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**State Bar Court of California  
Hearing Department  
San Francisco  
ACTUAL SUSPENSION**

<b>Counsel For The State Bar</b>  <b>Esther J. Rogers</b> <b>Senior Trial Counsel</b> <b>180 Howard Street</b> <b>San Francisco, CA 94105</b> <b>(415) 538-2258</b>  <b>Bar # 148246</b>	<b>Case Number(s):</b> <b>14-O-02839</b>	<b>For Court use only</b>  <b>PUBLIC MATTER</b>  <b>FILED</b>  <b>JUN 02 2015</b>  <b>STATE BAR COURT CLERK'S OFFICE</b> <b>SAN FRANCISCO</b>
<b>Counsel For Respondent</b>  <b>William M. Balin</b> <b>Balin &amp; Kotler</b> <b>345 Franklin St.</b> <b>San Francisco, CA 94102</b> <b>(415) 241-7360</b>  <b>Bar # 59104</b>	<b>Submitted to: Settlement Judge</b>  <b>STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING</b>  <b>ACTUAL SUSPENSION</b>  <input type="checkbox"/> <b>PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED</b>	
<b>In the Matter of:</b> <b>CHRISTIE SOO-KYUNG LEE</b>  <b>Bar # 224944</b>  <b>A Member of the State Bar of California</b> <b>(Respondent)</b>		

**Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.**

**A. Parties' Acknowledgments:**

- (1) Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted **June 3, 2003**.
- (2) The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
- (3) All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of **12** pages, not including the order.
- (4) A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."



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- (5) Conclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of Law".
- (6) The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."
- (7) No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.
- (8) Payment of Disciplinary Costs—Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 6140.7. (Check one option only):
  - Until costs are paid in full, Respondent will remain actually suspended from the practice of law unless relief is obtained per rule 5.130, Rules of Procedure.
  - Costs are to be paid in equal amounts prior to February 1 for the following membership years: (Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.
  - Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs".
  - Costs are entirely waived.

**B. Aggravating Circumstances [Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct, standards 1.2(f) & 1.5]. Facts supporting aggravating circumstances are required.**

- (1)  **Prior record of discipline**
  - (a)  State Bar Court case # of prior case
  - (b)  Date prior discipline effective
  - (c)  Rules of Professional Conduct/ State Bar Act violations:
  - (d)  Degree of prior discipline
  - (e)  If Respondent has two or more incidents of prior discipline, use space provided below.
- (2)  **Dishonesty:** Respondent's misconduct was intentional, surrounded by, or followed by bad faith, dishonesty, concealment, overreaching or other violations of the State Bar Act or Rules of Professional Conduct.
- (3)  **Trust Violation:** Trust funds or property were involved and Respondent refused or was unable to account to the client or person who was the object of the misconduct for improper conduct toward said funds or property.
- (4)  **Harm:** Respondent's misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public or the administration of justice.
- (5)  **Indifference:** Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for the consequences of his or her misconduct.
- (6)  **Lack of Cooperation:** Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims of his/her misconduct or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation or proceedings.

- (7)  **Multiple/Pattern of Misconduct:** Respondent's current misconduct evidences multiple acts of wrongdoing or demonstrates a pattern of misconduct. **See Attachment at page 8.**
- (8)  **Restitution:** Respondent failed to make restitution.
- (9)  **No aggravating circumstances** are involved.

**Additional aggravating circumstances:**

**C. Mitigating Circumstances [see standards 1.2(g) & 1.6]. Facts supporting mitigating circumstances are required.**

- (1)  **No Prior Discipline:** Respondent has no prior record of discipline over many years of practice coupled with present misconduct which is not deemed serious.
- (2)  **No Harm:** Respondent did not harm the client, the public, or the administration of justice.
- (3)  **Candor/Cooperation:** Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and cooperation with the victims of his/her misconduct and to the State Bar during disciplinary investigation and proceedings.
- (4)  **Remorse:** Respondent promptly took objective steps spontaneously demonstrating remorse and recognition of the wrongdoing, which steps were designed to timely atone for any consequences of his/her misconduct.
- (5)  **Restitution:** Respondent paid \$ \_\_\_\_\_ on \_\_\_\_\_ in restitution to \_\_\_\_\_ without the threat or force of disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings.
- (6)  **Delay:** These disciplinary proceedings were excessively delayed. The delay is not attributable to Respondent and the delay prejudiced him/her.
- (7)  **Good Faith:** Respondent acted with a good faith belief that was honestly held and reasonable.
- (8)  **Emotional/Physical Difficulties:** At the time of the stipulated act or acts of professional misconduct Respondent suffered extreme emotional difficulties or physical or mental disabilities which expert testimony would establish was directly responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities were not the product of any illegal conduct by the member, such as illegal drug or substance abuse, and the difficulties or disabilities no longer pose a risk that Respondent will commit misconduct.
- (9)  **Severe Financial Stress:** At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered from severe financial stress which resulted from circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond his/her control and which were directly responsible for the misconduct.
- (10)  **Family Problems:** At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered extreme difficulties in his/her personal life which were other than emotional or physical in nature.
- (11)  **Good Character:** Respondent's extraordinarily good character is attested to by a wide range of references in the legal and general communities who are aware of the full extent of his/her misconduct.
- (12)  **Rehabilitation:** Considerable time has passed since the acts of professional misconduct occurred followed by convincing proof of subsequent rehabilitation.

