, 2011, the Gonzalez’s hired Respondent to assist them with
keeping their home in connection with the pending foreclosure proceedings on
their property.
60. On August 15, 2011, the Gonzalez’s paid Respondent, through CLC, $2,500
in advanced fees.
61. On August 22, 2011, the Gonzalez’s paid Respondent, through CLC, an
additional $2,500 in advanced fees.
62. On September 21, 2011, Respondent filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition
for the Gonzalez’s in the United States Bankruptcy Court ("bankruptcy
action”).
63. On September 26, 2011, the Gonzalez’s signed a fee agreement with
Respondent, which stated that Respondent would file a Chapter 11 bankruptcy
petition for the Gonzalez’s and appear at the creditor’s meeting pursuant to 11
U.S.C. Section 341 ("Section 341"). The Gonzalez’s paid an advanced
fee of $3,961 to Respondent, through CLC.
64. On November 2, 2011, the court held a creditor’s meeting in the
bankruptcy action. Respondent had notice of the November 2, 2011 creditor’s
meeting but Respondent failed to appear and failed to notify the Gonzalez’s
that they must appear.
65. On November 3, 2011, the court continued the creditor’s meeting for the
bankruptcy action to November 23, 2011. The U.S. Trustee served Respondent with
notice of the November 23, 2011 creditor’s meeting. Respondent received the
notice.
66. On November 23, 2011, the court held a Section 341 creditor’s meeting
in the bankruptcy action. Respondent failed to appear at the creditor’s
meeting, and failed to notify the Gonzalez’s that they must appear.
67. On November 28, 2011, the court dismissed the bankruptcy action due to
Respondent’s failure to appear at the Section 341 creditor’s meeting.
Respondent had notice of the November 28, 2011 dismissal.
68. On January 25, 2012, the Bank of New York Mellon filed an unlawful
detainer against the Gonzalez’s ("Bank’s UD action").
69. In March 2012, the Gonzalez’s received a Notice to Vacate regarding the
Bank’s UD Action stating that they must turn over possession of their property
on or before March 29, 2012.
70. Thereafter, the Gonzalez’s met with Respondent at his office.
Respondent told the Gonzalez’s he would file a lawsuit to get them back into
their home.
71. Respondent performed no further legal services on behalf of the
Gonzalez’s.
72. In March 29, 2012, the Gonzalez’s were evicted from their home.
73. Thereafter, between March 2012 and June 2012, the Gonzalez’s repeatedly
phoned Respondent’s office seeking information about getting their home back,
but were unable to speak directly with Respondent, and instead left messages
requesting a return call from Respondent or spoke with Respondent’s employees.
Respondent received the messages. Respondent failed to return any of the
Gonzalez’s’ phone calls.
74. Respondent failed to earn the $9,500 in advanced fees paid by the
Gonzalez’s.
75. To date, Respondent has failed to refund any portion of the $9,500 in
unearned advanced fees paid by the Gonzalez’s.
76. To date, Respondent has failed to provide the Gonzalez’s with an
accounting for the $9,500 in advance fees.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
77. By failing to appear at the November 2, 2011 or November 23, 2011
creditor’s meetings, which resulted in the dismissal of the bankruptcy action,
by abandoning the bankruptcy action, and by failing to respond to the
Gonzalez’s’ efforts to contact him after he told them he could file a lawsuit
to get them back into their home, Respondent intentionally failed to perform
legal services with competence in wilful violation of Rules of Professional
Conduct, rule 3-110(A).
78. By failing to refund any portion of the unearned advanced fees paid by
the Gonzalez’s, Respondent failed to refund promptly any part of a fee paid in
advance that has not been earned in wilful violation of Rules of Professional
Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(2).
79. By failing to provide the Gonzalez’s with an accounting for the $9,500
in advanced fees that the Gonzalez’s paid CLC, Respondent failed to render
appropriate accounts to a client regarding all funds coming into Respondent’s
possession in wilful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule
4-100(B)(3).
80. By permitting CLC non-attorney employees Yolanda and Sandra LaCruz to
contact the Gonzalez’s by phone, go to the Gonzalez’s’ home to sell
Respondent’s legal services, and represent to the Gonzalez’s that Respondent,
through CLC, could assist the Gonzalez’s with keeping their home, Respondent
improperly solicited a prospective client in willful violation of Rules of
Professional Conduct, rule 1-400(C).
