

PUBLIC MATTER

1 STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
2 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL
3 JAYNE KIM, No. 174614
4 CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL
5 JOSEPH R. CARLUCCI, No. 172309
6 DEPUTY CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL
7 MELANIE J. LAWRENCE, No. 230102
8 ASSISTANT CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL
9 MICHAEL GLASS, No. 102700
10 SUPERVISING SENIOR TRIAL COUNSEL
11 SUE HONG, No. 285852
12 DEPUTY TRIAL COUNSEL
13 845 South Figueroa Street
14 Los Angeles, California 90017-2515
15 Telephone: (213) 765-1161

FILED

JUL 23 2015
STATE BAR COURT
CLERK'S OFFICE
LOS ANGELES

STATE BAR COURT

HEARING DEPARTMENT - LOS ANGELES

13 In the Matter of:) Case No. 15-J-12016
14 NATHAN W. DRAGE,) FIRST AMENDED NOTICE OF
15 No. 130448,) DISCIPLINARY CHARGES
16 A Member of the State Bar) (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6049.1; Rules Proc. Of
State Bar, rules 5.350 to 5.354)

NOTICE - FAILURE TO RESPOND!

18 **IF YOU FAIL TO FILE A WRITTEN ANSWER TO THIS NOTICE**
19 **WITHIN 20 DAYS AFTER SERVICE, OR IF YOU FAIL TO APPEAR AT**
20 **THE STATE BAR COURT TRIAL:**

- 21 (1) **YOUR DEFAULT WILL BE ENTERED;**
- 22 (2) **YOUR STATUS WILL BE CHANGED TO INACTIVE AND YOU**
23 **WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW;**
- 24 (3) **YOU WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PARTICIPATE FURTHER IN**
25 **THESE PROCEEDINGS UNLESS YOU MAKE A TIMELY MOTION**
26 **AND THE DEFAULT IS SET ASIDE, AND;**
- 27 (4) **YOU SHALL BE SUBJECT TO ADDITIONAL DISCIPLINE.**
28 **SPECIFICALLY, IF YOU FAIL TO TIMELY MOVE TO SET ASIDE**
OR VACATE YOUR DEFAULT, THIS COURT WILL ENTER AN
ORDER RECOMMENDING YOUR DISBARMENT WITHOUT
FURTHER HEARING OR PROCEEDING. SEE RULE 5.80 ET SEQ.,
RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA.

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1 The State Bar of California alleges:

2 Case No. 15-J-12016

3 JURISDICTION

4 1. Nathan W. Drage ("respondent") was admitted to the practice of law in the State of
5 California on December 11, 1987, was a member at all times pertinent to these charges, and is
6 currently a member of the State Bar of California.

7
8 PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT IN A FOREIGN JURISDICTION

9 2. On or about October 13, 2010 , the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County
10 of the State of Utah, ordered that respondent be disciplined upon findings that respondent had
11 committed professional misconduct in that jurisdiction as set forth in the Discipline by Consent,
12 Settlement Agreement, and Affidavit of Nathan Drage. Thereafter, the decision of the foreign
13 jurisdiction became final.

14 3. A copy of the final order of disciplinary action of the foreign jurisdiction is attached,
15 as Exhibit 1, and incorporated by reference.

16 4. A certified copy of the Discipline By Consent and Settlement Agreement is attached,
17 as Exhibit 2, and incorporated by reference.

18 5. A copy of the statutes, rules or court orders of the foreign jurisdiction found to have
19 been violated by respondent is attached, as Exhibit 3, and incorporated by reference.

20 6. Respondent's culpability as determined by the foreign jurisdiction indicates that the
21 following California statutes or rules have been violated or warrant the filing of this Notice of
22 Disciplinary Charges: Rules of Professional Conduct rule 3-310(B)(1)[Conflict-Relationship
23 with a Party], rule 4-100(A)[Commingling], Business and Professions Code section 6068(m)
24 [Failure to Inform Client of a Significant Development], and Business and Professions Code
25 section 6106 [Moral Turpitude-Issuance of NSF Checks].
26
27
28

1 ISSUES FOR DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

- 2 7. The attached findings and final order are conclusive evidence that respondent is
3 culpable of professional misconduct in this state subject only to the following issues:
- 4 A. The degree of discipline to impose;
 - 5 B. Whether, as a matter of law, respondent's culpability determined in the
6 proceeding in the other jurisdiction would not warrant the imposition of discipline in the State of
7 California under the laws or rules binding upon members of the State Bar at the time the member
8 committed misconduct in such other jurisdiction; and
 - 9 C. Whether the proceedings of the other jurisdiction lacked fundamental
10 constitutional protection.
- 11 8. Respondent shall bear the burden of proof with regard to the issues set forth in
12 subparagraphs B and C of the preceding paragraph.

13 NOTICE - INACTIVE ENROLLMENT!

14 **YOU ARE HEREBY FURTHER NOTIFIED THAT IF THE STATE BAR
15 COURT FINDS, PURSUANT TO BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE
16 SECTION 6007(c), THAT YOUR CONDUCT POSES A SUBSTANTIAL
17 THREAT OF HARM TO THE INTERESTS OF YOUR CLIENTS OR TO
18 THE PUBLIC, YOU MAY BE INVOLUNTARILY ENROLLED AS AN
19 INACTIVE MEMBER OF THE STATE BAR. YOUR INACTIVE
20 ENROLLMENT WOULD BE IN ADDITION TO ANY DISCIPLINE
21 RECOMMENDED BY THE COURT.**

19 NOTICE - COST ASSESSMENT!

20 **IN THE EVENT THESE PROCEDURES RESULT IN PUBLIC
21 DISCIPLINE, YOU MAY BE SUBJECT TO THE PAYMENT OF COSTS
22 INCURRED BY THE STATE BAR IN THE INVESTIGATION, HEARING
23 AND REVIEW OF THIS MATTER PURSUANT TO BUSINESS AND
24 PROFESSIONS CODE SECTION 6086.10.**

23 Respectfully submitted,

24 THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
25 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL

26 DATED: 7/23/15

26 By: 

27 Sue Hong
28 Deputy Trial Counsel

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

OCT 13 2010

SALT LAKE COUNTY

By

KE
Deputy Clerk

Billy L. Walker, #05568
Senior Counsel
OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Utah State Bar
645 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801 531-9110

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the)	ORDER OF DISCIPLINE:
Discipline of:)	PROBATION
Nathan Drage, #05194)	Civil No. 100901669
Respondent.)	Judge Denise P. Lindberg
)	

The above-entitled matter having come before the Court at the request of the parties, and the Court having reviewed all pleadings and papers on file herein, including the Complaint, the Discipline by Consent and Settlement Agreement, and the Affidavit of Nathan Drage, and the Court being fully advised in the premises:

IT IS ORDERED THAT: Mr. Drage shall be placed on probation for a period of two years with the following conditions:

- a. During the two year probation, Mr. Drage shall attend the OPC's Ethics School. Ethics School is typically held twice a year, in January and in either July or August.
- b. During the two year probation Mr. Drage shall take and pass the Multi

State Professional Responsibility Examination.


- c. In addition to or in lieu of the failure to attend Ethics School; and/or the failure to take and pass the Multi State Professional Responsibility Exam, if there are any Bar complaints (including OPC Bar complaints) filed against Mr. Drage during his two year probation where a Screening Panel of the Ethics and Discipline Committee finds probable cause for filing a formal complaint, then the OPC can proceed directly to the District Court on motion and Mr. Drage shall be suspended for one year for violation of his probation.
- d. The OPC can also seek a greater sanction than one year for any Bar complaints (including OPC complaints) filed against Mr. Drage during his two year probation where a Screening Panel of the Ethics and Discipline Committee finds probable cause for a filing of a formal complaint, however, if the OPC determines to seek a greater sanction than a one year suspension for violation of Mr. Drage's probation, the OPC shall file a formal complaint with the District Court pursuant to Rule 14-511 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability and proceed in accordance with this rule.
- e. As of the date of this Discipline by Consent, there are no other pending Bar complaints against Mr. Drage. However, there are federal criminal charges pending against Mr. Drage. Any future attorney discipline actions

that may result from the federal criminal charges are separate and independent from this Discipline by Consent presently before this Court.