- (13)  **No mitigating circumstances** are involved.

**Additional mitigating circumstances:**

**No Prior Discipline, See Attachment at page 9.**

**Prefiling Stipulation, See Attachment at page 9.**

**Financial Stress, See Attachment at page 9.**

**Pro Bono Activities, See Attachment at page 9.**

**D. Discipline:**

- (1)  **Stayed Suspension:**

(a)  Respondent must be suspended from the practice of law for a period of **two (2) years**.

i.  and until Respondent shows proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of rehabilitation and present fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the law pursuant to standard 1.2(c)(1) Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.

ii.  and until Respondent pays restitution as set forth in the Financial Conditions form attached to this stipulation.

iii.  and until Respondent does the following:

(b)  The above-referenced suspension is stayed.

- (2)  **Probation:**

Respondent must be placed on probation for a period of **two (2) years**, which will commence upon the effective date of the Supreme Court order in this matter. (See rule 9.18, California Rules of Court)

- (3)  **Actual Suspension:**

(a)  Respondent must be actually suspended from the practice of law in the State of California for a period of **ninety (90) days**.

i.  and until Respondent shows proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of rehabilitation and present fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the law pursuant to standard 1.2(c)(1), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct

ii.  and until Respondent pays restitution as set forth in the Financial Conditions form attached to this stipulation.

iii.  and until Respondent does the following:

**E. Additional Conditions of Probation:**

- (1)  If Respondent is actually suspended for two years or more, he/she must remain actually suspended until he/she proves to the State Bar Court his/her rehabilitation, fitness to practice, and learning and ability in the general law, pursuant to standard 1.2(c)(1), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.

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- (2)  During the probation period, Respondent must comply with the provisions of the State Bar Act and Rules of Professional Conduct.
- (3)  Within ten (10) days of any change, Respondent must report to the Membership Records Office of the State Bar and to the Office of Probation of the State Bar of California ("Office of Probation"), all changes of information, including current office address and telephone number, or other address for State Bar purposes, as prescribed by section 6002.1 of the Business and Professions Code.
- (4)  Within thirty (30) days from the effective date of discipline, Respondent must contact the Office of Probation and schedule a meeting with Respondent's assigned probation deputy to discuss these terms and conditions of probation. Upon the direction of the Office of Probation, Respondent must meet with the probation deputy either in-person or by telephone. During the period of probation, Respondent must promptly meet with the probation deputy as directed and upon request.
- (5)  Respondent must submit written quarterly reports to the Office of Probation on each January 10, April 10, July 10, and October 10 of the period of probation. Under penalty of perjury, Respondent must state whether Respondent has complied with the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and all conditions of probation during the preceding calendar quarter. Respondent must also state whether there are any proceedings pending against him or her in the State Bar Court and if so, the case number and current status of that proceeding. If the first report would cover less than 30 days, that report must be submitted on the next quarter date, and cover the extended period.

In addition to all quarterly reports, a final report, containing the same information, is due no earlier than twenty (20) days before the last day of the period of probation and no later than the last day of probation.

