STATE BAR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

HEARING DEPARTMENT - SAN FRANCISCO

In the Matter of **CORECIA JOY WOO,** **Member No. 214544,** A Member of the State Bar.	Case Nos.: **15-C-10250-LMA** 15-O-12351 (Cons.) **DECISION AND ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE ENROLLMENT**

Introduction[1]

This matter initially came before the court on order of reference filed by the Review Department of the State Bar Court on June 10, 2015, for a hearing and decision as to whether the facts and circumstances surrounding the misdemeanor violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (b) (driving with blood alcohol level of .08% or more) of which respondent Corecia Joy Woo (Respondent) was convicted, involved moral turpitude or other misconduct warranting discipline, and, if so found, a recommendation as to the discipline to be imposed.

On August 3, 2015, Respondent was charged with two additional allegations of misconduct, including failing to comply with disciplinary probation conditions and making a misrepresentation to the Office of Probation of the State Bar of California (Office of Probation).

For the reasons stated below, the court finds that the facts and circumstances surrounding Respondent's criminal conviction do not involve moral turpitude, but do constitute other misconduct warranting discipline. In addition, the court finds Respondent culpable of violating her probation conditions and making a misrepresentation to the Office of Probation. Based on

[1] Unless otherwise indicated, all references to rules refer to the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct. Furthermore, all statutory references are to the Business and Professions Code, unless otherwise indicated.

the facts and circumstances, as well as the applicable mitigating and aggravating factors, particularly Respondent's two prior records of discipline, the court recommends that she be disbarred from the practice of law.

Significant Procedural History

On October 2, 2013, Respondent pleaded nolo contendere to a misdemeanor violation of California Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (b) (driving with blood alcohol level of .08% or more).

On June 9, 2015, the Office of the Chief Trial Counsel of the State Bar of California (State Bar) transmitted evidence of finality of Respondent's conviction to the Review Department. On June 10, 2015, the Review Department referred the matter to the Hearing Department for a hearing and decision recommending the discipline to be imposed in the event that the facts and circumstances surrounding the conviction involved moral turpitude or other misconduct warranting discipline.[2]

On June 18, 2015, this court filed a Notice of Hearing on Conviction. On July 15, 2015, Respondent filed a response to the Notice of Hearing on Conviction.

On August 3, 2015, the State Bar filed a Notice of Disciplinary Charges (NDC) against Respondent in case No. 15-O-12351. This matter was subsequently consolidated with Respondent's conviction matter. Respondent filed a response to the NDC on August 21, 2015.

After granting each party a continuance, the present matter proceeded to trial on January 26, 2016. That same day, the parties filed a partial stipulation regarding facts and the

[2] In this same order, the Review Department also referred case No. 15-C-10251. Case No. 15-C-10251 involved Respondent's 1998 DUI conviction, which occurred prior to her admission to practice law in this state. Case No. 15-C-10251 was subsequently dismissed.

admission of documents. The State Bar was represented by Senior Trial Counsel Susan Kagan. Respondent represented herself.[3]

After the first two days of trial, the court granted Respondent's request to present her case-in-chief on March 17 and 18, 2016. Following the four-day trial and filing of closing briefs, the court took this matter under submission for decision on March 28, 2016.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in California on September 4, 2001, and has been a member of the State Bar of California at all times since that date.

Case No. 15-C-10250 – The Conviction Matter

Respondent is conclusively presumed, by the record of her conviction in this proceeding, to have committed all of the elements of the crimes of which she was convicted. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6101, subd. (a); *In re Crooks* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1090, 1097; *In re Duggan* (1976) 17 Cal.3d 416, 423; and *In the Matter of Respondent O* (Review Dept. 1993) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 581, 588.) However, "[w]hether those acts amount to professional misconduct . . . is a conclusion that can only be reached by an examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding the conviction." (*Id.* at p. 589, fn. 6.)

Facts

On the evening of July 20, 2013, Respondent left her sister's house in Sacramento, California, to drive to Respondent's home in Auburn, California. Within a few minutes, Respondent was stopped by a Sacramento County deputy at the corner of Watt and Karl Streets in Sacramento for making an unsafe lane change. During the traffic stop, the officer suspected Respondent had been drinking.

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[3] Respondent was represented by attorney Scott Drexel until the Pretrial Conference on January 19, 2016.

