State Bar Court of California
Hearing Department
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING DISBARMENT; ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE
ENROLLMENT
DISBARMENT
Case Number(s): 12-O-16850; 13-O-11620
In the Matter of: HAL ERWIN WRIGHT, Bar # 157814, A Member
of the State Bar of California, (Respondent).
Counsel For The State Bar: Robin B. Brune, Bar # 14948,
Counsel for Respondent: HAL ERWIN WRIGHT , Bar # 157814,
Submitted to: Assigned Judge .
Filed: December 20, 2013.
<<not>> checked. PREVIOUS STIPULATION
REJECTED
Note: All information required by this form and any
additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be
set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g.,
"Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law,"
"Supporting Authority," etc.
A. Parties' Acknowledgments:
1.
Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted April 7,
1992.
2.
The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained
herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the
Supreme Court.
3.
All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption
of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed
consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under
"Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 12 pages, not including
the order.
4.
A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or
causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
5.
Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts
are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
6.
The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level
of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
7.
No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent
has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not
resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
8.
Payment of Disciplinary Costs-Respondent acknowledges the provisions of
Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
checked. Costs are awarded to the
State Bar.
<<not>> checked. Costs
are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial
Waiver of Costs".
<<not>> checked. Costs
are entirely waived.
9.
ORDER OF INACTIVE ENROLLMENT:
The parties are aware that if this stipulation is approved, the judge will
issue an order of inactive enrollment under Business and Professions Code
section 6007, subdivision (c)(4), and Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, rule
5.111(D)(1).
B. Aggravating Circumstances [for definition, see Standards for Attorney
Sanctions for Professional Misconduct, standard 1.2(b)]. Facts supporting
aggravating circumstances are required.
checked. (1) Prior record of
discipline
checked. (a) State Bar Court case # of prior case 01-O-02009
(See attachment at page 9) .
checked. (b) Date prior discipline effective December 4,
2003 .
checked. (c) Rules of Professional Conduct/ State Bar Act
violations: Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A) failure to perform;
rule 3-700(D)(2) failure to return unearned fee; and rule 4-100(B)(3) failure
to render accounting.
checked. (d) Degree of prior discipline private reproval
checked. (e) If Respondent has two or more incidents of
prior discipline, use space provided below. See attachment at page 9 .
<<not>> checked. (2) Dishonesty:
Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by or followed by bad faith, dishonesty,
concealment, overreaching or other violations of the State Bar Act or Rules of
Professional Conduct.
<<not>> checked. (3) Trust
Violation: Trust funds or property were involved and Respondent refused or was
unable to account to the client or person who was the object of the misconduct
for improper conduct toward said funds or property.
checked. (4) Harm: Respondent's
misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public or the administration of
justice. See attachment at page 9
checked. (5) Indifference:
Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for
the consequences of his or her misconduct. See attachment at page 9
<<not>> checked. (6) Lack of
Cooperation: Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims
of his/her misconduct or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation or
proceedings.
checked. (7) Multiple/Pattern of
Misconduct: Respondent's current misconduct evidences multiple acts of
wrongdoing or demonstrates a pattern of misconduct. See attachment at page 9
<<not>> checked. (8) No
aggravating circumstances are involved.
Additional aggravating circumstances: .
C. Mitigating Circumstances [see standard 1.2(e)]. Facts supporting
mitigating circumstances are required.
<<not>> checked. (1) No Prior Discipline: Respondent has no prior record
of discipline over many years of practice coupled with present misconduct which
is not deemed serious.
<<not>>
checked. (2) No Harm: Respondent did not harm the client or person who was
the object of the misconduct.
<<not>>
checked. (3) Candor/Cooperation: Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and
cooperation with the victims of his/her misconduct and to the State Bar during
disciplinary investigation and proceedings.
<<not>>
checked. (4) Remorse: Respondent promptly took objective steps spontaneously
demonstrating remorse and recognition of the wrongdoing, which steps were
designed to timely atone for any consequences of his/her misconduct.
<<not>>
checked. (5) Restitution: Respondent paid $ on in restitution to without
the threat or force of disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings.
<<not>>
checked. (6) Delay: These disciplinary proceedings were excessively
delayed. The delay is not attributable to Respondent and the delay prejudiced
him/her.
<<not>>
checked. (7) Good Faith: Respondent acted in good faith.
