



PUBLIC MATTER

STATE BAR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

HEARING DEPARTMENT – LOS ANGELES

FILED

OCT 13 2015

STATE BAR COURT
CLERK'S OFFICE
LOS ANGELES

In the Matter of)	Case No.: 14-H-04090-DFM
)	
JOHN FRANCIS SHELLABARGER,)	DECISION
)	
Member No. 132805,)	
)	
<u>A Member of the State Bar.</u>)	

INTRODUCTION

Respondent **John Francis Shellabarger** (Respondent) is charged here with failing to comply with the conditions of his private reproof in willful violation of rule 1-110 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.¹ The court finds culpability and recommends discipline as set forth below.

PERTINENT PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Notice of Disciplinary Charges (NDC) was filed in this matter by the State Bar of California on September 29, 2014.

On October 3, 2014, a notice was issued by this court that the matter has been assigned to the undersigned and that the initial status conference would be held on November 3, 2014. A copy of that notice was mailed by the court to Respondent at his official membership address.

On November 3, 2014, Respondent filed his response to the NDC, denying all of the allegations contained therein, including the allegation that he is admitted to practice law in the State of California. On the same day, November 3, 2014, the initial status conference was held in the case. Appearing for the State Bar was Senior Trial Counsel Ashod Mooradian.

¹ Unless otherwise noted, all future references to rule(s) will be to the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Respondent did not appear. At that time, the case was given a trial date of January 29, 2015, with a one-day trial estimate. A pretrial conference was ordered to take place on January 20, 2015, and the parties were ordered to comply with Rules 1220-1225 of the Rules of Practice of the State Bar Court and file pretrial conference statements on or before January 13, 2015. A written order regarding these dates and obligations was filed and served by the court on November 6, 2014. A copy of that order was served by the court on Respondent by mailing it to him at his official membership address.

On November 12, 2014, Respondent filed a second response to the NDC. In his response he again declined to wholly admit any of the allegations of the NDC, including the jurisdictional allegation that he was a member of the bar. This new response contained the additional response: "Respondent believed that there were no further obligation [sic] upon entry of the stipulation for private reproof. At no time was there any effort to contact Respondent through his private e-mail address, designated for communications with the State Bar."

The pretrial conference was held as scheduled on January 20, 2015. Prior to that pretrial conference, the State Bar complied with its obligation to file a pretrial conference statement. Respondent did not. As a result, an order to show cause regarding the exclusion of Respondent's evidence at trial was issued by the court. Respondent then filed a pretrial conference statement on January 26, 2015. In it, Respondent stated, inter alia:

It appears State Bar is taking the position that respondent failed to comply with conditions of reproof. Respondent contends that the "conditions" were not part of the parties [sic] agreement and that the State Bar's [sic] sent the stipulation with only 4 days for respondents [sic] review, 2 which were a weekend, and insisted sign [sic] or the State Bar would withdraw the stipulation and force responded [sic] to go to trial.

In this pretrial conference statement, Respondent also indicated that his prior misconduct resulted "because respondent was ill" and concluded with the

comment, “because of health issues, Respondent has only minimally worked the last 2 years.”

Trial was commenced on January 29, 2015, and completed as scheduled. The State Bar was represented at trial by Deputy Trial Counsel Drew Massey. Respondent acted as counsel for himself.

During the course of that trial, this court became concerned regarding Respondent’s comments regarding his mental competency. At the time that the hearing was concluded, the court notified the parties of its intent to take additional steps regarding that issue.

On January 30, 2015, this court issued an order in case No. 15-TH-10427 (later designated case No. 15-TT-10427) and appointed Kevin Gerry to serve as counsel for Respondent in that new matter.

On February 10, 2015, Respondent, represented by Kevin Gerry, filed a motion to reopen the record in this matter. That motion was opposed by the State Bar in an opposition filed on February 13, 2015.

