Case Number(s): 12-O-16161; 12-O-17392;13-O-10045;13-O-10048;13-0-10269;
13-0-12027;13-O-15618;13-O-16405
In the Matter of: LOUIS ALLEN LIBERTY , Bar # 147975, A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Christine A. Sourada, Bar # 228256,
Counsel for Respondent: Samuel C. Bellicini, Bar # 152191,
Submitted to: Assigned Judge.
Filed: December 11, 2013.
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted October 12, 1990.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 19 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
checked. Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 5.130, Rules of Procedure.
<<not>> checked. Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: . (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
<<not>> checked. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs are entirely waived.
Attachment language (if any):.
ATTACHMENT TO
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION
IN THE MATTER OF: Louis Allen Liberty, State Bar No. 147975
STATE BAR COURT CASE NUMBER: 12-O-16161;12-O-17392;13-O-10045;
13-O-10048;13-0-10269;13-0-12027;13-O-15618;13-O-16405
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that he is culpable of violations of the specified statute and Rule of Professional Conduct.
Case No. 12-O-16161 (Complainant: Pedroza)
FACTS:
1. On July 15,2011, Guadalupe Pedroza ("Pedroza") visited Respondent’s office in response to an advertisement on Spanish language television for Respondent’s home loan modification services. Pedroza visited Respondent’s office for the purpose of obtaining a home loan modification.
2. During the visit on July 15, 2011, Pedroza employed Respondent to attempt to obtain a loan modification for Pedroza. A member of Respondent’s staff also represented to Pedroza that Respondent would attempt to obtain a loan modification for her.
3. On July 22, 2011, Pedroza returned to Respondent’s office and paid Respondent $1,500 as an advanced fee for his legal services in Pedroza’s home loan modification matter.
4. On July 15,2011 and again on July 22, 2011, Pedroza executed fee agreements with Respondent, each of which granted Respondent "a lien on any and all claims or causes of action that are the subject of the representation under this Agreement."
5. On August 11,201 I, Pedroza paid Respondent an additional $650 as an advanced fee for his legal services in Pedroza’s home loan modification matter.
6. Between October 6, 2011 and April 2012, Pedroza paid Respondent an additional $350 as an advanced fee for his legal services in Pedroza’s home loan modification matter.
7. Respondent did not fully perform each and every service he had contracted to perform or represented that he would perform for Pedroza, prior to demanding, charging, collecting or receiving any of the advanced attorney fees.
8. Respondent has recently refunded the advanced fees paid by Pedroza.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
9. By negotiating, arranging, or offering to perform a mortgage loan modification for a fee paid by a borrower, and demanding, charging, collecting and receiving fees firom Pedroza prior to fully performing each and every service he had. contracted to perform or represented that he would perform in violation of subsection (a)(1) of Section 2944.7 of the Civil Code, Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3.
10. By obtaining liens in his mortgage loan modification fee agreements with Pedroza, Respondent took a lien on any type of real or personal property, or other security to secure the payment of compensation in willful violation of Business and Professions Code section 6106.3 through Civil Code section 2944.7(a)(2).
Case No. 12-0-17392 (Complainant: Hernandez)
FACTS:
11. On October 28, 2011, Carlos Hernandez ("Hernandez") visited Respondent’s office in response to an advertisement on Spanish language television for Respondent’s home loan modification services. Hernandez visited Respondent’s office for the purpose of obtaining a home loan modification.
12. During the visit on October 28, 2011, Hernandez employed Respondent to attempt to obtain a loan modification for Hernandez. A member of Respondent’s staff also represented to Hernandez that Respondent would attempt to obtain a loan modification for him.
13. On November 3, 2011, Hernandez returned to Respondent office and paid Respondent $2,300 as an advanced fee for his legal services in Hernandez’s home loan modification matter.
14. On October 28, 2011 and again on November 3, 2011, Hernandez executed fee agreements with Respondent, each of which granted Respondent "a lien on any and all claims or causes of action that are the subject of the representation under this Agreement."
15. Respondent did not fully perform each and every service he had contracted to. perform or represented that he would perform for Hernandez, prior to demanding, charging, collecting or receiving any of the advanced attorney fees.