<<not>>
checked. (8) Emotional/Physical Difficulties: At the time of the stipulated
act or acts of professional misconduct Respondent suffered extreme emotional
difficulties or physical disabilities which expert testimony would establish
was directly responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities
were not the product of any illegal conduct by the member, such as illegal drug
or substance abuse, and Respondent no longer suffers from such difficulties or
disabilities.
<<not>>
checked. (9) Severe Financial Stress: At the time of the misconduct,
Respondent suffered from severe financial stress which resulted from
circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond his/her control
and which were directly responsible for the misconduct.
<<not>>
checked. (10) Family Problems: At the time of the misconduct, Respondent
suffered extreme difficulties in his/her personal life which were other than
emotional or physical in nature.
<<not>>
checked. (11) Good Character: Respondent's good character is attested to by a
wide range of references in the legal and general communities who are aware of
the full extent of his/her misconduct.
<<not>>
checked. (12) Rehabilitation: Considerable time has passed since the acts of
professional misconduct occurred followed by convincing proof of subsequent
rehabilitation.
checked.
(13) No mitigating circumstances are involved.
Additional
mitigating circumstances: Stipulation - See attachment, page 10
D. Discipline: Disbarment.
E. Additional Requirements:
(1) Rule 9.20,
California Rules of Court: Respondent must comply with the requirements of
rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in
subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 calendar days,
respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court's Order in this
matter.
checked. (2) Restitution:
Respondent must make restitution to in the amount of $ plus 10 percent
interest per year from . If the Client Security Fund has reimbursed for all
or any portion of the principal amount, respondent must pay restitution to CSF
of the amount paid plus applicable interest and costs in accordance with
Business and Professions Code section 6140.5. Respondent must pay the above
restitution and furnish satisfactory proof of payment to the State Bar's Office
of Probation in Los Angeles no later than days from the effective date of the
Supreme Court order in this case..
checked. (3) Other: Additional
information on restitution
1. Restitution to Steve lsaacson in the
amount of $40,000, with interest at the rate of ten percent per annum accruing
from April 5, 2011.
2. Restitution to the Davis Musical Theater
Company ("DMTC") in the amount of $15,500, with interest at the rate
of ten percent per annum accruing from November 19, 2012.
3. Restitution to Steve and Kathy Ramirez in
the sum of $2,500, with interest at the rate of ten percent per annum accruing
from April 1, 2010.
Attachment language (if any):.
ATTACHMENT TO
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION
IN THE MATTER OF: HAL ERWIN WRIGHT, State Bar No. 157814
STATE BAR COURT CASE NUMBER: 12-O-16850; 13-O-11620
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that he is culpable
of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct.
Case No. 13-O-11620 (Complainant: Steve Isaacson )
FACTS:
1. Steve Isaacson ("Isaacson") hired Respondent in September
2010, to represent him in a personal injury matter in connection with a fall
Isaacson sustained at the Big Idea Theater in Sacramento, California on June 5,
2010. The parties did not execute a written fee agreement.
2. Respondent settled Isaacson’s claim against the Big Idea Theater with
Northland Insurance Company on April 1,201 I, for the sum of $40,000 without
Isaacson’s knowledge or consent. The value of Isaacson’s suit far exceeded
$40,000.
3. On April 1,201 I, Respondent forged Isaacson’s signature and Isaacson’s
wife’s signature on the General Release, Defense, Indemnity and Hold Harmless
Agreement for the personal injury matter ("release") and forwarded it
to Northland Insurance Company. Based upon receipt of the forged release,
Northland Insurance Company issued two checks in settlement of the claim. The
first check, check no. 9360, dated April 5,2011, was issued to Steve and Jan
Isaacson and their Attorney, Hal E. Wright, in the sum of $5,000. The second
check, check no. 93601, also dated April 5, 2011, was issued to Steve and Jan
Isaacson and their Attorney, Hal E. Wright, in the sum of $35,000.
4. Upon receipt, Respondent forged the signatures of Isaacson and Jan
Isaacson on the backs of each of the checks and deposited the funds into
Respondent’s client trust account. Thereafter, Respondent diverted the funds to
another checking account and spent the monies on matters unrelated to Isaacson.
Respondent misappropriated the Isaacson settlement funds for his own use and
benefit. 5. From the beginning of Respondent’s representation in September
2010, until January 2013, Respondent made false statements and representations
to Isaacson indicating that Respondent was pursuing the personal injury case,
had filed suit, and that litigation was proceeding forward.
