State Bar Court of California Hearing Department Los Angeles **ACTUAL SUSPENSION** Counsel For The State Bar Case Number(s): For Court use only 14-C-00074 - LMA **PUBLIC MATTER** Nina Sarraf-Yazdi **Deputy Trial Counsel** 845 South Figueroa Los Angeles, California 90017 (213) 765-1277 JUN 2 5 201 Bar # 278877 Counsel For Respondent **STATE BAR COURT CLERK'S OFFICE** SAN FRANCISCO **David Carr Law Office of David Cameron Carr PLC** 525 B Street Suite 1500 San Diego, California 92101 (619) 696-0526 Submitted to: Settlement Judge STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND Bar # **124510** DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING In the Matter of: **JORDAN DAVID BEAL ACTUAL SUSPENSION** □ PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED Bar # 259587 A Member of the State Bar of California (Respondent)

Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.

A. Parties' Acknowledgments:

- (1) Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted **December 4, 2008**
- (2) The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
- (3) All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of **12** pages, not including the order.
- (4) A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."

(Effective January 1, 2014)

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(5)	Co La	Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".			
(6)	The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."				
(7)	No pe	No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.			
(8)	Pa 61	Payment of Disciplinary Costs—Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):			
		Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 5.130, Rules of Procedure. Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: two			
		billing cycles following the effective date of the Supreme Court Order. (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.			
		Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs". Costs are entirely waived.			
	Visc	ravating Circumstances [Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional conduct, standards 1.2(f) & 1.5]. Facts supporting aggravating circumstances are ired.			
(1)	[] (a)	Prior record of discipline State Bar Court case # of prior case			
	(b)	☐ Date prior discipline effective			
	(c)	Rules of Professional Conduct/ State Bar Act violations:			
	(d)	☐ Degree of prior discipline			
	(e)	If Respondent has two or more incidents of prior discipline, use space provided below.			
(2)		Dishonesty: Respondent's misconduct was intentional, surrounded by, or followed by bad faith, dishonesty, concealment, overreaching or other violations of the State Bar Act or Rules of Professional Conduct.			
(3)	<u> </u>	Trust Violation: Trust funds or property were involved and Respondent refused or was unable to account to the client or person who was the object of the misconduct for improper conduct toward said funds or property.			
(4)		Harm: Respondent's misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public or the administration of justice.			
(5)		Indifference: Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for the consequences of his or her misconduct.			

(Do n	ot writ	e above this line.)
(6)		Lack of Cooperation: Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims of his/her misconduct or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation or proceedings.
(7)		Multiple/Pattern of Misconduct: Respondent's current misconduct evidences multiple acts of wrongdoing or demonstrates a pattern of misconduct.
(8)		Restitution: Respondent failed to make restitution.
(9)	\boxtimes	No aggravating circumstances are involved.
Add	ition	al aggravating circumstances:
		pating Circumstances [see standards 1.2(g) & 1.6]. Facts supporting mitigating umstances are required.
(1)		No Prior Discipline: Respondent has no prior record of discipline over many years of practice coupled with present misconduct which is not deemed serious.
(2)		No Harm: Respondent did not harm the client, the public, or the administration of justice.
(3)	\boxtimes	Candor/Cooperation: Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and cooperation with the victims of his/her misconduct and to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation and proceedings.
(4)		Remorse: Respondent promptly took objective steps spontaneously demonstrating remorse and recognition of the wrongdoing, which steps were designed to timely atone for any consequences of his/her misconduct.
(5)		Restitution: Respondent paid \$ on in restitution to without the threat or force of disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings.
(6)		Delay: These disciplinary proceedings were excessively delayed. The delay is not attributable to Respondent and the delay prejudiced him/her.
(7)		Good Faith: Respondent acted with a good faith belief that was honestly held and reasonable.
(8)		Emotional/Physical Difficulties: At the time of the stipulated act or acts of professional misconduct Respondent suffered extreme emotional difficulties or physical or mental disabilities which expert testimony would establish was directly responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities were not the product of any illegal conduct by the member, such as illegal drug or substance abuse, and the difficulties or disabilities no longer pose a risk that Respondent will commit misconduct.
(9)		Severe Financial Stress: At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered from severe financial stress which resulted from circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond his/her control and which were directly responsible for the misconduct.
(10)		Family Problems: At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered extreme difficulties in his/her personal life which were other than emotional or physical in nature.
(11)	\boxtimes	Good Character: Respondent's extraordinarily good character is attested to by a wide range of references in the legal and general communities who are aware of the full extent of his/her misconduct.

