Case Number(s): 12-O-16302
In the Matter of: SUSAN L. JEFFRIES, Bar # 95296, A Member of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Sara J. Savage, Bar #199344,
Counsel for Respondent: Jonathan I. Arons, Bar #111257,
Submitted to: Assigned Judge.
Filed: July 29, 2013.
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.
1. Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted December 16, 1980.
2. The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
3. All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 10 pages, not including the order.
4. A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5. Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6. The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7. No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8. Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
<<not>> checked. Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 5.130, Rules of Procedure.
checked. Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: two billing cycles following the effective date of the Supreme Court Order. (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
<<not>> checked. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs are entirely waived.
Attachment language (if any):.
ATTACHMENT TO
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION
IN THE MATTER OF: SUSAN L. JEFFRIES, State Bar No. 95296
STATE BAR COURT CASE NUMBER: 12-O-16302
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Respondent admits that the following facts are tree and that she is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct.
Case No. 12-O-16302 (Complainant: Judge Evelio Grillo)
FACTS:
1. As of January 28, 2005, Respondent was representing Robin George-Ann Lynn in a family law matter entitled, Robin Lynn v. Dennis Lynn, Alameda County Superior Court case number HF-05-197785 ("family law matter"). Respondent substituted out as counsel of record for Robin George-Ann Lynn on June 22, 2006.
2. On January 8, 2009, an interpleader action was filed by Dennis Lynn, entitled Dennis Lynn v. Robin George-Ann Lynn et. al., County of Alameda Superior Court case number HG-09-429721 ("interpleader action"). Respondent claimed attorneys’ fees in the interpleader action in relation to her work in the family law matter.
3. On November 17, 2011, Respondent testified in Alameda Superior Court in the interpleader action. During her testimony on November 17, 2011, Respondent knowingly falsely testified that she served a Family Law Real Property Lien ("FLARPL") and a charging lien on the parties in the family law matter. In truth and in fact, Respondent had not served the FLARPL and charging lien on the parties.
4. During her testimony on November 17, 2011, Respondent also knowingly falsely testified that she filed the proofs of service for the FLARPL and the charging lien in the family law matter. In truth and in fact, Respondent had not filed the proofs of service for the FLARPL and the charging lien on the parties. Then, Respondent presented to the Court two false and fabricated proofs of service as evidence of serving the FLARPL and charging lien. Respondent fabricated the proofs of service for the interpleader action and knew the proofs of service were false and fabricated at the time she offered the documents to the Court. Respondent then authenticated the fabricated proofs of service.
5. On November 17, 2011, based upon Respondent’s testimony, the Court admitted both proofs of service into evidence in the interpleader action.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
6. By falsely testifying that she served the liens, by falsely testifying that she filed and served the proofs of service, by proffering the false proofs of service, and by falsely testifying about the authenticity of the proofs of service, Respondent intentionally committed acts involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption in willful violation of Business and Professions Code section 6106.
7. By falsely testifying that she served the liens, by falsely testifying that she filed and served the proofs of service, by proffering the false proofs of service into evidence, and by falsely testifying about the authenticity of the proofs of service, Respondent presented a matter to a tribunal and sought to mislead a judge, judicial officer, or jury by an artifice or false statement of fact or law in willful violation of rule 5-200(B) of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
ADDITIONAL FACTS RE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
Prior Record of Discipline (Std. 1.2(b)(i)): Respondent has a prior record of discipline, In case no. 07-O-11837, Respondent received a private reproval for falling to timely return a client’s file in willful violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(1).
Multiple Acts of Misconduct Standard 1.2 (b)(ii)).: Respondent committed four separate acts of misconduct in this matter.
Harm (Std. 1.2(b)(iv)): Respondent’s false testimony and proffer of fabricated evidence resulted in a third day of trial which wasted judicial resources, and harmed the administration of justice.
ADDITIONAL FACTS RE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
Pretrial Stipulation: Respondent is entitled to some credit for entering into a Pre-Trial Stipulation prior to trial, thereby saving the State Bar Court time and resources. (In the Matter of Downy (Review Dept. 2009) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 151,156; In the Matter of Van Sickle (Review Dept. 2006) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 980, 993-994.) However, Respondent did not enter into the Stipulation until the eve of trial, therefore, the mitigation afforded Respondent should be tempered by the proximity of the trial date.
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.
The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct provide a "process of fixing discipline" pursuant to a set of written principles to "better discharge the purposes of attorney discipline as announced by the Supreme Court." (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, Introduction (all further references to standards are to this source).) The primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings and of the sanctions imposed are "the protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession;, the maintenance of high professional standards by attorneys and the preservation of public confidence in the legal profession." (In re Morse (1995) 11 Cal.4th 184, 205; std. 1.3.)