6. In fact, Respondent did not file a personal injury lawsuit against Big
Idea Theater on behalf of Isaacson. Respondent sent Isaacson numerous emails in
which he misled Isaacson to believe that Isaacson’s case was moving forward, as
follows:
October 9, 2012; Respondent sent Isaacson an email stating, "Hi Steve,
Still working on getting you some jingle."; In truth and in fact,
Respondent was not working on the case.
January 18, 2012; Respondent sent. Isaacson an email stating, "It
sickens me that you are still in pain and I’m trying my best with these
"suits" but thinking outside the box/bun is not their forte. The case
is actually in better shape now than it was 6 months ago. Everybody’s
in."; In truth and in fact, Respondent was not working on the case.
January 12, 2013; Respondent sent Isaacson and email stating, "I spent
a couple of hours on the phone with Cincinnati. I told them that we absolutely had
to have some more in lost wages (easiest to quantify and, therefore, less to
fight over) because you were hurting financially. Threw Insurance Code 760h at
them (bad faith, hard to prove but it’s there) and said if we have to go that
route we will. I am supposed to hear first thing Monday and told them this time
we want a wire."; in truth and in fact, Respondent never had a telephone
conference with the defendant.
7. At the time the Respondent made the statements, he knew them to be
false. Respondent was no longer pursuing Isaacson’s personal injury matter but
had in fact settled Isaacson’s case for $40,000, and misappropriated the funds.
8. In December 2011, Respondent also told Isaacson that he intended to file
an additional suit on behalf of Isaacson for medical malpractice, in order to
address Isaacson’s concerns about the medical treatment Isaacson received after
Isaacson fell at the Big Idea Theater. On August 1, 2012, Isaacson wrote a
check in the amount of $390 to the Sacramento Court for the purpose of paying
for the filing fees for the medical malpractice case. Respondent scratched out
the payee, "Sac Superior Court", and wrote in "Hal Wright
POA" and cashed the check. Respondent misappropriated the Court filing
fees for his own use and benefit. Respondent never filed suit for medical
malpractice on behalf of Isaacson.
9. In May 2012, Isaacson hired Respondent for a second matter. Isaacson, in
his capacity as board member and Vice President of the Davis Musical Theater
company ("DMTC"), hired Respondent to obtain the proceeds of a
bequeath to the DMTC that a theater patron, Evalynn "Bridget" F.
Davis, ("Bridget’s Trust") had left to DMTC in her wilt. The parties
did not execute a written fee agreement. In May 2012, lsaacson gave the letter
regarding the inheritance and related documents to Respondent.
10. On October 1, 2012, Respondent executed a document entitled Beneficiary
Waiver of Account and Consent to Final Distribution in connection with the
Bridget’s Trust matter. On November 19, 2012, Respondent received a check,
check no. 1113, for $15,500 from Janice Townsend, Trustee, on behalf of
Bridget’s Trust, issued to the DMTC representing Evalynn "Bridget" F.
Davis’s bequeath to DMTC. Respondent endorsed the check from Bridget’s Trust
and deposited the funds into his client trust account.
11. Respondent paid $3,000 of the $15,500 funds from Bridget’s Trust to
Isaacson, falsely telling Isaacson that the funds were a partial payment from
the insurance company on the personal injury matter, for a lost wages claim.
Respondent then misappropriated the remaining $ I2,500 for his own use and
benefit. DMTC never received the $15,500 in funds from Bridget’s Trust.
Respondent did not advise Isaacson when he received the $15,500 from Bridget’s
Trust.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
12. By misappropriating $40,000 of Isaacson’s settlement funds for his own
use and benefit, Respondent committed an act involving moral turpitude,
dishonesty or corruption, in willful violation of Business and Professions
Code, section 6106.
13. By settling Isaacson’s suit without Isaacson’s knowledge or consent,
and by representing to Isaacson that he was still pursuing the lawsuit, when in
fact Respondent had never filed suit, had settled the matter for $40,000
without his client’s knowledge or consent, and had misappropriated the
settlement funds, Respondent committed acts involving moral turpitude,
dishonesty and corruption, in willful violation of Business and Professions
Code, section 6106.
14. By submitting a forged release to Northland Insurance company, and by
forging Isaacson and Jan Isaacson’s signatures on the settlement checks,
Respondent committed acts involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption,
in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.