(Do n	(Do not write above this line.)					
(12)		Reh folic	Rehabilitation: Considerable time has passed since the acts of professional misconduct occurred followed by convincing proof of subsequent rehabilitation.			
(13)		No	No mitigating circumstances are involved.			
Add	ition	al mi	tigatin	ng circumstances:		
	N	lo pri	ior dis	cipline, see attachment pg. 8		
D. C	Discipline:					
(1)		Stayed Suspension:				
	(a)	\boxtimes	Res	condent must be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.		
		i.		and until Respondent shows proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of rehabilitation and present fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the law pursuant to standard 1.2(c)(1) Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.		
		ii.		and until Respondent pays restitution as set forth in the Financial Conditions form attached to this stipulation.		
		iii.		and until Respondent does the following:		
	(b)	\boxtimes	The	above-referenced suspension is stayed.		
(2)	\boxtimes	Prof	bation			
				ust be placed on probation for a period of one (1) year , which will commence upon the effective reme Court order in this matter. (See rule 9.18, California Rules of Court)		
(3)	\boxtimes	Actual Suspension:				
	(a)	\boxtimes		condent must be actually suspended from the practice of law in the State of California for a period irty (30) days.		
		i.		and until Respondent shows proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of rehabilitation and present fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the law pursuant to standard 1.2(c)(1), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct		
		ii.		and until Respondent pays restitution as set forth in the Financial Conditions form attached to this stipulation.		
		iii.		and until Respondent does the following:		
E. A	ddit	iona	ıl Coı	nditions of Probation:		
(1)	П	If Re	spond	ent is actually suspended for two years or more, he/she must remain actually suspended until		
(· /	he/she proves to the State Bar Court his/her rehabilitation, fitness to practice, and learning and ab general law, pursuant to standard 1.2(c)(1), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Mis					
(2)	\boxtimes			probation period, Respondent must comply with the provisions of the State Bar Act and Rules of al Conduct.		

(Do no	(Do not write above this line.)						
(3)		State inform	hin ten (10) days of any change, Respondent must report to te Bar and to the Office of Probation of the State Bar of Cal rmation, including current office address and telephone nu poses, as prescribed by section 6002.1 of the Business and	ifornia ("Office of Probation"), all changes of mber, or other address for State Bar			
(4)		Within thirty (30) days from the effective date of discipline, Respondent must contact the Office of Probatio and schedule a meeting with Respondent's assigned probation deputy to discuss these terms and conditions of probation. Upon the direction of the Office of Probation, Respondent must meet with the probation deputy either in-person or by telephone. During the period of probation, Respondent must promptly meet with the probation deputy as directed and upon request. Respondent must submit written quarterly reports to the Office of Probation on each January 10, April 10, July 10, and October 10 of the period of probation. Under penalty of perjury, Respondent must state whether Respondent has complied with the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and all conditions of probation during the preceding calendar quarter. Respondent must also state whether there are any proceedings pending against him or her in the State Bar Court and if so, the case number and current status of that proceeding. If the first report would cover less than 30 days, that report must be submitted on the next quarter date, and cover the extended period.					
(5)							
		In add	ddition to all quarterly reports, a final report, containing the nty (20) days before the last day of the period of probation	same information, is due no earlier than and no later than the last day of probation.			
(6)		Respondent must be assigned a probation monitor. Respondent must promptly review the terms and conditions of probation with the probation monitor to establish a manner and schedule of compliance. During the period of probation, Respondent must furnish to the monitor such reports as may be requested, in addition to the quarterly reports required to be submitted to the Office of Probation. Respondent must cooperate fully with the probation monitor.					
(7)		Subject to assertion of applicable privileges, Respondent must answer fully, promptly and truthfully any inquiries of the Office of Probation and any probation monitor assigned under these conditions which are directed to Respondent personally or in writing relating to whether Respondent is complying or has complied with the probation conditions.					
(8)	\boxtimes	Within one (1) year of the effective date of the discipline herein, Respondent must provide to the Office of Probation satisfactory proof of attendance at a session of the Ethics School, and passage of the test gives at the end of that session.					
			No Ethics School recommended. Reason: .				
(9)	\boxtimes	Respondent must comply with all conditions of probation imposed in the underlying criminal matter and must so declare under penalty of perjury in conjunction with any quarterly report to be filed with the Office of Probation.					
(10)		The following conditions are attached hereto and incorporated:					
			Substance Abuse Conditions Law Off	fice Management Conditions			
	,		Medical Conditions	al Conditions			
F. O	ther	Con	nditions Negotiated by the Parties:				
(1)	\boxtimes	the Con	ultistate Professional Responsibility Examination: Rese Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination ("MPR onference of Bar Examiners, to the Office of Probation during year, whichever period is longer. Failure to pass the Miles of Probation Miles year, whichever period is longer.	RE"), administered by the National ng the period of actual suspension or within			