Respondent took and failed a series of field sobriety tests. A breath test was performed and revealed that Respondent had a blood alcohol level of .12%. Respondent was arrested for violating Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivisions (a) (driving under the influence) and (b) (driving with blood alcohol level of .08% or more).

On August 5, 2013, the Sacramento County District Attorney filed a criminal complaint in the Sacramento County Superior Court, case No. 13T03472, charging Respondent with the violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivisions (a) and (b). On October 2, 2013, the superior court entered Respondent's plea of nolo contendere to a single count of violating Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (b).[4]

Respondent had a previous conviction for driving under the influence (DUI). In or about October 1998, she entered a plea of nolo contendere to a count of violating Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a). Respondent was not an attorney at the time of her first DUI conviction.

Conclusions

An attorney's conviction of driving under the influence of alcohol, even with prior convictions of that offense, does not per se establish moral turpitude. (*In re Kelley* (1990) 52 Cal.3d 487, 494.) Here, the court finds that the facts and circumstances surrounding Respondent's conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol do not involve moral turpitude, but do involve other misconduct warranting discipline. (See *In re Carr* (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1089; and *In the Matter of Anderson* (Review Dept. 1992) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 208.)

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[4] The State Bar and Respondent stipulated that she pleaded to a violation of Vehicle Code section 23152, subdivision (a); however, based on the certified record of conviction from the Sacramento County Superior Court, it appears that she actually pleaded to subdivision (b).

Case No. 15-O-12351 – The Probation Violation Matter

Facts

Respondent has been on disciplinary probation off and on since November 2007. Respondent is presently serving a five-year disciplinary probation in Supreme Court case No. S197212, which commenced on January 27, 2012. As a condition of her probation, Respondent was required to submit quarterly reports to the Office of Probation. In each quarterly report, Respondent was to state whether she complied with all provisions of the State Bar Act and Rules of Professional Conduct, and all conditions of probation during the reporting period. Specifically, Respondent was required to indicate, under penalty of perjury, one of the following two options:

Box A: During the reporting period noted above, I have complied with all provisions of the State Bar Act, Rules of Professional Conduct, and all conditions of probation; and during the preceding calendar quarter, there were no proceedings pending against me in the State Bar Court, or if there were, I have attached my declaration, signed under penalty of perjury, regarding my pending proceeding(s) in State Bar Court including the case number(s), and current status.

Or

Box B: During the reporting period above, I have complied with all provisions of the State Bar Act, Rules of Professional Conduct, and all conditions of probation except: _____ (attach declaration under penalty of perjury if more space is needed); and during the preceding calendar quarter, there were no proceedings pending against me in the State Bar Court, or if there were, I have attached my declaration, signed under penalty of perjury, regarding my pending proceeding(s) in State Bar Court including the case number(s), and current status.

Between January and September 2013, Respondent periodically communicated with her probation deputy to clarify uncertainties and pass along information. On January 7, 2013, Respondent called her probation deputy to inquire whether she needed to send in another certificate for completion of Ethics School. On July 9, 2013, Respondent called her probation

deputy to request an additional quarterly report form. On July 22, 2013, two days after Respondent's DUI arrest, she emailed her probation deputy to inquire about her late probation reports. On September 3, 2013, Respondent emailed her probation deputy to advise that she changed the date of her MPRE. On September 5, 2013, Respondent emailed her probation deputy to check the date of her last MPRE exam.

On June 11, 2013, Respondent filed a petition for relief from actual suspension in Supreme Court case No. S197212. Such a proceeding is commonly known as a mini-reinstatement proceeding. In a mini-reinstatement proceeding, the petitioner has the burden of demonstrating his or her rehabilitation, fitness to practice, and present learning and ability in the law.

In August 2013, Respondent retained defense counsel Scott Drexel (Drexel) to represent her in her State Bar matters.

On September 13, 2013, this court issued a decision, in case No. 13-V-13205, denying Respondent's mini-reinstatement petition. The denial did not address Respondent's DUI arrest, as neither the State Bar nor the court were aware of it.

On October 2, 2013, Respondent pleaded nolo contendere to and was convicted on her DUI matter. Respondent's DUI conviction constituted a violation of section 6068, subdivision (a), of the State Bar Act (duty to support all laws). Accordingly, Respondent was required to report the conviction on her January 2014 quarterly report.[5] Respondent, however, did not timely report her DUI conviction on her January 2014 quarterly report or any other quarterly report.