- (6)  Respondent must be assigned a probation monitor. Respondent must promptly review the terms and conditions of probation with the probation monitor to establish a manner and schedule of compliance. During the period of probation, Respondent must furnish to the monitor such reports as may be requested, in addition to the quarterly reports required to be submitted to the Office of Probation. Respondent must cooperate fully with the probation monitor.
- (7)  Subject to assertion of applicable privileges, Respondent must answer fully, promptly and truthfully any inquiries of the Office of Probation and any probation monitor assigned under these conditions which are directed to Respondent personally or in writing relating to whether Respondent is complying or has complied with the probation conditions.
- (8)  Within one (1) year of the effective date of the discipline herein, Respondent must provide to the Office of Probation satisfactory proof of attendance at a session of the Ethics School, and passage of the test given at the end of that session.
- No Ethics School recommended. Reason: .
- (9)  Respondent must comply with all conditions of probation imposed in the underlying criminal matter and must so declare under penalty of perjury in conjunction with any quarterly report to be filed with the Office of Probation.
- (10)  The following conditions are attached hereto and incorporated:
- |   |   |
|---|---|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Substance Abuse Conditions | <input type="checkbox"/> Law Office Management Conditions |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Medical Conditions         | <input type="checkbox"/> Financial Conditions             |

#### F. Other Conditions Negotiated by the Parties:

- (1)  **Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination:** Respondent must provide proof of passage of the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination ("MPRE"), administered by the National

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Conference of Bar Examiners, to the Office of Probation during the period of actual suspension or within one year, whichever period is longer. **Failure to pass the MPRE results in actual suspension without further hearing until passage. But see rule 9.10(b), California Rules of Court, and rule 5.162(A) & (E), Rules of Procedure.**

No MPRE recommended. Reason:

- (2)  **Rule 9.20, California Rules of Court:** Respondent must comply with the requirements of rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 calendar days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court's Order in this matter.
- (3)  **Conditional Rule 9.20, California Rules of Court:** If Respondent remains actually suspended for 90 days or more, he/she must comply with the requirements of rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 120 and 130 calendar days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court's Order in this matter.
- (4)  **Credit for Interim Suspension [conviction referral cases only]:** Respondent will be credited for the period of his/her interim suspension toward the stipulated period of actual suspension. Date of commencement of interim suspension:
- (5)  **Other Conditions:**

**ATTACHMENT TO**  
**STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION**

IN THE MATTER OF: CHRISTIE SOO-KUNG LEE

CASE NUMBER: 14-O-02839

**FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.**

Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that she is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct.

**Case No. 14-O-02839 (Complainant: Ryta Martinez)**

**FACTS:**

1. In June 2012, Ryta Martinez hired respondent to file a Chapter 13 bankruptcy and agreed to pay \$3,500 in advanced fees. Because Martinez could not pay the entire fee upfront, Respondent agreed to accept \$700 in cash and seven monthly post-dated checks of \$400, for a total payment of \$2,800 via check over seven months. Respondent attempted to negotiate the first three checks, but they were returned due to insufficient funds.

2. In June 2012, respondent filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on behalf of Martinez. In August 2012, respondent informed Martinez that the postdated checks for June and July 2012 bounced and requested that Martinez pay the fees. Although the checks bounced, respondent continued to represent Martinez. On August 8, 2012, respondent and Martinez appeared at a creditor's meeting. On September 4, 2012, the bankruptcy trustee filed a motion to dismiss due to Martinez's failure to make Chapter 13 plan payments. Thereafter, respondent attempted to work with Martinez to make payment plans. Because Martinez was unable to make payments, respondent recommended that Martinez convert the Chapter 13 petition to a Chapter 7 petition.

3. In August, respondent requested that Martinez pay all outstanding attorney fees so that respondent could complete and file the necessary Chapter 7 schedules and forms. From August through October 2012, respondent requested that Martinez pay the fees and complete the paperwork necessary to file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Martinez failed to pay the attorney fees and the bankruptcy court dismissed Martinez's bankruptcy matter in November 2012 for failure to file the necessary documentation.

4. In approximately October 2012, Martinez terminated respondent. At the time that Martinez terminated respondent, respondent retained possession of four checks, dated for September, October, November and December 2012. The checks were drawn on an account Martinez maintained at Bank of Stockton, which has a stale date policy that prohibits the bank from negotiating checks that are six months or older.

5. Between October 2012 and March 2014, respondent periodically checked with the bank regarding Martinez's bank balance to determine whether respondent could negotiate the remaining four

postdated checks. On March 3, 2014, respondent learned that Martinez had sufficient funds in her account to cover the four checks, totaling \$1,600. Aware that the bank had a stale date policy, respondent altered the check dates by changing the year from 2012 to 2013 before she presented them to the bank. By changing the date, respondent was able to avoid the stale date policy and obtain \$1,600 from Martinez's bank account.

6. On March 5, 2014, Martinez learned from her bank that respondent had negotiated the checks and met with respondent to obtain reimbursement of the \$1,600. Respondent agreed to return the \$1,600 to Martinez. Respondent presented Martinez with a settlement agreement that contained the provision that Martinez "shall not take any action against [respondent], including but not limited to, filing complaint to State Bar Association ...." Martinez and respondent executed the settlement agreement and respondent returned the \$1,600 to Martinez.