- f. Termination of this probation shall be considered pursuant to filing of a petition in accordance with Rule 14-525 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability.


DATED: 13 October, 2010.

BY THE COURT:


Honorable Denise Lindberg
Third District Court Judge




Approved as to form:




Richard A. Van Wagoner
Counsel for Respondent

I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE CITY, STATE OF UTAH.

DATE: 3/3/15


DEPUTY COURT CLERK



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 12th day of October, 2010, I hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing proposed Order of Discipline: Probation to:

Richard A. Van Wagoner
Snow Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City UT 84145

Alisa Webb

Interest: Current Clients: Specific Rules), 1.8(a)(2) (Conflict of Interest: Current Clients: Specific Rules), 1.15(a) (Safekeeping Property), 1.15(b) (Safekeeping Property) and 8.4(a) (Misconduct). Given the Court's entry of default judgment and Mr. Drage's prior unsuccessful attempt to set aside the default judgment, Mr. Drage cannot successfully resist the default judgment at the trial court, and pursuant to this agreement he waives any further right to challenge the default judgment at the trial court and/or on appeal.

B. That Mr. Drage entered into this agreement voluntarily, without duress or coercion, fully understanding the implications of his admissions and the misconduct, and that in exchange for these admissions, the OPC, subject to the Court's approval, agrees that the discipline set forth in this agreement is a fair and just resolution of this matter.

C. That Mr. Drage admits that the following facts have been found by the Court:

1. The attorney charged with unprofessional conduct in this complaint is Nathan W. Drage who is an attorney in the State of Utah and a member of the Utah State Bar, and whose address according to the records of the Executive Director of the Utah State Bar is 4766 Holladay Blvd, Holladay, Utah 84117.

2. This Complaint is brought pursuant to a directive of a Screening Panel of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court, and is based upon an Informal Complaint submitted against Mr. Drage by Ruben Rodriguez, Jr.

3. On May 4, 2009, the OPC sent Mr. Drage a Notice of Informal Complaint ("NOIC").

4. On November 5, 2009, a Screening Panel of the Ethics and Discipline Committee of the Utah Supreme Court ("the Screening Panel") heard the Rodriguez matter.

5. At the conclusion of the hearing on November 5, 2009, the Screening Panel directed the OPC to file a formal complaint against Mr. Drage concerning the Rodriguez matter.

6. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Rule 14-511(a), Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability (amended January 1, 2003) ("RLDD").

7. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to Rule 14-511(b) of the RLDD, in that, at all relevant times, Respondent practiced law and resided in Salt Lake County.

8. Mr. Drage and Rubin Rodriguez have had an attorney-client relationship on previous legal matters.

9. Mr. Drage and Mr. Rodriguez have had business dealings in the past where there was no attorney-client relationship.

10. On March 19, 2008, Mr. Rodriguez and his wife were served with a Complaint from American Express.

11. Mr. Drage agreed to represent Mr. Rodriguez and his wife in the American Express matter.

12. Mr. Drage decided on a strategy allowing entry of a Default Judgment against Mr. Rodriguez and his wife.

13. Mr. Drage did not inform Mr. Rodriguez or his wife of his strategy.

14. Mr. Drage did not explain the basis of his strategy to the Rodriguezes.

15. Mr. Drage represented Mr. Rodriguez in connection with the merger of Cardiff Communications, Inc. with Liberator Medical Holding, Inc.

16. Mr. Rodriguez was promised 15,000 shares of stock from the merger.

17. Mr. Rodriguez received 10,000 shares.

18. Mr. Rodriguez sued for the remaining 5,000 shares.

19. Mr. Rodriguez's suit against Liberator Medical Holding could not be handled by Mr. Drage because Mr. Drage had business dealings with the principals of Liberator Medical Holding.

20. Mr. Drage did not clarify the terms of his various business transactions with Mr. Rodriguez.

21. Mr. Drage did not disclose in writing information necessary to clarify the business relationships in a manner that could be understood by Mr. Rodriguez.

22. Mr. Drage did not inform Mr. Rodriguez in writing of the desirability of seeking independent legal counsel on the business transactions.

23. Mr. Drage did not keep client funds related to a legal matter involving an entity known as TR3 in a separate account.

24. Mr. Drage did not safeguard his client's funds.

25. Mr. Drage intermingled his own funds with his legal client's funds.

26. Mr. Drage did not segregate business funds from funds related to his legal practice; examples of this are:

a) Check 3076, for \$3500, written on Mr. Drage's trust account to Mr. Rodriguez was returned for insufficient funds.

b) Check 3075, for \$5000, written on Mr. Drage's trust account to Mr. Rodriguez was returned for insufficient funds.

c) Check 3079, for \$5000, written on Mr. Drage's trust account to Kathleen Bennett was returned for insufficient funds.

d) Check 148, for \$3500, written on Mr. Drage's trust account to Kathleen Rodriguez was returned for insufficient funds.

e) Check 183, for \$3000, written on Mr. Drage's trust account to Kathleen Rodriguez was returned for insufficient funds.

f) Check 191, for \$1115, written on Mr. Drage's trust account to Kathleen Rodriguez was returned for insufficient funds.

g) Check 253, for \$1700, written on Mr. Drage's trust account to Kathleen Rodriguez was returned for insufficient funds.

h) Check 252, for \$1750, written on Mr. Drage's trust account to Kathleen Rodriguez was returned for insufficient funds.

i) Check 3060, for \$20,000, written on Mr. Drage's trust account to BCD Worldwide was returned for insufficient funds.

II. Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances

The Office of Professional Conduct and Mr. Drage stipulate that, for the purposes of this discipline by consent and settlement agreement, that there are no aggravating circumstances as outlined in Rule 14-607(a) of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.

The Office of Professional Conduct and Mr. Drage stipulate that for the purposes of this discipline by consent and settlement agreement, that there are no mitigating circumstances as outlined in Rule 14-607(b) of the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions.

III. Recommendation of Discipline

Pursuant to Rule 14-603(f) of the Standards:

Probation is a sanction that allows a lawyer to practice law under specified conditions. Probation can be public or nonpublic, can be imposed alone or in conjunction with other sanctions, and can be imposed as a condition of readmission or reinstatement.

Subject to the Court's approval, Mr. Drage and the OPC agree that Mr. Drage shall be placed on probation for two-years for his violations of the Rules of Professional Conduct, with the following conditions:

- a. During the two year probation, Mr. Drage shall attend the OPC's Ethics School. Ethics School is typically held twice a year, in January and in either July or August.
- b. During the two year probation Mr. Drage shall take and pass the Multi

State Professional Responsibility Examination.

- c. In addition to or in lieu of the failure to attend Ethics School; and/or the failure to take and pass the Multi State Professional Responsibility Exam, if there are any Bar complaints (including OPC Bar complaints) filed against Mr. Drage during his two year probation where a Screening Panel of the Ethics and Discipline Committee finds probable cause for filing a formal complaint, then the OPC can proceed directly to the District Court on motion and Mr. Drage shall be suspended for one year for violation of his probation.
- d. The OPC can also seek a greater sanction than one year for any Bar complaints (including OPC complaints) filed against Mr. Drage during his two year probation where a Screening Panel of the Ethics and Discipline Committee finds probable cause for a filing of a formal complaint, however, if the OPC determines to seek a greater sanction than a one year suspension for violation of Mr. Drage's probation, the OPC shall file a formal complaint with the District Court pursuant to Rule 14-511 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability and proceed in accordance with this rule.
- e. As of the date of this Discipline by Consent, there are no other pending Bar complaints against Mr. Drage. However, there are federal criminal charges pending against Mr. Drage. Any future attorney discipline actions

that may result from the federal criminal charges are separate and independent from this Discipline by Consent presently before this Court.

- f. Termination of this probation shall be considered pursuant to filing of a petition in accordance with Rule 14-525 of the Rules of Lawyer Discipline and Disability.

DATED: October 13, 2010




Billy L. Walker
Senior Counsel
Office of Professional Conduct

DATED: October _____, 2010



Nathan Drage
Respondent

DATED: October 12, 2010.