16. Respondent has recently refunded the advanced fees paid by Hernandez.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
17. By negotiating, arranging, or offering to perform a mortgage loan modification for a fee paid by a borrower, and demanding, charging, collecting and receiving fees from Hernandez prior to fully performing each and every service he had contracted to perform or represented that he would perform in violation of subsection (a)(1) of Section 2944.7 of the Civil Code, Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3.
18. By obtaining liens in his mortgage loan modification fee agreements with Hernandez, Respondent took a lien on any type of real or personal property, or other security to secure the payment of compensation in willful violation of Business and Professions Code section 6106.3 through Civil Code section 2944.7(a)(2).
Case No. 13-O-10045 (Complainant: Castillo)
FACTS:
19. On June 24, 2011, Carlos Castillo ("Castillo") visited Respondent’s office in response to an advertisement on Spanish language radio for Respondent’s home loan modification services. Castillo visited Respondent’s office for the purpose of obtaining a home loan modification.
20. During the visit on June 24, 2011, Castillo employed Respondent to attempt to obtain a loan modification for Castillo. A member of Respondent’s staff also represented to Castillo that Respondent would attempt to obtain a loan modification for him.
21. On June 24, 2011, Castillo executed two fee agreements with Respondent, each of which granted Respondent "a lien on any and all claims or causes of action that are the subject of the representation under this Agreement."
22. On June 24, 2011, paid Respondent $2,300 as an advanced fee for his legal services in Castillo’s home loan modification matter.
23. Between August 2011 and April 2012, Castillo paid Respondent an additional $550.
24. Respondent did not fully perform each and every service he had contracted to perform or represented that he would perform for Castillo, prior to demanding, charging, collecting or receiving any of the advanced attorney fees.
25. Respondent has recently refunded the advanced fees paid by Castillo.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
26. By negotiating, arranging, or offering to perform a mortgage loan modification for a fee paid by a borrower, and demanding, charging, collecting and receiving fees from Castillo prior to fully performing each and every service he had contracted to perform or represented that he would perform in violation of subsection (a)(1) of Section 2944.7 of the Civil Code, Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3.
27. By obtaining liens in his mortgage loan modification fee agreements with Castillo, Respondent took a lien on any type of real or personal property, or other security to secure the payment of compensation in willful violation of Business and Professions Code section 6106.3 through Civil Code section 2944.7(a)(2).
Case No. 13-O-10048 (Complainant: Hurtado)
FACTS:
28. On July 18, 2011, Viola Hurtado ("Hurtado") visited Respondent’s office in response to an advertisement on Spanish language radio for Respondent’s home loan modification services. Hurtado visited Respondent’s office for the purpose of obtaining a home loan modification.
29. During the visit on July 18, 2011, Hurtado employed Respondent to attempt to obtain a loan modification for Hurtado. A member of Respondent’s staff also represented to Hurtado that Respondent would attempt to obtain a loan modification for her.
30. On July 25, 2011, Hurtado returned to Respondent office and paid Respondent $2,300 as an advanced fee for his legal services in Hurtado’s home loan modification matter.
31. On July 18,2011 and again on July 25, 2011, Hurtado executed fee agreements with Respondent, each of which granted Respondent "a lien on any and all claims or causes of action that are the subject of the representation under this Agreement."
32. Respondent did not fully perform each and every service he had contracted to perform or represented that he would perform for Hurtado, prior to demanding, charging, collecting or receiving any of the advanced attorney fees.
33. In early 2012, Respondent closed his law office which provided loan modification services, but failed to inform Hurtado of its closure.
34. In May 2012, Hurtado’s husband, Luis Lucero, went to Respondent’s office and saw that it was closed.
35. By moving his office address without informing Hurtado, Respondent constructively terminated his employment with Hurtado. Before he constructively terminated his employment with Hurtado, Respondent did not take reasonable steps to avoid reasonably foreseeable prejudice to Hurtado.
36. Respondent has recently refunded the advanced fees paid by Hurtado.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
37. By negotiating, arranging, or offering to perform a mortgage loan modification for a fee paid by a borrower, and demanding, charging, collecting and receiving fees from Hurtado prior to fully performing each and every service he had contracted to perform or represented that he would perform in violation of subsection (a)(1) of Section 2944.7 of the Civil Code, Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3.
