

State	e Bar Court of Califor Hearing Department San Francisco ACTUAL SUSPENSION	nia	
Counsel For The State Bar	Case Number(s): 14-0-06405	For Court use only	
Manuel Jimenez Senior Trial Counsel 180 Howard Street		PUBLIC MATTER	
San Francisco, CA 94105 (415) 538-2288		FILED	
Bar # 218234		JUN 0 1 2018	
Counsel For Respondent Arthur L. Margolis Margolis & Margolis 2000 Riverside Drive Los Angeles, CA 90039 (323) 953-8996		STATE BAR COURT CLERK'S OFFICE SAN FRANCISCO	
	Submitted to: Assigned Judge		
Bar # 57703	STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING		
In the Matter of: JEFFREY FILON RYAN	ACTUAL SUSPENSION		
Bar # 129079	☑ PREVIOUS STIPULATION REJECTED		
A Member of the State Bar of California (Respondent)			

Note: All information required by this form and any additional information which cannot be provided in the space provided, must be set forth in an attachment to this stipulation under specific headings, e.g., "Facts," "Dismissals," "Conclusions of Law," "Supporting Authority," etc.

A. Parties' Acknowledgments:

- (1) Respondent is a member of the State Bar of California, admitted June 17, 1987.
- (2) The parties agree to be bound by the factual stipulations contained herein even if conclusions of law or disposition are rejected or changed by the Supreme Court.
- (3) All investigations or proceedings listed by case number in the caption of this stipulation are entirely resolved by this stipulation and are deemed consolidated. Dismissed charge(s)/count(s) are listed under "Dismissals." The stipulation consists of 11 pages, not including the order.
- (4) A statement of acts or omissions acknowledged by Respondent as cause or causes for discipline is included under "Facts."

(Do	not wr	rite above this line.)			
(5)	Co La	onclusions of law, drawn from and specifically referring to the facts are also included under "Conclusions of aw".			
(6)	The parties must include supporting authority for the recommended level of discipline under the heading "Supporting Authority."				
(7)	No pe	No more than 30 days prior to the filing of this stipulation, Respondent has been advised in writing of any pending investigation/proceeding not resolved by this stipulation, except for criminal investigations.			
(8)	Pa 61	syment of Disciplinary Costs—Respondent acknowledges the provisions of Bus. & Prof. Code §§6086.10 & 40.7. (Check one option only):			
		(Hardship, special circumstances or other good cause per rule 5.132, Rules of Procedure.) If Respondent fails to pay any installment as described above, or as may be modified by the State Bar Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately.			
Court, the remaining balance is due and payable immediately. Costs are waived in part as set forth in a separate attachment entitled "Partial Waiver of Costs". Costs are entirely waived.					
	Misc	ravating Circumstances [Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional conduct, standards 1.2(h) & 1.5]. Facts supporting aggravating circumstances are lired.			
(1)	(a)	Prior record of discipline State Bar Court case # of prior case			
	(b)	☐ Date prior discipline effective			
	(c)	Rules of Professional Conduct/ State Bar Act violations:			
	(d)	☐ Degree of prior discipline			
	(e)	If Respondent has two or more incidents of prior discipline, use space provided below.			
2)		Intentional/Bad Faith/Dishonesty: Respondent's misconduct was dishonest, intentional, or surrounded by, or followed by bad faith.			
3)		Misrepresentation: Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by, or followed by, misrepresentation.			
4)		Concealment: Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by, or followed by, concealment.			
5)		Overreaching: Respondent's misconduct was surrounded by, or followed by, overreaching.			
6)		Uncharged Violations: Respondent's conduct involves uncharged violations of the Business and Professions Code, or the Rules of Professional Conduct.			
7)		Trust Violation: Trust funds or property were involved and Respondent refused or was unable to account to the client or person who was the object of the misconduct for improper conduct toward said funds or property.			