A status conference was held in this matter on February 17, 2015, for the purpose of discussing whether the matter should be abated pending resolution of case No. 15-TT-10427. All parties and their counsel appeared. This court then issued an order abating this matter pending resolution of case No. 15-TT-10427. As a result, Respondent’s motion to re-open remained undecided while the case remained abated and not submitted for decision.

On August 6, 2015, this court issued an order dismissing case No. 15-TT-10427. On the same date, an order was issued in this matter, unabating the case and scheduling a status conference on August 24, 2015, to discuss the pending motion to re-open.

On August 21, 2015, the parties filed a “Second Stipulation as to Facts” in which they agreed that the evidentiary record could be re-opened for the limited purpose of accepting that

factual stipulation, including the attached medial record of the medical expert appointed by this court in the “TT” matter. The parties also stipulated that the stipulation, including the medical record would be filed under seal. At the scheduled status conference on August 24, 2015, and confirmed with a written order on August 25, 2015, this court accepted the parties’ stipulation and ordered that it be filed under seal; re-opened the evidentiary record to receive in evidence the parties’ stipulated facts and the attached medical record; closed the evidentiary record; and submitted the case for decision.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The following findings of fact are based on Respondent’s responses to the NDC, the two extensive stipulations of undisputed facts filed by the parties, and the documentary and testimonial evidence admitted at trial.

Jurisdiction

Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in the State of California on December 11, 1987, and has been a member of the State Bar of California since that time.

Case No. 14-H-04090

On December 9, 2013, Respondent signed a Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Disposition and Order Approving (“Stipulation”) in State Bar case number 12-O-17941-DFM. The stipulation included a statement of agreed misconduct and the parties’ agreement that Respondent would be privately reprovved (with public disclosure) for such misconduct and that Respondent would comply with certain specified conditions of reprovral for one year after the reprovral became effective.

The stipulated statement and history of the underlying misconduct arose out of Respondent’s failure to attend a scheduled pretrial conference in a civil case in the United States District Court in which Respondent represented the defendant. When Respondent did not

appear for a scheduled pretrial conference on August 30, 2010, the court issued an order to show cause why Respondent should be sanctioned for that failure. Thereafter, on September 10, 2010, Respondent filed a response to the OSC, in which he stated that his failure to appear at the pretrial conference was due to an undiagnosed medical condition. On December 2, 2010, the federal court ordered Respondent to pay sanctions in the amount of \$3,888 to plaintiffs' counsel no later than January 1, 2011. Respondent received the sanction order but then failed to pay the sanctions by the court-ordered deadline of January 1, 2011. Instead, Respondent paid the sanctions in the amount of \$3,888 on October 25, 2013, more than two years later and only after the initiation of the State Bar disciplinary matter. In the stipulation, the parties agreed that, by failing to timely comply with the sanction order, Respondent had willfully disobeyed or violated an order of the court requiring him to do or forbear an act connected with or in the course of Respondent's profession which he ought in good faith to do or forbear, in willful violation of section 6103 of the Business and Professions Code.

The Stipulation was approved by this court on January 10, 2014, and the agreed private reproof was imposed effective January 31, 2014.

The Stipulation's agreed conditions of reproof included, without limitation, the following:

- a. Within thirty (30) days of the effective date of discipline, Respondent must contact the Office of Probation and schedule a meeting with Respondent's assigned probation deputy to discuss these terms and conditions of probation. Under the direction of the Office of Probation, Respondent must meet with the probation deputy either in-person or by telephone. During the period of probation, Respondent must promptly meet with the probation deputy as directed and upon request; and
- b. Respondent must submit written quarterly reports to the Office of Probation on each January 10, April 10, July 10, and October 10 of the condition period attached to the reproof. Under penalty of perjury, Respondent must state whether Respondent has complied with the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and all

conditions of the reproof during the preceding calendar quarter. Respondent must also state in each report whether there are any proceedings pending against him or her in the State Bar Court and if so, the case number and current status of the proceeding. If the first report would cover less than thirty (30) days, that report must be submitted on the next following quarter date, and cover the extended period.