81. By failing to inform the Gonzalez’s they were required to attend the
November 2, 2011 and November 23, 2011 creditor’s meetings, and by failing to
respond to the Gonzalez’s’ phone calls and messages after Respondent told the
Gonzalez’s in March 2012 that he could file a lawsuit to get them back into
their home, Respondent failed to respond promptly to reasonable status
inquiries of a client in a matter in which Respondent had agreed to provide
legal services and failed to inform a client of significant developments in a
matter in which Respondent had agreed to provide legal services in willful
violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(m).
Case No. 12-O-16379 (Complainant: Teresa Hermenegildo)
FACTS:
82. On September 26, 2011, Teresa Hermenegildo ("Hermenegildo")
contacted CLC regarding loan modification for her two properties, and spoke
with CLC employee and non-attorney Charlie Hernandez, who advised Hermenegildo
to file a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.
83. On October 4, 2011, Charlie Hernandez went to Hermenegildo’s home and
again advised Hermenegildo to file a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.
84. On October 4, 2011, Hermenegildo hired Respondent, through CLC to file
a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition on her behalf. The fee agreement required Hermenegildo
to make an initial advanced fee payment of $5,000, and subsequent monthly
payments of $1,500.
85. Between October 4, 2011 and March 2012, Hermenegildo paid Respondent,
through CLC, a total of approximately $23,800 in advanced fees.
86. At no time did Respondent file a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition for
Hermenegildo, Respondent failed to provide any legal services of value for
Hermenegildo and failed to earn any portion of the $23,800 in advanced fees
paid by Hermenegildo.
87. In March 2012, Hermenegildo requested a full refund of the $23,800 in
advanced fees paid. Respondent’s agents promised Hermenegildo a full refund.
88. In April 2012, Hermenegildo again telephoned Respondent’s CLA office
and requested a full refund of the $23,800 in advanced fees paid. This time
Hermenegildo was told that Respondent would not provide a refund.
89. On April 20, 2012, Hermenegildo went to Respondent’s CLA office and
spoke with CLA staff regarding the refund of the $23,800 in advanced fees.
Respondent’s CLA staff promised Hermenegildo that Respondent would provide her
a refund.
90. To date, Respondent has failed to refund Hermenegildo any portion of
the $23,800 in advanced fees.
91. To date, Respondent has failed to provide Hermenegildo with an
accounting for the $23,800 in advanced fees.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
92. By failing to refund any portion of the $23,800 in unearned advanced
fees paid by Hermenegildo, Respondent failed to refund promptly any part of a
fee paid in advance that has not been earned in wilful violation of Rules of
Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(2).
93. By failing to provide Hermenegildo with an accounting for the $23,800
in advanced fees that Hermenegildo paid to Respondent, through CLC, Respondent
failed to render appropriate accounts to a client regarding all funds coming
into Respondent’s possession earned in wilful violation of Rules of
Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(B)(3).
94. By failing to provide any legal services of value for Hermenegildo,
Respondent intentionally failed to perform legal services with competence in
wilful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A).
Case No. 12-O-16600 (Complainant: Ruben Jauregui)
FACTS:
95. On February 8, 2011, Ruben Jauregui ("Jauregui") hired
Respondent, through CLC and entered into a fee agreement which provided that
Respondent would provide legal services to stop Jauregui’s lender from
foreclosing on his home.
96. The fee agreement also required Jauregui to make an initial advanced
fee payment of $1,500, and eight subsequent monthly payments of $1,500.
97. Between March 2011 and July 2011, Jauregui paid Respondent, through CLC
$7,500 in advanced fees. Between July 2011 and September 2011, Jauregui paid an
additional $1200.
98. On June 9, 2011, Respondent filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition and
plan on behalf of Jauregui, in the United States Bankruptcy Court
("Jauregui bankruptcy action"). Thereafter, the court set a
creditor’s meeting and confirmation hearing for September 28, 2011 in the
Jauregui bankruptcy action. Respondent received notice of the creditor meeting
and confirmation hearing for the Jauregui bankruptcy action.
99. On July 18, 2011, Respondent filed a "Debtor’s Notice of
Conversion of Bankruptcy Case from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7" in the
Jauregui bankruptcy action.
100. On September 28, 2011, Respondent failed to appear in court for the
creditors meeting for the Jauregui bankruptcy action.