Richard A. Van Wagoner
Counsel for Respondent

I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.

DATE: 3/3/15

DEPUTY COURT CLERK



CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 12th day of October, 2010, I hand-delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Discipline by Consent and Settlement Agreement to:

Richard A. Van Wagoner
Snow Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City UT 84145

Alisa Webb

Rule 1.4. Communication.

(a) A lawyer shall:

(a)(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client's informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(e), is required by these Rules;

(a)(2) reasonably consult with the client about the means by which the client's objectives are to be accomplished;

(a)(3) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter;

(a)(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and

(a)(5) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the lawyer's conduct when the lawyer knows that the client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.

(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

Comment

[1] Reasonable communication between the lawyer and the client is necessary for the client effectively to participate in the representation.

Communicating with Client

[2] If these Rules require that a particular decision about the representation be made by the client, paragraph (a)(1) requires that the lawyer promptly consult with and secure the client's consent prior to taking action unless prior discussions with the client have resolved what action the client wants the lawyer to take. For example, a lawyer who receives from opposing counsel an offer of settlement in a civil controversy or a proffered plea bargain in a criminal case must promptly inform the client of its substance unless the client has previously indicated that the proposal will be acceptable or unacceptable or has authorized the lawyer to accept or to reject the offer. See Rule 1.2(a).

[3] Paragraph (a)(2) requires the lawyer to reasonably consult with the client about the means to be used to accomplish the client's objectives. In some situations—depending on both the importance of the action under consideration and the feasibility of consulting with the client—this duty will require consultation prior to taking action. In other circumstances, such as during a trial when an immediate decision must be made, the exigency of the situation may require the lawyer to act without prior consultation. In such cases the lawyer must nonetheless act reasonably to inform the client of actions the lawyer has taken on the client's behalf. Additionally, paragraph (a)(3) requires that the lawyer keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter, such as significant developments affecting the timing or the substance of the representation.

[4] A lawyer's regular communication with clients will minimize the occasions on which a client will need to request information concerning the representation. When a client makes a reasonable request for information, however, paragraph (a)(4) requires prompt compliance with the request, or if a prompt response is not feasible, that the lawyer, or a member of the lawyer's staff, acknowledge receipt of the request and advise the client when a response may be expected. A lawyer should promptly respond to or acknowledge client communications.

Explaining Matters

[5] The client should have sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to do so. Adequacy of communication depends in part on the kind of advice or assistance that is involved. For example, when there is time to explain a proposal made in a negotiation, the lawyer should review all important provisions with the client before proceeding to an agreement. In litigation a lawyer should explain the general strategy and prospects of success and ordinarily should consult the client on tactics that are likely to result in significant expense or to injure or coerce others. On the other hand, a lawyer ordinarily will not be expected to describe trial or negotiation strategy in detail. The guiding principle is that the lawyer should fulfill reasonable client expectations for information consistent with the duty to act in the client's best interests and the client's overall

requirements as to the character of representation. In certain circumstances, such as when a lawyer asks a client to consent to a representation affected by a conflict of interest, the client must give informed consent, as defined in Rule 1.0(e).

[6] Ordinarily, the information to be provided is that appropriate for a client who is a comprehending and responsible adult. However, fully informing the client according to this standard may be impracticable, for example, where the client is a child or suffers from diminished capacity. See Rule 1.14. When the client is an organization or group, it is often impossible or inappropriate to inform every one of its members about its legal affairs; ordinarily, the lawyer should address communications to the appropriate officials of the organization. See Rule 1.13. Where many routine matters are involved, a system of limited or occasional reporting may be arranged with the client.

Withholding Information

[7] In some circumstances, a lawyer may be justified in delaying transmission of information when the client would be likely to react imprudently to an immediate communication. Thus, a lawyer might withhold a psychiatric diagnosis of a client when the examining psychiatrist indicates that disclosure would harm the client. A lawyer may not withhold information to serve the lawyer's own interest or convenience or the interests or convenience of another person. Rules or court orders governing litigation may provide that information supplied to a lawyer may not be disclosed to the client. Rule 3.4(c) directs compliance with such rules or orders.

Rule 1.7. Conflict of Interest: Current Clients.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if:

(a)(1) The representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or

(a)(2) There is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.

(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:

(b)(1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client;

(b)(2) the representation is not prohibited by law;

(b)(3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and

(b)(4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.

Comment

General Principles

[1] Loyalty and independent judgment are essential elements in the lawyer's relationship to a client. Concurrent conflicts of interest can arise from the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or from the lawyer's own interests. For specific rules regarding certain concurrent conflicts of interest, see Rule 1.8. For former client conflicts of interest, see Rule 1.9. For conflicts of interest involving prospective clients, see Rule 1.18. For definitions of "informed consent" and "confirmed in writing," see Rules 1.0(e) and (b).

[2] Resolution of a conflict of interest problem under this Rule requires the lawyer to: 1) clearly identify the client or clients; 2) determine whether a conflict of interest exists; 3) decide whether the representation may be undertaken despite the existence of a conflict, i.e., whether the conflict is consentable; and, 4) if so, consult with the clients affected under paragraph (a)(1) and obtain their informed consent, confirmed in writing. The clients affected under paragraph (a)(1) include both of the clients referred to in paragraph (a)(1) and the one or more clients whose representation might be materially limited under paragraph (a)(2).

[3] A conflict of interest may exist before representation is undertaken, in which event the representation must be declined, unless the lawyer obtains the informed consent of each client under the conditions of paragraph (b). To determine whether a conflict of interest exists, a lawyer should adopt reasonable procedures, appropriate for the size and type of firm and practice, to determine in both litigation and nonlitigation matters the persons and issues involved. See also Comment to Rule 5.1. Ignorance caused by a failure to institute such procedures will not excuse a lawyer's violation of this Rule. As to whether a client-lawyer relationship exists or, having once been established, is continuing, see Comment to Rule 1.3 and Scope.

[4] If a conflict arises after representation has been undertaken, the lawyer ordinarily must withdraw from the representation, unless the lawyer has obtained the informed consent of the client under the conditions of paragraph (b). See Rule 1.16. Where more than one client is involved, whether the lawyer may continue to represent any of the clients is determined both by the lawyer's ability to comply with duties owed to the former client and by the lawyer's ability to represent adequately the remaining client or clients, given the lawyer's duties to the former client. See Rule 1.9. See also Comments [5] and [29].

[4a] To eliminate confusion, former Rule 2.2 "Intermediary" has been deleted entirely. The term "intermediation" is changed in Rule 1.7 to "common representation". Comment [4] sets out the analysis that a lawyer should make in order to determine when common representation is improper. The comments to Rule 1.7 specifically instruct lawyers on what informed consent means in the situations.

[5] Unforeseeable developments, such as changes in corporate and other organizational affiliations or the

addition or realignment of parties in litigation, might create conflicts in the midst of a representation, as when a company sued by the lawyer on behalf of one client is bought by another client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter. Depending on the circumstances, the lawyer may have the option to withdraw from one of the representations in order to avoid the conflict. The lawyer must seek court approval where necessary and take steps to minimize harm to the clients. See Rule 1.16. The lawyer must continue to protect the confidences of the client from whose representation the lawyer has withdrawn. See Rule 1.9(c).

Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Directly Adverse

[6] Loyalty to a current client prohibits undertaking representation directly adverse to that client without that client's informed consent. Thus, absent consent, a lawyer may not act as an advocate in one matter against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even when the matters are wholly unrelated. The client as to whom the representation is directly adverse is likely to feel betrayed, and the resulting damage to the client-lawyer relationship is likely to impair the lawyer's ability to represent the client effectively. In addition, the client on whose behalf the adverse representation is undertaken reasonably may fear that the lawyer will pursue that client's case less effectively out of deference to the other client, i.e., that the representation may be materially limited by the lawyer's interest in retaining the current client. Similarly, a directly adverse conflict may arise when a lawyer is required to cross-examine a client who appears as a witness in a lawsuit involving another client, as when the testimony will be damaging to the client who is represented in the lawsuit. On the other hand, simultaneous representation in unrelated matters of clients whose interests are only economically adverse, such as representation of competing economic enterprises in unrelated litigation, does not ordinarily constitute a conflict of interest and thus may not require consent of the respective clients.