15. By failing to pursue the personal injury lawsuit on behalf of Isaacson,
Respondent intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly failed to perform legal
services with competence, in willful violation of Rules of Professional
Conduct, rule 3-110(A).
16. By misappropriating Isaacson’s $390 check for the court filing fees for
his own use ad benefit, Respondent committed acts involving moral turpitude,
dishonesty or corruption, in willful violation of Business and Professions
Code, section 6106.
17. By misrepresenting to Isaacson that he was going to file suit on behalf
of Isaacson for medical malpractice, as a pretext to obtaining the check for
$390 as filing fees, Respondent committed an act involving moral turpitude,
dishonesty or corruption in willful violation of Business and Professions Code,
section 6106.
18. By misappropriating $i2,500 of the Bridget Trust funds for his own use
and benefit, and by misrepresenting to Isaacson that the $3,000 payment to him
was from the personal injury matter; and not from Bridget’s Trust, Respondent
committed an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, in
willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.
19. By failing to advise Isaacson, as the board member and Vice President
of DMTC, when Respondent received the $15,500 from Bridget’s Trust, Respondent
failed to notify a client promptly of the receipt of the client’s funds, in
willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(B)(1 ).
Case No. 12-O-16850 (Complainants: Steven and Kathleen Ramirez)
20. On March 29, 20 t 0, Steven and Kathleen Ramirez ("the
Ramirez’s") hired Respondent to obtain a trademark for their company,
Ramirez Tow, as well as to obtain two LLCS (limited liability corporations) and
to seek to vacate a judgment against them. The Ramirez’s paid Respondent $3,000
as an advanced fee. Thereafter, Respondent performed no legal services on their
behalf.
21. On October 5,2011, Respondent sent an email to Kathleen Ramirez falsely
stating that he had downloaded and filled out forms to get a
copyright/servicemark registered in California and "mailed them, along
with the required fee, about three weeks ago." In fact, Respondent did not
submit a request for copyright or servicemark on behalf of the Ramirez’s to any
California registration process.
22. On February 22, 2012, Kathleen Ramirez sent an email to the Respondent
requesting an accounting and a full refund. Respondent received the email, but
failed to provide Kathleen Ramirez with an accounting or a refund.
23. The Ramirez’s obtained new counsel to assist them. On March 28, 2012,
the Ramirez’s’ new counsel sent an email to the Respondent and requested a full
refund of $3,000 in 30 days. Respondent agreed to provide a full refund and the
parties agreed to a payment plan. Respondent made one payment of $500 on June
8, 2012, but has made no further payments.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
24. By failing to provide legal services of any value on the Ramirez’s
behalf, Respondent intentionally, recklessly, or repeatedly failed to perform
legal services with competence in willful violation of Rules of Professional
Conduct, rule 3-110(A).
25. By misrepresenting to the Ramirez’s that he had taken action on their
behalf when in fact he had not done so, Respondent committed an act involving
moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption in willful violation of Business and
Professions Code, section 6106.
26. By failing to render appropriate accounts to Kathleen Ramirez of the
advanced fees, Respondent failed to render appropriate accounts to a client
regarding all funds coming into Respondent’s possession in willful violation of
Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(B)(3).
27. By failing to refund $2,500 in unearned fees to the Ramirez’s,
Respondent failed to refund promptly any part of a fee paid in advance that has
not been earned, in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule
3-700(D)(2).
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
Prior Record of Discipline (Std. 1.2(b)(i)): Respondent received a private
reproval in December 2003 (case no. 01-O-02009) for violating Rules of
Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A) failure to perform; rule 3-700(D)(2)
failure to refund an unearned fee; and rule 4-100(B)(3) failure to maintain
disputed funds in trust. On March 28, 2013, the State Bar Court issued a
decision in case no. 10-O-10808, et al. recommending an 18-month actual
suspension for Respondent’s misconduct in two client matters, including
violations of Business and Professions Code, section 6106, (moral turpitude)
for misrepresenting to the clients the status of their legal matters; and
Business and Professions Code, section 6106, moral turpitude, for falsely
reporting his MCLE compliance. Additional violations included Rules of
Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A) (two counts) failure to perform; rule
3-700(D)(2) (two counts) failure to refund an unearned fee; and Business and
Professions Code, section 6068(m) failure to communicate. This case is
currently on appeal.
