




ORIGINAL

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State Bar Court of California Hearing Department San Francisco ACTUAL SUSPENSION		
Counsel For The State Bar Heather E. Abelson Deputy Trial Counsel 180 Howard Street San Francisco, CA 94105 (415) 538-2357 Bar # 243691	Case Number(s): 13-O-16840 13-O-17116 13-O-17514 14-O-02136 14-O-04363	For Court use only <div style="text-align: center;"> PUBLIC MATTER FILED  DEC 02 2014 </div> STATE BAR COURT CLERK'S OFFICE SAN FRANCISCO
In Pro Per Respondent Hector Arnaldo Cavazos, Jr. 501 West Weber Avenue, Suite 300A Stockton, CA 95203 (209) 948-2222 Bar # 226400	Submitted to: Settlement Judge STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING ACTUAL SUSPENSION <input type="checkbox"/> PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED	
In the Matter of: HECTOR ARNOLDO CAVAZOS, JR. Bar # 226400 A Member of the State Bar of California (Respondent)		

Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.

A. Parties' Acknowledgments:

- (1) Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted **September 25, 2003**.
- (2) The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
- (3) All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of **21** pages, not including the order.
- (4) A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."
- (5) Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".

(Effective January 1, 2014)



- (6) The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
- (7) No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
- (8) Payment of Disciplinary Costs—Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
- Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 5.130, Rules of Procedure.
 - Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
 - Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
 - Costs are entirely waived.

B. Aggravating Circumstances [Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct, standards 1.2(f) & 1.5]. Facts supporting aggravating circumstances are required.

- (1) **Prior record of discipline**
- (a) State Bar Court case # of prior case
 - (b) Date prior discipline effective
 - (c) Rules of Professional Conduct/ State Bar Act violations:
 - (d) Degree of prior discipline
 - (e) If Respondent has two or more incidents of prior discipline, use space provided below.
- (2) **Dishonesty:** Respondent's misconduct was intentional, surrounded by, or followed by bad faith, dishonesty, concealment, overreaching or other violations of the State Bar Act or Rules of Professional Conduct. **See "Facts Supporting Aggravating Circumstances" in the attachment hereto at p. 16.**
- (3) **Trust Violation:** Trust funds or property were involved and Respondent refused or was unable to account to the client or person who was the object of the misconduct for improper conduct toward said funds or property.
- (4) **Harm:** Respondent's misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public or the administration of justice.
- (5) **Indifference:** Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for the consequences of his or her misconduct.
- (6) **Lack of Cooperation:** Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims of his/her misconduct or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation or proceedings. **See "Facts Supporting Aggravating Circumstances" in the attachment hereto at pp. 16-17.**

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- (7) **Multiple/Pattern of Misconduct:** Respondent's current misconduct evidences multiple acts of wrongdoing or demonstrates a pattern of misconduct. See "Facts Supporting Aggravating Circumstances" in the attachment hereto at p. 16.
- (8) **Restitution:** Respondent failed to make restitution.
- (9) **No aggravating circumstances** are involved.

Additional aggravating circumstances:

C. Mitigating Circumstances [see standards 1.2(g) & 1.6]. Facts supporting mitigating circumstances are required.

- (1) **No Prior Discipline:** Respondent has no prior record of discipline over many years of practice coupled with present misconduct which is not deemed serious.
- (2) **No Harm:** Respondent did not harm the client, the public, or the administration of justice.
- (3) **Candor/Cooperation:** Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and cooperation with the victims of his/her misconduct and to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation and proceedings.
- (4) **Remorse:** Respondent promptly took objective steps spontaneously demonstrating remorse and recognition of the wrongdoing, which steps were designed to timely atone for any consequences of his/her misconduct.
- (5) **Restitution:** Respondent paid \$ _____ on _____ in restitution to _____ without the threat or force of disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings.
- (6) **Delay:** These disciplinary proceedings were excessively delayed. The delay is not attributable to Respondent and the delay prejudiced him/her.
- (7) **Good Faith:** Respondent acted with a good faith belief that was honestly held and reasonable.
- (8) **Emotional/Physical Difficulties:** At the time of the stipulated act or acts of professional misconduct Respondent suffered extreme emotional difficulties or physical or mental disabilities which expert testimony would establish was directly responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities were not the product of any illegal conduct by the member, such as illegal drug or substance abuse, and the difficulties or disabilities no longer pose a risk that Respondent will commit misconduct.
- (9) **Severe Financial Stress:** At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered from severe financial stress which resulted from circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond his/her control and which were directly responsible for the misconduct.
- (10) **Family Problems:** At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered extreme difficulties in his/her personal life which were other than emotional or physical in nature.
- (11) **Good Character:** Respondent's extraordinarily good character is attested to by a wide range of references in the legal and general communities who are aware of the full extent of his/her misconduct.
- (12) **Rehabilitation:** Considerable time has passed since the acts of professional misconduct occurred followed by convincing proof of subsequent rehabilitation.

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(13) No mitigating circumstances are involved.

Additional mitigating circumstances:

No Prior Discipline - See "Facts Supporting Mitigating Circumstances" in the attachment hereto at p. 17.

Pre-filing Stipulation - See "Facts Supporting Aggravating Circumstances" in the attachment hereto at p. 17.

D. Discipline:

(1) **Stayed Suspension:**

(a) Respondent must be suspended from the practice of law for a period of **three years**.

i. and until Respondent shows proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of rehabilitation and present fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the law pursuant to standard 1.2(c)(1) Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.

ii. and until Respondent pays restitution as set forth in the Financial Conditions form attached to this stipulation.

iii. and until Respondent does the following:

(b) The above-referenced suspension is stayed.