38. By obtaining liens in his mortgage loan modification fee agreements with Hurtado, Respondent took a lien on any type of real or personal property, or other security to secure the payment of compensation in willful violation of Business and Professions Code section 6106.3 through Civil Code section 2944.7(a)(2).
39. By closing his law office without informing Hurtado of the closure, Respondent failed, upon termination of employment, to take reasonable steps to avoid reasonably foreseeable prejudice to his client in wilful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(A)(2).
Case No. 13-O-10269 (Complainant: Rocha)
FACTS:
40. On August 19, 2011, Alejandrina Rocha ("Rocha") visited Respondent’s office for the purpose of obtaining a loan modification.
41. During the visit on August 19, 2011, Rocha employed Respondent to attempt to obtain a loan modification for Rocha. A member of Respondent’s staff also represented to Rocha that Respondent would attempt to obtain a loan modification for her.
42. On August 26, 2011, Rocha executed a fee agreement with Respondent, which granted Respondent "a lien on any and all claims or causes of action that are the subject of the representation under this Agreement."
43. On September 6, 2011, paid Respondent $2,300 as an advanced fee for his legal services in Rocha’s home loan modification matter.
44. Respondent did not fully perform each and every service he had contracted to perform or represented that he would perform for Rocha, prior to demanding, charging, collecting or receiving any of the advanced attorney fees.
45. Respondent has recently refunded the advanced fees paid by Rocha.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
46. By negotiating, arranging, or offering to perform a mortgage loan modification for a fee paid by a borrower, and demanding, charging, collecting and receiving fees from Rocha prior to fully performing each and every service he had contracted to perform or represented that he would perform in violation of subsection (a)(1) of Section 2944.7 of the Civil Code, Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3.
47. By obtaining a lien in his mortgage loan modification fee agreement with Rocha, Respondent took a lien on any type of real or personal property, or other security to secure the payment of compensation in willful violation of Business and Professions Code section 6106.3 through Civil Code section 2944.7(a)(2).
Case No. 13-O-12027 (Complainant: Fabian)
FACTS:
48. On October 1, 2011, Wilfredo Fabian ("Fabian") visited Respondent’s office in response to an advertisement on Spanish language radio for Respondent’s home loan modification services. Fabian visited Respondent’s office for the purpose of obtaining a home loan modification.
49. During the visit on October 1, 2011, Fabian employed Respondent to attempt to obtain a loan modification for Fabian. A member of Respondent’s staff also represented to Fabian that Respondent would attempt to obtain a loan modification for him.
50. On October 1, 2011 and again on October 8, 2011, Fabian executed fee agreements with Respondent, each of which granted Respondent "a lien on any and all claims or causes of action that are the subject of the representation under this Agreement."
51. On October 8, 2011, Fabian paid Respondent $2,500 as an advanced fee for his legal services in Fabian’s home loan modification matter.
52. Between November 2011 and May 2012, Fabian paid Respondent an additional $350. 53. Respondent did not fully perform each and every service he had contracted to perform or represented that he would perform for Fabian, prior to demanding, charging, collecting or receiving any of the advanced attorney fees.
54. Respondent has recently refunded the advanced fees paid by Fabian.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
55. By negotiating, arranging, or offering to perform a mortgage loan modification for a fee paid by a borrower, and demanding, charging, collecting and receiving fees from Fabian prior to fully performing each and every service he had contracted to perform or represented that he would perform in violation of subsection (a)(1) of Section 2944.7 of the Civil Code, Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3.
56. By obtaining liens in his mortgage loan modification fee agreements with Fabian, Respondent took a lien on any type of real or personal property, or other security to secure the payment of compensation in willful violation of Business and Professions Code section 6t 06.3 through Civil Code section 2944.7(a)(2).
Case No. 13-O-15618 (Complainant: Navarro)
FACTS:
57. On March 15, 2012, Ruben Navarro (“Navarro") visited Respondent’s office for the purpose of obtaining a home loan modification.
58. During the visit on March 15, 2012, Navarro employed Respondent to attempt to obtain a loan modification for Fabian. A member of Respondent’s staff also represented to Navarro that Respondent would attempt to obtain a loan modification for him.
59. On March 15, 2012, Navarro executed a fee agreement with Respondent, which granted Respondent "a lien on any and all claims or causes of action that are the subject of the representation under this Agreement."