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		further hearing until passage. But see rule 9.10(b), California Rules of Court, and rule 5.162(A) & (E), Rules of Procedure.
		☐ No MPRE recommended. Reason:
(2)		Rule 9.20, California Rules of Court: Respondent must comply with the requirements of rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 calendar days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court's Order in this matter.
(3)		Conditional Rule 9.20, California Rules of Court: If Respondent remains actually suspended for 90 days or more, he/she must comply with the requirements of rule 9.20 , California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 120 and 130 calendar days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court's Order in this matter.
(4)		Credit for Interim Suspension [conviction referral cases only]: Respondent will be credited for the period of his/her interim suspension toward the stipulated period of actual suspension. Date of commencement of interim suspension:
(5)		Other Conditions:

ATTACHMENT TO

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION

IN THE MATTER OF:

JORDAN DAVID BEAL

CASE NUMBER:

14-C-00074

FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense for which he was convicted involved moral turpitude.

Case No. 14-C-00074 (Conviction Proceedings)

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND IN CONVICTION PROCEEDING:

- 1. This is a proceeding pursuant to sections 6101 and 6102 of the Business and Professions Code and rule 9.10 of the California Rules of Court.
- 2. On September 24, 2013, the San Diego District Attorney filed a felony complaint in the San Diego Superior Court, North County Division (case no. CN323850) charging respondent with selling/furnishing a controlled substance in violation of Health & Safety Code section 11379(a).
- 3. On June 20, 2014, respondent pled guilty to the amended charge of misdemeanor violation of Health & Safety Code section 11355, selling a substance in lieu of a controlled substance pursuant to Penal Code section 17(b)(4). Penal Code section 17(b)(4) allows a violation of Health & Safety Code section 11355 to be treated as a misdemeanor rather than a felony.
- 4. Respondent was sentenced to one year summary probation and was ordered to serve one day in county jail, for which he was given credit for time served. Respondent was granted early release from probation on May 22, 2015.
- 5. On February 20, 2015, the Review Department of the State Bar Court issued an order referring the matter to the Hearing Department for a hearing and decision recommending the discipline to be imposed in the event that the Hearing Department finds that the facts and circumstances surrounding the offense for which respondent was convicted involved moral turpitude or other misconduct warranting discipline.

FACTS:

- 6. On August 3, 2013, San Diego County Sheriff Deputies, J. Krull ("Krull") and J. Boegler ("Boegler") were on undercover assignment in the Solana Beach and Encinitas area to investigate drug sales taking place at local bars. Krull and Boegler went to the Saddle Bar in Solana Beach.
- 7. While there, Krull and Boegler made contact with respondent and his roommate. Krull and Boegler spoke to respondent and his roommate about purchasing drugs.

- 8. Boegler and Krull did not obtain any drugs from respondent or his roommate on August 3, 2013. The parties exchanged phone numbers and went their separate ways that night.
- 9. Four days later, on August 7, 2013, Krull sent respondent a text message stating that she was looking to obtain some Molly (slang term for MDMA, an illegal drug). Krull, Boegler and respondent met up that evening again at Saddle Bar. The officers asked to buy drugs from respondent. Respondent had no drugs on him, and left shortly after their conversation.
- 10. Approximately five minutes after leaving, respondent called Krull and offered to sell her drugs. Krull agreed. Boegler and Krull drove to respondent's house and parked at the end of respondent's driveway as instructed. Respondent came outside to the car, where Krull gave respondent \$120 in exchange for the drugs. Respondent told Krull to "be careful with those, they're strong."
- 11. Krull and Boegler left respondent's residence to meet Deputy Russell Ryan ("Ryan") from the Sheriff's Encinitas Street Narcotics and Gang Detail, who supervised the investigation. Ryan used a field test kit to determine that the substance respondent sold the undercover deputies weighed 0.8 grams and tested positive for a synthetic amphetamine-type of illegal drug.