On January 30, 2014, the day before the reproof became effective, Respondent's assigned Probation Deputy with the Office of Probation of the State Bar of California, Eddie Esqueda, sent a letter to Respondent explaining his obligations under the Stipulation. Enclosed with this January 30, 2014 letter was a quarterly report form tailored for Respondent's use. Also enclosed was a document entitled, "Quarterly Report Instructions" which explained how to submit and file appropriate quarterly reports. In bold font, the January 30, 2014 letter said, in part, **"You must also schedule a meeting with me to discuss the terms and conditions of your discipline within 30 days from the effective date of discipline."**

Respondent did not contact Mr. Esqueda or anyone else at the Office of Probation within thirty days of the effective date of discipline. In fact, the parties have stipulated, and this court finds that, as of the date of the trial of this matter, Respondent had not contacted anyone at the Office of Probation at any time since the effective date of his reproof.

Because Respondent never scheduled the initial meeting, he did not participate in the initial meeting with his assigned Probation Deputy.

Respondent also did not submit a timely quarterly report for the period January 31, 2014 through March 31, 2014 and due April 10, 2014. In fact, at no time until after the trial in this matter did Respondent submit any such report.

On July 8, 2014, Mr. Esqueda sent an additional letter to Respondent. Mr. Esqueda's letter informed Respondent that Respondent had not contacted Mr. Esqueda to set up the initial meeting and further informed Respondent that the first quarterly report, due April 10, 2014, had

not been received by the Office of Probation. In bold and italicized print, the July 8, 2014 letter informed Respondent, ***“This letter is to advise you that the Office of Probation has not received your first quarterly report. Please submit the required report immediately.”*** The July 8, 2014 letter was also sent to Respondent by e-mail at one of his two membership records e-mail addresses. Specifically, it was sent to: jfs_law@sbcoxmail.com. It was not sent to jfs_esq@sbcoxmail.com, the e-mail address designated in Respondent’s profile to be used for e-mail communications with him by the State Bar. At trial, Respondent acknowledged receiving this e-mail, but stated that he did not review it.

Respondent did not submit any quarterly report for the period April 1, 2014 through June 30, 2014, which report was due on or before July 10, 2014. Once again, at no time up to and including the date of the scheduled trial had Respondent submitted any such report.

Respondent also did not submit any quarterly report for the period July 1, 2014 through September 30, 2014, due on or before October 10, 2014. Again, at no time up to and including the date of the scheduled trial had Respondent submitted any such report.

At trial, although it is not alleged in the NDC, Respondent testified without objection that he had also not filed a quarterly report for the period October 1, 2014 through December 31, 2014, due on or before January 10, 2015. He also testified at the trial on January 29, 2015, that he had not yet signed up to take the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE) or the State Bar’s Ethics School, although the Stipulation and subsequent order of reprobation required him to present proof of successful completion of these two obligations within one year after the reprobation became effective on January 30, 2014.

After the initial trial of this matter was completed and counsel had been appointed by this court to represent Respondent, Respondent took steps to comply with the conditions of his reprobation, albeit belatedly. On February 17, 2015, Respondent submitted to the Office of

Probation the quarterly reports that had been due on April 10, July 10, and October 10, 2014, and January 10, 2015. In addition, on May 7, 2015, Respondent took and passed the MPRE, providing notice of that fact to this court on June 11, 2015. Finally, on June 4, 2015, he took and passed the State Bar Ethics School.

Count 1 - Rule 1-110, Rules of Professional Conduct [Failure to Comply with Conditions of Reapproval]

Rule 1-110 requires an attorney to comply with the conditions attached to a reapproval. When a reapproval becomes final, the conditions attached to it are presumed valid. (*In the Matter of Pyle* (Review Dept. 1998) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 929, 933.)

The NDC alleges that Respondent failed to schedule a meeting or meet with the Office of Probation as required by the order of reapproval and that he failed to timely file his first three quarterly reports, due on January 10, April 10, and October 10, 2014. At trial, although Respondent did not stipulate to culpability in this matter, he agreed that he had failed to comply timely with each of those obligations.