60. On March 15, 2012, Navarro paid Respondent $1,000 as an advanced fee for his legal services in Navarro’s home loan modification matter.
61. On April 15, 2012 and again on May 15, 2012, Navarro paid Respondent an additional $1,000 as an advanced fee for his legal services in Navarro’s home loan modification matter. Thus, Navarro paid Respondent a total of $3,000.
62. Respondent did not fully perform each and every service he had contracted to perform or represented that he would perform for Navarro, prior to demanding, charging, collecting or receiving any of the advanced attorney fees.
63. Respondent has recently refunded the advanced fees paid by Navarro.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
64. By negotiating, arranging, or offering to perform a mortgage loan modification for a fee paid by a borrower, and demanding, charging, collecting and receiving fees from Navarro prior to fully performing each and every service he had contracted to perform or represented that he would perform in violation of subsection (a)(1) of Section 2944.7 of the Civil Code, Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3.
65. By obtaining liens in his mortgage loan modification fee agreements with Navarro, Respondent took a lien on any type of real or personal property, or other security to secure the payment of compensation in willful violation of Business and Professions Code section 6106.3 through Civil Code section 2944.7(a)(2).
Case No. 13-O-16405 (Complainant: Mariscal)
FACTS:
66. On August 18, 2011, Angel Mariscal ("Mariscal") and Maria Bastidas ("Bastidas") visited Respondent’s office for the purpose of obtaining a home loan modification,
67. During the visit on August 18, 2011, Mariscal and Bastidas employed Respondent to attempt to obtain a loan modification for them. A member of Respondent’s staff also represented to them that Respondent would attempt to obtain a loan modification for them.
68. On August 18, 2011, Mariscal and Bastidas executed a tee agreement with Respondent, which granted Respondent "a lien on any and all claims or causes of action that are the subject of the representation under this Agreement."
69. On August 18, 2011, Mariscal and Bastidas paid Respondent $2,000 as an advanced fee for his legal services in Fabian’s home loan modification matter.
70. Between September 2011 and June 2012; Mariscal and Bastidas paid Respondent an additional $500.
71. Respondent did not fully perform each and every service he had contracted to perform or represented that he would perform for Mariscal and Bastidas, prior to demanding, charging, collecting or receiving any of the advanced attorney fees.
72. Respondent has recently refunded the advanced fees paid by Mariscal and Bastidas.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
73. By negotiating, arranging, or offering to perform a mortgage loan modification for a fee paid by a borrower, and demanding, charging, collecting and receiving fees from Mariscal and Bastidas prior to fully performing each and every service he had contracted to perform or represented that he would perform in violation of subsection (a)(1) of Section 2944.7 of the Civil Code, Respondent willfully violated Business and Professions Code section 6106.3.
74. By obtaining liens in his mortgage loan modification fee agreements with Mariscal and Bastidas, Respondent took a lien on any type of real or personal property, or other security to secure the payment of compensation in willful violation of Business and Professions Code section 6106.3 through Civil Code section 2944.7(a)(2).
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
Harm (Std. 1.2(b)(iv)): Castillo, the complainant in case no. 13-O-10045, was current on his mortgage and had a good credit score before hiring Respondent. When Castillo went to Respondent’s office, Respondent’s staff advised Castillo to stop paying his mortgage in order to induce the bank to modify Castillo’s loan. Based up on that advice, Castillo stopped paying his mortgage. Respondent failed to obtain a loan modification for Castillo; however, Castillo’s credit was seriously damaged by the fact that he stopped paying his mortgage, thus causing harm to Castillo.
In addition, all clients suffered harm in that they suffered the loss of the use of their money during the period Respondent sought to obtain for them a loan modification. Respondent clients’ financial desperation was compounded by the fact that he did not provide refunds for years. (In the Matter of Taylor (Review Dept. 2013) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr 221,235)
Multiple Acts of Misconduct (Std. 1.2(b)(ii)): Between April 2011 and May 2012, Respondent violated Civil Code section 2944.7 in each of the six client matters described herein. In case no. 11-O-17466 (discussed further below), Respondent also violated Civil Code section 2944.7 with respect to a seventh client during this time period. Respondent’s multiple violations and multiple acts of misconduct constitute an aggravating circumstance.
