State Bar Court of California
Hearing Department
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING DISBARMENT; ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE
ENROLLMENT
DISBARMENT
Case Number(s): 12-O-14888; 13-O-10816; 13-O-10454;
13-O-11192
In the Matter of: BRAD DANIEL PORTERFIELD, Bar # 134060, A
Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Susan J. Jackson, Bar #125042,
Counsel for Respondent: BRAD DANIEL PORTERFIELD, Bar #134060,
Submitted to: Settlement Judge.
Filed: August 8, 2013.
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION
REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any
additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be
set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g.,
"Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law,"
"Supporting Authority," etc.
A. Parties' Acknowledgments:
1.
Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted June 14,
1998.
2.
The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained
herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the
Supreme Court.
3.
All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption
of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed
consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under
"Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 15 pages, not including
the order.
4.
A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or
causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5.
Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts
are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6.
The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level
of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7.
No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent
has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not
resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8.
Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of
Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
checked. Costs are awarded to the
State Bar.
<<not>> checked. Costs
are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial
Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs
are entirely waived.
9.
ORDER OF INACTIVE ENROLLMENT:
The parties are aware that if this stipulation is approved, the judge will
issue an order of inactive enrollment under Business and Professions Code
section 6007, subdivision (c)(4), and Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, rule
5.111(D)(1).
B. Aggravating Circumstances [for definition, see Standards for Attorney
Sanctions for Professional Misconduct, standard 1.2(b)]. Facts supporting
aggravating circumstances are required.
<<not>> checked. (1) Prior
record of discipline
<<not>> checked. (a) State Bar Court case # of prior case .
<<not>> checked. (b) Date prior discipline effective .
<<not>> checked. (c) Rules of Professional Conduct/ State
Bar Act violations:
<<not>> checked. (d) Degree of prior discipline
<<not>> checked. (e) If Respondent has two or more incidents
of prior discipline, use space provided below. .
checked. (2) Dishonesty:
Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by or followed by bad faith, dishonesty,
concealment, overreaching or other violations of the State Bar Act or Rules of
Professional Conduct. See Attachment, page 12.
checked. (3) Trust Violation:
Trust funds or property were involved and Respondent refused or was unable to
account to the client or person who was the object of the misconduct for
improper conduct toward said funds or property. See Attachment, page 12.
checked. (4) Harm: Respondent's
misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public or the administration of
justice. See Attachment, page 12.
checked. (5) Indifference:
Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for
the consequences of his or her misconduct. See Attachment, page 12.
<<not>> checked. (6) Lack of
Cooperation: Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims
of his/her misconduct or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation or
proceedings.
checked. (7) Multiple/Pattern of
Misconduct: Respondent's current misconduct evidences multiple acts of
wrongdoing or demonstrates a pattern of misconduct. See Attachment, page 12.
<<not>> checked. (8) No
aggravating circumstances are involved.
Additional aggravating circumstances: .
C. Mitigating Circumstances [see standard 1.2(e)]. Facts supporting
mitigating circumstances are required.
<<not>> checked. (1) No Prior Discipline: Respondent has no prior record
of discipline over many years of practice coupled with present misconduct which
is not deemed serious.
<<not>>
checked. (2) No Harm: Respondent did not harm the client or person who was
the object of the misconduct.
<<not>>
checked. (3) Candor/Cooperation: Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and
cooperation with the victims of his/her misconduct and to the State Bar during
disciplinary investigation and proceedings.
<<not>>
checked. (4) Remorse: Respondent promptly took objective steps spontaneously
demonstrating remorse and recognition of the wrongdoing, which steps were
designed to timely atone for any consequences of his/her misconduct.
<<not>>
checked. (5) Restitution: Respondent paid $ on in restitution to without
the threat or force of disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings.
<<not>>
checked. (6) Delay: These disciplinary proceedings were excessively
delayed. The delay is not attributable to Respondent and the delay prejudiced
him/her.
<<not>>
checked. (7) Good Faith: Respondent acted in good faith.