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[5] Due to the timing of Respondent's DUI conviction, there was confusion regarding whether Respondent should have reported the DUI conviction in her October 2013 quarterly report or her January 2014 quarterly report. Regardless, Respondent did not timely report the DUI conviction in either report.

Respondent did not seek advice from Drexel as to whether she was required to report the DUI conviction to the Office of Probation.[6] Nor did Respondent ask her probation deputy whether she was required to report the DUI conviction to the Office of Probation.

Respondent knew that the terms of her probation required her to mail original quarterly reports to the Office of Probation for filing. Prior to October 10, 2013, Respondent had mailed all her quarterly reports to the Office of Probation for filing. Yet, on October 10, 2013, Respondent attempted to file her October 2013 quarterly report by emailing it to the Office of Probation as a JPEG attachment. The JPEG attachment did not include the full date of the reporting period or the full signature date, and, obviously, was not an original. On the JPEG attachment, Respondent checked Box A, indicating, among other things, that Respondent had complied with all provisions of the State Bar Act. Respondent's probation deputy did not immediately contact Respondent to advise her that the JPEG quarterly report was unacceptable because she assumed that Respondent would have also put the original quarterly report in the mail.

After not receiving an original copy of the October 2013 quarterly report by mail, Respondent's probation deputy contacted Respondent by email on November 4, 2013. In that email, the probation deputy advised Respondent that the Office of Probation had yet to receive the original quarterly report due October 10, 2013. The probation deputy also explained that the emailed quarterly report had pertinent information (case numbers and date) cut off. The probation deputy requested that Respondent execute a new October 2013 quarterly report and mail the original to the Office of Probation.

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[6] Respondent's testimony on this subject was not credible considering the inconsistencies between her present testimony and her deposition testimony from May 14, 2015. As illustrated below, Respondent's version of events were further cast into question by other factors, including her unusual handling of her October 2013 quarterly report.

On November 4, 2013, Respondent sent an email to her probation deputy advising that she would send in an original October 2013 quarterly report that same day. Despite this assurance, over two months went by before Respondent sent in an original October 2013 quarterly report, which, as it turned out, was also deficient.

On or about January 8, 2014, Respondent sent the Office of Probation two original quarterly reports for October 2013 and January 2014. In both quarterly reports, Respondent checked Box A and did not disclose her October 2013 criminal conviction. The Office of Probation accepted and filed Respondent's January 2014 quarterly report. Her October 2013 quarterly report, however, was rejected, as it was inexplicably dated "July 7, 2013."

On January 16, 2014, Respondent and her probation deputy spoke by telephone. Respondent was advised that the October 2013 quarterly report sent by Respondent on January 8, 2014, could not be filed because it was misdated. The probation deputy requested that Respondent again submit the October 2013 quarterly report. Once again, however, Respondent did not promptly comply with the probation deputy's request.

About two months later, on March 14, 2014, Respondent and her probation deputy had another telephone conversation. Respondent was again advised that the October 2013 quarterly report was still outstanding. Nearly a month later, on April 7, 2014, Respondent mailed a third version of her October 2013 quarterly report to the Office of Probation. In this report, Respondent again checked box A. That quarterly report was accepted for filing on April 10, 2014.

On January 29, 2015, the State Bar notified Drexel that it had discovered Respondent's DUI conviction. During this same time period, Respondent was pursuing a second mini-reinstatement proceeding. In her second mini-reinstatement proceeding, Respondent had not disclosed her 2013 DUI conviction.

On May 13, 2015, Respondent submitted an amended version of her October 2013 quarterly report. In this report, Respondent checked Box B, reporting the 2013 DUI conviction to the Office of Probation.[7]

Conclusions

Count One – § 6068, Subd. (k) [Failure to Comply with Probation]

Section 6068, subdivision (k), provides that an attorney has a duty to comply with all conditions attached to any disciplinary probation. By failing to: (1) timely submit an original October 2013 quarterly report; (2) comply with the State Bar Act by sustaining the DUI conviction, in willful violation of section 6068, subdivision (a); and (3) timely report her failure to comply with the State Bar Act in either her October 2013 or January 2014 quarterly reports, Respondent failed to comply with conditions attached to her disciplinary probation, in willful violation of section 6068, subdivision (k).