(2) **Probation:**

Respondent must be placed on probation for a period of **three years**, which will commence upon the effective date of the Supreme Court order in this matter. (See rule 9.18, California Rules of Court)

(3) **Actual Suspension:**

(a) Respondent must be actually suspended from the practice of law in the State of California for a period of **18 months**.

i. and until Respondent shows proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of rehabilitation and present fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the law pursuant to standard 1.2(c)(1), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct

ii. and until Respondent pays restitution as set forth in the Financial Conditions form attached to this stipulation.

iii. and until Respondent does the following:

E. Additional Conditions of Probation:

(1) If Respondent is actually suspended for two years or more, he/she must remain actually suspended until he/she proves to the State Bar Court his/her rehabilitation, fitness to practice, and learning and ability in the general law, pursuant to standard 1.2(c)(1), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.

(2) During the probation period, Respondent must comply with the provisions of the State Bar Act and Rules of Professional Conduct.

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- (3) Within ten (10) days of any change, Respondent must report to the Membership Records Office of the State Bar and to the Office of Probation of the State Bar of California ("Office of Probation"), all changes of information, including current office address and telephone number, or other address for State Bar purposes, as prescribed by section 6002.1 of the Business and Professions Code.
- (4) Within thirty (30) days from the effective date of discipline, Respondent must contact the Office of Probation and schedule a meeting with Respondent's assigned probation deputy to discuss these terms and conditions of probation. Upon the direction of the Office of Probation, Respondent must meet with the probation deputy either in-person or by telephone. During the period of probation, Respondent must promptly meet with the probation deputy as directed and upon request.
- (5) Respondent must submit written quarterly reports to the Office of Probation on each January 10, April 10, July 10, and October 10 of the period of probation. Under penalty of perjury, Respondent must state whether Respondent has complied with the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and all conditions of probation during the preceding calendar quarter. Respondent must also state whether there are any proceedings pending against him or her in the State Bar Court and if so, the case number and current status of that proceeding. If the first report would cover less than 30 days, that report must be submitted on the next quarter date, and cover the extended period.

In addition to all quarterly reports, a final report, containing the same information, is due no earlier than twenty (20) days before the last day of the period of probation and no later than the last day of probation.

- (6) Respondent must be assigned a probation monitor. Respondent must promptly review the terms and conditions of probation with the probation monitor to establish a manner and schedule of compliance. During the period of probation, Respondent must furnish to the monitor such reports as may be requested, in addition to the quarterly reports required to be submitted to the Office of Probation. Respondent must cooperate fully with the probation monitor.
- (7) Subject to assertion of applicable privileges, Respondent must answer fully, promptly and truthfully any inquiries of the Office of Probation and any probation monitor assigned under these conditions which are directed to Respondent personally or in writing relating to whether Respondent is complying or has complied with the probation conditions.
- (8) Within one (1) year of the effective date of the discipline herein, Respondent must provide to the Office of Probation satisfactory proof of attendance at a session of the Ethics School, and passage of the test given at the end of that session.
- No Ethics School recommended. Reason: .
- (9) Respondent must comply with all conditions of probation imposed in the underlying criminal matter and must so declare under penalty of perjury in conjunction with any quarterly report to be filed with the Office of Probation.
- (10) The following conditions are attached hereto and incorporated:
- | | |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Substance Abuse Conditions | <input type="checkbox"/> Law Office Management Conditions |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Medical Conditions | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Financial Conditions |

F. Other Conditions Negotiated by the Parties:

- (1) **Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination:** Respondent must provide proof of passage of the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination ("MPRE"), administered by the National Conference of Bar Examiners, to the Office of Probation during the period of actual suspension or within one year, whichever period is longer. **Failure to pass the MPRE results in actual suspension without**

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further hearing until passage. But see rule 9.10(b), California Rules of Court, and rule 5.162(A) & (E), Rules of Procedure.

No MPRE recommended. Reason:

- (2) **Rule 9.20, California Rules of Court:** Respondent must comply with the requirements of rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 calendar days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court's Order in this matter.
- (3) **Conditional Rule 9.20, California Rules of Court:** If Respondent remains actually suspended for 90 days or more, he/she must comply with the requirements of rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 120 and 130 calendar days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court's Order in this matter.
- (4) **Credit for Interim Suspension [conviction referral cases only]:** Respondent will be credited for the period of his/her interim suspension toward the stipulated period of actual suspension. Date of commencement of interim suspension:
- (5) **Other Conditions:**

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In the Matter of: HECTOR ARNOLDO CAVAZOS, JR.	Case Number(s): 13-O-16840; 13-O-17116; 13-O-17514- 14-O-02136; 14-O-04363
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Financial Conditions

a. Restitution

- Respondent must pay restitution (including the principal amount, plus interest of 10% per annum) to the payee(s) listed below. If the Client Security Fund ("CSF") has reimbursed one or more of the payee(s) for all or any portion of the principal amount(s) listed below, Respondent must also pay restitution to CSF in the amount(s) paid, plus applicable interest and costs.

Payee	Principal Amount	Interest Accrues From
Rosalba and Damin Luna	\$3,000	October 21, 2014
Gerardo Barrera	\$1,500	October 21, 2014
Ramiro Rodriguez Alvarado	\$5,000	October 21, 2014
Felipe and Bertha Plascencia	\$1,500	October 21, 2014

- Respondent must pay above-referenced restitution and provide satisfactory proof of payment to the Office of Probation not later than **30 days from the effective date of discipline.**

b. Installment Restitution Payments

- Respondent must pay the above-referenced restitution on the payment schedule set forth below. Respondent must provide satisfactory proof of payment to the Office of Probation with each quarterly probation report, or as otherwise directed by the Office of Probation. No later than 30 days prior to the expiration of the period of probation (or period of reprobation), Respondent must make any necessary final payment(s) in order to complete the payment of restitution, including interest, in full.