[7] Directly adverse conflicts can also arise in transactional matters. For example, if a lawyer is asked to represent the seller of a business in negotiations with a buyer represented by the lawyer, not in the same transaction but in another, unrelated matter, the lawyer could not undertake the representation without the informed consent of each client.

Identifying Conflicts of Interest: Material Limitation

[8] Even where there is no direct adverseness, a conflict of interest exists if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's ability to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client will be materially limited as a result of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. For example, a lawyer asked to represent several individuals seeking to form a joint venture is likely to be materially limited in the lawyer's ability to recommend or advocate all possible positions that each might take because of the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the others. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client. The mere possibility of subsequent harm does not itself require disclosure and consent. The critical questions are the likelihood that a difference in interests will eventuate and, if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the lawyer's independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or foreclose courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client.

Lawyer's Responsibilities to Former Clients and Other Third Persons

[9] In addition to conflicts with other current clients, a lawyer's duties of loyalty and independence may be materially limited by responsibilities to former clients under Rule 1.9 or by the lawyer's responsibilities to other persons, such as fiduciary duties arising from a lawyer's service as a trustee, executor or corporate director.

Personal Interest Conflicts

[10] The lawyer's own interests should not be permitted to have an adverse effect on representation of a client. For example, if the probity of a lawyer's own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice. Similarly, when a lawyer has discussions concerning possible employment with an opponent of the lawyer's client, or with a law firm representing the opponent, such discussions could materially limit the lawyer's representation of the client. In addition, a lawyer may not allow related business interests to affect representation, for example, by referring clients to an enterprise in which the lawyer has an undisclosed financial interest. See Rule 1.8 for specific rules pertaining to a number of personal interest conflicts, including business transactions with clients. See also Rule 1.10 (personal interest conflicts under Rule 1.7 ordinarily are not imputed to other lawyers in a law firm).

[11] When lawyers representing different clients in the same matter or in substantially related matters are

closely related by blood or marriage, there may be a significant risk that client confidences will be revealed and that the lawyer's family relationship will interfere with both loyalty and independent professional judgment. As a result, each client is entitled to know of the existence and implications of the relationship between the lawyers before the lawyer agrees to undertake the representation. Thus, a lawyer related to another lawyer, e.g., as parent, child, sibling or spouse, ordinarily may not represent a client in a matter where that lawyer is representing another party, unless each client gives informed consent. The disqualification arising from a close family relationship is personal and ordinarily is not imputed to members of firms with whom the lawyers are associated. See Rule 1.10.

[12] A lawyer is prohibited from engaging in sexual relationships with a client unless the sexual relationship predates the formation of the client-lawyer relationship. See Rule 1.8(j).

Interest of Person Paying for a Lawyer's Service

[13] A lawyer may be paid from a source other than the client, including a co-client, if the client is informed of that fact and consents and the arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty or independent judgment to the client. See Rule 1.8(f). If acceptance of the payment from any other source presents a significant risk that the lawyer's representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's own interest in accommodating the person paying the lawyer's fee or by the lawyer's responsibilities to a payer who is also a co-client, then the lawyer must comply with the requirements of paragraph (b) before accepting the representation, including determining whether the conflict is consentable and, if so, that the client has adequate information about the material risks of the representation.

Prohibited Representations

[14] Ordinarily, clients may consent to representation notwithstanding a conflict. However, as indicated in paragraph (b), some conflicts are nonconsentable, meaning that the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's consent. When the lawyer is representing more than one client, the question of consentability must be resolved as to each client.

[15] Consentability is typically determined by considering whether the interests of the clients will be adequately protected if the clients are permitted to give their informed consent to representation burdened by a conflict of interest. Thus, under paragraph (b)(1), representation is prohibited if in the circumstances the lawyer cannot reasonably conclude that the lawyer will be able to provide competent and diligent representation. See Rule 1.1 (competence) and Rule 1.3 (diligence).

[16] Paragraph (b)(2) describes conflicts that are nonconsentable because the representation is prohibited by applicable law. For example, in some states substantive law provides that the same lawyer may not represent more than one defendant in a capital case, even with the consent of the clients, and under federal criminal statutes certain representations by a former government lawyer are prohibited, despite the informed consent of the former client. In addition, decisional law in some states limits the ability of a governmental client, such as a municipality, to consent to a conflict of interest.

[17] Paragraph (b)(3) describes conflicts that are nonconsentable because of the institutional interest in vigorous development of each client's position when the clients are aligned directly against each other in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal. Whether clients are aligned directly against each other within the meaning of this paragraph requires examination of the context of the proceeding. Although this paragraph does not preclude a lawyer's multiple representation of adverse parties to a mediation (because mediation is not a proceeding before a "tribunal" under Rule 1.0(m)), such representation may be precluded by paragraph (b)(1).

Informed Consent

[18] Informed consent requires that each affected client be aware of the relevant circumstances and of the material and reasonably foreseeable ways that the conflict could have adverse effects on the interests of that client. See Rule 1.0(e) (informed consent). The information required depends on the nature of the conflict and the nature of the risks involved. When representation of multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the information must include the implications of the common representation, including possible effects on loyalty, confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege and the advantages and risks involved. See Comments [30] and [31] (effect of common representation on confidentiality).

[19] Under some circumstances it may be impossible to make the disclosure necessary to obtain consent. For example, when the lawyer represents different clients in related matters and one of the clients refuses

to consent to the disclosure necessary to permit the other client to make an informed decision, the lawyer cannot properly ask the latter to consent. In some cases the alternative to common representation can be that each party may have to obtain separate representation with the possibility of incurring additional costs. These costs, along with the benefits of securing separate representation, are factors that may be considered by the affected client in determining whether common representation is in the client's interests.

Consent Confirmed in Writing[20] Paragraph (b) requires the lawyer to obtain the informed consent of the client, confirmed in writing. Such a writing may consist of a document executed by the client or one that the lawyer promptly records and transmits to the client following an oral consent. See Rule 1.0(b). See also Rule 1.0(n) (writing includes electronic transmission). If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the client gives informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter. See Rule 1.0(b). The requirement of a writing does not supplant the need in most cases for the lawyer to talk with the client, to explain the risks and advantages, if any, of representation burdened with a conflict of interest, as well as reasonably available alternatives, and to afford the client a reasonable opportunity to consider the risks and alternatives and to raise questions and concerns. Rather, the writing is required in order to impress upon clients the seriousness of the decision the client is being asked to make and to avoid disputes or ambiguities that might later occur in the absence of a writing.

Revoking Consent

[21] A client who has given consent to a conflict may revoke the consent and, like any other client, may terminate the lawyer's representation at any time. Whether revoking consent to the client's own representation precludes the lawyer from continuing to represent other clients depends on the circumstances, including the nature of the conflict, whether the client revoked consent because of a material change in circumstances, the reasonable expectations of the other client and whether material detriment to the other clients or the lawyer would result.

Consent to Future Conflict

[22] Whether a lawyer may properly request a client to waive conflicts that might arise in the future is subject to the test of paragraph (b). The effectiveness of such waivers is generally determined by the extent to which the client reasonably understands the material risks that the waiver entails. The more comprehensive the explanation of the types of future representations that might arise and the actual and reasonably foreseeable adverse consequences of those representations, the greater the likelihood that the client will have the requisite understanding. Thus, if the client agrees to consent to a particular type of conflict with which the client is already familiar, then the consent ordinarily will be effective with regard to that type of conflict. If the consent is general and open-ended, then the consent ordinarily will be ineffective, because it is not reasonably likely that the client will have understood the material risks involved. On the other hand, if the client is an experienced user of the legal services involved and is reasonably informed regarding the risk that a conflict may arise, such consent is more likely to be effective, particularly if, e.g., the client is independently represented by other counsel in giving consent and the consent is limited to future conflicts unrelated to the subject of the representation. In any case, advance consent cannot be effective if the circumstances that materialize in the future are such as would make the conflict nonconsentable under paragraph (b).