<<not>>
checked. (8) Emotional/Physical Difficulties: At the time of the stipulated
act or acts of professional misconduct Respondent suffered extreme emotional difficulties
or physical disabilities which expert testimony would establish was directly
responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities were not the
product of any illegal conduct by the member, such as illegal drug or substance
abuse, and Respondent no longer suffers from such difficulties or disabilities.
<<not>>
checked. (9) Severe Financial Stress: At the time of the misconduct,
Respondent suffered from severe financial stress which resulted from
circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond his/her control
and which were directly responsible for the misconduct.
<<not>>
checked. (10) Family Problems: At the time of the misconduct, Respondent
suffered extreme difficulties in his/her personal life which were other than
emotional or physical in nature.
<<not>>
checked. (11) Good Character: Respondent's good character is attested to by a
wide range of references in the legal and general communities who are aware of
the full extent of his/her misconduct.
<<not>>
checked. (12) Rehabilitation: Considerable time has passed since the acts of
professional misconduct occurred followed by convincing proof of subsequent
rehabilitation.
<<not>>
checked. (13) No mitigating circumstances are involved.
Additional
mitigating circumstances: See Attachment, pages 12-13.
D. Discipline: Disbarment.
E. Additional Requirements:
(1) Rule 9.20,
California Rules of Court: Respondent must comply with the requirements of
rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in subdivisions
(a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 calendar days, respectively, after
the effective date of the Supreme Court's Order in this matter.
checked. (2) Restitution:
Respondent must make restitution to to Christine Bellwood in the amount of $35,000
plus 10 percent interest per year from July 18, 2012 . If the Client Security
Fund has reimbursed Christine Bellwood for all or any portion of the principal
amount, respondent must pay restitution to CSF of the amount paid plus
applicable interest and costs in accordance with Business and Professions Code
section 6140.5. Respondent must pay the above restitution and furnish
satisfactory proof of payment to the State Bar's Office of Probation in Los
Angeles no later than N/A days from the effective date of the Supreme Court
order in this case..
checked. (3) Other: Restitution:
Respondent must make restitution to Rebecca McKeown in the amount of $28,333,
plus 10 percent interest per year from July 8, 2009. If the Client Security
Fund has reimbursed Rebecca McKeown for all or any portion of the principal
amount, respondent must pay restitution to CSF of the amount paid plus
applicable interest and costs in accordance with Business and Professions Code
section 6140.5..
Attachment language (if any):.
ATTACHMENT TO
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION
IN THE MATTER OF: Brad Daniel Porterfield, State Bar No. 134060
STATE BAR COURT CASE NUMBER: 12-O-14888; 13-O-10816; 13-O-10454;
13-O-11192
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that he is culpable
of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct.
Case No. 12-0-14888-RAP (Complainant: Zohreh P. Ball)
FACTS:
1. In late 2008, Zohreh P. Ball ("Ball") hired Respondent to
represent her in pursuing a personal injury claim against Conoco Phillips
Company ("Conoco") on a contingency fee basis. Respondent filed a
lawsuit on Ball’s behalf.
2. In 2012, Respondent settled Ball’s lawsuit after mediation for $50,000.
3. On May 7, 2012, Respondent received the $50,000 settlement check from
Conoco. Respondent failed to inform Ball that he received the settlement check
on May 7, 2012.
4. The settlement check was issued payable only to "Law Offices of
Brad D. Porterfield." On May 7, 2012, Respondent deposited the $50,000
settlement check into his client trust account ("CTA") at U. S. Bank.
5. On May 8, 2012, Ball sent Respondent an email inquiring about the status
of the settlement check. Respondent received the e-mail. In his response to the
email, Respondent failed to inform Ball that he had already received and
deposited her settlement check. Instead, in his email, Respondent misled Ball
to believe that he had not received the check by falsely informing Ball that
there was "still some delay."
6. On May 10, 2012, Respondent disbursed $7,500 to Ball but Respondent
still failed to inform her that he had already received and deposited her
settlement check.