(Do n	ot writ	e above this line.)		
(8)		Harm: Respondent's misconduct harmed significantly a client, the public, or the administration of justice.		
(9)		Indifference: Respondent demonstrated indifference toward rectification of or atonement for the consequences of his or her misconduct.		
(10)		Candor/Lack of Cooperation: Respondent displayed a lack of candor and cooperation to victims of his/her misconduct, or to the State Bar during disciplinary investigations or proceedings.		
(11)		Multiple Acts: Respondent's current misconduct evidences multiple acts of wrongdoing. See Attachment at page 8.		
(12)		Pattern: Respondent's current misconduct demonstrates a pattern of misconduct.		
(13)		Restitution: Respondent failed to make restitution.		
(14)		Vulnerable Victim: The victim(s) of Respondent's misconduct was/were highly vulnerable.		
(15)		No aggravating circumstances are involved.		
Addi	tiona	al aggravating circumstances:		
		ating Circumstances [see standards 1.2(i) & 1.6]. Facts supporting mitigating mstances are required.		
(1)		No Prior Discipline: Respondent has no prior record of discipline over many years of practice coupled with present misconduct which is not likely to recur.		
(2)		No Harm: Respondent did not harm the client, the public, or the administration of justice.		
(3)		Candor/Cooperation: Respondent displayed spontaneous candor and cooperation with the victims of his/her misconduct or `to the State Bar during disciplinary investigations and proceedings.		
(4)		Remorse: Respondent promptly took objective steps demonstrating spontaneous remorse and recognition of the wrongdoing, which steps were designed to timely atone for any consequences of his/her misconduct.		
(5)		Restitution: Respondent paid \$ on in restitution to without the threat or force of disciplinary, civil or criminal proceedings.		
(6)		Delay: These disciplinary proceedings were excessively delayed. The delay is not attributable to Respondent and the delay prejudiced him/her.		
(7)		Good Faith: Respondent acted with a good faith belief that was honestly held and objectively reasonable.		
(8)		Emotional/Physical Difficulties: At the time of the stipulated act or acts of professional misconduct Respondent suffered extreme emotional difficulties or physical or mental disabilities which expert testimony would establish was directly responsible for the misconduct. The difficulties or disabilities were not the product of any illegal conduct by the member, such as illegal drug or substance abuse, and the difficulties or disabilities no longer pose a risk that Respondent will commit misconduct.		

(Do n	ot wri	te abo	ve this I	ine.)		
(9)		wh	ich res	inancial Stress: At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered from severe financial stress ulted from circumstances not reasonably foreseeable or which were beyond his/her control and re directly responsible for the misconduct.		
(10)		Family Problems: At the time of the misconduct, Respondent suffered extreme difficulties in his/her personal life which were other than emotional or physical in nature.				
(11)		Go in t	Good Character: Respondent's extraordinarily good character is attested to by a wide range of references in the legal and general communities who are aware of the full extent of his/her misconduct.			
(12)		Rel	Rehabilitation: Considerable time has passed since the acts of professional misconduct occurred followed by convincing proof of subsequent rehabilitation.			
(13)		No	mitiga	ating circumstances are involved.		
Addi	tion	al mi	tigatir	ng circumstances:		
Good	d Ch rial S	arac Stipu	ter. Solation.	See Attachment at page 9. ee Attachment at page 9. See Attachment at page 9.		
	<u></u>	-				
(1)	ΔJ		-	uspension:		
	(a)		Resp	pondent must be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.		
		i.		and until Respondent shows proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of rehabilitation and fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the general law pursuant to standard 1.2(c)(1) Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.		
		ii.		and until Respondent pays restitution as set forth in the Financial Conditions form attached to this stipulation.		
		iii.		and until Respondent does the following:		
	(b)	\boxtimes	The a	above-referenced suspension is stayed.		
(2)	⊠ Probation:					
	Res date	pond of the	lent mu ne Sup	ust be placed on probation for a period of one (1) year , which will commence upon the effective reme Court order in this matter. (See rule 9.18, California Rules of Court)		
(3)	\boxtimes	Actu	ıal Su	spension:		
	(a)		Resp of nir	ondent must be actually suspended from the practice of law in the State of California for a period nety (90) days .		
		i.		and until Respondent shows proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of rehabilitation and fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the general law pursuant to standard 1.2(c)(1), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct		
		ii.		and until Respondent pays restitution as set forth in the Financial Conditions form attached to this stipulation.		