Payee/CSF (as applicable)	Minimum Payment Amount	Payment Frequency

- If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.

c. Client Funds Certificate

1. If Respondent possesses client funds at any time during the period covered by a required quarterly report, Respondent must file with each required report a certificate from Respondent and/or a certified public accountant or other financial professional approved by the Office of Probation, certifying that:
- Respondent has maintained a bank account in a bank authorized to do business in the State of California, at a branch located within the State of California, and that such account is designated as a "Trust Account" or "Clients' Funds Account";

- b. Respondent has kept and maintained the following:
 - i. A written ledger for each client on whose behalf funds are held that sets forth:
 - 1. the name of such client;
 - 2. the date, amount and source of all funds received on behalf of such client;
 - 3. the date, amount, payee and purpose of each disbursement made on behalf of such client; and,
 - 4. the current balance for such client.
 - ii. a written journal for each client trust fund account that sets forth:
 - 1. the name of such account;
 - 2. the date, amount and client affected by each debit and credit; and,
 - 3. the current balance in such account.
 - iii. all bank statements and cancelled checks for each client trust account; and,
 - iv. each monthly reconciliation (balancing) of (i), (ii), and (iii), above, and if there are any differences between the monthly total balances reflected in (i), (ii), and (iii), above, the reasons for the differences.
 - c. Respondent has maintained a written journal of securities or other properties held for clients that specifies:
 - i. each item of security and property held;
 - ii. the person on whose behalf the security or property is held;
 - iii. the date of receipt of the security or property;
 - iv. the date of distribution of the security or property; and,
 - v. the person to whom the security or property was distributed.
2. If Respondent does not possess any client funds, property or securities during the entire period covered by a report, Respondent must so state under penalty of perjury in the report filed with the Office of Probation for that reporting period. In this circumstance, Respondent need not file the accountant's certificate described above.
3. The requirements of this condition are in addition to those set forth in rule 4-100, Rules of Professional Conduct.

d. Client Trust Accounting School

- Within one (1) year of the effective date of the discipline herein, Respondent must supply to the Office of Probation satisfactory proof of attendance at a session of the Ethics School Client Trust Accounting School, within the same period of time, and passage of the test given at the end of that session.

ATTACHMENT TO
STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION

IN THE MATTER OF: HECTOR ARNOLDO CAVAZOS, JR.

CASE NUMBERS: 13-O-16840; 13-O-17116; 13-O-17514; 14-O-02136;
14-O-04363

FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that he is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct.

General Background Facts Applicable to all Matters

1. On March 6, 2009, the San Joaquin County District Attorney's Office filed a criminal complaint against respondent's father, Hector Cavazos Sr. ("Cavazos Sr."), in San Joaquin County Superior Court, case no. SF111206A, charging Cavazos Sr. with violating Penal Code section 487(a) [Grand Theft of Personal Property], a felony, Penal Code section 532(a) [Obtain Money by False Pretenses], a felony, and Business and Professions Code section 6126 [Unauthorized Practice or Advertising], a misdemeanor.
2. On September 24, 2009, the court entered Cavazos Sr.'s plea of no contest to one count of violating Penal Code section 487(a) [Grand Theft of Personal Property], a misdemeanor, and one count of violating Business and Professions Code section 6126 [Unauthorized Practice or Advertising], a misdemeanor. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the court dismissed the remaining counts in the furtherance of justice. As part of Cavazos Sr.'s plea agreement, Cavazos Sr. agreed "not to work out of son's office or anywhere practicing law."
3. Soon after September 24, 2009, respondent became aware that Cavazos Sr. was not allowed to work out of respondent's office.
4. Cavazos Sr. maintained an office in respondent's law firm from at least October 22, 2009 through at least April 2, 2014, when a State Bar investigator visited respondent's office and saw Cavazos Sr.
5. On March 25, 2014, in response to a letter from a State Bar investigator, respondent stated that he employed an individual named Dain Birkley ("Birkley") as his office manager. In his letter, respondent stated that Birkley "supervises the support staff and oversees the day-to-day operation of the office. Additionally, he assists me with preparation of cases for various hearings and trial." Birkley was a California attorney who resigned with charges pending in 2000. Birkley began working for respondent sometime in 2011, was continuously employed thereafter, and respondent was aware at that time that Birkley had resigned with charges pending. Respondent did not notify the State Bar of his employment of Birkley prior to, or at the time of, Birkley's employment.

Case No. 13-O-16840 (Complainant: Alejandro Rosas)

FACTS:

6. In 1997, Alejandro Rosas ("Rosas") filed Petitions for Adjustment of Status on behalf of himself and his two brothers, with Cavazos Sr.'s assistance.

7. On February 27, 2012, Rosas went to respondent's office to obtain a status update on the Petitions for Adjustment of Status that had been filed in 1997. Respondent's receptionist asked Rosas which attorney Cavazos he wanted to speak with, Senior or Junior. Rosas was then directed to Cavazos Sr.'s office. Once in Cavazos Sr.'s office, Cavazos Sr. told Rosas that he would reopen Rosas' original Petition, answered Rosas' legal questions regarding the immigration process, offered legal advice on what needed to be done, and told Rosas that he would help Rosas for \$15,000. When Rosas asked why Cavazos Sr. charged so much money, Cavazos Sr. replied that he was an attorney, and attorneys charge more than "notarios." Cavazos Sr. then presented Rosas with a retainer agreement to sign. Rosas signed the retainer agreement in which he agreed to pay \$15,000 in return for respondent's law firm performing the following legal services: "(1) Prepare and File I-130, Petition for Alien Relative; (2) Prepare and File Adjustment of status when Visa available for Mr. Alejandro Jose T and Adrian Rosas; (3) Request Form G-639/Freedom of Information Act (FOIA); (4) Request Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI); (5) Request Department of Justice (DOJ)." At all times during this meeting, Rosas believed that Cavazos Sr. was an attorney.