Count Two – § 6106 [Moral Turpitude – Misrepresentation]

Section 6106 provides, in part, that the commission of any act involving dishonesty, moral turpitude, or corruption constitutes cause for suspension or disbarment. The State Bar alleged that Respondent violated section 6106 by submitting quarterly reports under penalty of perjury that she knew or was grossly negligent in not knowing were false. Based on the following, the court agrees that Respondent intentionally filed false quarterly reports under penalty of perjury.

A DUI conviction is an extremely disruptive event in one's life. It is not a simple procedure like getting a speeding ticket or some other minor infraction. A DUI involves an arrest, incarceration, criminal charges, and ultimately criminal probation including numerous

[7] As noted above, the DUI conviction should have been reported in Respondent's January 2014 quarterly report, rather than her October 2013 quarterly report.

statutorily mandated conditions. At the time Respondent was arrested for DUI, she had already filed her first petition for mini-reinstatement. So Respondent found herself in the unenviable position of simultaneously attempting to demonstrate in the State Bar Court her rehabilitation and fitness to practice, while facing criminal charges in the Sacramento County Superior Court. It was at this point, the evidence indicates, that she chose not to jeopardize her pending mini-reinstatement by disclosing her DUI arrest. And, ultimately, when her DUI arrest resulted in a DUI conviction, she chose to continue that course of action.

Although Respondent testified that she believed her criminal conviction did not warrant disclosure in her quarterly reports, the court did not find her testimony on this subject to be credible, as her actions were inconsistent with her words. To begin with, Respondent's claim that she researched and determined that she need not disclose her DUI conviction in her quarterly report was not credible. Even cursory case law research would reveal that attorneys with DUI convictions are routinely found culpable of violating section 6068, subdivision (a). And although Respondent could have easily verified her "research" with her defense counsel or probation deputy, she chose not to.

Second, Respondent's filing of her October 2013 quarterly report was shrouded in bizarre behavior on her part. Although she mailed all of her previous quarterly reports to the Office of Probation, Respondent emailed her October 2013 quarterly report. Then in November 2013, Respondent assured the Office of Probation she would immediately send in an original copy of her October 2013 quarterly report, but failed to do so. Then when Respondent ultimately sent in the quarterly report in January 2014, it was pre-dated, reflecting a date prior to her DUI arrest. And finally, after Respondent was twice-more instructed by the Office of Probation to properly submit her October 2013 quarterly report, she waited nearly three more months before submitting the report in April 2014.

Third, Respondent's testimony and arguments in this proceeding conflict with her deposition testimony. At her May 14, 2015 deposition, Respondent was questioned whether she ever asked Drexel what she should do with respect to reporting her DUI to the State Bar. Respondent replied, "Like I said, after reading the code section, I didn't think I had any requirement." (Exhibit 1, p. 44.) When Respondent was subsequently asked if she asked her probation deputy whether she should report the DUI, Respondent stated, "I've never asked anyone because I read the code section and I just didn't realize that I had any requirement to ask. I just didn't think that it needed to be addressed." (Exhibit 1, p. 45.) In contrast to Respondent's deposition testimony, Respondent testified in the present proceeding that she told Drexel about her DUI in August 2013. Respondent justified the discrepancy in her testimony by stating that Drexel was her attorney at the deposition, and all conversations she had with him were privileged, therefore she didn't disclose privileged information in her deposition.

The court finds this explanation to be disingenuous. Neither Drexel nor Respondent raised an attorney-client objection at the deposition. Had the objection been raised, Respondent could have declined to answer the question; however, under no circumstances would the attorney-client privilege justify the presentation of false or misleading deposition testimony.

Accordingly, the court finds there is clear and convincing evidence that Respondent committed an act involving dishonesty, moral turpitude, or corruption, in willful violation of section 6106, by intentionally failing to timely and accurately report her DUI conviction as a failure to comply with section 6068, subdivision (a), in either her October 2013 or January 2014 quarterly reports.

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Aggravation[8]

Prior Record of Discipline (Std. 1.5(a))

Respondent has been previously disciplined on two occasions. The court assigns significant weight to Respondent's prior record of discipline.