CONCLUSION OF LAW:

12. By the foregoing conduct, the facts and circumstances surrounding respondent's conviction involved moral turpitude.

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

Absence of Any Prior Record of Discipline. Respondent was admitted to practice law in the State of California on December 4, 2008. Respondent has practiced law for approximately seven (7) years with no prior record of discipline. Although the misconduct here is serious and seven years is not an extensive amount of time, he is entitled to some mitigation credit. (*In re Naney* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 196 [the absence of a prior record of discipline was not a strong mitigating factor, where the attorney had been in practice only seven years at the time of the misconduct.].)

Extreme Emotional Difficulties (Std. 1.6(d)). At the time of the incident respondent had recently lost his job as an associate in-house counsel at Douglas Wilson Companies (then, his only job since his admission to the State Bar or California). He had recently ended a serious, five (5) year relationship; and he had suffered medical problems following a head injury. Shortly after his arrest, and prior to State Bar investigation, respondent began treatment for depression with Dr. Michael Lardon of San Diego. Respondent is still being treated by Dr. Lardon. Dr. Lardon's expert opinion is that respondent's depression directly contributed to his bad judgment regarding the incident, but that through therapy respondent's mental state has significantly improved and he does not believe that respondent will repeat the misconduct. These facts would entitle respondent to mitigation credit. (In the Matter of Wells (Review Dept. 2006) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 896, 912 [Mitigating credit given for testimony of respondent and respondent's marriage counselor as to extreme emotional difficulties due to marital problems.].)

Good Character (Std. 1.6(f)). Respondent served on his law school's alumni board and was a law student mentor from 2009 through 2012. He also organized a charity event that collected used clothing donations. During 2014, respondent's mother temporarily relocated to California. For about one (1) year respondent assisted his mother in taking care of his older brother, who is bipolar and

borderline schizophrenic. Respondent moved out of the apartment he shared with his roommate as a result of this incident and no longer associates with that individual. Respondent has also provided four (4) good character reference letters from a range of sources within the community who are aware of his misconduct. Respondent also no longer lives with his former roommate. Respondent has acknowledged his wrongdoing and has stated that it was the "dumbest thing he has ever done." (In the Matter of Taylor (2012) 5 Cal. State Bar. Ct. Rptr. 221, 235.)

Pretrial Stipulation/Cooperation (Std. 1.6(e)): Respondent has entered into a full stipulation prior to trial, which preserves State Bar time and resources, and entitles respondent to mitigation. He has fully cooperated with the State Bar and made his therapist available to the State Bar. (Silva-Vidor v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1071, 1079 [mitigating credit for entering into a stipulation as to facts and culpability].)

AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.

The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct "set forth a means for determining the appropriate disciplinary sanction in a particular case and to ensure consistency across cases dealing with similar misconduct and surrounding circumstances." (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, Std. 1.1.) The Standards help fulfill the primary purposes of discipline, which include: protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; maintenance of the highest professional standards; and preservation of public confidence in the legal profession. (See Std. 1.1; *In re Morse* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 184, 205.)

Although not binding, the Standards are entitled to "great weight" and should be followed "whenever possible" in determining level of discipline. (In re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 92, quoting In re Brown (1995) 12 Cal.4th 205, 220 and In re Young (1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 267, fn. 11.) Adherence to the Standards in the great majority of cases serves the valuable purpose of eliminating disparity and assuring consistency, that is, the imposition of similar attorney discipline for instances of similar attorney misconduct. (In re Naney (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 190.) If a recommendation is at the high end or low end of a Standard, an explanation must be given as to how the recommendation was reached. (Std. 1.1.) "Any disciplinary recommendation that deviates from the Standards must include clear reasons for the departure." (Std. 1.1; Blair v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 762, 776, fn. 5.)