8. Between February 27, 2012 and March 18, 2013, Rosas paid a total of \$15,000 in attorney's fees to respondent's law firm.

9. Sometime in early 2013, Rosas learned that Cavazos Sr. was not an attorney. Rosas returned to respondent's law firm and confronted the receptionist, who denied that Cavazos Sr. was not an attorney. Rosas orally demanded a refund and his client file, and was told that he would have to speak with an attorney.

10. On September 25, 2013, Rosas filed a complaint against respondent with the State Bar.

11. On July 22, 2014, Rosas sent a letter to respondent terminating his firm's services, requesting a refund of unearned fees, and his client file.

12. Respondent performed all of the services set forth in the retainer agreement, except for filing an Adjustment of Status form. Respondent did not file the Adjustment of Status form because respondent was terminated prior to when the form could be filed.

13. To date, respondent has not provided Rosas with a refund of unearned fees.

14. Respondent did not provide Rosas with his client file until October 27, 2014.

15. Between February 27, 2012 and July 22, 2014, Rosas never met, or spoke to, respondent.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

16. By knowingly allowing Cavazos Sr., who was not licensed to practice law in California, to provide legal advice to Rosas, respondent aided in the unauthorized practice of law, in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-300(A).

17. By failing to inform Rosas that Cavazos Sr. was not a licensed attorney, respondent failed to keep respondent's client, Rosas, reasonably informed of significant developments in a matter in which respondent had agreed to provide legal services, in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(m).

18. By allowing Cavazos Sr. to work out of respondent's law office, when respondent knew that his father had been ordered by the San Joaquin County Superior Court, as part of a criminal plea agreement, to not work out of respondent's office, respondent committed an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.

19. By failing to provide written notice to the State Bar of respondent's employment of Birkley, whom respondent knew had resigned from the State Bar, respondent failed to serve upon the State Bar notice of employment of an attorney who resigned with charges pending, prior to or at the time of such employment, in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-311(D).

20. By failing to promptly release all of Rosas' papers and property to Rosas, respondent failed to release a client file, in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(1).

Case No. 13-O-17116 (Complainant: Rosalba and Damin Luna)

FACTS:

21. In March 2010, Rosalba Luna ("Ms. Luna") telephoned respondent's law office to discuss adjusting her and her husband's, Damin Luna (collectively, "the Lunas"), immigration status. Ms. Luna was directed to Cavazos Sr.

22. During the phone call with Ms. Luna, Cavazos Sr. discussed the legal effect Mr. Luna's prior criminal history, which included convictions for failing to provide proof of car insurance and driving too slowly and driving without a license, would have on their ability to obtain permanent resident status. Cavazos Sr. told Ms. Luna that he could help them, and that the Lunas should arrange an in-person meeting with him.

23. In the Spring of 2010, the Lunas went to respondent's law office and met with Cavazos Sr. Cavazos Sr. told the Lunas that he was an attorney with experience in immigration law, and that he would help them obtain permanent resident status for \$7,500. Cavazos Sr. advised the Lunas that they were eligible for permanent resident status, notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Luna had left and illegally re-entered the United States several times within the last few years. Cavazos Sr. advised the Lunas that they needed to stay in the United States, without leaving, for a few years in order to qualify for an adjustment of status. Cavazos Sr. also discussed the types of immigration forms the Lunas would need to complete.

24. The Lunas did not return to respondent's law office until July 25, 2011. On July 25, 2011, the Lunas again met with Cavazos Sr., at respondent's office, and again discussed the various legal aspects of their immigration matter. Cavazos Sr. presented a fee agreement to the Lunas, which the Lunas signed. The retainer agreement provided that the Lunas would pay respondent \$10,000 in return for respondent performing the following legal services: "(1) Prepare and File I-130, Petition for Alien Relative; (2) Prepare and File Adjustment of status when date becomes available; (3) Request Form G-639/Freedom of Information Act (FOIA); (4) Request Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI); and (5) Request Department of Justice."

25. Between July 25, 2011 through February 25, 2013, the Lunas paid a total of \$9,400 in attorney's fees to respondent's law office.

26. In March 2013, Cavazos Sr. told Ms. Luna over the telephone that he could not obtain permanent resident status for Mr. Luna, because Mr. Luna had two prior deportation orders. After that call, the Lunas ceased communicating with respondent's law firm.

27. On August 6, 2014, the Lunas sent a certified letter to respondent, in which they stated that they considered respondent's services terminated as of March 2013.

28. Respondent performed all of the services set forth in the retainer agreement, except for filing an Adjustment of Status form. Respondent did not file the Adjustment of Status form because respondent was terminated prior to when the form could be filed.

29. As of October 21, 2014, the parties have agreed that the Lunas are entitled to a refund of \$3,000 for advanced fees that they paid to respondent to file an Adjustment of Status form on their behalf, which respondent did not file.