Harm (Std. 1.2(b)(iv)): Respondent significantly harmed his clients.
Isaacson was deprived of $40,000 of his settlement funds. Isaacson was deprived
of his day in court and a full and accurate assessment of the worth of his
lawsuit due to Respondent’s settlement of the suit prematurely for an amount
far less than its value. Respondent also injured the DMTC, a non-profit
community theater which has now been deprived of the benefit of the Bridget’s
Trust payment of $ I5,000. Respondent also harmed the Ramirez’s who have been
deprived of $2,500 for over a year.
Indifference (Std. 1.2(b)(v)): Respondent has not returned any of the funds
he misappropriated.
Multiple Acts of Misconduct (Std. 1.2(b)(ii)): Respondent committed 12 acts
of misconduct in three client matters, demonstrating multiple acts of
misconduct.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Pretrial Stipulation: Respondent admitted culpability to the misconduct,
obviating a need for a trial in this matter. ((See Silva-Vidor v. State Bar
(1989) 49 Cal. 3d 1071, 1079 [where mitigative credit was given for entering
into a stipulation as to facts and culpability]).
AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.
The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct provide a
"process of fixing discipline" pursuant to a set of written
principles to "better discharge the purposes of attorney discipline as
announced by the Supreme Court." (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds.
for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, Introduction (all further references
to standards are to this source).) The primary purposes of disciplinary
proceedings and of the sanctions imposed are "the protection of the
public, the courts and the legal profession; the maintenance of high
professional standards by attorneys and the preservation of public confidence
in the legal profession." (In re Morse (1995) 11 Cal. 4th 184, 205; std.
1.3.)
Although not binding, the standards are entitled to "great
weight" and should be followed "whenever possible" in
determining level of discipline. (In re Silverton (2005) 36 Cat.4th 81, 92,
quoting In re Brown (1995) 12 Cal.4th 205,220 and In re Young (1989) 49 Cal.3d
257, 267, fn. 11.) Adherence to the standards in the great majority of cases
serves the valuable purpose of eliminating disparity and assuring consistency, that
is, the imposition of similar attorney discipline for instances of similar
attorney misconduct. (In re Naney v (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 190.) Any discipline
recommendation different from that set forth in the applicable standards should
clearly explain the reasons for the deviation. (Blair v. State Bar (1989) 49
Cal.3d 762, 776, fn. 5.)
The most severe sanction applicable to Respondent’s misconduct is found in
Standard 2.2(a) based on Respondent’s misappropriation of client funds.
Standard 2.2(a) provides that a misappropriation of entrusted funds shall
result in disbarment, only if the amount of funds or property misappropriated
is insignificantly small or if the most compelling mitigating circumstances
clearly predominate, shall disbarment not be imposed. In those latter cases,
the discipline shall not be less than a one-year actual suspension,
irrespective of mitigating circumstances. Here, Respondent misappropriated
significant sums of money, $40,000 in one case and $12,500 in the second case.
He concealed his misconduct by failing to advise Isaacson that he had even
received the funds in both the DMTC theater mad personal injury matter. In the
personal injury matter, he also gave Isaacson false information about the
progress of the case when in fact he never filed suit. Here, there only
mitigating circumstance is Respondent’s agreement to stipulate to this matter,
and the misappropriated sums are large. Disbarment is warranted pursuant to
Standard 2.2.
Standard 1.7(b) also applies because Respondent has two prior records of
discipline. Standard 1.7(b), provides that if a member is found culpable of
professional misconduct in any proceeding in which discipline may be imposed
and the member has a record of two prior impositions of discipline as defined by
Standard 12(f), the degree of discipline in the current proceeding shall be
disbarment unless the most compelling mitigating circumstances clearly
predominate. Here, Respondent has two prior disciplinary matters. Respondent
received a private reproval in December 2003 (case no. 01-O-02009) for
violating Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A) failure to perform; rule
3-700(D)(2) failure to refund an unearned fee; and rule 4-100(B)(3) failure to
maintain disputed funds in trust. On March 28, 2013, the State Bar Court issued
a decision in case no. 10-O-10808, et al. recommending an 18-month actual
suspension for Respondent’s misconduct in two client matters, including
violations of Business and Professions Code, section 6106, (moral turpitude)
for misrepresenting to the clients the status of their legal matters; and
Business and Professions Code, section 6106, moral turpitude, for falsely
reporting his MCLE compliance. Additional violations included Rules of
Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A) (two counts) failure to perform; rule
3-700(D)(2) (two counts) failure to refund an unearned fee; and Business and
Professions Code, section 6068(m) failure to communicate. Although this second
case is currently on appeal, it constitutes a prior for purposes of the Standards
(Standard 1.2(0; Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, rule 216). Pursuant to
these Standards, this is Respondent’s third disciplinary offense and he should
be disbarred.