Respondent's failure to perform the conditions of reapproval, itemized above, constituted willful violations by him of his obligations under rule 1-110. Respondent's testimony, that he signed the Stipulation without reading it, provides no defense to his failure to comply with the conditions that he had agreed to in writing and that were subsequently ordered by this court.

Aggravating Circumstances

The State Bar bears the burden of proving aggravating circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, std. 1.5.)² The court finds the following with respect to alleged aggravating factors.

² Because this matter was tried in January 2015, before the standards were amended effective July 1, 2015, this court applies the prior version of the standards that was effective at the time of the trial. All further references to standard(s) or std. are to this source.

Prior Discipline

As noted above, Respondent has been formally disciplined on one prior occasion. Respondent's prior record of discipline is an aggravating circumstance. (Std. 1.5(a).)

Multiple Acts of Misconduct

Respondent has been found culpable of four separate instances of failing to comply with the conditions of his reproof. Respondent's repeated failures to comply with the reproof conditions evidences multiple acts of misconduct and is an aggravating factor. (Std. 1.5(b); see *In the Matter of Hunter* (Review Dept. 1994) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 63, 76 [violating three separate conditions of probation constituted multiple acts of wrongdoing].)

Uncharged Violations/Indifference

As noted above, Respondent failed to timely comply with three other conditions, to wit: timely filing the quarterly report due January 10, 2015; and presenting proof of passage of the MPRE and the State Bar Ethics School within one year after the effective date of the reproof. While these violations may not be treated as a separate basis for imposing discipline, they may be treated as an aggravating factor, especially to the extent they reflect Respondent's ongoing disregard for the terms of his prior discipline even after this disciplinary proceeding had been initiated. (*Edwards v. State Bar* (1990) 52 Cal.3d 28, 35-36.)

Respondent's indifference to the disciplinary process was also reflected in his conduct in this proceeding. As set forth in the procedural history of this matter, Respondent failed to appear for the initial status conference in this matter, failed to comply with the terms of this court's trial-setting order, failed to make any effort to comply with the conditions of his reproof despite the pendency of this disciplinary proceedings against him for his non-compliance with those conditions, and repeatedly continued to deny any culpability for his non-compliance. Such conduct is a recognized aggravating factor.

Mitigating Circumstances

Respondent bears the burden of proving mitigating circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. (Std. 1.6.) The court finds the following with respect to alleged mitigating factors.

Cooperation

On the eve of trial, Respondent entered into an extensive stipulation of facts regarding his failure to timely comply with the conditions of his reproval. For that conduct, Respondent is entitled to some mitigation. (Std. 1.2(e)(v); see also *In the Matter of Gadda* (Review Dept. 2002) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 416, 443.) The weight of that mitigation, however, is greatly reduced by his repeated and ongoing denials of culpability and the lateness of his cooperation, with either this court or the Office of Probation. (Std. 1.6(e); see also *In the Matter of Riordan* (Review Dept. 2007) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 41, 50; cf. *In the Matter of Johnson* (Review Dept. 2000) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 179, 190 [credit for stipulating to facts but “very limited” where culpability is denied].)

Emotional Difficulties/Physical or Mental Disabilities

Extreme emotional difficulties or physical or mental disabilities may be considered mitigating where it is established by expert testimony that they were responsible for the attorney’s misconduct and the member establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the difficulties or disabilities no longer pose a risk that the member will commit misconduct. (Std. 1.6(d); *In the Matter of Frazier* (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 676, 701-702.)

Respondent testified during trial to significant physical and mental difficulties he has been experiencing during the last several years, difficulties substantially reducing his ability to practice law. As reflected above, Respondent also attributed his misconduct in 2012 to “an undiagnosed medical condition.”

The evidence offered by Respondent did not provide clear and convincing evidence that his problems are a mitigating factor here. The evidence was insufficient for this court to conclude that any of the problems suffered by Respondent in the past have now been satisfactorily resolved.