Conflicts in Litigation

[23] Paragraph (b)(3) prohibits representation of opposing parties in the same litigation, regardless of the clients' consent. On the other hand, simultaneous representation of parties whose interests in litigation may conflict, such as coplaintiffs or codefendants, is governed by paragraph (a)(2). A conflict may exist by reason of substantial discrepancy in the parties' testimony, incompatibility in positions in relation to an opposing party or the fact that there are substantially different possibilities of settlement of the claims or liabilities in question. Such conflicts can arise in criminal cases as well as civil. The potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more than one codefendant. On the other hand, common representation of persons having similar interests in civil litigation is proper if the requirements of paragraph (b) are met.

[24] Ordinarily a lawyer may take inconsistent legal positions in different tribunals at different times on behalf of different clients. The mere fact that advocating a legal position on behalf of one client might create precedent adverse to the interests of a client represented by the lawyer in an unrelated matter does not create a conflict of interest. A conflict of interest exists, however, if there is a significant risk that a lawyer's action on behalf of one client will materially limit the lawyer's effectiveness in representing

another client in a different case; for example, when a decision favoring one client will create a precedent likely to seriously weaken the position taken on behalf of the other client. Factors relevant in determining whether the clients need to be advised of the risk include: where the cases are pending, whether the issue is substantive or procedural, the temporal relationship between the matters, the significance of the issue to the immediate and long-term interests of the clients involved and the clients' reasonable expectations in retaining the lawyer. If there is significant risk of material limitation, then absent informed consent of the affected clients, the lawyer must refuse one of the representations or withdraw from one or both matters.

[25] When a lawyer represents or seeks to represent a class of plaintiffs or defendants in a class-action lawsuit, unnamed members of the class are ordinarily not considered to be clients of the lawyer for purposes of applying paragraph (a)(1) of this Rule. Thus, the lawyer does not typically need to get the consent of such a person before representing a client suing the person in an unrelated matter. Similarly, a lawyer seeking to represent an opponent in a class action does not typically need the consent of an unnamed member of the class whom the lawyer represents in an unrelated matter.

Nonlitigation Conflicts

[26] Conflicts of interest under paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) arise in contexts other than litigation. For a discussion of directly adverse conflicts in transactional matters, see Comment [7]. Relevant factors in determining whether there is significant potential for material limitation include the duration and intimacy of the lawyer's relationship with the client or clients involved, the functions being performed by the lawyer, the likelihood that disagreements will arise and the likely prejudice to the client from the conflict. The question is often one of proximity and degree. See Comment [8].

[27] For example, conflict questions may arise in estate planning and estate administration. A lawyer may be called upon to prepare wills for several family members, such as husband and wife, and, depending upon the circumstances, a conflict of interest may be present. In estate administration the identity of the client may be unclear under the law of a particular jurisdiction. Under one view, the client is the fiduciary; under another view, the client is the estate or trust, including its beneficiaries. In order to comply with conflict of interest rules, the lawyer should make clear the lawyer's relationship to the parties involved.

[28] Whether a conflict is consentable depends on the circumstances. For example, a lawyer may not represent multiple parties to a negotiation whose interests are fundamentally antagonistic to each other, but common representation is permissible where the clients are generally aligned in interest even though there is some difference in interest among them. Thus, a lawyer may seek to establish or adjust a relationship between clients on an amicable and mutually advantageous basis; for example, in helping to organize a business in which two or more clients are entrepreneurs, working out the financial reorganization of an enterprise in which two or more clients have an interest or arranging a property distribution in settlement of an estate. The lawyer seeks to resolve potentially adverse interests by developing the parties' mutual interests. Otherwise, each party might have to obtain separate representation, with the possibility of incurring additional cost, complication or even litigation. Given these and other relevant factors, the clients may prefer that the lawyer act for all of them.

Special Considerations in Common Representation

[29] In considering whether to represent multiple clients in the same matter, a lawyer should be mindful that if the common representation fails because the potentially adverse interests cannot be reconciled, the result can be additional cost, embarrassment and recrimination. Ordinarily, the lawyer will be forced to withdraw from representing all of the clients if the common representation fails. In some situations, the risk of failure is so great that multiple representation is plainly impossible. For example, a lawyer cannot undertake common representation of clients where contentious litigation or negotiations between them are imminent or contemplated. Moreover, because the lawyer is required to be impartial between commonly represented clients, representation of multiple clients is improper when it is unlikely that impartiality can be maintained. Generally, if the relationship between the parties has already assumed antagonism, the possibility that the clients' interests can be adequately served by common representation is not very good. Other relevant factors are whether the lawyer subsequently will represent both parties on a continuing basis and whether the situation involves creating or terminating a relationship between the parties.

[30] A particularly important factor in determining the appropriateness of common representation is the effect on client-lawyer confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege. With regard to the attorney-client privilege, the prevailing rule is that, as between commonly represented clients, the privilege does not attach. Hence, it must be assumed that if litigation eventuates between the clients, the privilege will not protect any such communications, and the client should be so advised.

[31] As to the duty of confidentiality, continued common representation will almost certainly be inadequate if one client asks the lawyer not to disclose to the other client information relevant to the common representation. This is so because the lawyer has an equal duty of loyalty to each client, and each client has the right to be informed of anything bearing on the representation that might affect that client's interests and the right to expect that the lawyer will use that information to that client's benefit. See Rule 1.4. The lawyer should, at the outset of the common representation and as part of the process of obtaining each client's informed consent, advise each client that information will be shared and that the lawyer will have to withdraw if one client decides that some matter material to the representation should be kept from the other. In limited circumstances, it may be appropriate for the lawyer to proceed with the representation when the clients have agreed, after being properly informed, that the lawyer will keep certain information confidential. For example, the lawyer may reasonably conclude that failure to disclose one client's trade secrets to another client will not adversely affect representation involving a joint venture between the clients and agree to keep that information confidential with the informed consent of both clients.

[32] When seeking to establish or adjust a relationship between clients, the lawyer should make clear that the lawyer's role is not that of partisanship normally expected in other circumstances and, thus, that the clients may be required to assume greater responsibility for decisions than when each client is separately represented. Any limitations on the scope of the representation made necessary as a result of the common representation should be fully explained to the clients at the outset of the representation. See Rule 1.2(c).

[33] Subject to the above limitations, each client in the common representation has the right to loyal and diligent representation and the protection of Rule 1.9 concerning the obligations to a former client. The client also has the right to discharge the lawyer as stated in Rule 1.16.

Organizational Clients

[34] A lawyer who represents a corporation or other organization does not, by virtue of that representation, necessarily represent any constituent or affiliated organization, such as a parent or subsidiary. See Rule 1.13(a). Thus, the lawyer for an organization is not barred from accepting representation adverse to an affiliate in an unrelated matter, unless the circumstances are such that the affiliate should also be considered a client of the lawyer, there is an understanding between the lawyer and the organizational client that the lawyer will avoid representation adverse to the client's affiliates, or the lawyer's obligations to either the organizational client or the new client are likely to limit materially the lawyer's representation of the other client.[35] A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a member of its board of directors should determine whether the responsibilities of the two roles may conflict. The lawyer may be called on to advise the corporation in matters involving actions of the directors. Consideration should be given to the frequency with which such situations may arise, the potential intensity of the conflict, the effect of the lawyer's resignation from the board and the possibility of the corporation's obtaining legal advice from another lawyer in such situations. If there is material risk that the dual role will compromise the lawyer's independence of professional judgment, the lawyer should not serve as a director or should cease to act as the corporation's lawyer when conflicts of interest arise. The lawyer should advise the other members of the board that in some circumstances matters discussed at board meetings while the lawyer is present in the capacity of director might not be protected by the attorney-client privilege and that conflict of interest considerations might require the lawyer's recusal as a director or might require the lawyer and the lawyer's firm to decline representation of the corporation in a matter.

Rule 1.8. Conflict of Interest: Current Clients: Specific Rules.

(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:

(a)(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing in a manner that can be reasonably understood by the client;

(a)(2) the client is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal counsel on the transaction; and

(a)(3) the client gives informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, to the essential terms of the transaction and the lawyer's role in the transaction, including whether the lawyer is representing the client in the transaction.

