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| State Bar Court of California Hearing Department Los Angeles DISBARMENT | | |
| <p>Counsel For The State Bar</p> <p>Shane C. Morrison Deputy Trial Counsel 845 S. Figueroa St. Los Angeles, CA 90017 (213) 765-1000</p> <p>Bar # 284115</p> | <p>Case Number(s): 13-C-11955</p> | <p>For Court use only</p> <p style="text-align: center;">FILED</p> <p style="text-align: center;">JUN -8 2016 <i>Jrc</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;">STATE BAR COURT CLERK'S OFFICE LOS ANGELES</p> |
| <p>Counsel For Respondent</p> <p>Mark Daniel Melnick 14401 Sylvan St. Suite 201 Van Nuys, CA 91401 (818) 981-9777</p> <p>Bar # 86419</p> | PUBLIC MATTER | |
| <p>In the Matter of: STEPHEN HOWARD BEECHER</p> <p>Bar # 137509</p> <p>A Member of the State Bar of California (Respondent)</p> | <p>Submitted to: Settlement Judge</p> <p>STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING; ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE ENROLLMENT</p> <p>DISBARMENT</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED</p> | |

Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.

A. Parties' Acknowledgments:

- (1) Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted **December 7, 1988**.
- (2) The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
- (3) All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of (11) pages, not including the order.
- (4) A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."

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- (5) Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law."
- (6) The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
- (7) No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
- (8) Payment of Disciplinary Costs—Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
- Costs to be awarded to the State Bar.
 - Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
 - Costs are entirely waived.
- (9) **ORDER OF INACTIVE ENROLLMENT:**
The parties are aware that if this stipulation is approved, the judge will issue an order of inactive enrollment under Business and Professions Code section 6007, subdivision (c)(4), and Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, rule 5.111(D)(1).

B. Aggravating Circumstances [Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct, standards 1.2(h) & 1.5]. Facts supporting aggravating circumstances are required.

- (1) **Prior record of discipline**
- (a) State Bar Court case # of prior case **08-O-10035, et al. (see Attachment to Stipulation at pp. 7-8).**
 - (b) Date prior discipline effective **February 13, 2010.**
 - (c) Rules of Professional Conduct/ State Bar Act violations: **Rules of Professional Conduct, rules 4-100(A) and 3-700(D)(2); Business and Professions Code section 6106 and 6068(o)(3).**
 - (d) Degree of prior discipline **Two years of stayed suspension, two years of probation, and 60 days of actual suspension.**
 - (e) If respondent has two or more incidents of prior discipline, use space provided below:
- (2) **Intentional/Bad Faith/Dishonesty:** Respondent's misconduct was dishonest, intentional, or surrounded by, or followed by bad faith.
- (3) **Misrepresentation:** Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by, or followed by misrepresentation.
- (4) **Concealment:** Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by, or followed by concealment.
- (5) **Overreaching:** Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by, or followed by overreaching.
- (6) **Uncharged Violations:** Respondent's conduct involves uncharged violations of the Business and Professions Code or the Rules of Professional Conduct.

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- (7) **Trust Violation:** Trust funds or property were involved and Respondent refused or was unable to account to the client or person who was the object of the misconduct for improper conduct toward said funds or property.
- (8) **Harm:** Respondent's misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public, or the administration of justice. **See Attachment to Stipulation at p. 8.**
- (9) **Indifference:** Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for the consequences of his or her misconduct.
- (10) **Lack of Candor/Cooperation:** Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims of his/her misconduct, or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigations or proceedings.
- (11) **Multiple Acts:** Respondent's current misconduct evidences multiple acts of wrongdoing.
- (12) **Pattern:** Respondent's current misconduct demonstrates a pattern of misconduct.
- (13) **Restitution:** Respondent failed to make restitution.
- (14) **Vulnerable Victim:** The victim(s) of Respondent's misconduct was/were highly vulnerable.
- (15) **No aggravating circumstances** are involved.

