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**State Bar Court of California
Hearing Department
Los Angeles
ACTUAL SUSPENSION**

PUBLIC HEARING

<p>Counsel For The State Bar</p> <p>Shane C. Morrison Deputy Trial Counsel 845 S. Figueroa St. Los Angeles, CA 90017-2515 (213) 765-1000</p> <p>Bar # 284115</p>	<p>Case Number(s): 14-C-01083</p>	<p>For Court use only</p> <p>FILED</p> <p>NOV 19 2014</p> <p>STATE BAR COURT CLERK'S OFFICE LOS ANGELES</p> 
<p>Counsel For Respondent</p> <p>Arthur L. Margolis Margolis & Margolis LLP 2000 Riverside Drive Los Angeles, CA 90039 (323) 953-8996</p> <p>Bar # 57703</p>	<p>Submitted to: Assigned Judge</p> <p>STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING</p> <p>ACTUAL SUSPENSION</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED</p>	
<p>In the Matter of: JOSE ANGEL TREJO</p> <p>Bar # 262612</p> <p>A Member of the State Bar of California (Respondent)</p>		

Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.

A. Parties' Acknowledgments:



- (1) Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted **March 24, 2009**.
- (2) The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
- (3) All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of **13** pages, not including the order.
- (4) A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."

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- (5) Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
- (6) The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
- (7) No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
- (8) Payment of Disciplinary Costs—Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
- Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 5.130, Rules of Procedure.
 - Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: **three billing cycles following the effective date of the Supreme Court order in this matter.** (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
 - Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
 - Costs are entirely waived.

B. Aggravating Circumstances [Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct, standards 1.2(f) & 1.5]. Facts supporting aggravating circumstances are required.

- (1) **Prior record of discipline**
- (a) State Bar Court case # of prior case **12-O-15283 (See Attachment to Stipulation at p. 9.)**
 - (b) Date prior discipline effective **September 27, 2013**
 - (c) Rules of Professional Conduct/ State Bar Act violations: **Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A); Business and Professions Code section 6106.3(a).**
 - (d) Degree of prior discipline **Private Reproval**
 - (e) If Respondent has two or more incidents of prior discipline, use space provided below.
- (2) **Dishonesty:** Respondent's misconduct was intentional, surrounded by, or followed by bad faith, dishonesty, concealment, overreaching or other violations of the State Bar Act or Rules of Professional Conduct.
- (3) **Trust Violation:** Trust funds or property were involved and Respondent refused or was unable to account to the client or person who was the object of the misconduct for improper conduct toward said funds or property.
- (4) **Harm:** Respondent's misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public or the administration of justice. **See Attachment to Stipulation at p. 9.**
- (5) **Indifference:** Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for the consequences of his or her misconduct.

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- (6) **Lack of Cooperation:** Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims of his/her misconduct or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation or proceedings.
- (7) **Multiple/Pattern of Misconduct:** Respondent's current misconduct evidences multiple acts of wrongdoing or demonstrates a pattern of misconduct.
- (8) **Restitution:** Respondent failed to make restitution.
- (9) **No aggravating circumstances** are involved.

Additional aggravating circumstances:

C. Mitigating Circumstances [see standards 1.2(g) & 1.6]. Facts supporting mitigating circumstances are required.

- (1) **No Prior Discipline:** Respondent has no prior record of discipline over many years of practice coupled with present misconduct which is not deemed serious.
- (2) **No Harm:** Respondent did not harm the client, the public, or the administration of justice.
- (3) **Candor/Cooperation:** Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and cooperation with the victims of his/her misconduct and to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation and proceedings.
- (4) **Remorse:** Respondent promptly took objective steps spontaneously demonstrating remorse and recognition of the wrongdoing, which steps were designed to timely atone for any consequences of his/her misconduct.
- (5) **Restitution:** Respondent paid \$ _____ on _____ in restitution to _____ without the threat or force of disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings.
- (6) **Delay:** These disciplinary proceedings were excessively delayed. The delay is not attributable to Respondent and the delay prejudiced him/her.
- (7) **Good Faith:** Respondent acted with a good faith belief that was honestly held and reasonable.
- (8) **Emotional/Physical Difficulties:** At the time of the stipulated act or acts of professional misconduct Respondent suffered extreme emotional difficulties or physical or mental disabilities which expert testimony would establish was directly responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities were not the product of any illegal conduct by the member, such as illegal drug or substance abuse, and the difficulties or disabilities no longer pose a risk that Respondent will commit misconduct.
- (9) **Severe Financial Stress:** At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered from severe financial stress which resulted from circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond his/her control and which were directly responsible for the misconduct.
- (10) **Family Problems:** At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered extreme difficulties in his/her personal life which were other than emotional or physical in nature.
- (11) **Good Character:** Respondent's extraordinarily good character is attested to by a wide range of references in the legal and general communities who are aware of the full extent of his/her misconduct.

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- (12) **Rehabilitation:** Considerable time has passed since the acts of professional misconduct occurred followed by convincing proof of subsequent rehabilitation.
- (13) **No mitigating circumstances** are involved.

Additional mitigating circumstances:

Remorse and Recognition of Wrongdoing (See Attachment to Stipulation at p. 9.)
Pretrial Stipulation (See Attachment to Stipulation at p. 9.)

D. Discipline:

- (1) **Stayed Suspension:**
 - (a) Respondent must be suspended from the practice of law for a period of **one year**.
 - i. and until Respondent shows proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of rehabilitation and present fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the law pursuant to standard 1.2(c)(1) Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.
 - ii. and until Respondent pays restitution as set forth in the Financial Conditions form attached to this stipulation.
 - iii. and until Respondent does the following:
 - (b) The above-referenced suspension is stayed.

- (2) **Probation:**

Respondent must be placed on probation for a period of **three years**, which will commence upon the effective date of the Supreme Court order in this matter. (See rule 9.18, California Rules of Court)

- (3) **Actual Suspension:**

- (a) Respondent must be actually suspended from the practice of law in the State of California for a period of **60 days**.
 - i. and until Respondent shows proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of rehabilitation and present fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the law pursuant to standard 1.2(c)(1), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct
 - ii. and until Respondent pays restitution as set forth in the Financial Conditions form attached to this stipulation.
 - iii. and until Respondent does the following:

E. Additional Conditions of Probation:

- (1) If Respondent is actually suspended for two years or more, he/she must remain actually suspended until he/she proves to the State Bar Court his/her rehabilitation, fitness to practice, and learning and ability in the general law, pursuant to standard 1.2(c)(1), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.
- (2) During the probation period, Respondent must comply with the provisions of the State Bar Act and Rules of Professional Conduct.

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- (3) Within ten (10) days of any change, Respondent must report to the Membership Records Office of the State Bar and to the Office of Probation of the State Bar of California ("Office of Probation"), all changes of information, including current office address and telephone number, or other address for State Bar purposes, as prescribed by section 6002.1 of the Business and Professions Code.
- (4) Within thirty (30) days from the effective date of discipline, Respondent must contact the Office of Probation and schedule a meeting with Respondent's assigned probation deputy to discuss these terms and conditions of probation. Upon the direction of the Office of Probation, Respondent must meet with the probation deputy either in-person or by telephone. During the period of probation, Respondent must promptly meet with the probation deputy as directed and upon request.
- (5) Respondent must submit written quarterly reports to the Office of Probation on each January 10, April 10, July 10, and October 10 of the period of probation. Under penalty of perjury, Respondent must state whether Respondent has complied with the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and all conditions of probation during the preceding calendar quarter. Respondent must also state whether there are any proceedings pending against him or her in the State Bar Court and if so, the case number and current status of that proceeding. If the first report would cover less than 30 days, that report must be submitted on the next quarter date, and cover the extended period.