101. On October 14, 2011, the Chapter 7 Trustee filed a request for
dismissal of the Jauregui bankruptcy action due to Respondent’s failure to
appear at the September 28, 2011 creditor meeting.
102. Respondent received notice of the Chapter 7 Trustee’s request for
dismissal but did not file any response or take any corrective action.
Respondent also failed to inform Jauregui of the pending request for dismissal.
103. On November 4, 2011, the bankruptcy court ordered the dismissal of the
Jauregui bankruptcy action.
104. Respondent received notice of the bankruptcy court’s dismissal of the
Jauregui bankruptcy action but failed to take any subsequent action or to
inform Jauregui of the dismissal.
105. Between on November 28, 2011 and on March 19, 2012, Jauregui paid
Respondent, through CLC, additional advanced fees in the amount of $1,900
pursuant to the fee agreement.
106. In April 2012, Jauregui met with Respondent, who informed Jauregui
that he should forget about trying to save his house and focus on bankruptcy.
At the time, Jauregui was still not aware that the bankruptcy court ordered the
dismissal of the Jauregui bankruptcy action.
107. Between April 22, 2012 and June 12, 2012, Jauregui paid Respondent,
through CLA, additional advanced fees in the amount of $1,500 pursuant to the
fee agreement.
108. Respondent failed to earn the $13,600 in advanced fees paid by
Jauregui.
109. To date, Respondent has failed to refund any portion of the $13,600 in
unearned advanced fees paid by Jauregui.
110. To date, Respondent has failed to provide Jauregui with an accounting
for the $13,600 in fees Jauregui paid to Respondent.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
111. By failing to respond to the trustee’s request for dismissal, by
failing to appear at the creditor meeting resulting in the dismissal of the
Jauregui bankruptcy action, by failing to take any action to set aside the
dismissal of the Jauregui bankruptcy action and by otherwise failing to perform
any legal service of value for Jauregui, Respondent intentionally failed to
perform legal services with competence in willful violation of Rules of
Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A).
112. By failing to refund any portion of the unearned advanced fees paid by
Jauregui, Respondent failed to refund promptly any part of a fee paid in
advance that has not been earned in wilful violation of Rules of Professional
Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(2).
113. By failing to provide Jauregui with an accounting for the $13,600 in
advanced fees that Jauregui paid Respondent, Respondent failed to render
appropriate accounts to a client regarding all funds coming into Respondent’s
possession in wilful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule
4-100(B)(3).
Case No. 12-O-17070 (Complainant: Socorro Velazquez)
FACTS:
114. On May 27, 2011, Socorro Velazquez ("Velazquez") hired
Respondent, through CLC, to apply for a loan modification and to sue her lender
ING bank.
115. Velazquez signed a fee agreement, dated June 3, 2011, retaining Respondent.
Velazquez, pursuant to the fee agreement, also paid $3,500.00 up-front and
agreed to make monthly payments of $1,800.00 until the case was settled.
116. Between on July 5, 2011 and on January 6, 2012, Velazquez paid
Respondent $16,100 in advanced fees for a loan modification, pursuant to the
fee agreement. At the time, Respondent had not completed all of the loan
modification services he had agreed to perform.
117. Respondent did not perform any legal services on behalf of Velazquez.
118. To date, Respondent has failed to refund any portion of the $16,100 in
fees paid by Velazquez.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
119. By failing to perform any legal services on behalf of Velazquez,
Respondent intentionally failed to perform legal services with compete in
wilful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A).
120. By agreeing to negotiate a mortgage loan modification for Velazquez
and collecting fees from them when he had not completed all loan modification
services he had agreed to perform, Respondent negotiated, arranged or otherwise
offered to perform a mortgage loan modification for a fee paid by the borrower,
and demanded, charged, collected or received such fee prior to fully performing
each and every service Respondent had contracted to perform or represented that
he would perform, in violation of Section 2944.7(a)(1) of the Civil Code, and
thereby wilfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3(a).
Case No. 13-O-10500 (Complainant: Jose and Bertha Cruz)
FACTS:
121. On May 3, 2011, Jose and Bertha Cruz ("the Cruzes") signed a
fee agreement with Respondent, through CLC to provide legal services regarding
their property located at 7582 10th Street, in Buena Park, California
("7582 10th Street property"). The fee agreement required the Cruzes
to make an initial advanced fee payment of $2,500, and subsequent monthly
payments of $1,600 for three months.