Additional aggravating circumstances:

C. Mitigating Circumstances [see standards 1.2(i) & 1.6]. Facts supporting mitigating circumstances are required.

- (1) **No Prior Discipline:** Respondent has no prior record of discipline over many years of practice coupled with present misconduct which is not likely to recur.
- (2) **No Harm:** Respondent did not harm the client, the public, or the administration of justice.
- (3) **Candor/Cooperation:** Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and cooperation with the victims of his/her misconduct or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigations and proceedings.
- (4) **Remorse:** Respondent promptly took objective steps demonstrating spontaneous remorse and recognition of the wrongdoing, which steps were designed to timely atone for any consequences of his/her misconduct.
- (5) **Restitution:** Respondent paid \$ _____ on _____ in restitution to _____ without the threat or force of disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings.
- (6) **Delay:** These disciplinary proceedings were excessively delayed. The delay is not attributable to respondent and the delay prejudiced him/her.
- (7) **Good Faith:** Respondent acted with a good faith belief that was honestly held and objectively reasonable.
- (8) **Emotional/Physical Difficulties:** At the time of the stipulated act or acts of professional misconduct respondent suffered extreme emotional difficulties or physical or mental disabilities which expert testimony would establish was directly responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities were not the

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product of any illegal conduct by the member, such as illegal drug or substance abuse, and the difficulties or disabilities no longer pose a risk that Respondent will commit misconduct.

- (9) **Severe Financial Stress:** At the time of the misconduct, respondent suffered from severe financial stress which resulted from circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond his/her control and which were directly responsible for the misconduct.
- (10) **Family Problems:** At the time of the misconduct, respondent suffered extreme difficulties in his/her personal life which were other than emotional or physical in nature.
- (11) **Good Character:** Respondent's extraordinarily good character is attested to by a wide range of references in the legal and general communities who are aware of the full extent of his/her misconduct.
- (12) **Rehabilitation:** Considerable time has passed since the acts of professional misconduct occurred followed by subsequent rehabilitation.
- (13) **No mitigating circumstances** are involved.

Additional mitigating circumstances: Pretrial Stipulation. (See Attachment to Stipulation at p. 8.)

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D. Discipline: Disbarment.

E. Additional Requirements:

- (1) **Rule 9.20, California Rules of Court:** Respondent must comply with the requirements of rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 calendar days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court's Order in this matter.

- (2) **Restitution:** Respondent must make restitution to _____ in the amount of \$ _____ plus 10 percent interest per year from _____. If the Client Security Fund has reimbursed _____ for all or any portion of the principal amount, respondent must pay restitution to CSF of the amount paid plus applicable interest and costs in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6140.5. Respondent must pay the above restitution and furnish satisfactory proof of payment to the State Bar's Office of Probation in Los Angeles no later than _____ days from the effective date of the Supreme Court order in this case.

- (3) **Other:**

ATTACHMENT TO

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION

IN THE MATTER OF: STEPHEN HOWARD BEECHER

CASE NUMBER: 13-C-11955

FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense for which he was convicted involved other misconduct warranting discipline.

Case No. 13-C-11955 (Conviction Proceedings)

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND IN CONVICTION PROCEEDING:

1. On April 8, 2013, the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office filed a felony complaint in Los Angeles County Superior Court case number BA409719 that alleged Respondent committed the following criminal acts: (1) violation of Penal Code section 182(a)(1) [Conspiracy to Commit a Crime], a felony; (2) violation of Penal Code section 182(a)(1) [Conspiracy to Commit a Crime], a felony; (3) violation of Penal Code section 4573(a) [Bringing Drugs Into a Jail], a felony; (4) violation of Health and Safety Code section 11352(a) [Transportation of a Controlled Substance], a felony; and (5) violation of Penal Code section 4574(a) [Bringing a Firearm Into a Jail], a felony.
2. On December 17, 2013, a first amended felony complaint was filed that alleged additional criminal acts against Respondent's co-conspirators.
3. On February 6, 2014, a second amended felony complaint was filed that alleged the same criminal acts with additional specificity.
4. On June 18, 2014, a preliminary hearing was held and the court issued an order holding Respondent to answer for all counts alleged in the amended felony complaint.
5. On July 2, 2014, an information was filed alleging the same criminal acts as the amended felony complaint.
6. On December 10, 2014, the court entered Respondent's plea of nolo contendere to a violation of Penal Code section 4573(a) [Bringing Drugs Into a Jail], a felony, found Respondent guilty of that count, and convicted Respondent thereof.
7. On February 18, 2015, the court denied probation and sentenced Respondent to serve two years in county jail. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the remaining counts were dismissed. Respondent was committed to county jail and remained incarcerated until February 9, 2016.
8. On March 2, 2015, the State Bar transmitted the record of Respondent's conviction to the State Bar Court.