30. At all times during respondent's representation of the Lunas, the Lunas believed that Cavazos Sr. was an attorney.

31. Between March 2010 and August 16, 2014, the Lunas never met, or spoke to, respondent.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

32. By knowingly allowing Cavazos Sr., who was not licensed to practice law in California, to provide legal advice to the Lunas, respondent aided in the unauthorized practice of law, in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-300(A).

33. By failing to inform the Lunas that Cavazos Sr. was not a licensed attorney, respondent failed to keep respondent's clients, the Lunas, reasonably informed of significant developments in a matter in which respondent had agreed to provide legal services, in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(m).

Case No. 13-O-17514 (Complainant: Gerardo Barrera)

FACTS:

34. Sometime in 2003, Gerardo Barrera and his wife filed an I-130 Petition for Alien Relative.

35. On July 13, 2012, Gerardo Barrera ("Barrera") went to respondent's law office and asked to speak with an attorney regarding obtaining an adjustment of immigration status. Barrera was directed to speak with Cavazos Sr. During this meeting, Cavazos Sr. advised Barrera that he needed to file for an adjustment of status, and discussed the forms that Barrera would have to complete.

36. On July 13, 2012, Barrera executed a retainer agreement in which he agreed to pay \$2,500 in exchange for respondent's law firm reviewing Barrera's immigration records.

37. Between July 13, 2012 and July 30, 2012, Barrera paid a total of \$2,500 in attorney's fees.

38. Respondent's law firm completed a review of Barrera's immigration records.

39. On October 26, 2012, Barrera returned to respondent's law office after being notified that a new I-130 Petition needed to be filed. Barrera executed a new retainer agreement which provided that Barrera would pay respondent \$5,000 in return for respondent's law firm performing the following legal services: "Prepare and File I-130, Petition for Alien Relative; (2) Prepare and File Adjustment of status when Visa available for Mr. Gerardo Barrera Cervantes."

40. Between October 26, 2012 and May 7, 2013, Barrera paid a total of \$5,000 to respondent's law firm.

41. Respondent performed all of the services set forth in the retainer agreement, except for filing an Adjustment of Status form. Respondent did not file the Adjustment of Status form because respondent was terminated prior to when the form could be filed.

42. On June 28, 2013, the National Visa Center ("NVC") sent a letter to Barrera's wife stating that Barrera's earlier petition had been combined with his later petition, but because a period of more than one year had passed without contact on the earlier petition, all fees and forms would have to be resubmitted.

43. In July 2013, Barrera contacted respondent's law office to discuss his case but was told that his client file could not be located. Respondent's law office failed to contact Barrera after this call.

44. On August 23, 2013, Barrera sent a certified letter to respondent terminating his services, asking for a refund, an accounting, and his client file.

45. Respondent did not provide Barrera with his client file until April 30, 2014.

46. To date, respondent has not refunded any portion of the \$5,000 in attorney's fees paid by Barrera.

47. To date, respondent has not provided an accounting to Barrera.

48. As of October 21, 2014, the parties have agreed that Barrera is entitled to a refund of \$1,500 for advanced fees that Barrera paid to respondent to file an Adjustment of Status form on his behalf, which respondent did not file.

49. At all times during respondent's representation of Barrera, Barrera believed that Cavazos Sr. was an attorney.

50. Between July 13, 2012 and August 23, 2013, Barrera never met, or spoke to, respondent.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

51. By knowingly allowing Cavazos Sr., who was not licensed to practice law in California, to provide legal advice to Barrera, respondent aided in the unauthorized practice of law, in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-300(A).

52. By failing to inform Barrera that Cavazos Sr. was not a licensed attorney, respondent failed to keep respondent's client, Barrera, reasonably informed of significant developments in a matter in

which respondent had agreed to provide legal services, in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(m).

53. By failing to promptly release all of Barrera's papers and property to Barrera, respondent failed to release a client file, in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(1).

54. By failing to render an appropriate accounting to respondent's client, Barrera, following Barrera's request for such accounting on August 23, 2013, respondent failed to provide an accounting, in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 4-100(B)(3).

Case No. 14-O-02136 (Complainant: Liselda Luna and Ramiro Rodriguez Alvarado)

FACTS:

55. In March of 2010, Ramiro Rodriguez Alvarado ("Alvarado") and Liselda Luna ("Luna") went to respondent's law office to obtain legal advice regarding obtaining permanent resident status for Alvarado, and clearing Alvarado's criminal record of theft and unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle and DUI. Alvarado and Luna were directed to speak with Cavazos Sr.

56. During the meeting, Cavazos Sr. told them that he could obtain permanent resident status for Alvarado for \$7500, notwithstanding the fact that Alvarado had a criminal record. Luna and Alvarado did not have the funds at that time to hire respondent's law firm, and so they left respondent's office.

57. On January 31, 2011, Luna and Alvarado returned to respondent's law office, and were again directed to meet with Cavazos Sr. and respondent's paralegal. Cavazos Sr. told them that, in his legal opinion, Alvarado would qualify for permanent residency. Cavazos Sr. stated that he would charge \$15,000, and explained that they would first clean Alvarado's criminal record and then file the appropriate immigration forms.

58. On January 31, 2011, Alvarado executed a retainer agreement in which Alvarado agreed to pay \$15,000 in return for respondent's law firm performing the following legal services: "(1) Post Conviction Relief in Madera (False Citizenship – CRM023463) and Solano County (FCR218714); (2) Prepare and File I-130, Petition for Alien Relative; (3) Petition and File Adjustment of status (when visa becomes available)."

59. Between January 31, 2011 and July 17, 2012, Alvarado and Luna paid a total of \$15,000 in attorney's fees.

60. On August 24, 2012, Alvarado disclosed to respondent's law firm that he had been caught at the United States/Mexico border twice between 2004 and 2005.