122. Also on May 3, 2011, the Cruzes signed a second fee agreement with
Respondent, through CLC, to provide legal services regarding their property
located at 1206 W. Orangethorpe Avenue, in Fullerton, California ("1206 W.
Orangethorpe property"). The fee agreement required the Cruzes to make an
initial advanced fee payment of $3,500, and subsequent monthly payments of
$1,800 for three months.
123. Between May 6, 2011 and August 3, 2011, pursuant to the fee agreement
regarding the 1206 W. Orangethorpe property, the Cruzes paid $8,900 to Respondent,
through CLC.
124. Between May 6, 2011 and August 3, 2011, pursuant to the fee agreement
regarding the 7582 10th Street property, the Cruzes paid $7,300 to Respondent,
through CLC.
125. On June 15, 2011, Respondent filed a verified complaint on behalf of
the Cruzes in Orange County Superior Court, in a case entitled Jose Angel Cruz
v. IndyMac Mortgage Services, et al.
("Cruz litigation").
126. On July 1, 2011, Respondent filed a Chapter 13 Petition on behalf of
the Cruzes in the United States Bankruptcy Court ("Chapter 13
petition").
127. On July 12, 2011, IndyMac filed a Motion for relief from stay
regarding the Chapter 13 petition. Respondent received notice of IndyMac’s
motion for relief from stay.
128. On July 25, 2011, Respondent filed a request for dismissal of the Cruz
litigation.
129. At no time did Respondent inform the Cruzes that he had filed a
request for dismissal of the Cruz litigation.
130. On August 5, 2011, Respondent filed a Notice of Entry of Dismissal and
Proof of Service in the Cruz litigation.
131. On September 6, 2011, the bankruptcy court granted the creditor’s
motion for relief from stay regarding the Chapter 13 petition.
132. On October 13, 2011, the Cruz litigation was dismissed.
133. At no time did Respondent inform the Cruzes that Cruz litigation was
dismissed.
134. On August 10, 2011, Respondent filed a request for dismissal of the
Chapter 13 Petition.
135. On September 21, 2011, the Chapter 13 petition was dismissed pursuant
to the request for dismissal.
136. Between May 3, 2011 and August 3, 2011, the Cruzes paid Respondent,
through CLC, a total of $16,200 in legal fees.
137. Respondent failed to earn the $16,200 in advanced fees paid by the
Cruzes.
138. To date, Respondent has failed to refund any portion of the $16,200 in
unearned advanced fees paid by the Cruzes.
139. On August 23, 2011, Respondent, through CLC staff, requested that the
Cruzes deposit $22,500 with CLC, for purposes of paying these funds to IndyMac
Bank as settlement of the Cruz litigation.
140. On August 23, 2011, the Cruzes paid the $22,500 to Respondent, through
CLC, for settlement of the Cruz litigation.
141. At no time was the $22,500 deposited into Respondent’s client trust
account.
142. None of the $22,500 the Cruzes paid to settle the Cruz litigation was
used for that purpose or was returned to them or paid to any other party on the
Cruzes’ behalf.
143. Respondent dishonestly misappropriated $22,500 of the Cruzes’ funds.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
144. By failing to refund any portion of the unearned advanced fees paid by
the Cruzes, Respondent failed to refund promptly any part of a fee paid in
advance that has not been earned in willful violation of Rules of Professional
Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(2).
145. By failing to deposit the Cruzes’ $22,500 into his client trust
account, Respondent failed to deposit funds received for the benefit of a
client in a bank account labeled "Trust Account," "Client’s
Funds Account" or words of similar import in wilful violation of Rules of
Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(A).
146. By misappropriating approximately $22,500 of the Cruzes’ funds,
Respondent committed an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption
in wilful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.
147. By not informing the Cruzes that he had filed a request for dismissal
of the Cruz litigation on July 25, 2011 and that the Cruz litigation was
dismissed on October 13, 2011, Respondent failed to keep a client reasonably informed
of significant developments in a matter in which Respondent had agreed to
provide legal services in willful violation of Business and Professions Code,
section 6068(m).