In addition to all quarterly reports, a final report, containing the same information, is due no earlier than twenty (20) days before the last day of the period of probation and no later than the last day of probation.

- (6) Respondent must be assigned a probation monitor. Respondent must promptly review the terms and conditions of probation with the probation monitor to establish a manner and schedule of compliance. During the period of probation, Respondent must furnish to the monitor such reports as may be requested, in addition to the quarterly reports required to be submitted to the Office of Probation. Respondent must cooperate fully with the probation monitor.
- (7) Subject to assertion of applicable privileges, Respondent must answer fully, promptly and truthfully any inquiries of the Office of Probation and any probation monitor assigned under these conditions which are directed to Respondent personally or in writing relating to whether Respondent is complying or has complied with the probation conditions.
- (8) Within one (1) year of the effective date of the discipline herein, Respondent must provide to the Office of Probation satisfactory proof of attendance at a session of the Ethics School, and passage of the test given at the end of that session.
- No Ethics School recommended. Reason: **Respondent completed Ethics School on August 21, 2014 in connection with conditions attached to reprobation in State Bar case number 12-O-15283.**
- (9) Respondent must comply with all conditions of probation imposed in the underlying criminal matter and must so declare under penalty of perjury in conjunction with any quarterly report to be filed with the Office of Probation.
- (10) The following conditions are attached hereto and incorporated:
- | | |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Substance Abuse Conditions | <input type="checkbox"/> Law Office Management Conditions |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Medical Conditions | <input type="checkbox"/> Financial Conditions |

F. Other Conditions Negotiated by the Parties:

- (1) **Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination:** Respondent must provide proof of passage of the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination ("MPRE"), administered by the National Conference of Bar Examiners, to the Office of Probation during the period of actual suspension or within one year, whichever period is longer. **Failure to pass the MPRE results in actual suspension without**

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further hearing until passage. But see rule 9.10(b), California Rules of Court, and rule 5.162(A) & (E), Rules of Procedure.

No MPRE recommended. Reason: Respondent passed the MPRE given on March 29, 2014 in connection with conditions attached to reproof in State Bar case number 12-O-15283.

- (2) **Rule 9.20, California Rules of Court:** Respondent must comply with the requirements of rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 calendar days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court's Order in this matter.
- (3) **Conditional Rule 9.20, California Rules of Court:** If Respondent remains actually suspended for 90 days or more, he/she must comply with the requirements of rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 120 and 130 calendar days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court's Order in this matter.
- (4) **Credit for Interim Suspension [conviction referral cases only]:** Respondent will be credited for the period of his/her interim suspension toward the stipulated period of actual suspension. Date of commencement of interim suspension: **July 23, 2014.**
- (5) **Other Conditions:**

FACTS:

7. On July 10, 2013, respondent drove a vehicle while he was intoxicated. On that date, at approximately 12:01 a.m., respondent was involved in an automobile accident wherein the vehicle respondent was driving collided with the rear of a vehicle that was stopped in a left turn lane. The vehicle respondent collided with was occupied by a victim in the driver's seat and a victim in the front passenger's seat.

8. After the collision, respondent failed to stop, render aid, or identify himself in any way to the victims. Respondent left the scene of the accident and drove to his residence.

9. The license plate from respondent's vehicle was left in the street at the site of the accident as a result of the collision. The victim in the passenger seat collected the license plate, returned to her vehicle, and the victims then drove to their residence.

10. The arresting officers arrived at the residence of the victims and collected respondent's license plate. The victim who had been seated in the driver's seat at the time of the accident complained of pain to her lower back and indicated she would seek her own medical treatment.

11. After recovering respondent's license plate from the victims, the arresting officers shortly thereafter conducted a follow up investigation at respondent's residence. When the officers arrived at respondent's residence, respondent was standing in front of the residence inspecting the damage to his vehicle. After the officers arrived, respondent covered the front end of his vehicle with a car cover.