(b) A lawyer shall not use information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client unless the client gives informed consent, except as permitted or required by these Rules.

(c) A lawyer shall not solicit any substantial gift from a client, including a testamentary gift or prepare on behalf of a client an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer any substantial gift unless the lawyer or other recipient of the gift is related to the client. For purpose of this paragraph, related persons include a spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grandparent or other relative or individual with whom the lawyer or the client maintains a close, familial relationship.

(d) Prior to the conclusion of representation of a client, a lawyer shall not make or negotiate an agreement giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or an account based in substantial part on information relating to the representation.

(e) A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending or contemplated litigation, except that:

(e)(1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; and

(e)(2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and expenses of litigation, and minor expenses reasonably connected to the litigation, on behalf of the client.

(f) A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than the client unless:

(f)(1) the client gives informed consent;

(f)(2) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship; and

(f)(3) information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by Rule 1.6.

(g) A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients or in a criminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client gives informed consent, in writing signed by the client. The lawyer's disclosure shall include the existence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved and of the participation of each person in the settlement.

(h) A lawyer shall not:

(h)(1) make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice unless the client is independently represented in making the agreement; or

(h)(2) settle a claim or potential claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or former client unless that person is advised in writing of the desirability of seeking and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent legal counsel in connection therewith.

(i) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:

(i)(1) acquire a lien authorized by law to secure the lawyer's fee or expenses; and

(i)(2) contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.

(j) A lawyer shall not engage in sexual relations with a client that exploit the lawyer-client relationship. For the purposes of this Rule:

(j)(1) "sexual relations" means sexual intercourse or the touching of an intimate part of another person for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse; and

(j)(2) except for a spousal relationship or a sexual relationship that existed at the commencement of the lawyer-client relationship, sexual relations between the lawyer and the client shall be presumed to be exploitive. This presumption is rebuttable.

(k) While lawyers are associated in a firm, a prohibition in the foregoing paragraphs (a) through (i) that applies to any one of them shall apply to all of them.

Comment

Business Transactions Between Client and Lawyer

[1] A lawyer's legal skill and training, together with the relationship of trust and confidence between lawyer and client, create the possibility of overreaching when the lawyer participates in a business, property or financial transaction with a client, for example, a loan or sales transaction or a lawyer investment on behalf of a client. The requirements of paragraph (a) must be met even when the transaction is not closely related to the subject matter of the representation, as when a lawyer drafting a will for a client learns that the client needs money for unrelated expenses and offers to make a loan to the client. The Rule applies to lawyers engaged in the sale of goods or services related to the practice of law, for example, the sale of title insurance or investment services to existing clients of the lawyer's legal practice. See Rule 5.7. It also applies to lawyers purchasing property from estates they represent. It does not apply to ordinary fee arrangements between client and lawyer, which are governed by Rule 1.5, although its requirements must be met when the lawyer accepts an interest in the client's business or other nonmonetary property as payment of all or part of a fee. In addition, the Rule does not apply to standard commercial transactions between the lawyer and the client for products or services that the client generally markets to others, for example, banking or brokerage services, medical services, products manufactured or distributed by the client, and utilities' services. In such transactions, the lawyer has no advantage in dealing with the client, and the restrictions in paragraph (a) are unnecessary and impracticable.

[2] Paragraph (a)(1) requires that the transaction itself be fair to the client and that its essential terms be communicated to the client, in writing, in a manner that can be reasonably understood. Paragraph (a)(2) requires that the client also be advised, in writing, of the desirability of seeking the advice of independent legal counsel. It also requires that the client be given a reasonable opportunity to obtain such advice. Paragraph (a)(3) requires that the lawyer obtain the client's informed consent, in a writing signed by the client, both to the essential terms of the transaction and to the lawyer's role. When necessary, the lawyer should discuss both the material risks of the proposed transaction, including any risk presented by the lawyer's involvement, and the existence of reasonably available alternatives and should explain why the advice of independent legal counsel is desirable. See Rule 1.0(e) (definition of informed consent).

[3] The risk to a client is greatest when the client expects the lawyer to represent the client in the transaction itself or when the lawyer's financial interest otherwise poses a significant risk that the lawyer's representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's financial interest in the transaction. Here the lawyer's role requires that the lawyer must comply, not only with the requirements of paragraph (a), but also with the requirements of Rule 1.7. Under that Rule, the lawyer must disclose the risks associated with the lawyer's dual role as both legal adviser and participant in the transaction, such as the risk that the lawyer will structure the transaction or give legal advice in a way that favors the lawyer's interests at the expense of the client. Moreover, the lawyer must obtain the client's informed consent. In some cases, the lawyer's interest may be such that Rule 1.7 will preclude the lawyer from seeking the client's consent to the transaction.

[4] If the client is independently represented in the transaction, paragraph (a)(2) of this Rule is inapplicable, and the paragraph (a)(1) requirement for full disclosure is satisfied either by a written disclosure by the lawyer involved in the transaction or by the client's independent counsel. The fact that the client was independently represented in the transaction is relevant in determining whether the agreement was fair and reasonable to the client as paragraph (a)(1) further requires.

Use of Information Related to Representation

[5] Use of information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the client violates the lawyer's duty of loyalty. Paragraph (b) applies when the information is used to benefit either the lawyer or a third person, such as another client or business associate of the lawyer. For example, if a lawyer learns that a client intends to purchase and develop several parcels of land, the lawyer may not use that information to purchase one of the parcels in competition with the client or to recommend that another client make such a purchase. The Rule does not prohibit uses that do not disadvantage the client. For example, a lawyer who learns a government agency's interpretation of trade legislation during the representation of one client may properly use that information to benefit other clients. Paragraph (b) prohibits disadvantageous use of client information unless the client gives informed consent, except as permitted or required by these Rules. See Rules 1.2(d), 1.6, 1.9(c), 3.3, 4.1(b), 8.1 and 8.3.

Gifts to Lawyers

[6] A lawyer may accept a gift from a client, if the transaction meets general standards of fairness. For example, a simple gift such as a present given at a holiday or as a token of appreciation is permitted. If a client offers the lawyer a more substantial gift, paragraph (c) does not prohibit the lawyer from accepting it, although such a gift may be voidable by the client under the doctrine of undue influence, which treats client gifts as presumptively fraudulent. In any event, due to concerns about overreaching and imposition on clients, a lawyer may not suggest that a substantial gift be made to the lawyer or for the lawyer's benefit, except where the lawyer is related to the client as set forth in paragraph (c).

[7] If effectuation of a substantial gift requires preparing a legal instrument such as a will or conveyance the client should have the detached advice that another lawyer can provide. The sole exception to this Rule is where the client is a relative of the donee.

[8] This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from seeking to have the lawyer or a partner or associate of the lawyer named as executor of the client's estate or to another potentially lucrative fiduciary position. Nevertheless, such appointments will be subject to the general conflict of interest provision in Rule 1.7 when there is a significant risk that the lawyer's interest in obtaining the appointment will materially limit the lawyer's independent professional judgment in advising the client concerning the choice of an executor or other fiduciary. In obtaining the client's informed consent to the conflict, the lawyer should advise the client concerning the nature and extent of the lawyer's financial interest in the appointment, as well as the availability of alternative candidates for the position.

Literary Rights

[9] An agreement by which a lawyer acquires literary or media rights concerning the conduct of the representation creates a conflict between the interests of the client and the personal interests of the lawyer. Measures suitable in the representation of the client may detract from the publication value of an account of the representation. Paragraph (d) does not prohibit a lawyer representing a client in a transaction concerning literary property from agreeing that the lawyer's fee shall consist of a share in ownership in the property, if the arrangement conforms to Rule 1.5.