Additionally, Respondent’s misconduct is aggravated by his repeated
dishonesty in all three client matters. Case law supports that dishonesty to
clients and misappropriation warrant disbarment. In Kennedy v. State Bar (1989)
48 Cal. 3d. 610, the Supreme Court disbarred an attorney with no prior
disciplinary record for misappropriating $8,000 of a client’s settlement funds.
The Court deemed $8,000 to be a significant amount. The attorney also forged
the client’s name on a medical payment check from the insurance company and
deposited the check without notifying the client. In aggravation, the Court
noted that the attorney had not reimbursed any funds. In mitigation, the Court
stated that the attorney’s partnership was dissolving at the time of the
misconduct and that there were no additional complaints against him.
Respondent’s misconduct is similar to that in Kennedy. Both Respondent and the
attorney in Kennedy), misappropriated client funds, forged checks, and made
misrepresentations to the clients. Respondent’s misconduct is more egregious
since Respondent has a prior record of discipline and his mitigation is limited
to his agreement to enter into this stipulation. Respondent significantly
harmed his clients and he failed to return any of the misappropriated funds.
Therefore, disbarment in this matter is appropriate and is the only discipline
consistent with the purposes of discipline set forth in standard 1.3.
COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.
Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has
informed Respondent that as of July 22, 2013, the prosecution costs in this
matter are $4,404.05. Respondent further acknowledges that should this
stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the
costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.
SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES
Case Number(s): 12-O-16850; 13-O-11620
In the Matter of: HAL ERWIN WRIGHT
By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable,
signify their agreement with each of the recitation and each of the terms and
conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law and Disposition.
Signed by:
Respondent: HAL ERWIN WRIGHT
Date: 11/20/2013
Respondent’s Counsel:
Date:
Deputy Trial Counsel: ROBIN B. BRUNE
Date:11/26/2013
DISBARMENT ORDER
Case Number(s): 12-O-16850; 13-O-11620
In the Matter of: HAL ERWIN WRIGHT
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately
protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of
counts/charges, if any is GRANTED without prejudice, and:
checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the
DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. The stipulated facts and disposition are
APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to
the Supreme Court.
<<not>> checked. All Hearing dates are vacated.
The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to
withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this
order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved
stipulation. (See rule 5.58 (E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective
date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order
herein, normally 30 days after the file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California
Rules of Court.)
Respondent is ordered transferred to involuntary inactive status pursuant
to Business and Professions Code section 6007, subdivision (c)(4). Respondent’s
inactive enrollment will be effective three (3) calendar days after this order
is served by mail and will terminate upon the effective date of the Supreme
Court’s order imposing discipline herin, or as provided for by rule 5.111(D)(2)
or the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California, or as otherwise
ordered by the Supreme Court pursuant to its plenary jurisdiction.
Signed by:
Judge of the State Bar Court: Judge McElroy
Date: 12/20/13
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]
I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over
the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to
standard court practice, in the City and County of San Francisco, on December
20, 2013, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER
APPROVING
in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:
checked. by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through
the United States Postal Service at San Francisco, California, addressed as
follows:
HAL E. WRIGHT
216 F ST
DAVIS, CA 95616
<<not>> checked. by certified mail, No. , with return receipt
requested, through the United States Postal Service at , California, addressed
as follows:
<<not>> checked. by overnight mail at , California, addressed
as follows:
<<not>> checked. by fax transmission, at fax number . No error
was reported by the fax machine that I used.
<<not>> checked. By personal service by leaving the documents
in a sealed envelope or package clearly labeled to identify the attorney being
served with a receptionist or a person having charge of the attorney’s office,
addressed as follows:
checked. by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the
State Bar of California addressed as follows:
Robin B. Brune, Enforcement, San Francisco
I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San
Francisco, California, on December 20, 2013.
Signed by:
Lauretta Cramer
Case Administrator
State Bar Court