7. On May 31, 2012, Ball learned from Conoco that Respondent received the
settlement check on May 7, 2012. Later that day, Ball sent an email to
Respondent informing him of the information she received from Conoco and
inquiring about the status of her settlement funds. Respondent received the
email.
8. On May 31, 2012, Ball received a reply email from Respondent’s
assistant, Harmony L. Kenney, who informed Ball that Respondent was out of the
office due to surgery. Kenney also for the first time informed Ball that her
share of the settlement funds could not be distributed until they received a
response from Medicare regarding its outstanding lien against the settlement
proceeds.
9. On June 12, 2012, the State Bar received Ball’s complaint against
Respondent.
10. By October 4, 2012, Respondent disbursed an additional $200 to Ball.
11. On October 5, 2012, Respondent disbursed $24,303.48 to Ball as her
remaining share of the settlement funds.
12. On October 5, 2012, Respondent also provided an accounting to Ball
setting forth all disbursements of her settlement proceeds, as follows:
$4,559.52, reimbursed to Medicare; $2,337, in legal costs; $7,700,
disbursements to Ball; $11,100, attorneys’ fees to Respondent; and $24,303.48,
disbursement to Ball.
13. Respondent included with his October 5, 2012 accounting an explanation
that while he believed he was entitled to $16,665 in attorneys’ fees (one-third
of the settlement as set forth in the retainer agreement), he gave Ball a
professional courtesy discount that reduced his fees to $11,100, and resulted
in a disbursement to Ball of $24,303.48.
14. During the period from May 7, 2012 to May 9, 2012, Respondent was
required to maintain in the CTA a minimum balance of $33,335 ($50,000, less
fees of $16,665); from May 10, 2012, to October 3, 2012, Respondent was
required to maintain a balance of $25,835 ($33,335, less disbursement of
$7,500, to Ball); on and after October 4, 2012, Respondent was required to
maintain a balance of $25,635 ($25,835, less $200, disbursement to Ball).
During the period from May 7, 2012, to October 3, 2012, the CTA balance fell below
$25,835, on multiple dates. On June 30, 2012, the CTA balance fell to its
lowest of $196.44. Respondent intentionally misappropriated $25,638.56, of
Ball’s funds.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
15. By failing to maintain a CTA balance of $25,638.56 on Ball’s behalf
between May 7, 2012 and October 3, 2012, Respondent failed to maintain the
balance of funds received for the benefit of a client and deposited in a bank
account labeled "Trust Account," "Client’s Funds Account"
or words of similar import in willful violation of Rules of Professional
Conduct, rule 4-100(A).
16. By not informing Ball that he received the $50,000 settlement check on
May 7, 2012, Respondent failed to notify a client promptly of the receipt of
the client’s funds, in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule
4-100(B)(1).
17. By not rendering an appropriate accounting to Ball until five months
after he received her settlement proceeds, and until after Ball complained to
the State Bar, Respondent failed to render appropriate accounts to a client
regarding all funds coming into Respondent’s possession in willful violation of
Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(B)(3).
18. By not disbursing to Ball her share of the settlement proceeds until
five months after he received and deposited the settlement check, despite her
repeated inquiries about the status of the settlement check, and not until
after she had complained to the State Bar, Respondent failed to pay promptly,
as requested by a client, any funds in Respondent’s possession which the client
is entitled to receive, in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct,
rule 4-100(B)(4).
19. By falsely informing Ball that there had been a delay in the settlement
process, Respondent made a material misrepresentation to a client about the
status of her settlement funds. By making a matedai misrepresentation to a
client, Respondent committed an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or
corruption in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.
20. By intentionally misappropriating $25,638.56, in funds belonging to
Ball, Respondent committed acts involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, or
corruption, in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section
6106.
Case No. 13-O- 10816-RAP (Complainant: Christine Bellwood)
FACTS:
21. On November 28, 2011, Christine Bellwood ("Bellwood") hired
Respondent to represent her in pursuing a personal injury claim for a 25
percent contingency fee.
22. In July 2012, Respondent settled Bellwood’s claim for $100,000, with
Bellwood’s knowledge and consent.
23. In early July 2012, Respondent received the settlement check in the
amount of $100,000, on behalf of Bellwood.