9. On March 26, 2015, the Review Department of the State Bar Court issued an order that placed Respondent on interim suspension, effective April 15, 2015, pending final disposition of this disciplinary proceeding.

10. On July 9, 2015, the Review Department issued an order referring this matter to the Hearing Department for a hearing and decision recommending the discipline to be imposed in the event the Hearing Department finds that the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense for which Respondent was convicted involved moral turpitude or other conduct warranting discipline.

FACTS:

11. On December 22, 2012, Respondent's client, who was at that time in custody at the North County Correction Facility awaiting trial, made an arrangement to bring narcotics into the North County Correction Facility on December 28, 2012 through Respondent.

12. Thereafter, the client's wife ironed and flattened two packages of heroin to fit in a greeting card. The client's wife met with Respondent on the morning of December 28, 2012, prior to Respondent's scheduled visit with the client, and gave Respondent the greeting card containing 36.09 grams of heroin, which was worth more than \$30,000.

13. On December 28, 2012, Respondent was arrested in the visiting area of the North County Correction Facility with the greeting card containing the heroin in his possession.

14. Respondent knowingly brought heroin, a Schedule I controlled substance (Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 11054(c)(11)), the possession of which is prohibited (Cal. Health & Saf. Code § 11350(a)), into a county detention facility.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

15. The facts and circumstances surrounding Respondent's conviction for violation of Penal Code section 4573(a) [Bringing Drugs Into a Jail], a felony, involved moral turpitude.

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

Prior Record of Discipline (Std. 1.5(a)): Respondent has one prior record of discipline. Effective February 13, 2010, Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for two years, stayed, and placed on probation for two years subject to various conditions, including the condition that Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for the first 60 days of probation, pursuant to Supreme Court order S177911 (State Bar case nos. 08-O-10035, et al.) filed on January 14, 2010. Respondent stipulated to seven counts of misconduct in numerous matters, which included: one count of commingling personal funds in his client trust account (Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(A)); three counts of issuing checks or electronic payments from his client trust account when he knew or should have known the account had insufficient funds to cover those transactions (Business and Professions Code section 6106); one count of failing to refund unearned fees (Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(2)); one count of failing to deposit client funds in his client trust account (Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(A)); and one count of failing to report a sanction greater than \$1,000 to the State Bar (Business and Professions Code section 6068(o)(3)). The misconduct was aggravated by multiple acts of wrongdoing and significant harm to the public and the administration of justice. The misconduct was mitigated by lack of a prior record of discipline over 19 years of practice,

cooperation by entering into a comprehensive stipulation at an early stage in the proceedings, and good character attested to by four attorneys.

Harm (Std. 1.5(i)): By using his status as an attorney to gain access to an inmate and knowingly attempting to deliver a prohibited controlled substance to that inmate, Respondent undermined the ability of jail officials to rely on the fact that he could be trusted with the privilege of having access to inmates because he was an officer of the court, which caused significant harm to the administration of justice. (See *In the Matter of Reiss* (Review Dept. 2012) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 206, 220.)

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

Pretrial Stipulation: Respondent is entitled to mitigation for entering into this stipulation as to facts, conclusions of law, and disposition, thereby saving State Bar resources and evidencing recognition of wrongdoing. (*Silva-Vidor v. State Bar* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1071, 1079 [mitigative credit given for entering into a stipulation as to facts and culpability].)

AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.

The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct “set forth a means for determining the appropriate disciplinary sanction in a particular case and to ensure consistency across cases dealing with similar misconduct and surrounding circumstances.” (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, std. 1.1. All further references to Standards are to this source.) The Standards help fulfill the primary purposes of discipline, which include: protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; maintenance of the highest professional standards; and preservation of public confidence in the legal profession. (See std. 1.1; *In re Morse* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 184, 205.)