<u>(Do</u>	not wr	ite above this line.)	
		iii.	
E.	Add	itional Conditions of Probation:	
(1)		If Respondent is actually suspended for two years or more, he/she must remain actually suspended until he/she proves to the State Bar Court his/her rehabilitation, fitness to practice, and present learning and ability in the general law, pursuant to standard 1.2(c)(1), Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.	
(2)	\boxtimes	During the probation period, Respondent must comply with the provisions of the State Bar Act and Rules of Professional Conduct.	
(3)		Within ten (10) days of any change, Respondent must report to the Membership Records Office of the State Bar and to the Office of Probation of the State Bar of California ("Office of Probation"), all changes of information, including current office address and telephone number, or other address for State Bar purposes, as prescribed by section 6002.1 of the Business and Professions Code.	
(4)		Within thirty (30) days from the effective date of discipline, Respondent must contact the Office of Probation and schedule a meeting with Respondent's assigned probation deputy to discuss these terms and conditions of probation. Upon the direction of the Office of Probation, Respondent must meet with the probation deputy either in-person or by telephone. During the period of probation, Respondent must promptly meet with the probation deputy as directed and upon request.	
(5)		Respondent must submit written quarterly reports to the Office of Probation on each January 10, April 10, July 10, and October 10 of the period of probation. Under penalty of perjury, Respondent must state whether Respondent has complied with the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and all conditions of probation during the preceding calendar quarter. Respondent must also state whether there are any proceedings pending against him or her in the State Bar Court and if so, the case number and current status of that proceeding. If the first report would cover less than 30 days, that report must be submitted on the next quarter date, and cover the extended period.	
		In addition to all quarterly reports, a final report, containing the same information, is due no earlier than twenty (20) days before the last day of the period of probation and no later than the last day of probation.	
(6)		Respondent must be assigned a probation monitor. Respondent must promptly review the terms and conditions of probation with the probation monitor to establish a manner and schedule of compliance. During the period of probation, Respondent must furnish to the monitor such reports as may be requested, in addition to the quarterly reports required to be submitted to the Office of Probation. Respondent must cooperate fully with the probation monitor.	
(7)		Subject to assertion of applicable privileges, Respondent must answer fully, promptly and truthfully an inquiries of the Office of Probation and any probation monitor assigned under these conditions which a directed to Respondent personally or in writing relating to whether Respondent is complying or has complied with the probation conditions.	
(8)	\boxtimes	Within one (1) year of the effective date of the discipline herein, Respondent must provide to the Office of Probation satisfactory proof of attendance at a session of the Ethics School, and passage of the test given at the end of that session.	
		☐ No Ethics School recommended. Reason:	
(9)		Respondent must comply with all conditions of probation imposed in the underlying criminal matter and must so declare under penalty of perjury in conjunction with any quarterly report to be filed with the Office of Probation.	

(Do no	ot write	above	this line.)		
(10)		The fo	ollowing conditions are attached hereto ar	ıd inco	rporated:
			Substance Abuse Conditions		Law Office Management Conditions
			Medical Conditions		Financial Conditions
F. O	ther	Con	ditions Negotiated by the Parties	s :	
(1)	\boxtimes	the I Con one furti	Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination: Respondent must provide proof of passage of the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination ("MPRE"), administered by the National Conference of Bar Examiners, to the Office of Probation during the period of actual suspension or within one year, whichever period is longer. Failure to pass the MPRE results in actual suspension without further hearing until passage. But see rule 9.10(b), California Rules of Court, and rule 5.162(A) & (E), Rules of Procedure.		
			lo MPRE recommended. Reason:		
(2)	\boxtimes	Calif	Rule 9.20, California Rules of Court: Respondent must comply with the requirements of rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 calendar days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court's Order in this matter.		
(3)		days perfo	Conditional Rule 9.20, California Rules of Court: If Respondent remains actually suspended for 90 days or more, he/she must comply with the requirements of rule 9.20, California Rules of Court, and perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 120 and 130 calendar days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court's Order in this matter.		
(4)		perio	Credit for Interim Suspension [conviction referral cases only]: Respondent will be credited for the period of his/her interim suspension toward the stipulated period of actual suspension. Date of commencement of interim suspension:		
(5)		Othe	er Conditions:		

ATTACHMENT TO

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION

IN THE MATTER OF:

JEFFREY FILON RYAN

CASE NUMBERS:

14-O-06405

FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.