DISCUSSION

The purpose of State Bar disciplinary proceedings is not to punish the attorney but to protect the public, the courts, and the legal profession; to maintain the highest possible professional standards for attorneys; and to preserve public confidence in the legal profession. (Std. 1.1; *Chadwick v. State Bar* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 103, 111.)

In determining the appropriate level of discipline, this court looks first to the standards for guidance. (*Drociak v. State Bar* (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1085, 1090; *In the Matter of Koehler* (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 615, 628.) The court then looks to the decisional law. (*Snyder v. State Bar* (1990) 49 Cal.3d 1302, 1310-1311; *In the Matter of Taylor* (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 563, 580.) As the Review Department noted more than two decades ago in *In the Matter of Bouyer* (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 404, 419, even though the standards are not to be applied in a talismanic fashion, they are to be followed unless there is a compelling reason that justifies not doing so. (Accord, *In re Silverton* (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 91; *Aronin v. State Bar* (1990) 52 Cal.3d 276, 291.) Ultimately, in determining the appropriate level of discipline, each case must be decided on its own facts after a balanced consideration of all relevant factors. (*Connor v. State Bar* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1047, 1059; *Gary v. State Bar* (1988) 44 Cal.3d 820, 828; *In the Matter of Oheb* (Review Dept. 2006) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 920, 940.)

Standard 2.10 calls for “suspension” for willful violations of rule 1-110, but it does not provide a timeframe for the length of any actual suspension. Instead, it states that the degree of

sanction depends on the nature of the condition violated and the member's unwillingness or inability to comply with disciplinary orders. Therefore, we look to comparable case law for guidance. (See *Snyder v. State Bar* (1990) 49 Cal.3d 1302, 1310-1311).

In the prior published cases dealing with violations of conditions of reproof, discipline ranges from a further reproof to 90 days' actual suspension, depending on mitigation, aggravation, and level of cooperation in the proceedings. (*Conroy v. State Bar* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 799 [60-day actual]; *In the Matter of Stansbury* (Review Dept. 2000) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 103 [90-day actual]; *In the Matter of Posthuma* (Review Dept. 1998) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 813 [further reproof for failing to pass MPRE]; *In the Matter of Meyer* (Review Dept. 1997) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 697 [90-day actual].)

As delineated in the standard, the determination of the appropriate discipline in these matters is governed by the circumstances and attitude surrounding the respondent's breach of the reproof conditions and by the nature of the conditions breached. In this situation, however, all factors call for substantial discipline. Respondent has violated the conditions of his reproof in multiple ways and on multiple occasions. His violations continued even after disciplinary proceedings had been initiated against him for his violations, and they did not stop until after counsel had been appointed by this court to represent him in a related matter.

At trial, the State Bar asked that this court recommend that Respondent be suspended for no shorter than one year, stayed, and be placed on probation for at least one year, with conditions of probation including at least 60 days of actual suspension. In support of that discipline, the State Bar relies on *In the Matter of Meyer* (Review Dept. 1997) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 697. In contrast, Respondent asks that no actual suspension result from his actions, in the event that this court finds culpability in the matter.

This court agrees with the State Bar's assessment of the situation. Respondent's conduct during the period of reproof reflects a complete failure by him to comply with the affirmative obligations imposed by this court in its order of reproof. While Respondent testified persuasively that his failure to comply with those obligations did not result from any mens rea or intentional dereliction by Respondent, his repeated and ongoing failures to comply with his professional obligations raise considerable concern by this court regarding his ability to comply with his many professional obligations in the future.

Accordingly, it is recommended that Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years; that execution of that period of suspension be stayed; and that Respondent be placed on probation for a period of three years, with various conditions of probation. Those probation conditions should include a requirement that Respondent be actually suspended for a period of 60 days. (See *In the Matter of Meyer, supra*, 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 697; *Conroy v. State Bar, supra*, 53 Cal.3d 495; *In the Matter of Stansbury, supra*, 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 103.) Perhaps more significantly, the parties have stipulated, and this court concludes, that the conditions of probation should include compliance with the recommendations set forth in the parties' Second Stipulation as to Facts.