Prior Record of Discipline (Std. 1.2(b)(i)): On July 12, 2013, the State Bar Court issued a decision in case no. 11-0-17476, finding Respondent culpable of violating Civil Code sections 2944.7(a) and 2944.7(a)(2) and recommending that Respondent be placed on two years’ stayed suspension and two years’ probation pursuant to Business and Professions Code, section 6106.3 (two counts). As of the date of this stipulation, the July 12, 2013, disciplinary recommendation is pending adoption by the California Supreme Court. The misconduct in case no. 11-O-17476 occurred from April to July 2011. As discussed below, the discipline agreed to in this stipulation takes into account the State Bar Court’s culpability and discipline findings in case no. 11-O-17476, pursuant to In the Matter of Sklar (Review Dept.) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 602.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
Prefiling Stipulation: Respondent has entered into this stipulation resolving the eight matters herein before disciplinary charges had to be filed against him. (Silva-Vidor v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1071, 1079 [where mitigative credit was given for entering into a stipulation as to facts and culpability].)
Remedial Measures: After being contacted by the State Bar regarding allegations of misconduct in his loan modification practice, Respondent has ceased practicing in the area of loan modifications. (See In the Matter of Lias (Review Dept. 1998) 3 Cal. State Bar Rptr. 907, 926 [where mitigative credit was given for substantial efforts made to correct the problems surrounding the misconduct].)
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.
The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct provide a "process of fixing discipline" pursuant to a set of written principles to "better discharge the purposes of attorney discipline as announced by the Supreme Court." (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, Introduction (all further references to standards are to this source).) The primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings and of the sanctions imposed are "the protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; the maintenance of high professional standards by attorneys and the preservation of public confidence in the legal profession." (In re Morse (1995) 11 Cal.4th 184, 205; std. 1.3.)
Although not binding, the standards are entitled to "great weight" and should be followed "whenever possible" in determining level of discipline, (In re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 92, quoting In re Brown (1995) 12 Cal.4th 205, 220 and In re Young (1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 267, fn. 11.) Adherence to the standards in the great majority of cases serves the valuable purpose of eliminating disparity and assuring consistency, that is, the imposition of similar attorney discipline for instances of similar attorney misconduct. (In re Naney (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 190.) Any discipline recommendation different from that set forth in the applicable standards should clearly explain the reasons for the deviation. (Blair v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 762, 776, fn. 5.)
Standard 2.10 applies to this matter and provides that violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct and the State Bar Act not specifically specified in the Standards, including violations of rule 3-700 and section 6 106.3, shall result in reproval or suspension depending on the gravity of the misconduct or harm to the victim, with due regard to the purposes of imposing discipline.
In addition, in order to determine the appropriate level of discipline for the misconduct discussed herein, the State Bar Court’s findings and discipline recommendation in its July 12, 2013 decision in connection with case no. 11-O-17476 must be considered, because the Court found Respondent committed misconduct in that matter of the same nature as the misconduct herein during the same time period as the misconduct committed herein.
In its decision in case no. 11-O-17476, the State Bar Court found Respondent culpable of one count of violating Business and Professions Code, section 6106.3 [Illegal Advanced Fee] and one count of violating Business and Professions Code, section 6106.3 [Illegal Lien]. The misconduct spanned from April to July of 201 land involved one client matter. The Court recommended discipline including two years’ stayed suspension. To date, the Supreme Court has not filed an order approving the decision.
In the present case, Respondent is charged with the same violations in eight additional client matters. Moreover, Respondent improperly withdrew from representation of Hurtado, the complainant in case no. 13-O-10048. This misconduct spanned from July 2011 to May 2012.
In In the Matter of Sklar, the Review Department stated that,
"Prior discipline is a proper factor in aggravation "[w]henever discipline is imposed." [citation omitted] ... Nonetheless, the aggravating force of prior discipline is generally diminished if the misconduct underlying it occurred during the same time period. [citation omitted] Since part of the rationale for considering prior discipline as having an aggravating impact is that it is indicative of a recidivist attorney’s inability to conform his or her conduct to ethical norms [citation omitted], it is therefore appropriate to consider the fact that the misconduct involved here was contemporaneous with the misconduct in the prior case .... We therefore consider the totality of the findings in the two cases to determine what the discipline would have been had all the charged misconduct in this period been brought as one case."