Respondent admits that the following facts are true and that he is culpable of violations of the specified statutes and/or Rules of Professional Conduct.

Case No. 14-O-06405 (Complainant: Chevonne Siupa)

FACTS:

- 1. On July 22, 2009, Chevonne Siupa ("Siupa") employed respondent and Massachusetts-licensed attorney, Edward P. Karcis, to perform legal services in connection with her termination as a medical sales representative with Astra Tech Dental.
- 2. On February 16, 2010, Karcis filed a civil complaint on behalf of Siupa, entitled Siupa v. Astra Tech, Inc., case number 1081CV00611, in the Superior Court for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, County of Middlesex. On March 29, 2010, the defendants removed jurisdiction to federal court, in a case entitled, Siupa v. Astra Tech, Inc., case no. 1:10-cv-10525-LTS, in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts.
 - 3. On November 2, 2011, respondent was admitted Pro Hac Vice in the federal lawsuit.
- 4. On the morning of October 24, 2012, respondent was defending a deposition of his client, Siupa, being taken by opposing counsel, Andrea C. Kramer ("Kramer"). During the deposition, Kramer asked Siupa about one of her interrogatory responses, which contained an incorrect date. While Siupa was answering the question, respondent passed Siupa a note. Kramer confronted respondent about the note, and requested that he show her the notepad. Respondent denied writing notes, but refused to show the notepad to Kramer. The parties went off the record and an argument ensued.
- 5. In the afternoon of October 24, 2012, respondent and Kramer appeared before Magistrate Judge Leo T. Sorokin. Kramer orally moved for an order revoking respondent's *pro hac vice* admission, based upon respondent's conduct at the aforementioned deposition. Respondent denied passing a note to his client regarding the substance of the deposition, and presented to the court a document he falsely claimed was the note at issue, which consisted of the address of the courthouse. Judge Sorokin conducted an evidentiary hearing, at which he took testimony from Siupa and the deposition court reporter, Deborah Rumson. The court denied Kramer's motion, without prejudice.
- 6. On October 31, 2012, Judge Sorokin issued an order to show cause, ordering respondent to show cause why his *pro hac vice* admission should not be revoked for misconduct, including, (1) writing a note to his client during her deposition, (2) subsequently altering the writing on his notepad to conceal

his misconduct, (3) presenting the falsified document to the court, and verbally lying to the court about the aforementioned.

- 7. On December 18, 2012, Judge Sorokin issued an order in which he made factual findings based in part the October 24, 2012 testimony of the deposition court reporter Rumson. The court's factual findings included, in part: (1) While Siupa was struggling to answer a question at her October 24, 2012, deposition, respondent wrote something on his notepad and pushed it toward Siupa, (2) Respondent falsely denied having written anything and refused to show his notepad to Kramer, and (3) Respondent showed the court a notepad containing a note that only had the courthouse address and falsely represented that it was the same writing that had been on the notepad at the deposition. The court revoked respondent's *pro hac vice* status. Judge Sorokin also sanctioned respondent \$2,528. Respondent appealed the order to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, and by doing so was under the mistaken impression that he did not have to report it to the State Bar until finality. Based upon his mistaken belief, respondent did not timely report the sanction to the State Bar. Once the sanction became final, the respondent did report the sanction.
- 8. On November 14, 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court's order revoking respondent's *pro hac vice* admission and imposition of sanctions, finding that there was "ample, very convincing evidentiary support," for the District Court's findings that respondent falsified evidence and lied with premeditation to the court.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:

- 9. By denying to opposing counsel Andrea C. Kramer that he had written and passed a note to his client, Chevonne Siupa, during her deposition testimony, when he knew that statement to be false, respondent committed an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty and corruption in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.
- 10. By denying to District Court Magistrate Judge Leo T. Sorokin that he had written and passed a note to his client, Chevonne Siupa, during her deposition testimony, when he knew that statement to be false, respondent committed an act involving moral turpitude, dishonesty and corruption in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.
- 11. By submitting false evidence to the District Court during Magistrate Judge Leo T. Sorokin's October 24, 2012 hearing, when respondent knew the evidence to be false, respondent sought to mislead the judge or judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law, in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(d).
- 12. By failing to report to the State Bar the \$2,528 sanction issued against respondent by Magistrate Judge Leo T. Sorokin, respondent failed to report to the agency charged with attorney discipline, in writing, within 30 days of the time respondent had knowledge, of the imposition of judicial sanctions, in willful violation of Business and Professions Code, section 6068(o)(3).

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

Multiple Acts of Wrongdoing (Std. 1.5(b)): Respondent committed four acts of misconduct in this matter. Respondent's multiple acts of misconduct constitute an aggravating circumstance pursuant to Standard 1.5(b).

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

Additional Mitigating Circumstances:

No prior discipline: Respondent was admitted to the State Bar on June 17, 1987 and has no prior record of discipline. Although respondent's misconduct is serious, he is entitled to some mitigation for his 25 years of discipline-free practice. (In the Matter of Riordan (Review Dept. 2007) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 41, 49.)

Good Character: Respondent provided eight character reference letters from a wide range of references in the legal and general communities, who are aware of the full extent of respondent's misconduct. Respondent's good character constitutes a mitigating circumstance pursuant to Standard 1.6(f).

Pretrial Stipulation: Respondent is entitled to mitigation for entering into a stipulation with the Office of Chief Trial Counsel prior to filing of the Notice of Disciplinary Charges, thereby saving State Bar Court time and resources. (Silva-Vidor v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1071, 1079 [where mitigative credit was given for entering into a stipulation as to facts and culpability].)

AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING DISCIPLINE.

The Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct "set forth a means for determining the appropriate disciplinary sanction in a particular case and to ensure consistency across cases dealing with similar misconduct and surrounding circumstances." (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, std. 1.1. All further references to standards are to this source.) The standards help fulfill the primary purposes of discipline, which include: protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; maintenance of the highest professional standards; and preservation of public confidence in the legal profession. (See std. 1.1; *In re Morse* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 184, 205.)

Although not binding, the standards are entitled to "great weight" and should be followed "whenever possible" in determining level of discipline. (In re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 92, quoting In re Brown (1995) 12 Cal.4th 205, 220 and In re Young (1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 267, fn. 11.) Adherence to the standards in the great majority of cases serves the valuable purpose of eliminating disparity and assuring consistency, that is, the imposition of similar attorney discipline for instances of similar attorney misconduct. (In re Naney (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 190.) If a recommendation is at the high end or low end of a standard, an explanation must be given as to how the recommendation was reached. (Std. 1.1.) "Any disciplinary recommendation that deviates from the Standards must include clear reasons for the departure." (Std. 1.1; Blair v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 762, 776, fn. 5.)

In determining whether to impose a sanction greater or less than that specified in a given standard, in addition to the factors set forth in the specific standard, consideration is to be given to the primary purposes of discipline; the balancing of all aggravating and mitigating circumstances; the type of misconduct at issue; whether the client, public, legal system or profession was harmed; and the member's willingness and ability to conform to ethical responsibilities in the future. (Stds. 1.7(b) and (c).)

In this matter, respondent admits to committing four acts of professional misconduct. Standard 1.7(a) requires that where a respondent "commits two or more acts of misconduct and the Standards specify different sanctions for each act, the most severe sanction must be imposed."

The most severe sanction applicable to respondent's misconduct is found in standard 2.11, which applies to respondent's violations of Business and Professions Code, section 6106.