12. During the follow up investigation, respondent told the officers that he had "hit something" with his vehicle, that he did not know what he had hit because he was suffering from a migraine headache that caused his vision to be blurry, that he was waiting for his girlfriend to arrive, and that he was planning to go to the Beverly Hills Police Department to report the accident.

13. During the follow up investigation, the officers observed respondent displaying objective symptoms of intoxication. Respondent indicated he had one alcoholic beverage at a restaurant prior to the accident. The officers had respondent perform a field sobriety test. After failing the one leg stand test respondent pretended to cry as if his knees were in pain. Respondent was unable to perform the rest of the field sobriety test as demonstrated.

14. At the conclusion of the follow up investigation, respondent was arrested for driving under the influence-causing injury, a felony. When the officers informed respondent he was under arrest, respondent declined to give a breath test for blood alcohol concentration and instead demanded to provide a blood sample. Respondent ultimately provided a blood sample that was found to contain a blood alcohol level of 0.15 percent.

15. On February 7, 2014, at the time respondent's plea of nolo contendere was entered in case number BA413456 and respondent was found guilty of violating Vehicle Code section 23153(b), the court stated:

"I will note for the record that the court is willing to go along with this because of the defendant's lack of a prior criminal history, his remorse, the fact that he has already [completed the AB-541 Program]... and the fact that he is doing everything he possibly can to make up for his misbehavior in this case... And I would very strongly recommend that the State Bar take all of this into consideration as well as his early admission to this

case.... And the fact that he has not consumed any alcoholic beverages at all since this incident. So it appears to this court that he has learned his lesson, that he has been severely punished, and I will strongly recommend to the State Bar that they take all of this into account.”

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

16. The facts and circumstances surrounding the above-described conviction for violation of Vehicle Code section 23153(b) [Driving Under the Influence Over 0.08 Percent Blood Alcohol Level-Causing Injury] did not involve moral turpitude but did involve other misconduct warranting discipline.

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

Prior Record of Discipline (Std. 1.5(a)): Respondent has one prior imposition of discipline. In State Bar Court Case Number 12-O-15283, respondent was privately reprovved with conditions for a period of one year, effective September 27, 2013, pursuant to a stipulation in which respondent acknowledged that he: failed to supervise his non-attorney employee [a violation of Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-110(A)]; and negotiated, arranged, or offered to perform a form of mortgage loan forbearance for a fee paid by a borrower, and demanded, charged, collected, or received fees prior to fully performing each and every service he had contracted to perform or represented that he would perform, in violation of Civil Code section 2944.7(a)(1) [a violation of Business and Professions Code section 6106.3(a)]. The misconduct occurred from November 2010 through July 2013. The misconduct did not involve aggravating circumstances, and was mitigated by respondent’s remorse and cooperation in entering into a pre-filing stipulation.

Harm (Std. 1.5(f)): At the time the victim was interviewed by the arresting officer, the victim complained of pain to her lower back. As of September 4, 2013, the victim was continuing to receive treatment from a chiropractor for the injuries she sustained as a result of the collision on July 10, 2013.

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

Additional Mitigating Circumstances:

Remorse and Recognition of Wrongdoing: Before respondent was convicted, he had already voluntarily completed a 3-month first-time-offender driving-under-the-influence program (AB 541 Program). From shortly after the collision up through the day respondent was convicted, he wore a SCRAM device which confirmed that he had not consumed any alcoholic beverages since the collision. At the time respondent was convicted, he volunteered to work with Mothers Against Drunk Driving, the Victim Impact Program, or the Other Bar. Respondent is entitled to mitigating credit for prompt objective steps, demonstrating remorse and recognition of his wrongdoing. That an attorney displays remorse and a willingness to accept punishment and to rehabilitate himself may be a significant mitigating factor. (*Bradpiece v. State Bar* (1974) 10 Cal.3d 742, 748.) However, in the present matter, such mitigation is tempered by respondent’s conduct on the date of the collision, including that respondent failed to stop, render aid, or identify himself to the victims after the collision.