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
Harm (Std. 1.2(b)(iv)): Respondent’s misconduct significantly harmed
several clients. (Standard 1.2(b)(iv)). Each client had the same goal - to keep
their home - and some paid over $15,000 in fees but still lost their home. (In
the Matter of Bach (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 631,646 [loss
of case constitutes significant harm, even if the amount of damages would have
been relatively modest]). Respondent continues to fail to repay the clients
causing them significant ongoing financial harm (misappropriations from two
client totaling $37,500, multiple failures to refund totaling over $88,000.)
(In the Matter of Bouyer (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 404,
417 [failure to make restitution to a client is an aggravating factor]).
Multiple Acts of Misconduct (Std. 1.2(b)(ii)): Respondent’s misconduct
evidences multiple acts of wrongdoing. Standard 1.2(b)(ii). Respondent’s
misconduct herein involved thirty counts of violations of the Rules of
Professional Conduct or the State Bar Act including misappropriations from two
client totaling $37,500, multiple failures to refund over $88,000 in unearned
fees, a violation of SB94, multiple client trust account violations, a failure
to communicate and several failures to perform legal services with competence.
(In the Matter of Elkins (Review Dept. 2010) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 160,
168 [multiple acts of misconduct are an aggravating factor]).
ADDITIONAL FACTS RE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
No Prior Discipline (Std. 1.2(e)(i)): Respondent had practiced law for
nearly 20 years without a prior record of discipline when the misconduct herein
occurred. Respondent is entitled to mitigating credit for no prior discipline
even where the underlying conduct is found to be serious or significant. (In
the Matter of Stamper (Review Dept. 1990) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 96, 106,
fn. 3.; In the Matter of Riordan (Review Dept. 2007) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr.
41, 49.)
Pre-Trial Stipulation (Std. 1.2(e)(v)): Respondent has agreed to enter into
this pre-trial stipulation to fully resolve this matter without the necessity
of a trial, thereby saving the State Bar time and resources. (Silva-Vidor v.
State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1071, 1079 [where mitigative credit was given for
entering into a stipulation as to facts and culpability].)
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.
The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct provide a
"process of fixing discipline" pursuant to a set of written
principles to "better discharge the purposes of attorney discipline as
announced by the Supreme Court." (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds.
for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, Introduction (all further references
to standards are to this source).) The primary purposes of disciplinary
proceedings and of the sanctions imposed are "the protection of the public,
the courts and the legal profession; the maintenance of high professional
standards by attorneys and the preservation of public confidence in the legal
profession." (In re Morse (1995) 11 Cal.4th 184, 205; std. 1.3.)
Although not binding, the standards are entitled to "great
weight" and should be followed "whenever possible" in
determining level of discipline. (In re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 92,
quoting In Brown (1995) 12 Cal.4th 205,220 and In re Young (1989) 49 Cal.3d
257, 267, fn. 11.) Adherence to the standards in the great majority of cases
serves the valuable purpose of eliminating disparity and assuring consistency,
that is, the imposition of similar attorney discipline for instances of similar
attorney misconduct. (In re Naney (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 190.) Any discipline
recommendation different from that set forth in the applicable standards should
clearly explain the reasons for the deviation. (Blair v. State Bar (1989) 49
Cal.3d 762, 776, fn. 5.)
In this matter the most serious applicable standard is Standard 2.2(a).
Standard 2.2(a) provides that culpability of a member of wilful
misappropriation of entrusted funds or property shall result in disbarment.
Only if the amount of funds or property misappropriated is insignificantly
small or if the most compelling mitigating circumstances clearly predominate,
shall disbarment not be imposed. In those latter cases, the discipline shall
not be less than a one-year actual suspension, irrespective of mitigating
circumstances.
In two client matters herein, Respondent dishonestly misappropriated
$37,500 of the Francos’ and the Cruzes’ funds. The amount misappropriated is
not insignificantly small. Further, there are no most compelling circumstances
that could be seen as the "most compelling" or that "clearly predominate."
In addition, Standard 1.2(b) provides for a greater degree of sanction set
forth in the standards where aggravating circumstances exist. In this matter
there are two aggravating circumstances. First, pursuant to Standard
1.2(b)(ii), Respondent committed multiple acts of misconduct. Second, pursuant
to Standard 1.2(b)(iii), Respondent’s misconduct significantly harmed his
client in that up through the present date the Francos’ or the Cruzes’ funds
have not been reimbursed.