Standard 2.11 provides that disbarment or actual suspension is the presumed sanction for an act of moral turpitude involving misrepresentation. Standard 2.11 further specifies that the degree of sanction depends on the magnitude of the misconduct, the extent of harm, and the extent to which the misconduct related to the practice of law. Based on the nature of respondent's misconduct, the aggravation and lack of compelling mitigation, there is no reason to deviate from the standards. A disciplinary disposition of a 90-day actual suspension, one-year stayed suspension, and one-year probation is appropriate.

In determining the precise level of actual suspension warranted, a review of applicable case law serves as useful guidance. In the In the Matter of Downey (Review Dept. 2009) 5 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 151, the Review Department of the State Bar Court, recommended that respondent be actually suspended for 150 days, with a two-year stayed suspension and two years probation. In *Downey*, the court found respondent culpable of one count of moral turpitude based on his gross neglect in executing and filing a complaint verification that falsely attested under penalty of perjury that his clients were out of the county, and one count of failing to update his membership address. The court observed that Downey's misconduct was central to the practice of law and it was misleading to opposing counsel and the court. Downey is distinguished from the instant case, in that Downey had a 12-year-old prior record of discipline that resulted in a four-month actual suspension, one-year stayed suspension, and three years probation for performance related issues and moral turpitude. In the Downey decision, the court wrote, "Had this been Downey's first offense, the limited nature of the misconduct ordinarily may have called for a short or even stayed period of suspension. However, Downey's misconduct is aggravated by his serious prior record and his subsequent dishonesty and concealment..." Being that this is respondent's first disciplinary matter, and guided by *Downey*, a disciplinary disposition of a 90-day actual suspension, one-year stayed suspension, and one-year probation is appropriate is sufficient to protect the public and promote respect and confidence in the legal profession.

COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS.

Respondent acknowledges that the Office of Chief Trial Counsel has informed respondent that as of date the discipline costs in this matter are \$3,130. Respondent further acknowledges that should this stipulation be rejected or should relief from the stipulation be granted, the costs in this matter may increase due to the cost of further proceedings.

EXCLUSION FROM MCLE CREDIT

Pursuant to rule 3201, respondent may <u>not</u> receive MCLE credit for completion of State Bar Ethics School (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 3201.)

SIGNATURE OF THE PARTIES

By their signatures below, the parties and their counsel, as applicable, signify their agreement with each of the recitations and each of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation Re Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Disposition.

April 30 , 2018	Sthry F Ryan	JEFFREY F. RYAN
Date	Respondent's Signature	Print Name
April / , 2018 Date	Respondent's Counsel Signature	ARTHUR L. MARGOLIS Print Name
My 7, 2018	M1	MANUEL JIMENEZ
Date	Deputy Trial Counsel's Signature	Print Name

In the Matter of:	Case Number(s):
JEFFREY FILON RYAN	14-0-06405
ACTU	AL SUSPENSION ORDER
Finding the stipulation to be fair to the parties a requested dismissal of counts/charges, if any, is	nd that it adequately protects the public, IT IS ORDERED that the s GRANTED without prejudice, and:
/	on are APPROVED and the DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED to the
The stipulated facts and disposition DISCIPLINE IS RECOMMENDED	on are APPROVED AS MODIFIED as set forth below, and the D to the Supreme Court.
All Hearing dates are vacated.	
stipulation. (See rule 5.58(E) & (F). Rules of Pro	roved unless: 1) a motion to withdraw or modify the stipulation, filed ated; or 2) this court modifies or further modifies the approved accedure.) The effective date of this disposition is the effective date 30 days after file date. (See rule 9.18(a), California Rules of
June 1,2018	PATE MCELROY

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Court Specialist of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of San Francisco, on June 1, 2018, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):

STIPULATION RE FACTS, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DISPOSITION AND ORDER APPROVING

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:

by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at San Francisco, California, addressed as follows:

ARTHUR LEWIS MARGOLIS MARGOLIS & MARGOLIS LLP 2000 RIVERSIDE DR LOS ANGELES, CA 90039

by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

MANUEL JIMENEZ, Enforcement, San Francisco

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on June 1, 2018.

Bernadette Molina Court Specialist State Bar Court