Pretrial Stipulation: Respondent is entitled to mitigation for entering into this stipulation, fully resolving the present matter prior to trial, thereby preserving State Bar Court time and resources. (*Silva-Vidor v. State Bar* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1071, 1079 [where mitigative credit was given for entering into a stipulation as to facts and culpability].)

AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.

The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct “set forth a means for determining the appropriate disciplinary sanction in a particular case and to ensure consistency across cases dealing with similar misconduct and surrounding circumstances.” (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, std. 1.1. All further references to Standards are to this source.) The Standards help fulfill the primary purposes of discipline, which include: protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; maintenance of the highest professional standards; and preservation of public confidence in the legal profession. (See std. 1.1; *In re Morse* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 184, 205.)

Although not binding, the Standards are entitled to “great weight” and should be followed “whenever possible” in determining level of discipline. (*In re Silvertown* (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 92, quoting *In re Brown* (1995) 12 Cal.4th 205, 220 and *In re Young* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 267, fn. 11.) Adherence to the Standards in the great majority of cases serves the valuable purpose of eliminating disparity and assuring consistency, that is, the imposition of similar attorney discipline for instances of similar attorney misconduct. (*In re Naney* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 190.) If a recommendation is at the high end or low end of a Standard, an explanation must be given as to how the recommendation was reached. (Std. 1.1.) “Any disciplinary recommendation that deviates from the Standards must include clear reasons for the departure.” (Std. 1.1; *Blair v. State Bar* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 762, 776, fn. 5.)

In determining whether to impose a sanction greater or less than that specified in a given standard, in addition to the factors set forth in the specific standard, consideration is to be given to the primary purposes of discipline; the balancing of all aggravating and mitigating circumstances; the type of misconduct at issue; whether the client, public, legal system or profession was harmed; and the member’s willingness and ability to conform to ethical responsibilities in the future. (Stds. 1.7(b) and (c).)

Standard 2.12(a) provides that “[a]ctual suspension is appropriate for final conviction of a felony not involving moral turpitude, but involving other misconduct warranting discipline.” In the present matter, the facts and circumstances surrounding respondent’s conviction do not involve moral turpitude, but do involve other conduct warranting discipline.

Neither the California Supreme Court nor the Review Department of the State Bar Court have directly addressed the issue of whether a vehicular hit and run involves moral turpitude, for purposes of determining the appropriate level of attorney discipline for such criminal conduct. However, there are several decisions that address similar vehicular crimes.

In *In re Alkow* (1966) 64 Cal.2d 838, an attorney was convicted of vehicular manslaughter after hitting a pedestrian with his vehicle. Prior to the accident, the attorney had been denied renewal of his driver’s license because of his impaired vision, and in the little more than three years from his license expiration was convicted of more than 20 traffic violations. At the time of the accident, the attorney was on probation for three separate incidents, all three finding that he drove without a license and in two cases failed to observe a right of way or a stop sign. The Supreme Court determined that the attorney showed “a complete disregard for the conditions of his probation, the law and the safety of the public...” and concluded that the attorney’s criminal conduct involved moral turpitude. (*In re Alkow, supra*, 64 Cal.2d at p. 841.)

In *In re Kelley* (1990) 52 Cal.3d 487, an attorney was convicted twice of drunk driving within a 31-month period. On her first arrest, the attorney had driven her car into an embankment and was arrested at the scene. While on probation, imposed as a result of her first drunk driving conviction, she was stopped by a police officer while driving home and eventually arrested after failing a field sobriety test. No one was injured in either of her drunk driving offenses. The Court found that the attorney's conduct did not involve moral turpitude, but rather constituted other misconduct warranting disciplinary action. Noting there had been no specific harm caused to the public or the courts, as well as the attorney's significant mitigating evidence, the Court ordered her publicly reprimanded and directed her to participate in the State Bar's program on alcohol abuse.