Although not binding, the Standards are entitled to “great weight” and should be followed “whenever possible” in determining level of discipline. (*In re Silvertown* (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 92, quoting *In re Brown* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 205, 220 and *In re Young* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 267, fn. 11.) Adherence to the Standards in the great majority of cases serves the valuable purpose of eliminating disparity and assuring consistency, that is, the imposition of similar attorney discipline for instances of similar attorney misconduct. (*In re Naney* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 190.) If a recommendation is at the high end or low end of a Standard, an explanation must be given as to how the recommendation was reached. (Std. 1.1.) “Any disciplinary recommendation that deviates from the Standards must include clear reasons for the departure.” (Std. 1.1; *Blair v. State Bar* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 762, 776, fn. 5.)

In determining whether to impose a sanction greater or less than that specified in a given standard, in addition to the factors set forth in the specific standard, consideration is to be given to the primary purposes of discipline; the balancing of all aggravating and mitigating circumstances; the type of misconduct at issue; whether the client, public, legal system or profession was harmed; and the member’s willingness and ability to conform to ethical responsibilities in the future. (Stds. 1.7(b) and (c).)

The sanction most applicable to Respondent’s misconduct is found under Standard 2.15(b), which provides:

“Disbarment is the presumed sanction for final conviction of a felony in which the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense involve moral turpitude, unless the most

compelling mitigating circumstance clearly predominate, in which case actual suspension of at least two years is appropriate.”

In the present matter, the only mitigating circumstance is Respondent’s having entered into this stipulation. Additionally, Respondent’s misconduct is aggravated by his prior record of discipline and harm to the administration of justice. As such, there is no evidence that that the most compelling mitigating circumstances clearly predominate and, under Standard 2.15(b), the presumed sanction in this matter is disbarment.

A felony conviction that involves moral turpitude constitutes serious misconduct and warrants disbarment in the absence of compelling mitigating circumstances. (*In re Leardo* (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1, 10, citing Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6101(a), *In re Possino* (1984) 37 Cal.3d 163 [disbarment after conviction of offer to sell 350 pounds of marijuana], and *In re Giddens* (1981) 30 Cal.3d 110 [disbarment after federal conviction of conspiring to sell large quantities of amphetamines].)

There are two Supreme Court decisions that address criminal convictions for possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute. Although Respondent’s conviction did not specifically involve an intent to distribute, it is still closely analogous to such a conviction because surreptitiously bringing drugs into a jail is akin to trafficking drugs. Respondent brought approximately \$30,000 worth of heroin into a jail that had been ironed into sheets in order to be hidden inside a greeting card. Respondent’s actions demonstrate that this was obviously not a case of simple possession, but was more closely related to those cases dealing with possession with an intent to distribute. “Anything that is related to trafficking is more serious than possessing.” (*People v. Cortez* (1985) 166 Cal. App.3d 994, 1000, citing *People v. Cina* (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 136, 140.)

In *In re Nadrich* (1988) 44 Cal.3d 271, the attorney was convicted of possessing, with intent to distribute, approximately 30 grams of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) and using interstate commerce to distribute that substance. The Supreme Court held the protection of the public, the courts, and the legal profession did not require disbarment, and ordered Nadrich suspended from the practice of law for five years, stayed, with one year of actual suspension, to be followed by four years of probation. Although Nadrich was convicted of serious crimes that warranted disbarment in the absence of compelling mitigating circumstances, the court held that many such circumstances were present. Nadrich’s crimes arose from a need to subsidize his drug addiction, and the addiction was a result of legitimate medical treatment, rather than illicit drug use. Also, after his conviction Nadrich entered a drug treatment program and became, and remained, very active in recovery-oriented self-help organizations. Moreover, he had no prior disciplinary record, he withdrew from the active practice of law prior to committing his criminal acts, and his offenses were neither committed in his capacity as an attorney nor in any way related to his practice of law.