In this matter, Respondent has no prior record of discipline. However,
given the seriousness of the misconduct at issue herein as well as the large
amount of clients funds misappropriated, Respondent is entitled to very limited
mitigation credit. (ln the Matter of Stamper (Review Dept. 1990) 1 Cal. State
Bar Ct. Rptr. 96, 106, fn. 13.; In the Matter of Riordan (Review Dept. 2007) 5
Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 41, 49.) Also, Respondent has agreed to enter into
this pre-trial stipulation to fully resolve this matter without the necessity
of a trial, thereby saving the State Bar time and resources. (Silva-Vidor v.
State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1071, 1079 [where mitigative credit was given for
entering into a stipulation as to facts and culpability].) Although Standard
1.2(e) allows for mitigation of discipline when mitigating circumstances are
present, in this case aggravating factors are at least as strong, and therefore
there can be no "compelling mitigation" reducing the mandate of
Standard 2.2(a).
"Misappropriation of client funds has long been viewed as a
particularly serious ethical violation. It breaches the high duty of loyalty
owed to the client, violates basic notions of honesty, and endangers public
confidence in the legal profession." (Kelly v. State Bar (1988) 45 Cal.3d
649, 656 (citations omitted); McKnight v. State Bar (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1025,
1035; See also Matter of Tindall (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct.
Rptr. 652, 663.)
Misappropriation of client funds is a grievous breach of an attorney’s
ethical responsibilities, and generally warrants disbarment unless the most
compelling mitigating circumstances clearly predominate. (See Matter of Spaith
(Review Dept. 1996) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 511.)
Here, there are no such compelling circumstances that clearly predominate and
the appropriate level of discipline pursuant to the standards, with due
consideration of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, is disbarment.
COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.
Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has
informed respondent that as of October 16, 2013, the prosecution costs in this
matter are $10,337.27. Respondent further acknowledges that should this
stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the
costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.
RESTITUTION.
Respondent must make restitution to Antonio Soria in the amount of $8,900
plus 10 percent interest per year from March 7, 2012. If the Client Security
Fund ("CSF") has reimbursed Antonio Sofia for all or any portion of
the principal amount, Respondent must pay restitution to CSF of the amount paid
plus applicable interests and costs in accordance with Business and
Professional Code Section 6140.5. Respondent must pay the above restitution and
furnish satisfactory proof of payment to the State Bar’s Office of Probation in
Los Angeles no later than 180 days from the effective date of the Supreme Court
order in this case.
Respondent must make restitution to Josefina and Benjamin Franco in the
amount of $15,000 plus 10 percent interest per year from October 21, 2011. If
the Client Security Fund ("CSF") has reimbursed Josefina and Benjamin
Franco for all or any portion of the principal amount, Respondent must pay
restitution to CSF of the amount paid plus applicable interests and costs in
accordance with Business and Professional Code Section 6140.5. Respondent must
pay the above restitution and furnish satisfactory proof of payment to the
State Bar’s Office of Probation in Los Angeles no later than 180 days from the
effective date of the Supreme Court order in this case.
Respondent must make restitution to Paulino and Merina Gonzalez in the
amount of $9,500 plus 10 percent interest per year from March 6, 2012. If the
Client Security Fund ("CSF") has reimbursed Paulino and Merina
Gonzalez for all or any portion of the principal amount, Respondent must pay
restitution to CSF of the amount paid plus applicable interests and costs in
accordance with Business and Professional Code Section 6140.5. Respondent must
pay the above restitution and furnish satisfactory proof of payment to the
State Bar’s Office of Probation in Los Angeles no later than 180 days from the
effective date of the Supreme Court order in this case.
Respondent must make restitution to Teresa Hermenegildo in the amount of
$23,800 plus 10 percent interest per year from March 14, 2012. If the Client
Security Fund ("CSF") has reimbursed Teresa Hermenegildo for all or
any portion of the principal amount, Respondent must pay restitution to CSF of
the amount paid plus applicable interests and costs in accordance with Business
and Professional Code Section 6140.5. Respondent must pay the above restitution
and furnish satisfactory proof of payment to the State Bar’s Office of
Probation in Los Angeles no later than 180 days from the effective date of the
Supreme Court order in this case.