The present case is most closely analogous to *In the Matter of Anderson* (Review Dept. 1992) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 208. The Review Department's reasoning in that case is instructive in the current matter. In *Anderson*, the attorney had four separate convictions for drunk driving. In determining whether the attorney's consolidated convictions constituted moral turpitude, the Review Department reasoned that the attorney's decision to drive while intoxicated on four occasions differed to a significant degree from the attorney in *Alkow's* decision to continue driving after more than 20 motor vehicle citations. The Review Department decided that while the attorney's misconduct was closer to that in *Kelley*, his drunk driving convictions were still notably more aggravated and greater in number than those of the attorney in *Kelley*. Additionally, the attorney in *Anderson* had a prior record of discipline, which the attorney in *Kelley* did not. The Review Department therefore held that the attorney's criminal offenses indicated a more serious threat to the public and to the attorney's fitness to practice than in *Kelley*. Ultimately, the Review Department concluded that while the attorney's misconduct posed a closer question, the facts and circumstances surrounding the various convictions did not involve moral turpitude. However, the facts and circumstances surrounding the attorney's convictions did involve other conduct warranting discipline.

In the present case, respondent was convicted of one count of violation of Vehicle Code section 23153(b) [Driving Under the Influence Over 0.08 Percent Blood Alcohol Level-Causing Injury], a felony. The facts and circumstances surrounding the conviction indicate respondent's vehicle collided with the rear of another vehicle, injuring the driver of that vehicle, and respondent then left the scene of the accident after failing to stop, render aid, or identify himself in any way to the victim. However, this was respondent's first criminal conviction, so his decision to drive while intoxicated differs to a significant degree from the attorney in *Alkow's* decision to continue driving after more than 20 motor vehicle citations. While respondent's misconduct is closer to *Kelley* than it is to *Alkow*, it still indicates a more serious threat to the public and respondent's fitness to practice than the attorney's misconduct in *Kelley*. No one was injured in either of the drunk driving offenses involved in *Kelley*, nor did the attorney in that case ever leave the scene of an accident. Further, respondent took no steps to assess or rectify the consequences of the collision. While respondent's misconduct poses a closer question than that in *Kelley*, the facts and circumstances surrounding his conviction nonetheless did not involve moral turpitude. However, the facts and circumstances surrounding the conviction did involve other misconduct warranting discipline, and in light of the harm to the victim and respondent's actions in connection with the collision, a period of actual suspension is warranted.

In consideration of respondent's misconduct, the aggravating circumstances, and the mitigating circumstances, a level of discipline consisting of one year of stayed suspension and three years of probation with conditions including sixty days of actual suspension will best serve the goals of protection of the public, the courts, and the legal profession; maintenance of high professional standards by attorneys; and preservation of public confidence in the legal profession.

COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.




Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has informed respondent that as of October 24, 2014, the prosecution costs in this matter are \$2,447.00. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.

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In the Matter of: JOSE ANGEL TREJO	Case number(s): 14-C-01083
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SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES

By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitations and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Disposition.

<u>NOVEMBER 8, 2014</u> Date	 Respondent's Signature	<u>Jose Angel Trejo</u> Print Name
<u>11/12/14</u> Date	 Respondent's Counsel Signature	<u>Arthur L. Margolis</u> Print Name
<u>11/12/14</u> Date	 Deputy Trial Counsel's Signature	<u>Shane C. Morrison</u> Print Name

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In the Matter of: JOSE ANGEL TREJO	Case Number(s): 14-C-01083
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ACTUAL SUSPENSION ORDER

Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any, is GRANTED without prejudice, and:

- The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
- The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
- All Hearing dates are vacated.

The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58(E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) **The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)**

November 14, 2014
Date


Judge of the State Bar Court

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on November 19, 2014, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:


- by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:

**ARTHUR LEWIS MARGOLIS
MARGOLIS & MARGOLIS LLP
2000 RIVERSIDE DR
LOS ANGELES, CA 90039**

- by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

SHANE C. MORRISON, Enforcement, Los Angeles

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on November 19, 2014.



Johnnie Lee Smith
Case Administrator
State Bar Court