On October 5, 2007, the Supreme Court issued order no. S155014 (State Bar Court case No. 06-O-12824) suspending Respondent from the practice of law for one year, stayed, with two years' probation, including a 90-day actual suspension. In this matter, Respondent's client terminated her services and requested a refund of all unearned fees. Respondent failed to refund any unearned fees and her client filed a small claims lawsuit. During the lawsuit, Respondent filed a declaration, under penalty of perjury, containing multiple false statements. Respondent made these statements deliberately and with reckless disregard for the truth. In addition, Respondent fabricated a check stub and presented it to the State Bar as exculpatory evidence. No aggravating or mitigating factors were identified.[9]

On December 28, 2011, the Supreme Court issued order no. S197212 (State Bar Court case nos. 08-O-10238, etc.) suspending Respondent from the practice of law for five years, stayed, with five years' probation, including a minimum period of actual suspension of five years (with credit given for Respondent's period of inactive enrollment, which commenced on October 16, 2008) and until Respondent demonstrates her rehabilitation, fitness to practice, and learning and ability in the general law. In this matter, Respondent stipulated to culpability on twelve counts of misconduct in five client matters, including failing to perform legal services with competence (three counts), failing to inform clients of significant developments (three

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[8] All references to standards (Std.) are to the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, title IV, Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.

[9] At the onset of Respondent's misconduct, she had been entitled to practice law for approximately four years.

counts), improper withdrawal from representation (three counts), failing to account (two counts), and disobeying a court order requiring Respondent to pay sanctions. In aggravation, Respondent had a prior record of discipline. In mitigation, Respondent cooperated with the State Bar investigation and entered into a disciplinary stipulation, she demonstrated remorse by attempting to resign from the State Bar, and her lack of attention to her practice was at least partially the result of grave illnesses within Respondent's family.

Multiple Acts (Std. 1.5(b))

Respondent's multiple acts of misconduct warrant some consideration in aggravation.

Mitigation

Extreme Emotional Difficulties (Std. 1.6(d))

At the time of the misconduct, Respondent was experiencing extreme emotional difficulties associated with her marital separation involving her abusive husband, which ultimately resulted in divorce. In addition, Respondent was still suffering from the effects of losing her grandmother and brother in 2009 and 2010. Although Respondent did not present expert testimony regarding her emotional difficulties, the court still affords these factors limited weight in mitigation.

Cooperation with the State Bar (Std. 1.6(e))

Respondent entered into a partial stipulation of facts and admission of documents. Respondent's cooperation with the State Bar warrants consideration in mitigation.

Good Character Evidence (Std. 1.6(f))

Respondent provided character evidence from five witnesses. Of the five character witnesses, two were attorneys and two were relatives. Respondent's character witnesses attested to her honesty and good character. Respondent's good character evidence warrants limited

consideration in mitigation. (*In the Matter of Myrdall* (Review Dept. 1995) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 363, 387 [testimony of three clients and three attorneys entitled to limited weight].)

Community Service

Respondent volunteers at her church, as well as at her children's school and sports activities. Respondent's community service warrants consideration in mitigation; however, it is somewhat diminished by the fact that parents are generally expected or even required to volunteer in their children's endeavors.

Discussion

The purpose of State Bar disciplinary proceedings is not to punish the attorney, but to protect the public, to preserve public confidence in the profession, and to maintain the highest possible professional standards for attorneys. *(Chadwick v. State Bar* (1989) 49 Cal.3d. 103, 111; *Cooper v. State Bar* (1987) 43 Cal.3d. 1016, 1025; Std. 1.1.)

In determining the level of discipline, the court looks first to the standards for guidance. *(Drociak v. State Bar* (1991) 52 Cal.3d. 1085, 1090; *In the Matter of Koehler* (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 615, 628). Second, the court looks to decisional law. (*Snyder v. State Bar* (1990) 49 Cal.3d. 1302, 1310-1311; *In the Matter of Taylor* (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 563, 580.)

Standard 1.7 provides that if aggravating or mitigating circumstances are found, they should be considered alone and in balance with any other aggravating or mitigating factors. In this case, the standards call for the imposition of a minimum sanction ranging from suspension to disbarment. (Standards 2.11, 2.14, and 2.16.) The most severe sanction is found at standard 2.11 which provides that disbarment or actual suspension is appropriate for an act of moral turpitude.

Due to Respondent's prior record of discipline, the court also looks to standard 1.8(b) for guidance. Standard 1.8(b) states, in part, that unless the most compelling mitigation

circumstances clearly predominate or the misconduct underlying the prior discipline occurred during the same time period as the current suspension, disbarment is appropriate when an attorney has two prior records of discipline and has been previously ordered to serve a period of actual suspension.