24. On July 18, 2012, Respondent deposited the $100,000 settlement check
into his client trust account at U. S. Bank.
25. Respondent was entitled to receive $25,000 from Bellwood’s settlement
as his contingency fee.
26. During the period from July 18, 2012 through August 5, 2012, Respondent
was required to maintain in the CTA a minimum balance of $75,000 on Bellwood’s
behalf. During that period, the balance in the CTA fell below $75,000 on
multiple dates. On August 3, 2012, the CTA balance fell to its lowest of
$59,696.44.
27. On August 6, 2012, Respondent disbursed $40,000, of the settlement
proceeds to Bellwood.
28. During the period from August 6, 2012 to the present, Respondent was
required to maintain in the CTA a minimum balance of $35,000, on Bellwood’s
behalf. During that period, the balance in the CTA fell below $35,000 on
multiple dates and none of the monies expended from the trust account were
expended on behalf of Bellwood. On September 6, 2012, the CTA balance fell to
$246.44. Respondent intentionally misappropriated $34,753.34, of Bellwood’s
funds.
29. Beginning July 18, 2012 until the present, Respondent was required to
maintain in the CTA sufficient funds to pay medical liens in Bellwood’s case.
The total amount of those liens is $32,894. To date, Respondent has not
disbursed any settlement funds to pay the outstanding liens in Bellwood’s case.
30. To date, Respondent has not provided Bellwood with any accounting of
the settlement proceeds.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
31. By failing to maintain a CTA balance of $75,000 on Bellwood’s behalf
from July 18, 2012 to August 5, 2012; and a balance of $35,000 from August 6,
2012 to the present; Respondent failed to maintain the balance of funds
received for the benefit of a client and deposited in a bank account labeled
"Trust Account," "Client’s Funds Account" or words of
similar import, in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule
4-100(A).
32. By not rendering any accounting of Bellwood’s settlement proceeds,
Respondent failed to render appropriate accounts to a client regarding all
funds coming into Respondent’s possession, in willful violation of Rules of
Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(B)(3).
33. By intentionally misappropriating $34,753.34 in funds belonging to
Bellwood, Respondent committed acts involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, or
corruption, in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section
6106.
Case No. 13-O-14054 (INV) (Complainant: Rebecca McKeown)
FACTS:
34. In late 2007, Rebecca McKeown ("McKeown") hired Respondent to
represent her in pursuing a personal injury claim on a contingency fee basis.
Her injuries were sustained in a car accident that took place in July 2006.
35. In 2008, Respondent settled the McKeown claim for $80,000 with
McKeown’s knowledge and consent.
36. On July 8, 2009, Respondent received the $80,000 settlement check and
deposited it into his client trust account at U. S. Bank.
37. Respondent was entitled to receive one-third of the settlement
($26,667) as his contingency fee.
38. During the period from July 8, 2009 to January 10, 2010, Respondent
disbursed $25,000 of the settlement funds to McKeown, in two payments of
$20,000 and $5,000, respectively. No other settlement funds were disbursed.
39. During the entire period from July 8, 2009 to January 10, 2010,
Respondent was required to maintain in the CTA a minimum balance of $28,333 on
McKeown’s behalf.
40. During the period from July 8, 2009 to January 10, 2010, the balance in
Respondent’s CTA fell below $28,333. On August 13, 2009, the CTA balance fell
to $21.84. Respondent intentionally misappropriated $28,311 of McKeown’s funds.
41. Respondent has not paid any additional funds to McKeown since January
10, 2010.
42. At no time did Respondent provide McKeown with any accounting of her
settlement proceeds.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
43. By failing to maintain a CTA balance of at least $28,333, for the period
from July 8, 2009 to January 10, 2010, Respondent failed to maintain the
balance of funds received for the benefit of a client and deposited in a bank
account labeled "Trust Account," "Client’s Funds Account"
or words of similar import, in willful violation of Rules of Professional
Conduct, rule 4-100(A).
44. By intentionally misappropriating $28,311, Respondent committed an act
involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, in willful violation of
Business and Professions Code, section 6106.