61. In October 2013, Luna and Alvarado went to respondent's law firm and orally requested a refund of all fees paid, and effectively terminated respondent.

62. Respondent performed all of the services set forth in the retainer agreement, except for filing an Adjustment of Status form. Respondent did not file the Adjustment of Status form because Luna and Alvarado stopped communicating with respondent's law firm prior when the form could be filed.

63. To date, respondent has not refunded any portion of the \$15,000 in attorney's fees paid by Alvarado and Luna.

64. As of October 21, 2014, the parties have agreed that Alvarado is entitled to a refund of \$5,000 for advanced fees that they paid to respondent to file an Adjustment of Status form on their behalf, which respondent did not file.

65. At all times during respondent's representation of Alvarado, Alvarado believed that Cavazos Sr. was an attorney.

66. Between March 2010 and October 2013, Alvarado never met, or spoke to, respondent.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

67. By knowingly allowing Cavazos Sr., who was not licensed to practice law in California, to provide legal advice to Alvarado, respondent aided in the unauthorized practice of law, in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-300(A).

68. By failing to inform Alvarado that Cavazos Sr. was not a licensed attorney, respondent failed to keep respondent's client, Alvarado, reasonably informed of significant developments in a matter in which respondent had agreed to provide legal services, in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(m).

Case No. 14-O-04363 (Complainant: Felipe Plascencia-Tejeda and Bertha Plascencia)

FACTS:

69. On October 22, 2009, Felipe and Bertha Plascencia (hereafter, the "Plascencias"), went to respondent's law office to hire an attorney to assist them with obtaining an adjustment of immigration status for Mr. Plascencia, notwithstanding the fact that he had been denied adjustment of status in 2006, based on a drug conviction which had been expunged. The Plascencias were directed to speak with Cavazos Sr.

70. In the meeting, Cavazos Sr. discussed the legal aspects of Mr. Plascencia's criminal and immigration issues, and told them that he believed that Mr. Plascencia could qualify for an adjustment of status once they "cleaned" his criminal record. Cavazos Sr. told the Plascencias that he could help them for a fee of \$10,000.

71. On October 22, 2009, the Plascencias signed a retainer agreement in which they agreed to pay \$10,000 in attorney's fees in exchange for respondent's law firm handling Mr. Plascencia's criminal and immigration matters.

72. Between October 24, 2009 and January 20, 2012, the Plascencias paid a total of \$5,000 in attorney's fees, and \$170 for a required medical exam and lab tests, to respondent's law firm.

73. In March of 2012, the Plascencias were notified by respondent's paralegal that there was a problem with Mr. Plascencia's case. The Plascencias met with Cavazos Sr. and respondent's paralegal, and were told that his adjustment of status had been denied not only because of a drug conviction but because of two previously undisclosed illegal re-entries into the United States. Cavazos Sr. told the Plascencias that Mr. Plascencia had no legal basis to apply for an adjustment of status. The Plascencias requested a refund, and Cavazos Sr. told them, for the first time, that he was not an attorney and would have to ask respondent whether a refund should be issued.

74. On June 19, 2012, the Plascencias, through the California Hispanic Resource Council, sent a certified letter to respondent requesting a refund of \$5,170, as well as their client file.

75. Respondent performed some work on behalf of the Plascencias with regards to Mr. Plascencia's criminal and immigration matters.

76. To date, respondent has not refunded any portion of the \$5,170 in attorney's fees paid by the Plascencias.

77. As of October 21, 2014, the parties have agreed that the Plascencias are entitled to a refund of \$1,500 for advanced fees that they paid to respondent to file an Adjustment of Status form on their behalf, which respondent did not file

78. Respondent did not provide the Plascencias with their client file until October 28, 2014.

79. At all times during respondent's representation of the Plascencias, the Plascencias believed that Cavazos Sr. was an attorney.

80. Between October 22, 2009 and June 19, 2012, the Plascencias never met, or spoke to, respondent.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

81. By knowingly allowing Cavazos Sr., who was not licensed to practice law in California, to provide legal advice to the Plascencias, respondent aided in the unauthorized practice of law, in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 1-300(A).

82. By failing to inform the Plascencias that Cavazos Sr. was not a licensed attorney, respondent failed to keep respondent's clients, the Plascencias, reasonably informed of significant developments in a matter in which respondent had agreed to provide legal services, in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(m).

83. By failing to promptly release all of the Plascencias papers and property to the Plascencias, respondent failed to release a client file, in willful violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-700(D)(1).

FACTS SUPPORTING AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

Multiple Acts of Misconduct (Std. 1.5(b)): Respondent committed 16 acts of misconduct in five client matters. Respondent's multiple acts of misconduct constitute an aggravating circumstance pursuant to Standard 1.5(b).

Dishonesty (Std. 1.5(d)): Respondent demonstrated dishonesty by concealing the fact that his father was not a licensed attorney in at least five client matters. Respondent's dishonesty and act of concealment constitutes an aggravating circumstance pursuant to Standard 1.5(d).

Lack of Cooperation (Std. 1.5(h)): Respondent demonstrated a lack of candor with the State Bar in his March 25, 2014 letter in which he claimed to have not been aware that his father was prohibited from working in his office as part of his criminal probation. However, respondent admitted to the State Bar at an April 3, 2014 meeting, that he in fact was aware of the terms of his father's

criminal probation in 2009. Respondent's lack of candor constitutes an aggravating circumstance pursuant to Standard 1.5(h).

FACTS SUPPORTING MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

No Prior Discipline: Although respondent's misconduct is serious, he is entitled to limited mitigation for having practiced law for approximately 11 years without discipline. (*In the Matter of Riordan* (Review Dept. 2007) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 41, 49.)