RECOMMENDED DISCIPLINE

Actual Suspension

For all of the above reasons, it is recommended that **JOHN FRANCIS SHELLABARGER**, Member No. 132805, be suspended from the practice of law for two years; that execution of that suspension be stayed; and that Respondent be placed on probation for three years, with the following conditions:

1. Respondent must be actually suspended from the practice of law for the first sixty (60) days of probation.

2. Respondent must comply with the provisions of the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and all of the conditions of this probation.
3. Within 10 days of any change in the information required to be maintained on the membership records of the State Bar pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6002.1, subdivision (a), including his current office address and telephone number, or if no office is maintained, the address to be used for State Bar purposes, he must report such change in writing to the Membership Records Office and the State Bar Office of Probation.
4. Within 30 days after the effective date of discipline, he must contact the Office of Probation and schedule a meeting with his assigned probation deputy to discuss the terms and conditions of probation. Upon the direction of the Office of Probation, he must meet with the probation deputy either in person or by telephone. During the period of probation, he must promptly meet with the probation deputy as directed and upon request.
5. He must submit written quarterly reports to the Office of Probation on each January 10, April 10, July 10, and October 10 of the period of probation. Under penalty of perjury, he must state whether he has complied with the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and all of the conditions of his probation during the preceding calendar quarter. In addition to all quarterly reports, a final report, containing the same information, is due no earlier than 20 days before the last day of the probation period and no later than the last day of the probation period.
6. Subject to the assertion of applicable privileges, Respondent must answer fully, promptly, and truthfully, any inquiries of the Office of Probation that are directed to him personally

or in writing, relating to whether he is complying or has complied with the conditions contained herein.

7. Within one year after the effective date of the discipline herein, Respondent must submit to the Office of Probation satisfactory evidence of completion of the State Bar's Ethics School and passage of the test given at the end of that session. This requirement is separate from any Minimum Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) requirement, and he shall not receive MCLE credit for attending Ethics School. (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 3201.)
8. Within 30 days after the effective date of the order imposing discipline in this matter, Respondent must comply with the recommendations set forth in numbered paragraphs 5 and 6 on pages 2-3 of the parties' sealed Second Stipulation as to Facts and, with each quarterly report required herein, to report, in writing, to the Office of Probation, his compliance as set forth in numbered paragraph 6 of the Second Stipulation as to Facts.

The period of probation will commence on the effective date of the Supreme Court order imposing discipline in this matter. At the expiration of the period of probation, if he has complied with all conditions of probation, the period of stayed suspension will be satisfied and that suspension will be terminated.

MPRE


The court does not recommend that Respondent be ordered to take and pass the MPRE as Respondent took and passed the MPRE on May 7, 2015.

Costs

It is further recommended that costs be awarded to the State Bar in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6086.10 and that such costs be enforceable both as provided in Business and Professions Code section 6140.7 and as a money judgment. It is also

recommended that Respondent be ordered to reimburse the Client Security Fund to the extent that the misconduct in this matter results in the payment of funds and that such payment obligation be enforceable as provided for under Business and Professions Code section 6140.5.

Dated: October 13, 2015

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Donald F. Miles", written over a horizontal line.

DONALD F. MILES
Judge of the State Bar Court

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on October 13, 2015, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):

DECISION

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:

- by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:


KEVIN P. GERRY
711 N SOLEDAD ST
SANTA BARBARA, CA 93103

JOHN F. SHELLABARGER
LAW OFC JOHN SHELLABARGER
928 GARDEN ST #3
SANTA BARBARA, CA 93101 - 7400

- by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

DREW MASSEY, Enforcement, Los Angeles

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on October 13, 2015.



Rose M. Luthi
Case Administrator
State Bar Court