In determining whether to impose a sanction greater or less than that specified in a given Standard, in addition to the factors set forth in the specific Standard, consideration is to be given to the primary purposes of discipline; the balancing of all aggravating and mitigating circumstances; the type of misconduct at issue; whether the client, public, legal system or profession was harmed; and the member's willingness and ability to conform to ethical responsibilities in the future. (Stds. 1.7(b) and (c).)

Respondent's culpability in these proceeding is conclusively established by the record of his conviction. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6101, subd. (a); In re Crooks (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1090, 1097.) Respondent is presumed to have committed all of the elements of the crimes of which he was convicted. (In re Duggan (1976) 17 Cal.3d 416, 423; In the Matter of Respondent O (Review Dept. 1993) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 581, 588.) The facts and circumstances surrounding respondent's conviction herein involved moral turpitude. The Supreme Court recently discussed the moral turpitude standard in the context of criminal convictions: "Moral turpitude is a concept that 'defies exact description' (citation omitted) and 'cannot be defined with precision' (citation omitted). In attorney discipline cases, however, moral turpitude should be defined with the aim of protecting the public, promoting confidence in the legal

system, and maintaining high professional standards (citation omitted). (In re Grant (2014) 58 Cal.4th 469, 475-476.)

Standard 2.11(c) states that disbarment or actual suspension is appropriate for final conviction of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.

As explained below, respondent's conduct involved moral turpitude. Respondent willingly and knowingly sold Krull and Boegler illegal drugs.

After meeting the women in the context of obtaining drugs, on August 7, 2013, Respondent agreed to provide drugs to Krull in exchange for money. He arranged to have Krull and Boegler pull into the driveway at his residence where he then gave them 0.8 grams of illegal drugs in exchange for \$120.

The facts and circumstances surrounding respondent's misconduct in this matter are serious and involve moral turpitude. The Court has found that sales of drugs amounts to moral turpitude. (E.g. *In re Leardo, supra,* 53 Cal.3d 1; *In re Possino* (1984) 37 Cal.3d 163). However, there are no aggravating circumstances present in this matter, and mitigating circumstances predominate. Respondent is entitled to some mitigation for approximately seven (7) years of practice without a prior record of discipline. Respondent has also demonstrated that he was under extreme emotional difficulties during the time of the misconduct and he has shown recognition of his wrongdoing and has taken steps toward rehabilitation by seeking therapy. Respondent also has established good character through his community service and four good character reference letters. In addition, respondent's conduct was unrelated to his practice of law. Because the mitigation outweighs aggravation, discipline at the low end of Standard 2.11(c) is appropriate.

Therefore, in order to protect the public, the courts and the legal profession, to maintain the highest professional standards, and to preserve public confidence in the legal profession pursuant to Standard 1.1, and in consideration of the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, a one (1) year suspension, stayed, a one (1) year probation, with a period of actual suspension during the first thirty (30) days of his probation, along with probation conditions will serve the purposes of imposing discipline.

COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.

Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has informed respondent that as of May 22, 2015, the prosecution costs in this matter are \$2,507.00. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.

EXCLUSION FROM MCLE CREDIT

Pursuant to rule 3201, respondent may <u>not</u> receive MCLE credit for completion of State Bar Ethics School. (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 3201.)

SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES

By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitations and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Disposition.

(/2 2/15 Date

Respondent's Signature

Jordan David Beal

Print Name

David Carr

Print Name

6/22/15

Deputy That Counsel's Signature

Respondent's Counsel Signature

Nina Sarraf-Yazdi

Print Name

requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any, is GRANTED without prejudice, and:

The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.

The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.

All Hearing dates are vacated.

On page 1 of the Stipulation at paragraph A. (3), "12" is deleted und in its place is inserted "11"

The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58(E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)

June 22, 2015

Judge of the State Bar Court

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of San Francisco, on June 25, 2015, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:

by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at San Francisco, California, addressed as follows:

DAVID C. CARR LAW OFFICE OF DAVID CAMERON CARR PLC 525 B ST STE 1500 SAN DIEGO, CA 92101

by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

NINA SARRAF-YAZDI, Enforcement, Los Angeles

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on June 25, 2015.

Bernadette C.O. Molina Case Administrator State Bar Court