Prefiling Stipulation: Respondent is entitled to mitigation for entering into a full stipulation with the Office of Chief Trial Counsel prior to the State Bar filing a Notice of Disciplinary Charges, thereby saving State Bar Court time and resources. (*Silva-Vidor v. State Bar* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1071, 1079 [where mitigative credit was given for entering into a stipulation as to facts and culpability].)

AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.

The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct "set forth a means for determining the appropriate disciplinary sanction in a particular case and to ensure consistency across cases dealing with similar misconduct and surrounding circumstances." (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, std. 1.1. All further references to Standards are to this source.) The Standards help fulfill the primary purposes of discipline, which include: protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; maintenance of the highest professional standards; and preservation of public confidence in the legal profession. (See std. 1.1; *In re Morse* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 184, 205.)

Although not binding, the standards are entitled to "great weight" and should be followed "whenever possible" in determining level of discipline. (*In re Silvertown* (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 92, quoting *In re Brown* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 205, 220 and *In re Young* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 267, fn. 11.) Adherence to the standards in the great majority of cases serves the valuable purpose of eliminating disparity and assuring consistency, that is, the imposition of similar attorney discipline for instances of similar attorney misconduct. (*In re Naney* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 190.) If a recommendation is at the high end or low end of a Standard, an explanation must be given as to how the recommendation was reached. (Std. 1.1.) "Any disciplinary recommendation that deviates from the Standards must include clear reasons for the departure." (Std. 1.1; *Blair v. State Bar* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 762, 776, fn. 5.)

In determining whether to impose a sanction greater or less than that specified in a given Standard, in addition to the factors set forth in the specific Standard, consideration is to be given to the primary purposes of discipline; the balancing of all aggravating and mitigating circumstances; the type of misconduct at issue; whether the client, public, legal system or profession was harmed; and the member's willingness and ability to conform to ethical responsibilities in the future. (Stds. 1.7(b) and (c).)

In this matter, Respondent committed 16 acts of professional misconduct. Standard 1.7(a) requires that where a Respondent "commits two or more acts of misconduct and the Standards specify different sanctions for each act, the most severe sanction must be imposed." The most severe sanction applicable to Respondent's misconduct is found in Standard 2.7 based on respondent's violations of Business and Professions Code section 6106. Standard 2.7 provides that "[d]isbarment or actual suspension is appropriate for an act of moral turpitude, dishonesty, fraud, corruption or concealment of a material fact. The degree of sanction depends on the magnitude of the misconduct and the extent to which the misconduct harmed or misled the victim and related to the member's practice of law."

Here, an 18-month actual suspension, which is on the higher end of available range of discipline, is appropriate because it related to the practice of law, and the magnitude to which respondent misled his clients is substantially high. Respondent intentionally operated his law practice in such a manner as to give clients the impression that his father was an attorney. Respondent also continued to allow his father to operate out of his law office knowing that his father had been criminally prosecuted for UPL, and knowing that his father was not allowed to work in the same office as respondent. Respondent also never met with or spoke to any of the clients discussed above. Based on these facts, the magnitude to which respondent misled his clients into believing his father was licensed to practice law warrants substantial discipline. Respondent's misconduct is also aggravated by multiple acts of misconduct, dishonesty, and a lack of candor to the State Bar.

Disbarment is not warranted in this matter because none of respondent's clients appear to have been foreclosed from pursuing a change in their immigration status. Respondent's misconduct is also entitled to some mitigation for his 11 years of practice without discipline.

In the Matter of Huang (Review Dept. 2014), 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 296, supports the imposition of an 18-month actual suspension in this case. In *Huang*, the Review Department recommended a two-year actual suspension for attorney Huang, who was found culpable of violating Business and Professions Code, section 6106.3, and Rules of Professions Conduct, rules 3-110(A) and 1-300(A) in eight client matters. Huang's misconduct was aggravated by multiple acts of misconduct and significant client harm, and mitigated by no prior record of discipline, good character, remorse, and cooperation.

Here, respondent's misconduct is quite similar to, but not as extensive as attorney Huang's misconduct. This case involves only five client matters, as opposed to the eight client matters at issue in *Huang*. Based on these facts, a slightly lower level of discipline is warranted.

Balancing all of the appropriate factors, an 18-month actual suspension is consistent with Standard 2.7 and applicable caselaw, and is appropriate taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of this case.

COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.

Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has informed respondent that as of October 30, 2014, the prosecution costs in this matter are \$6,812. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.

FEE ARBITRATION CONDITIONS OF PROBATION:

A. Respondent's Duty to Initiate and Participate in Fee Arbitration

Respondent must initiate fee arbitration with the State Bar of California's Mandatory Fee Arbitration Program within thirty (30) days from the effective date of this matter, including making any payment(s) and filing fees required to start the process. The fee arbitration will be for the \$15,000 in fees that Alejandro Rosas paid respondent between February 27, 2012 and March 18, 2013. Respondent must not request more fees than have already been paid by, or on behalf of, Alejandro Rosas.

Respondent must provide the Office of Probation with a copy of the conformed filing within forty-five (45) days from the effective date of this matter. Respondent must immediately provide the Office of

Probation with any information requested regarding the fee arbitration to verify respondent's compliance.

Respondent must fully and promptly participate in the fee arbitration as directed by the State Bar Mandatory Fee Arbitration Program. Respondent will not be permitted to raise the statute of limitations as a defense to the fee arbitration. Respondent understands and agrees that the Office of Probation may contact the Mandatory Fee Arbitration Program for information.