45. By not providing McKeown with any accounting of the settlement proceeds
he received on her behalf, Respondent failed to render appropriate accounts to
a client regarding all funds coming into Respondent’s possession, in willful
violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(B)(3).
Case No. 13-O-11192 (INV) (Complainant: Cheryl Fowlkes)
FACTS:
46. On November 13, 2009, Cheryl Fowlkes ("Fowlkes") hired
Respondent to represent her in pursuing a personal injury claim for a 33 1/3
percent contingency fee.
47. Prior to settlement, the AAA gave two advances to Fowlkes, totaling
$3,077.42. The first advance, issued prior to November 13, 2009, in the amount
of $15, was for a medical prescription. The second advance in the amount of $
3,062.42, was disbursed on January 6, 2010.
48. In December 2011, Respondent settled the claim with the Interinsurance
Exchange of the Automobile Club ("AAA") for $30,000 without Fowlkes’
knowledge or consent.
49. Respondent did not inform Fowlkes that her personal injury claim had settled.
50. In December 2011, Respondent received a settlement check on behalf of
Fowlkes, in the amount of $26,923.
51. Respondent did not inform Fowlkes that he received the settlement
check.
52. Without Fowlkes’ knowledge or consent, on December 15, 2011, Respondent
signed or caused to be signed Fowlkes’s name to the Hold Harmless/Indemnity
Agreement ("Hold Harmless") received from AAA.
53. From December 2011 through April 28, 2012, Fowlkes repeatedly contacted
Respondent and inquired about the status of her matter. Each time, Respondent
responded to Fowlkes but he concealed the fact that her case had settled or
that he had received the settlement proceeds.
54. On April 29, 2012, Fowlkes learned through an independent third party
that her matter had already settled. Fowlkes immediately contacted Respondent
and requested payment of her undisputed share of the settlement funds.
Respondent received Fowlkes demand but did not promptly disburse any funds to
Fowlkes and did not otherwise respond to the demand.
55. In August 2012, Fowlkes hired attorney Seymone Javaherian
("Javaherian"), to assist her in obtaining her share of the
settlement proceeds from respondent. Subsequently, on multiple occasions,
Javaherian requested on Fowlkes’ behalf an accounting of the settlement
proceeds from respondent.
56. On September 11, 2012, respondent provided an accounting of the
settlement proceeds to Javaherian.
57. In October 2012, 10 months after he received the settlement proceeds,
Respondent disbursed Fowlkes’ share of the settlement fimds totaling $19,563.36
to Javaherian.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
58. By concealing from Fowlkes that her case had settled and that he had
received the settlement proceeds; and by signing Fowlkes’ name to the Hold
Harmless, or causing it to be signed, without Fowlkes knowledge and consent;
Respondent made material misrepresentations and omissions to a client about the
status of her case, and misrepresentations to the insurance company that
Fowlkes had agreed to the settlement and signed the Hold Harmless. By making
material misrepresentations and omissions to a client and misrepresentations to
the insurance company that settled the case in exchange for the client’s
release, Respondent committed acts involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or
corruption in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.
59. By not informing Fowlkes that he received the settlement check in
December 2011, Respondent failed to notify a client promptly of the receipt of
the client’s funds, in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule
4-100(B)(1).
60. By not disbursing to Fowlkes her share of the settlement proceeds until
10 months after he received the settlement check, despite her repeated
inquiries about the status of the case, and only after she hired new counsel to
assist her, Respondent failed to pay promptly, as requested by a client, any
funds in Respondent’s possession which the client is entitled to receive, in
willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(B)(4).
61. By not rendering an appropriate accounting to Fowlkes until nine months
after he received her settlement proceeds, and only after Fowlkes hired new
counsel to assist her, Respondent failed to render appropriate accounts to a
client regarding all funds coming into Respondent’s possession in willful
violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(B)(3).