Respondent must make restitution to Ruben Jauregui in the amount of $13,600
plus 10 percent interest per year from June 12, 2012. If the Client Security
Fund ("CSF") has reimbursed Ruben Jauregui for all or any portion of
the principal amount, Respondent must pay restitution to CSF of the amount paid
plus applicable interests and costs in accordance with Business and
Professional Code Section 6140.5. Respondent must pay the above restitution and
furnish satisfactory proof of payment to the State Bar’s Office of Probation in
Los Angeles no later than 180 days from the effective date of the Supreme Court
order in this case.
Respondent must make restitution to Socorro Velazquez in the amount of
$16,100 plus 10 percent interest per year from January 6, 2012. If the Client
Security Fund ("CSF") has reimbursed Socorro Velazquez for all or any
portion of the principal amount, Respondent must pay restitution to CSF of the
amount paid plus applicable interests and costs in accordance with Business and
Professional Code Section 6140.5. Respondent must pay the above restitution and
furnish satisfactory proof of payment to the State Bar’s Office of Probation in
Los Angeles no later than 180 days from the effective date of the Supreme Court
order in this case.
Respondent must make restitution to Jose and Bertha Cruz in the amount of
$16,200 plus 10 percent interest per year from August 3, 2011. If the Client
Security Fund ("CSF") has reimbursed Jose and Bertha Cruz for all or
any portion of the principal amount, Respondent must pay restitution to CSF of
the amount paid plus applicable interests and costs in accordance with Business
and Professional Code Section 6140.5. Respondent must pay the above restitution
and furnish satisfactory proof of payment to the State Bar’s Office of
Probation in Los Angeles no later than 180 days from the effective date of the
Supreme Court order in this case.
Respondent must make restitution to Jose and Bertha Cruz in the amount of
$22,500 plus 10 percent interest per year from August 23, 2011. If the Client
Security Fund ("CSF") has reimbursed Jose and Bertha Cruz for all or
any portion of the principal amount, Respondent must pay restitution to CSF of
the amount paid plus applicable interests and costs in accordance with Business
and Professional Code Section 6140.5. Respondent must pay the above restitution
and furnish satisfactory proof of payment to the State Bar’s Office of
Probation in Los Angeles no later than 180 days from the effective date of the
Supreme Court order in this case.
SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES
Case Number(s): 12-O-14637,12-O-15347,12-O-15548,12-O-16379,
12-O-16600,12-O-17070,13-O-10500
In the Matter of: PAUL ERIC St. AMANT
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable,
signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and
conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: Paul Eric St. Amant
Date: 10/22/13
Respondent’s Counsel:
Date:
Deputy Trial Counsel: Ashod Mooradian
Date: 11/15/13
DISBARMENT ORDER
Case Number(s): 12-O-14637,12-O-15347,12-O-15548,
12-O-16379,12-O-16600,12-O-17070, 13-O-10500
In the Matter of: PAUL ERIC St. AMANT
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately
protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of
counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the
DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are
APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to
the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to
withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this
order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved
stipulation. (See rule 5.58 (E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective
date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order
herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California
Rules of Court.)
Respondent PAUL ERIC St. AMANT is ordered transferred to involuntary
inactive status pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6007,
subdivision (c)(4). Respondent’s inactive enrollment will be effective three
(3) calendar days after this order is served by mail and will terminate upon
the effective date of the Supreme Court’s order imposing discipline herein, or
as provided for by rule 5.111(D)(2) or the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar
of California, or as otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court pursuant to its
plenary jurisdiction.
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Richard A. Platel
Date: 12/4/13
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over
the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to
standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on December 4,
2013, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND
ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through
the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as
follows:
PAUL E. ST AMANT
26100 NEWPORT RD STE. A12-37
MENIFEE, CA 92584
<<not>> checked. by certified mail, No. , with return receipt
requested, through the United States Postal Service at , California, addressed
as follows:
<<not>> checked. by overnight mail at , California, addressed
as follows:
<<not>> checked. by fax transmission, at fax number . No error
was reported by the fax machine that I used.
<<not>> checked. By personal service by leaving the documents
in a sealed envelope or package clearly labeled to identify the attorney being
served with a receptionist or a person having charge of the attorney’s office,
addressed as follows:
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the
State Bar of California addressed as follows:
Ashod Mooradian, Enforcement, Los Angeles
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los
Angeles, California, on December 4, 2013.
Signed by:
Johnnie Lee Smith
Case Administrator
State Bar Court