In *In re Leardo, supra*, 53 Cal.3d 1, the attorney was convicted of two counts of possessing controlled substances (heroin and cocaine) with intent to distribute. The Supreme Court ordered that Leardo be suspended from the practice of law for five years, stayed, and placed Leardo on probation for five years, during which period he was permitted to engage in the practice of law, subject to certain probationary conditions. The court held that there was compelling evidence of mitigation and rehabilitation such that disbarment was not necessary. The court further held that an exception to the rule of actual suspension was warranted because of the mitigating factors. Specifically, the court found that Leardo had become addicted to opiates prescribed by doctors as treatment for serious injuries and when he could no longer obtain prescriptions he became addicted to illicit drugs; he never provided illicit drugs to anyone other than an undercover agent and he did not profit financially from the transactions, instead retaining only a

small portion of the drugs for personal use; when he was arrested and incarcerated he commenced a rehabilitation program and followed it conscientiously; attorneys for whom he was working vouched for his recovery and legal skills; no client had been harmed by his misconduct; he consistently admitted the wrongfulness of his acts; he expressed deep remorse; he voluntarily initiated the disciplinary proceedings; and he fully cooperated with the State Bar throughout the investigation. Although Leardo had not practiced long enough in California to be given mitigation, he had no prior disciplinary record.

Nadrich and *Leardo* both involved felony convictions for drug offenses that included an intent to distribute element. Respondent was convicted for knowingly bringing drugs into a detention facility. The underlying criminal conduct is comparable, but there the comparisons end. The court in *Nadrich* declined to impose the presumptive sanction of disbarment, and instead imposed a one year actual suspension, because of the significant mitigating factors. The court in *Leardo* departed from the precedent in *Nadrich*, and declined to impose any period of actual suspension, because *Nadrich* became a large-scale drug dealer to support his habit and *Leardo* furnished relatively small quantities of drugs over a short period of time to a single buyer. The court felt that *Leardo*'s culpability was "measurably less" than that of *Nadrich*. (*In re Leardo, supra*, 53 Cal.3d at p. 17.) However, neither *Nadrich* nor *Leardo* had a prior record of discipline. Respondent does. Additionally, neither *Nadrich*'s offenses nor *Leardo*'s offenses were committed in their capacity as attorneys or in any way related to their practice of law. Respondent's criminal conduct was directly related to his practice of law and involved an abuse of Respondent's privileges as an attorney. Namely, his ability to access inmates and deliver documents to them. Additionally, there was compelling mitigation involved in both *Nadrich* and *Leardo*. Here, there is a single mitigating circumstance involved and, in the absence of compelling mitigation, Respondent's misconduct warrants disbarment. (*In re Leardo, supra*, 53 Cal.3d at p. 10.)

In light of the foregoing, disbarment is appropriate to protect the public, the courts, and the legal profession; to maintain high professional standards by attorneys; and to preserve public confidence in the legal profession.

COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.




Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has informed respondent that as of May 19, 2016, the prosecution costs in this matter are \$2,507.00. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.

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| In the Matter of: STEPHEN HOWARD BEECHER | Case number(s): 13-C-11955 |
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SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES

By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitations and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Disposition.

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| <u>5/20/2016</u> Date |  Respondent's Signature | <u>Stephen Howard Beecher</u> Print Name |
| <u>5/20/16</u> Date |  Respondent's Counsel Signature | <u>Mark Daniel Melnick</u> Print Name |
| <u>6/3/16</u> Date |  Deputy Trial Counsel's Signature | <u>Shane C. Morrison</u> Print Name |

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| In the Matter of: STEPHEN HOWARD BEECHER | Case Number(s): 13-C-11955 |
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DISBARMENT ORDER


Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any, is GRANTED without prejudice, and:

- The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
- The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
- All Hearing dates are vacated.

The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58(E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) **The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)**

Respondent STEPHEN HOWARD BEECHER is ordered transferred to involuntary inactive status pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6007, subdivision (c)(4). Respondent's inactive enrollment will be effective three (3) calendar days after this order is served by mail and will terminate upon the effective date of the Supreme Court's order imposing discipline herein, or as provided for by rule 5.111(D)(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California, or as otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court pursuant to its plenary jurisdiction.

June 8, 2016
Date


Judge of the State Bar Court
Yvette D. Roland

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on June 8, 2016, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING; ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE ENROLLMENT – DISBARMENT

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:

- by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:


**STEPHEN H. BEECHER
PO BOX 57077
SHERMAN OAKS, CA 91413**

**COURTESY COPY:
MARK DANIEL MELNICK
14401 SYLVAN ST STE 201
VAN NUYS, CA 91401**

- by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

SHANE MORRISON, Enforcement, Los Angeles

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on June 8, 2016.



Tammy Cleaver
Case Administrator
State Bar Court