7. When the State Bar contacted respondent to explain her behavior, respondent misrepresented to the State Bar, through counsel, that respondent "can state unequivocally that she had nothing to do with any alteration of any of these checks."

8. After the State Bar attorney informed respondent and her counsel that the State Bar intended to take respondent's deposition, respondent agreed to provide a declaration to the State Bar confessing that respondent altered the checks so that she could obtain some of the outstanding fees she believed that Martinez.

#### **CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:**

9. By altering Martinez's checks without her knowledge or permission to avoid the bank's stale date policy, respondent committed acts involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, in willful violation of Business and Profession Code, section 6106.

10. By permitting her counsel to make repeated misrepresentations to the State Bar that respondent did not alter the checks, when respondent knew that she had altered the checks, respondent committed acts involving moral turpitude, dishonesty or corruption, in willful violation of Business and Profession Code, section 6106.

11. By including a provision in the settlement agreement that Martinez agree not to file a complaint with the State Bar, respondent entered into an agreement that her professional misconduct shall not be reported to the disciplinary agency, in willful violation of Business and Profession Code section 6090.5.

#### **AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.**

**Multiple Acts of Misconduct (Std. 1.5(b)):** Respondent engaged in two counts of moral turpitude and one count of entering into an agreement not to report misconduct to the State Bar, thereby engaging in multiple acts of misconduct.



## MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

### Additional Mitigating Circumstances:

**No Prior Discipline:** Respondent was admitted in 2003 and has no prior record of discipline. (*Friedman v. State Bar* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 235, 245 [Even when the present misconduct is serious, an attorney is entitled to mitigation credit.]

**Prefiling Stipulation:** By entering into a pre-filing, dispositive stipulation, respondent has spared the State Bar time and resources. (*Silva-Vidor v. State Bar* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1071, 1079 [where mitigative credit was given for entering into a stipulation as to facts and culpability].)

**Financial Stress:** Respondent's husband left respondent and her three minor children and did not provide adequate monetary support. Severe financial difficulties can be considered as a mitigating factor if they were not reasonably foreseeable, beyond respondent's control, and directly responsible for respondent's misconduct. (*Smith v. State Bar* (1985) 38 Cal.3d 525, 539; *Bradpiece v. State Bar* (1974) 10 Cal.3d 742, 747.) Here, respondent did not anticipate that her husband would leave her without monetary support. Her desire to collect her fee so that she could support her family led to respondent's decision to alter the dates on her client's checks.

**Pro bono Activities:** Respondent has volunteered since 2008 at the Modesto Korean School as the principal and as a teacher, is a member of Lions Club and has volunteered her time at many of the Club's community events and is a member of the Korean School Association of Northern California, a non-profit organization that provides programs to enhance education regarding the Korean culture and language. Community service is to be considered as a mitigating factor. (*Calvert v. State Bar* (1991) 54 Cal.3d 765, 785, citing *Schneider v. State Bar* (1987) 43 Cal.3d 784, 799.)

## AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.

The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct "set forth a means for determining the appropriate disciplinary sanction in a particular case and to ensure consistency across cases dealing with similar misconduct and surrounding circumstances." (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, std. 1.1. All further references to standards are to this source).

The Standards help fulfill the primary purposes of discipline, which include: protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; maintenance of high professional standards; and preservation of public confidence in the legal profession. (*In re Morse* (1995) 11 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 184, 205.)

Although not binding, the standards are entitled to "great weight" and should be followed "whenever possible" in determining level of discipline. (*In re Silvertown* (2005) 36 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 81, 92, quoting *In re Brown* (1995) 12 Cal.4<sup>th</sup> 205, 220 and *In re Young* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 267, fn. 11.) Adherence to the standards in the great majority of cases serves the valuable purpose of eliminating disparity and assuring consistency, that is, the imposition of similar attorney discipline for instances of similar attorney misconduct. (*In re Naney* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 190.) If a recommendation is at the high end or low end of a Standard, an explanation must be given as to how the recommendation was reached. (Std. 1.1.) Any discipline recommendation that deviates from the Standards must include clear reasons for the departure. (Std. 1.1; *Blair v. State Bar* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 762, 776, fn. 5.)

In determining whether to impose a sanction greater or less than that specified in a given Standard, in addition to the factors set forth in the specific Standard, consideration is to be given to the primary purposes of discipline; the balancing of all aggravating and mitigating circumstances; the type of misconduct at issue; whether the client, public, legal system or profession was harmed; and the member's willingness and ability to conform to ethical responsibilities in the future. (Stds. 1.7(b) and (c).)