(In the Matter of Sklar (Review Dept.) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 602, 618-619.)
Taking the present cases together with case no. 11-O-17476 (per Sklar), Respondent is culpable of 18 counts of violating Business and Professions Code section 6106.3 in nine separate client matters. In addition, Respondent caused harm. In mitigation, Respondent has agreed to enter into this Stipulation prior to the filing of a notice of disciplinary charges mad has thereby saved the State Bar Court time and resources. Although not mitigation, it is also worth noting that Respondent has provided all of the complainants with a refund of the illegal fees that he received from them. (Doyle v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 12, 24 [Restitution made only under the pressure of a forthcoming disciplinary investigation is entitled to no weight as a mitigating circumstance.]) By providing such refunds, Respondent has brought to an end the harm the clients suffered due to being wrongfully deprived of the use of their funds, and has negated any need for restitution as a term of discipline.
Respondent’s multiple and serious violations of the Business and Professions Code warrant a period of actual suspension, notwithstanding the mitigating circumstances and the fact that Respondent has provided the complainants with refunds.
In light of the gravity of Respondent’s misconduct, the harm to clients, the applicable standard, and the aggravating and mitigating factors that are present, discipline including six months’ actual suspension is appropriate under the standards and serves the primary purposes of attorney discipline.
This level of discipline is also supported by the case law. In In the Matter of Taylor (Review Dept. 2013) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 221, the Review Department found Taylor culpable of eight counts of violating Business and Professions Code, section 2944.7, and one count of violating Business and Professions Code, section 2944.6, and determined the appropriate level of discipline to be six months’ actual suspension. Taylor is substantially similar to the present matter, thus similar discipline is appropriate.
COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.
Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has informed respondent that as of September 10, 2013, the prosecution costs in this matter are $7,839.30. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.
EXCLUSION FROM MCLE CREDIT
Pursuant to rule 3201, Respondent may not receive MCLE credit for completion of State Bar Ethics School. (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 3201 .)
SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES
Case Number(s): 12-O-16161; 12-O-17392; 13-O-10048; 13-O-10045;
13-O-10269; 13-O-12027; 13-O-15618; 13-O-16405
In the Matter of: LOUIS ALLEN LIBERTY
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: LOUIS ALLEN LIBERTY
Date: 11/26/13
Respondent’s Counsel: Samuel C. Bellicini
Date: 12/3/13
Deputy Trial Counsel: Christine Souhrada
Date:12/5/13
ACTUAL SUSPENSION ORDER
Case Number(s): 12-O-16161;12-O-17392;13-O-10045;13-O-10048;
13-O-10269;13-O-12027;13-O-15618;13-O-16405
In the Matter of: LOUIS ALLEN LIBERTY
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
1.On page 4 of the stipulation, the "X" in the box next to paragraph E.(1) is deleted;
2.On page 6 of the stipulation, an "X" is inserted in the box next to paragraph F.(5);
3.On page 9 of the stipulation, paragraph 22, "paid Respondent" is deleted, and in its place is inserted "Castillo paid Respondent"; and
4. On page 11 of the stipulation, paragraph 43, "paid Respondent" is deleted, and in its place is inserted "Rocha paid Respondent".
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58 (E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Lucy Armendariz
Date: 12/11/13
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of San Francisco, on December 11, 2013, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION
AND ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at San Francisco, California, addressed as follows:
SAMUEL C. BELLICINI
FISHKIN & SLATTER, LLP
1575 TREAT BLVD STE 215
WALNUT CREEK, CA 94598
<<not>> checked. by certified mail, No. , with return receipt requested, through the United States Postal Service at , California, addressed as follows:
<<not>> checked. by overnight mail at , California, addressed as follows:
<<not>> checked. by fax transmission, at fax number . No error was reported by the fax machine that I used.
<<not>> checked. By personal service by leaving the documents in a sealed envelope or package clearly labeled to identify the attorney being served with a receptionist or a person having charge of the attorney’s office, addressed as follows:
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
CHRISTINE A. SOUHRADA, Enforcement, Los Angeles
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on December 11, 2013.
Signed by:
Mazie Yip
Case Administrator
State Bar Court