Although not binding, the standards are entitled to "great weight" and should be followed "whenever possible" in determining level of discipline. (In re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 92, quoting In re Brown (1995) 12 Cal.4th 205,220 and In re Young (1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 267, fn. 11.) Adherence to the standards in the great majority of cases serves the valuable purpose of eliminating disparity and assuring consistency, that is, the imposition of similar attorney discipline for instances of similar attorney misconduct. (In re Naney (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 190.) Any discipline recommendation different from that set forth in the applicable standards should clearly explain the reasons for the deviation. (Blair v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 762, 776, fn. 5.)
Respondent admits to committing four acts of professional misconduct. Standard 1.6(a) requires that where a Respondent acknowledges two or more acts of misconduct, and different sanctions are prescribed by the standards that apply to those acts, the sanction imposed shall be the more or most severe prescribed in the applicable standards. The most severe sanction applicable to Respondent’s misconduct is found in standard 2.3 which applies to Respondent’s violation of section 6106 of the Business and Professions Code.
Standard 2.3 calls for actual suspension or disbarment depending upon the extent to which the victim of the misconduct is harmed or misled and depending upon the magnitude of the act of misconduct and the degree to which it related to the member’s acts within the practice of law. In the present case, Respondent intentionally made misrepresentations to the Court and proffered fabricated evidence. Respondent’s misconduct is serious and directly related to the practice of law. Further, Respondent’s misconduct wasted valuable judicial resources, causing harm to the administration of justice. Such misconduct calls for a lengthy period of actual suspension.
Respondent’s misconduct is aggravated by multiple acts of misconduct. Further, Standard 1.7(a) mandates that the discipline in the current matter shall be greater than that imposed in the prior proceeding. Respondent’s prior discipline was a private reproval. Therefore, a greater level of discipline in this matter is warranted. In mitigation, Respondent has agreed to enter into a Pre-Trial Stipulation. However, settlement immediately prior to trial should be given little weight. Given the aggravation and limited mitigative credit, a two-year actual suspension is in line with the Standards.
Borre v. State Bar (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1047, is instructive on the appropriate level of discipline. In Borre, the respondent who had no prior record of discipline was found culpable of abandoning his client and attempting to deceive the State Bar by fabricating an exculpatory letter. The Supreme Court noted that the attorney’s fabrication of the letter and subsequent lies, were particularly egregious and stated: "We have held that fraudulent and contrived misrepresentations to the State Bar may perhaps constitute a greater offense than misappropriation.’" (Id. at 1053.) In finding that such acts demonstrate moral turpitude, the Court stated that the misrepresentations "manifest an abiding disregard of the fundamental rule of ethics - that of common honesty - without which the profession is worse than valueless in the place it holds in the administration of justice." (Ibid.) The Court then imposed an actual suspension of two years.
Respondent’s misconduct is similar that in Borre, albeit less egregious since it was not as widespread and did not involve a client. Yet, there are more aggravating factors in this matter, and less mitigation, than in Borre.
When viewing the facts in this case, together with the aggravation and mitigation, a two-year actual suspension is appropriate under the standards and case law.
COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.
Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has informed respondent that as of July 22, 2013, the prosecution costs in this matter are $7,428.50. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.
SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES
Case Number(s): 12-O-16302
In the Matter of: SUSAN L. JEFFRIES
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: Susan L. Jeffries
Date: 7/23/13
Respondent’s Counsel: Jonathan I. Arons
Date: 7/23/13
Deputy Trial Counsel: Sara J. Savage
Date: 7/23/13
ACTUAL SUSPENSION ORDER
Case Number(s): 12-O-16302
In the Matter of: SUSAN L. JEFFRIES
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58 (E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Pat McElroy
Date: 7/29/13
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of San Francisco, on July 29, 2013, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND
ORDER APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at San Francisco, California, addressed as follows:
JONATHAN IRWIN ARONS
LAW OFC JONATHAN I ARONS
221 MAIN ST. STE. 740
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94105
<<not>> checked. by certified mail, No. , with return receipt requested, through the United States Postal Service at , California, addressed as follows:
<<not>> checked. by overnight mail at , California, addressed as follows:
<<not>> checked. by fax transmission, at fax number . No error was reported by the fax machine that I used.
<<not>> checked. By personal service by leaving the documents in a sealed envelope or package clearly labeled to identify the attorney being served with a receptionist or a person having charge of the attorney’s office, addressed as follows:
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:
SARA J. SAVAGE, Enforcement, San Francisco
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on July 29, 2013.
Signed by:
Bernadette C.O. Molina
Case Administrator
State Bar Court