Respondent committed multiple acts of professional misconduct. Standard 1.7 (a) requires that where a respondent commits two or more acts of misconduct, and the Standards specify different sanctions for each act, the most severe sanction must be imposed.

The most severe sanction applicable to respondent's misconduct is found in standard 2.7, which applies to respondent's two acts of moral turpitude in violation of section 6106.

Standard 2.7 provides that disbarment or actual suspension is appropriate for an act of moral turpitude, dishonesty, fraud, corruption or concealment of a material act. The degree of sanction depends on the magnitude of the misconduct and the extent to which the misconduct harmed or misled the victim and related to the member's practice of law.

Here, respondent was terminated in October 2012. At the time she was terminated, respondent believed she was owed \$2,800 for the services she provided Martinez. However, Martinez failed to pay those fees. Therefore, respondent retained the four uncashed checks and regularly consulted with Martinez's bank to determine if Martinez maintained sufficient funds in her bank account to cover the \$1,600 in checks respondent retained. As soon as she discovered that Martinez for the first time in one and one-half years maintained at least \$1,600 in Martinez's account, respondent altered the year on the checks so that the bank's six month stale date policy would not preclude her from collecting the \$1,600.

When Martinez discovered respondent's actions, Martinez confronted respondent. Respondent agreed to return the \$1,600 and required Martinez to sign a settlement agreement that prohibited Martinez from reporting respondent's actions to the State Bar.

Considering Standard's 2.7 balancing test, respondent's misconduct did not harm Martinez since respondent repaid Martinez the funds almost immediately. However, respondent's conduct was directly related to the practice of law and was compounded by her attempts to conceal her conduct from the State Bar with the improper settlement agreement clause and her misrepresentations to the State Bar that respondent had nothing to do with the check alterations.

As stated in standard 1.7(b), if aggravating circumstances are found, they should be considered alone and in balance with any mitigating circumstances. In aggravation, respondent committed multiple acts. In mitigation, respondent's 11 years of discipline-free practice will be given significant weight in mitigation. (See, *Hawes v. State Bar* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 587, 596, where over 10 years of practice without any prior was worth significant weight in mitigation) and and respondent's pro bono work and financial stress will be given some weight (Respondent's counsel to insert citation.)

Pursuant to the Standards, considering the culpability, and weighing the aggravation and mitigation, a mid-range actual suspension is appropriate and will serve the primary purposes of discipline. Accordingly, a two years stayed suspension, two years' probation, including a 90 day actual suspension is appropriate.

**COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.**

Respondent acknowledges that the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel has informed Respondent that as of April 22, 2015, the prosecution costs in this matter are approximately \$3,000. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.

**EXCLUSION FROM MCLE CREDIT**




Pursuant to rule 3201, Respondent may not receive MCLE credit for completion of State Bar Ethics School and State Bar Client Trust Accounting School. (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 3201.)

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In the Matter of: CHRISTIE SOO-KYUNG LEE	Case number(s): 14-O-02839
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**SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES**

By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitations and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Disposition.

<u>4/30/15</u> Date	<u></u> Respondent's Signature	<u>Christie Soo-Kyung Lee</u> Print Name
<u>5/5/15</u> Date	<u></u> Respondent's Counsel Signature	<u>William M. Balin</u> Print Name
<u>5/11/15</u> Date	<u></u> Deputy Trial Counsel's Signature	<u>Esther J. Rogers</u> Print Name

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In the Matter of: CHRISTIE SOO-KYUNG LEE	Case Number(s): 14-O-02839
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### ACTUAL SUSPENSION ORDER

Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties and that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any, is GRANTED without prejudice, and:

- The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
- The stipulated facts and disposition are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED to the Supreme Court.
- All Hearing dates are vacated.

The parties are bound by the stipulation as approved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed within 15 days after service of this order, is granted; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved stipulation. (See rule 5.58(E) & (F), Rules of Procedure.) **The effective date of this disposition is the effective date of the Supreme Court order herein, normally 30 days after file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of Court.)**

Date June 2, 2015

  
PAT E. McELROY  
Judge of the State Bar Court

## CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of San Francisco, On June 2, 2015, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:


- by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at San Francisco, California, addressed as follows:

WILLIAM M BALIN  
345 FRANKLIN ST  
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94102

- by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

Esther J. Rogers, Enforcement, San Francisco

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on June 2, 2015.

  
Lauretta Cramer  
Case Administrator  
State Bar Court