Financial Assistance

[10] Lawyers may not subsidize lawsuits or administrative proceedings brought on behalf of their clients, including making or guaranteeing loans to their clients for living expenses, because to do so would encourage clients to pursue lawsuits that might not otherwise be brought and because such assistance gives lawyers too great a financial stake in the litigation. These dangers do not warrant a prohibition on a lawyer lending a client court costs and litigation expenses, including the expenses of medical examination and the costs of obtaining and presenting evidence, because these advances are virtually indistinguishable from contingent fees and help ensure access to the courts. Similarly, an exception allowing lawyers representing indigent clients to pay court costs and litigation expenses and minor sums reasonably connected to the litigation, such as the cost of maintaining nominal basic local telephone service or providing bus passes to enable the indigent client to have means of contact with the lawyer during litigation, regardless of whether these funds will be repaid, is warranted.

[10a] Relative to the ABA Model Rule, Utah Rule 1.8(e)(2) broadens the scope of direct support that a lawyer may provide to indigent clients to cover minor expenses reasonably connected to the litigation. This would include, for example, financial assistance in providing transportation, communications or lodging that would be required or desirable to assist the indigent client in the course of the litigation.

Person Paying for a Lawyer's Services

[11] Lawyers are frequently asked to represent a client under circumstances in which a third person will compensate the lawyer, in whole or in part. The third person might be a relative or friend, an indemnitor (such as a liability insurance company) or a co-client (such as a corporation sued along with one or more of its employees). Because third-party payers frequently have interests that differ from those of the client, including interests in minimizing the amount spent on the representation and in learning how the representation is progressing, lawyers are prohibited from accepting or continuing such representations unless the lawyer determines that there will be no interference with the lawyer's independent professional judgment and there is informed consent from the client. See also Rule 5.4(c) (prohibiting interference with a lawyer's professional judgment by one who recommends, employs or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another).

[12] Sometimes, it will be sufficient for the lawyer to obtain the client's informed consent regarding the fact of the payment and the identity of the third-party payer. If, however, the fee arrangement creates a conflict of interest for the lawyer, then the lawyer must comply with Rule 1.7. The lawyer must also conform to the requirements of Rule 1.6 concerning confidentiality. Under Rule 1.7(a), a conflict of interest exists if there is significant risk that the lawyer's representation of the client will be materially limited by the lawyer's own interest in the fee arrangement or by the lawyer's responsibilities to the third-party payer (for example, when the third-party payer is a co-client). Under Rule 1.7(b), the lawyer may accept or continue the representation with the informed consent of each affected client, unless the conflict is nonconsentable under that paragraph. Under Rule 1.7(b), the informed consent must be confirmed in writing.

Aggregate Settlements

[13] Differences in willingness to make or accept an offer of settlement are among the risks of common representation of multiple clients by a single lawyer. Under Rule 1.7, this is one of the risks that should be discussed before undertaking the representation, as part of the process of obtaining the clients' informed consent. In addition, Rule 1.2(a) protects each client's right to have the final say in deciding whether to accept or reject an offer of settlement and in deciding whether to enter a guilty or nolo contendere plea in a criminal case. The rule stated in this paragraph is a corollary of both these Rules and provides that, before any settlement offer or plea bargain is made or accepted on behalf of multiple clients, the lawyer must inform each of them about all the material terms of the settlement, including what the other clients will receive or pay if the settlement or plea offer is accepted. See also Rule 1.0(e) (definition of informed consent). Lawyers representing a class of plaintiffs or defendants, or those proceeding derivatively, may not have a full client-lawyer relationship with each member of the class; nevertheless, such lawyers must comply with applicable rules regulating notification of class members and other procedural requirements designed to ensure adequate protection of the entire class.

Limiting Liability and Settling Malpractice Claims

[14] Agreements prospectively limiting a lawyer's liability for malpractice are prohibited unless the client is independently represented in making the agreement because they are likely to undermine competent and diligent representation. Also, many clients are unable to evaluate the desirability of making such an agreement before a dispute has arisen, particularly if they are then represented by the lawyer seeking the agreement. This paragraph does not, however, prohibit a lawyer from entering into an agreement with the client to arbitrate legal malpractice claims, provided such agreements are enforceable and the client is fully informed of the scope and effect of the agreement. Nor does this paragraph limit the ability of lawyers to practice in the form of a limited-liability entity, where permitted by law, provided that each lawyer remains personally liable to the client for his or her own conduct and the firm complies with any conditions required by law, such as provisions requiring client notification or maintenance of adequate liability insurance. Nor does it prohibit an agreement in accordance with Rule 1.2 that defines the scope of the representation, although a definition of scope that makes the obligations of representation illusory will amount to an attempt to limit liability.

[15] Agreements settling a claim or a potential claim for malpractice are not prohibited by this Rule. Nevertheless, in view of the danger that a lawyer will take unfair advantage of an unrepresented client or former client, the lawyer must first advise such a person in writing of the appropriateness of independent representation in connection with such a settlement. In addition, the lawyer must give the client or former client a reasonable opportunity to find and consult independent counsel.

Acquiring Proprietary Interest in Litigation

[16] Paragraph (i) states the traditional general rule that lawyers are prohibited from acquiring a proprietary interest in litigation. Like paragraph (e), the general rule has its basis in common law champerty and maintenance and is designed to avoid giving the lawyer too great an interest in the representation. In addition, when the lawyer acquires an ownership interest in the subject of the representation, it will be more difficult for a client to discharge the lawyer if the client so desires. The Rule is subject to specific exceptions developed in decisional law and continued in these Rules. The exception for certain advances of the costs of litigation is set forth in paragraph (e). In addition, paragraph (i) sets forth exceptions for liens authorized by law to secure the lawyer's fees or expenses and contracts for reasonable contingent fees. The law of each jurisdiction determines which liens are authorized by law. These may include liens granted by statute, liens originating in common law and liens acquired by contract with the client. When a lawyer acquires by contract a security interest in property other than that recovered through the lawyer's efforts in the litigation, such an acquisition is a business or financial transaction with a client and is governed by the requirements of paragraph (a). Contracts for contingent fees in civil cases are governed by Rule 1.5.

Client-Lawyer Sexual Relationships

[17] The relationship between lawyer and client is a fiduciary one in which the lawyer occupies the highest position of trust and confidence. The relationship is almost always unequal; thus, a sexual relationship between lawyer and client can involve unfair exploitation of the lawyer's fiduciary role, in violation of the lawyer's basic ethical obligation not to use the trust of the client to the client's disadvantage. In addition, such a relationship presents a significant danger that, because of the lawyer's emotional involvement, the lawyer will be unable to represent the client without impairment of the exercise of independent professional judgment. Moreover, a blurred line between the professional and personal relationships may make it difficult to predict to what extent client confidences will be protected by the attorney-client evidentiary privilege, since client confidences are protected by privilege only when they are imparted in the context of the client-lawyer relationship. Because of the significant danger of harm to client interests and because the client's own emotional involvement renders it unlikely that the client could give adequate informed consent, this Rule prohibits the lawyer from having sexual relations with a client regardless of whether the relationship is consensual and regardless of the absence of prejudice to the client.

[18] Spousal relationships and sexual relationships that predate the client-lawyer relationship are not prohibited. Issues relating to the exploitation of the fiduciary relationship and client dependency are diminished when the sexual relationship existed prior to the commencement of the client-lawyer relationship. However, before proceeding with the representation in these circumstances, the lawyer should consider whether the lawyer's ability to represent the client will be materially limited by the relationship. See Rule 1.7(a)(2).

[19] When the client is an organization, paragraph (j) of this Rule prohibits a lawyer for the organization (whether inside counsel or outside counsel) from having a sexual relationship with a constituent of the organization who supervises, directs or regularly consults with that lawyer concerning the organization's legal matters.

[19a] Utah Rule 1.8(j) is different from the ABA Model Rule. It follows the language from former Utah Rule 8.4(g) regarding the prohibition of sexual relations with a client. This Rule defines "sexual relations" and clarifies the presumption that sexual relations with a client are exploitive of the client.

Imputation of Prohibitions

[20] Under paragraph (k), a prohibition on conduct by an individual lawyer in paragraphs (a) through (i) also applies to all lawyers associated in a firm with the personally prohibited lawyer. For example, one lawyer in a firm may not enter into a business transaction with a client of another member of the firm without complying with paragraph (a), even if the first lawyer is not personally involved in the representation of the client. The prohibition set forth in paragraph (j) is personal and is not applied to associated lawyers.