The standards, however, "do not mandate a specific discipline." (*In the Matter of Van Sickle* (Review Dept. 2006) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 980, 994.) It has long been held that the court is "not bound to follow the standards in talismanic fashion. As the final and independent arbiter of attorney discipline, [the Supreme Court is] permitted to temper the letter of the law with considerations peculiar to the offense and the offender." (*Howard v. State Bar* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 215, 221-222.) Yet, while the standards are not binding, they are entitled to great weight. (*In re Silverton* (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 92.)

The State Bar recommended that Respondent be disbarred from the practice of law. Respondent, on the other hand, argued for an extension of probation, stayed suspension, or other discipline short of disbarment.

The Supreme Court and Review Department have not historically applied standard 1.8(b) in a rigid fashion.[10] As the standard provides, the critical issue is whether the most compelling mitigating circumstances clearly predominate to warrant an exception to the severe penalty of disbarment. (See *Barnum v. State Bar* (1990) 52 Cal.3d 104, 113 [disbarment under std. 1.7(b) imposed where no compelling mitigation]; compare *Arm v. State Bar* (1990) 50 Cal.3d 763, 778-779, 781 [disbarment under std. 1.7(b) not imposed where compelling mitigation included lack of harm and no bad faith].)

[10] Standard 1.8(b) was previously identified as standard 1.7(b). Standard 1.8(b) is more limited than former standard 1.7(b), but is applicable here.

Here, Respondent's willingness and ability to be forthright and honest is a significant concern. Despite having been previously disciplined for making false statements under penalty of perjury and fabricating evidence, Respondent has again been found culpable of misrepresentation. Integrity and honesty are essential qualities that all attorney should possess. Respondent has now twice-demonstrated a deficiency in this area.

That said, even if this court had not found Respondent culpable of misrepresentation, it would be difficult to justify a level of discipline short of disbarment. The present matter marks Respondent's third discipline. Both of Respondent's previous disciplines were extremely serious. In fact, the latter resulted in a five-year period of actual suspension and five years of probation. Respondent's second discipline resulted in about the highest level of discipline recommended by the State Bar Court, short of disbarment. And only two years into her five-year period of probation, Respondent demonstrated her unwillingness or inability to stay out of trouble, as she: (1) was arrested and convicted of DUI; (2) failed to timely submit an adequate October 2013 quarterly report; (3) did not disclose her criminal conviction; and (4) failed to promptly rectify problems in her quarterly reports after they were pointed out by her probation deputy. Respondent's conduct during just the first two years of her five-year disciplinary probation gives this court little reason to justify another term of probation.

While Respondent has demonstrated some mitigation, it does not rise to the level of "compelling." Further, Respondent's mitigation was effectively offset by the significant aggravation involved.

Therefore, having considered the nature and extent of the misconduct, the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, as well as the case law, the court finds that Respondent's disbarment is necessary to protect the public, the courts, and the legal community; to maintain high professional standards; and to preserve public confidence in the legal profession.

Recommendations

It is recommended that respondent **Corecia Joy Woo**, State Bar Number 214544, be disbarred from the practice of law in California and Respondent's name be stricken from the roll of attorneys.

California Rules of Court, Rule 9.20

It is further recommended that Respondent be ordered to comply with the requirements of rule 9.20 of the California Rules of Court, and to perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule within 30 and 40 days, respectively, after the effective date of the Supreme Court order in this proceeding.

Costs

It is recommended that costs be awarded to the State Bar in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6086.10, and are enforceable both as provided in Business and Professions Code section 6140.7 and as a money judgment.

Order of Involuntary Inactive Enrollment

Respondent is ordered transferred to involuntary inactive status pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6007, subdivision (c)(4). Respondent's inactive enrollment will be effective three calendar days after this order is served by mail and will terminate upon the effective date of the Supreme Court's order imposing discipline herein, or as provided for by rule 5.111(D)(2) of the State Bar Rules of Procedure, or as otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court pursuant to its plenary jurisdiction.

Dated: June 1, 2016

LUCY ARMENDARIZ
Judge of the State Bar Court

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of San Francisco, on June 1, 2016, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):

DECISION AND ORDER OF INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE ENROLLMENT

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:

☒ by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at San Francisco, California, addressed as follows:

CORECIA J. WOO
CORECIA J. WOO
9732 COLLIE WAY
ELK GROVE, CA 95757

☒ by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

SUSAN I. KAGAN, Enforcement, San Francisco

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in San Francisco, California, on June 1, 2016.

Mazie Yip
Case Administrator
State Bar Court