ADDITIONAL FACTS RE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
Dishonesty (Standard 1.2(b)(iii)): Respondent misappropriated client funds
in three matters, and still owes money to two former clients. Respondent also
misrepresented to one client that there had been a delay in the settlement
process of her claim; and, he concealed from another client the fact that her
case had settlement and that he had received the settlement funds.
Trust Violations (Standard 1.2(b)(iii)): Respondent failed to maintain
client funds in his client trust account in three matters, and failed to render
an appropriate accounting in all four matters.
Harm (Standard 1.2(b)(iv)): Respondent misappropriated a total of
$88,702.90 in client funds belonging to three separate clients. Although
Respondent has fully disbursed all settlement funds to one victim, he still
owes $63,333.00 (plus interest) to the other two victims.
Indifference (Standard 1.2(b)(v)): Respondent has not taken any steps to
pay Bellwood or McKeown the amounts owed to them.
Multiple Acts of Misconduct (Standard 1.2(b)(ii)): Respondent engaged in
multiple acts of wrongdoing, for nearly four years.
ADDITIONAL FACTS RE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
No Prior Record of Discipline: Though Respondent’s misconduct is extremely
serious, Respondent has no prior record of discipline in nearly 18 years of
practice and is entitled to some mitigation. (Standard 1.2(e)(i); In the Matter
of Riordan (Review Dept. 2007) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 41, 49; In the Matter
of Stamper (Review Dept. 1990) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 96, 106, fn. 13.)
Pretrial Stipulation: Respondent is entitled to mitigation for entering
into this stipulated settlement without the need of a trial to resolve this
matter (Silva-Vidor v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1071, 1079 [where mitigative
credit was given for entering into a stipulation as to facts and culpability].)
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.
The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct provide a
"process of fixing discipline" pursuant to a set of written
principles to "better discharge the purposes of attorney discipline as
announced by the Supreme Court." (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds.
for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, Introduction (all further references
to standards are to this source).) The primary purposes of disciplinary
proceedings and of the sanctions imposed are "the protection of the
public, the courts and the legal profession; the maintenance of high
professional standards by attorneys and the preservation of public confidence
in the legal profession." (In re Morse (1995) 11 Cal.4th 184, 205; std.
1.3.)
Although not binding, the standards are entitled to "great
weight" and should be followed "whenever possible" in
determining level of discipline. (ln re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 92,
quoting In re Brown (1995) 12 Cal.4th 205,220 and In re Young (1989) 49 Cal.3d
257, 267, fn. 11.) Adherence to the standards in the great majority of cases
serves the valuable purpose of eliminating disparity and assuring consistency,
that is, the imposition of similar attorney discipline for instances of similar
attorney misconduct. (In re Naney (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 190.) Any discipline recommendation
different from that set forth in the applicable standards should clearly
explain the reasons for the deviation. (Blair v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d
762, 776, fn. 5.)
Respondent admits to committing multiple acts of professional misconduct.
Standard 1.6(a) requires that where two or more acts of misconduct are found or
acknowledged, and different sanctions are prescribed by the standards for such
acts, the sanction imposed shall be the more or most severe prescribed in the
applicable standards.
The most severe sanction applicable to Respondent’s misconduct is found in
standard 2.2(a), which applies to Respondent’s violation of Business and
Professions Code section 6106.
Standard 2.2(a) provides that:
"Culpability of a member of wilful misappropriation of entrusted funds
or property shall result in disbarment. Only if the amount of funds or property
misappropriated is insignificantly small or if the most compelling mitigating
circumstances clearly predominate, shall disbarment not be imposed. In those
latter cases, the discipline shall not be less than a one-year actual
suspension, irrespective of the mitigating circumstances."
Respondent misappropriated a significant amount of money, totaling at least
$88,702.90. There are no compelling mitigating circumstances. Accordingly,
Respondent’s disbarment is warranted under standard 2.2.
COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.
Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has
informed him that as of July 9, 2013, the prosecution costs in this matter are
$9,921.53. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be
rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this
matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings
SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES
Case Number(s): 12-O-14888, 13-O-10816, 13-O-10454, 13-O-11192
In the Matter of: BRAD DANIEL PORTERFIELD
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable,
signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and
conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: BRAD DANIEL PORTERFIELD
Date: 7/9/13
Respondent’s Counsel:
Date:
Deputy Trial Counsel: Susan J. Jackson
Date: 7/9/13
DISBARMENT ORDER
Case Number(s): 12-O-14888, 13-O-10816, 13-O-10454, 13-O-11192
In the Matter of: BRAD DANIEL PORTERFIELD
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately
protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of
counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are
APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as
set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to
withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this
order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved
stipulation. (See rule 5.58 (E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective
date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order
herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California
Rules of Court.)
Respondent is ordered transferred to involuntary inactive status pursuant
to Business and Professions Code section 6007, subdivision (c)(4). Respondent’s
inactive enrollment will be effective three (3) calendar days after this order
is served by mail and will terminate upon the effective date of the Supreme
Court’s order imposing discipline herin, or as provided for by rule 5.111(D)(2)
or the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California, or as otherwise ordered
by the Supreme Court pursuant to its plenary jurisdiction.
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Richard A. Honn
Date: 8/8/13
In the Matter of:
BRAD DANIEL PORTERFIELD
SBN 134060
Case Number(s):
12-O-14888-RAP, 13-O-10816-RAP,
13-O-10454 (INV), 13-O-11192 (INV)
MODIFICATIONS TO STIPULATION
1. On page 2 of the stipulation, the
"X" in boxes B(2) (Dishonesty) and B(3) (Trust Violation) are
DELETED. Without question, it is improper to rely on the same act or acts to
establish both a substantive statutory or rule violation (e.g., Bus. &
Prof. Code, § 6106) and an aggravating circumstance under standard 1.2(b)(iii).
(E.g., In the Matter of Chesnut (Review Dept. 2000) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr.
166, 176; In the Matter of Duxbury (Review Dept. 1999) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct.
Rptr. 61, 68; In the Matter of Fandey (Review Dept. 1994) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct.
Rptr. 767, 777.)
2. On page 2 of the stipulation, in paragraph B(2) (Dishonesty), the
following sentence is DELETED: "See Attachment, page 12."
3. On page 2 of the stipulation, in paragraph B(3) (Trust Violation), the
following sentence is DELETED: "See Attachment, page 12."
4. On page 9 of the stipulation, in paragraph number 28, in the fifth line,
the figure "$34,753.34" is changed to "$34,753.56."
5. On page 9 of the stipulation, in paragraph number 30, in the first line,
the figure "$34,753.34" is changed to "$34,753.56."
6. On page 12 of the stipulation, under the heading "Additional Facts
Re Aggravating Circumstances," the first two paragraphs, which begin
"Dishonesty (Standard 1.2(b)(iii))" and "Trust Violations
(Standard 1.2(b)(iii))," respectively, are DELETED.
7. On page 12 of the stipulation, under the heading "Additional Facts
Re Mitigating Circumstances," in the first paragraph, which begins
"No Prior Record of Discipline," in the second and third lines, the
phrase "and is entitled to some mitigation" is DELETED, and the
phrase "for which respondent is entitled to significant mitigation"
is INSERTED in its place.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over
the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to
standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on August 8,
2013, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND
ORDER APPROVING; ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE ENROLLMENT
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through
the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as
follows:
BRAD D. PORTERFIELD
535 N PUENTE ST
BREA, CA 92821
<<not>> checked. by certified mail, No. , with return receipt
requested, through the United States Postal Service at , California, addressed
as follows:
<<not>> checked. by overnight mail at , California, addressed
as follows:
<<not>> checked. by fax transmission, at fax number . No error
was reported by the fax machine that I used.
<<not>> checked. By personal service by leaving the documents
in a sealed envelope or package clearly labeled to identify the attorney being
served with a receptionist or a person having charge of the attorney’s office,
addressed as follows:
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the
State Bar of California addressed as follows:
Susan J. Jackson, Enforcement, Los Angeles
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los
Angeles , California, on August 8, 2013.
Signed by:
Johnnie Lee Smith
Case Administrator
State Bar Court