Rule 1.15. Safekeeping Property.

(a) A lawyer shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in a lawyer's possession in connection with a representation separate from the lawyer's own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained in the state where the lawyer's office is situated or elsewhere with the consent of the client or third person. The account may only be maintained in a financial institution that agrees to report to the Office of Professional Conduct in the event any instrument in properly payable form is presented against an attorney trust account containing insufficient funds, irrespective of whether or not the instrument is honored. Other property shall be identified as such and appropriately safeguarded. Complete records of such account funds and other property shall be kept by the lawyer and shall be preserved for a period of five years after termination of the representation.

(b) A lawyer may deposit the lawyer's own funds in a client trust account for the sole purpose of paying bank service charges on that account, but only in an amount necessary for that purpose.

(c) A lawyer shall deposit into a client trust account legal fees and expenses that have been paid in advance, to be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees are earned or expenses incurred.

(d) Upon receiving funds or other property in which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify the client or third person. Except as stated in this Rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.

(e) When in the course of representation a lawyer is in possession of property in which two or more persons (one of whom may be the lawyer) claim interests, the property shall be kept separate by the lawyer until the dispute is resolved. The lawyer shall promptly distribute all portions of the property as to which the interests are not in dispute.

Comment

[1] A lawyer should hold property of others with the care required of a professional fiduciary. Securities should be kept in a safe deposit box, except when some other form of safekeeping is warranted by special circumstances. All property which is the property of clients or third persons, including prospective clients, must be kept separate from the lawyer's business and personal property and, if monies, in one or more trust accounts. Separate trust accounts may be warranted when administering estate monies or acting in similar fiduciary capacities. In addition to normal monthly maintenance fees on each account, the lawyers can anticipate that financial institutions may charge additional fees for reporting overdrafts in accordance with this Rule. A lawyer should maintain on a current basis books and records in accordance with generally accepted accounting practice and comply with any recordkeeping rules established by law or court order. See, e.g., ABA Model Financial Recordkeeping Rule.

[2] While normally it is impermissible to commingle the lawyer's own funds with client funds, paragraph (b) provides that it is permissible when necessary to pay bank service charges on that account. Accurate records must be kept regarding which part of the funds are the lawyer's.

[3] Lawyers often receive funds from third parties from which the lawyer's fee will be paid. The lawyer is not required to remit to the client funds that the lawyer reasonably believes represent fees owed. However, a lawyer may not hold funds to coerce a client into accepting the lawyer's contention. The disputed portion of the funds must be kept in a trust account, and the lawyer should suggest means for prompt resolution of the dispute, such as arbitration. The undisputed portion of the funds shall be promptly distributed.

[4] Paragraph (e) also recognizes that third parties may have lawful claims against specific funds or other property in a lawyer's custody, such as a client's creditor who has a lien on funds recovered in a personal injury action. A lawyer may have a duty under applicable law to protect such third-party claims against wrongful interference by the client. In such cases, when the third-party claim is not frivolous under applicable law, the lawyer must refuse to surrender the property to the client until the claims are resolved. A lawyer should not unilaterally assume to arbitrate a dispute between the client and the third party, but, when there are substantial grounds for dispute as to the person entitled to the funds, the lawyer may file an action to have a court resolve the dispute.

[5] The obligations of a lawyer under this Rule are independent of those arising from activity other than

rendering legal services. For example, a lawyer who serves as an escrow agent is governed by the applicable law relating to fiduciaries even though the lawyer does not render legal services in the transaction and is not governed by this Rule.

[6] A lawyers' fund for client protection provides a means through the collective efforts of the Bar to reimburse persons who have lost money or property as a result of dishonest conduct of a lawyer. Where such a fund has been established, a lawyer must participate where it is mandatory, and, even when it is voluntary, the lawyer should participate.

[6a] This Rule is identical to ABA Model Rule 1.15 except it incorporates two sentences that were added to the prior version of this Rule in 1997. These two sentences are the third sentence of paragraph (a) of the Rule and the corresponding fifth sentence of Comment [1].

Rule 8.4. Misconduct.

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

- (a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;
- (b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
- (c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;
- (d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice;
- (e) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official or to achieve results by means that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law; or
- (f) knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct or other law.

Comment

[1] Lawyers are subject to discipline when they violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or knowingly assist or induce another to do so through the acts of another, as when they request or instruct an agent to do so on the lawyer's behalf. Paragraph (a), however, does not prohibit a lawyer from advising a client concerning action the client is legally entitled to take.

[1a] A violation of paragraph (a) based solely on the lawyer's violation of another Rule of Professional Conduct shall not be charged as a separate violation. However, this rule defines professional misconduct as a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct as the term professional misconduct is used in the Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice, including the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. In this respect, if a lawyer violates any of the Rules of Professional Conduct, the appropriate discipline may be imposed pursuant to Rule 14-605.

[2] Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law, such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an income tax return. However, some kinds of offenses carry no such implication. Traditionally, the distinction was drawn in terms of offenses involving "moral turpitude." That concept can be construed to include offenses concerning some matters of personal morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses, that have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice. Offenses involving violence, dishonesty, breach of trust or serious interference with the administration of justice are in that category. A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when considered separately, can indicate indifference to legal obligation.

[3] A lawyer who, in the course of representing a client, knowingly manifests by words or conduct bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status, violates paragraph (d) when such actions are prejudicial to the administration of justice. Legitimate advocacy respecting the foregoing factors does not violate paragraph (d). A trial judge's finding that peremptory challenges were exercised on a discriminatory basis does not alone establish a violation of this rule.

[4] A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by law upon a good faith belief that no valid obligation exists. The provisions of Rule 1.2(d) concerning a good faith challenge to the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law apply to challenges of legal regulation of the practice of law.

[5] Lawyers holding public office assume legal responsibilities going beyond those of other citizens. A lawyer's abuse of public office can suggest an inability to fulfill the professional role of lawyers. The same is true of abuse of positions of private trust such as trustee, executor, administrator, guardian, agent and officer, director or manager of a corporation or other organization.

DECLARATION OF SERVICE

by
U.S. FIRST-CLASS MAIL / U.S. CERTIFIED MAIL / OVERNIGHT DELIVERY / FACSIMILE-ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION

CASE NUMBER(s): 15-J-12016

I, the undersigned, am over the age of eighteen (18) years and not a party to the within action, whose business address and place of employment is the State Bar of California, 845 South Figueroa Street, Los Angeles, California 90017, declare that:

- on the date shown below, I caused to be served a true copy of the within document described as follows:

FIRST AMENDED NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY CHARGES

- By U.S. First-Class Mail: (CCP §§ 1013 and 1013(a))
By U.S. Certified Mail: (CCP §§ 1013 and 1013(a))
By Overnight Delivery: (CCP §§ 1013(c) and 1013(d))
By Fax Transmission: (CCP §§ 1013(e) and 1013(f))
By Electronic Service: (CCP § 1010.6)

- (for U.S. First-Class Mail) in a sealed envelope placed for collection and mailing at Los Angeles, addressed to: (see below)
(for Certified Mail) in a sealed envelope placed for collection and mailing as certified mail, return receipt requested, Article No.: 9414 7266 9904 2010 0698 12 at Los Angeles, addressed to: (see below)
(for Overnight Delivery) together with a copy of this declaration, in an envelope, or package designated by UPS, Tracking No.: addressed to: (see below)

Table with 4 columns: Person Served, Business-Residential Address, Fax Number, Courtesy Copy to. Row 1: NATHAN W. DRAGE, 6975 S Union Park Ctr #600 Midvale, UT 84047, Electronic Address.

via inter-office mail regularly processed and maintained by the State Bar of California addressed to:

N/A

I am readily familiar with the State Bar of California's practice for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Postal Service, and overnight delivery by the United Parcel Service ('UPS').

I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date on the envelope or package is more than one day after date of deposit for mailing contained in the affidavit.

I declare under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the State of California, that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed at Los Angeles, California, on the date shown below.

DATED: July 23, 2015

SIGNED:

Handwritten signature of Kim Wimbish and printed name KIM WIMBISH Declarant