Respondent must accept binding arbitration on the arbitration request form. If the arbitration proceeds as non-binding, however, respondent must abide by the arbitration award and forego the right to file an action seeking a trial de novo in court to vacate the award.

B. Disputed Funds Must be Held in Trust by Respondent

Respondent must keep the disputed funds in a separate interest-bearing trust account (not an IOLTA). If respondent has removed the disputed funds from trust, respondent must open a separate interest-bearing trust account and deposit the disputed funds into such account within fifteen (15) days from the effective date of discipline. Respondent must provide evidence, e.g. a copy of respondent's bank statement showing that the disputed funds have been placed in trust within thirty (30) days from the effective date of this matter, and a statement under penalty of perjury that the funds have remained in trust with each of respondent's quarterly and final reports.

C. Respondent's Duty to Comply with the Arbitration Award

Within fifteen (15) days after issuance of any arbitration award or judgment or agreement reflected in a stipulated award issued pursuant to a fee arbitration matter, respondent must provide a copy of said award, judgment or stipulated award to the Office of Probation.

Respondent must abide by any award, judgment or stipulated award of any such fee arbitrator and agrees to provide proof thereof to the Office of Probation within thirty (30) days after compliance with any such award, judgment or stipulated award. If the award, judgment or stipulated award does not set forth a deadline for any payment, respondent is to make full payment within thirty (30) days of the issuance of any such award, judgment or stipulated award. Respondent must provide proof thereof to the Office of Probation within thirty (30) days after payment.

To the extent that respondent has paid any fee arbitration award, judgment or stipulated award prior to the effective date of this matter, respondent will be given credit for such payment(s) provided satisfactory proof of such payment(s) is or has been provided to the Office of Probation.

D. Fee Arbitration Conditions can be Satisfied by Respondent's Full Payment to Alejandro Rosas

The Fee Arbitration Conditions can also be satisfied by respondent's full payment of \$15,000 in fees that Alejandro Rosas paid respondent on between February 27, 2012 and March 18, 2013, plus interest of 10% per annum from February 27, 2012, within thirty (30) days from the effective date of this matter. Satisfactory proof of payment must be received by the Office of Probation within forty-five (45) days from the effective date of this matter.

If the Client Security Fund ("CSF") has reimbursed Alejandro Rosas for all or any portion of the principal amount(s), respondent must also pay restitution to CSF in the amount(s) paid, plus applicable

interest and costs. To the extent the CSF has paid only principal amounts, respondent will still be liable for interest payments to Alejandro Rosas. Any restitution to the CSF is enforceable as provided in Business and Professions Code section 6140.5, subdivisions (c) and (d). Respondent must pay all restitution to Alejandro Rosas before making payment to CSF. Satisfactory proof of payment(s) to CSF must be received by the Office of Probation within thirty (30) days of any payment.

E. Effect of Respondent's Failure to Comply with Fee Arbitration Conditions

Respondent understands that failure to strictly comply with these conditions regarding fee arbitration may result in this Court imposing additional discipline (with attendant costs) and conditions upon respondent, including ordering respondent to pay back the full amount of \$15,000 paid to respondent by Alejandro Rosas plus 10% interest from February 27, 2012.

EXCLUSION FROM MCLE CREDIT

Pursuant to rule 3201, Respondent may not receive MCLE credit for completion of State Bar Ethics School. (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 3201.)


(Do not write above this line.)

In the Matter of: HECTOR ARNOLDO CAVAZOS, JR.	Case number(s): 13-O-16840; 13-O-17116; 13-O-17514; 14-O-02136; 14-O-04363
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SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES

By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitations and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Disposition.

11/10/14  Hector Arnaldo Cavazos, Jr.
Date Respondent's Signature Print Name

4/12/14  Heather E. Abelson
Date Deputy Trial Counsel's Signature Print Name

(Do not write above this line.)

In the Matter of: HECTOR ARNOLDO CAVAZOS, JR.	Case Number(s): 13-O-16840; 13-O-17116; 13-O-17514; 14-O-02136; 14-O-04363
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ACTUAL SUSPENSION ORDER

Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any, is GRANTED without prejudice, and:

- The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
- The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
- All Hearing dates are vacated.

1. On p. 1, "Settlement Judge" should be corrected to read "Assigned Judge."
2. On p. 4, E. (1), the box should be checked because there's an "and until" he makes restitution condition
3. On p. 6, (5), check the box for "Other Conditions" and add "See pp. 18-20 re Fee Arbitration Conditions of Probation."
4. On p. 7, a., add "Liselda Luna" as payee after the name Ramiro Rodriguez Alvarado.
5. On p. 17, respondent has practiced law for six years without any prior record of discipline, not 11 years. He was admitted in 2003 and his first misconduct occurred in 2009. Therefore, he should not get any mitigation. (In the Matter of Greenwood (Review Dept. 1998) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 831, 837 [Although the attorney has no prior record of discipline, his six years of practice prior to the start of misconduct was not mitigating.])
6. On p. 18, second paragraph, delete the last sentence re mitigation "for his 11 years of practice without discipline."

(Do not write above this line.)

The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58(E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) **The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)**

Dec. 1, 2014

Date



LUCY ARMENDARIZ
Judge of the State Bar Court

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of San Francisco, on December 2, 2014, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:

- by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at San Francisco, California, addressed as follows:

HECTOR A. CAVAZOS JR
501 W WEBER AVE STE 300A
STOCKTON, CA 95203

- by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

HEATHER E. ABELSON, Enforcement, San Francisco

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on December 2, 2014.



Bernadette C.O. Molina
Case Administrator
State Bar Court