PUBLIC MATTER

STATE BAR COURT OF CALIFORNIA

HEARING DEPARTMENT - LOS ANGELES

In the Matter of **LENORE LUANN ALBERT,** **Member No. 210876,** A Member of the State Bar.	Case Nos.: **15-O-11311 (15-O-11708; 15-O-12260)** **DECISION**

Introduction[1]

Respondent Lenore Luann Albert (Respondent) is charged with four counts of misconduct: one count of willfully violating section 6068, subdivision (i) (failure to cooperate), and three counts of willfully violating section 6103 (failure to obey a court order). The Office of Chief Trial Counsel of the State Bar of California (OCTC) has the burden of proving these charges by clear and convincing evidence.[2] This court finds Respondent culpable of three of the four charged counts of misconduct and recommends that Respondent be suspended from the practice of law in California for one year, that execution of that period of suspension be stayed, and that Respondent be placed on probation for a period of one year subject to a minimum 30-day actual suspension.

[1] Unless otherwise indicated, all references to rules refer to the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct. Furthermore, all statutory references are to the Business and Professions Code, unless otherwise indicated.

[2] Clear and convincing evidence leaves no substantial doubt and is sufficiently strong to command the unhesitating assent of every reasonable mind. (*Conservatorship of Wendland* (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 552.)

Significant Procedural History

OCTC initiated this proceeding by filing a Notice of Disciplinary Charges (NDC) in case numbers 15-O-11311, 15-O-11708 and 15-O-12260 on December 16, 2015. Respondent filed a response to the NDC on February 19, 2016.

A three-day trial took place on July 7, 2016, July 8, 2016, and July 22, 2016.[3] OCTC was represented by Senior Trial Counsel Sherell N. McFarlane. Respondent represented herself. The matter was submitted for decision on July 22, 2016. On August 8, 2016, OCTC and Respondent filed their closing briefs.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in California on December 5, 2000, and has been a member of the State Bar of California at all times since that date.

Case No. 15-O-11311 – OCTC Investigation Matter

Facts

In February 2015, Jodi and Tim Sisson submitted a complaint to the State Bar against Respondent. OCTC began investigating the Sissons' complaint. On July 7, 2015, Caitlin Elen-Morin, an OCTC investigator assigned to the Sisson matter, sent a letter to Respondent at her State Bar membership records address. Elen-Morin requested a response to the allegations raised by the Sissons in their State Bar complaint by July 21, 2015. On the same date, Elen-Morin emailed a copy of the letter to Respondent at her membership records email address. Respondent received OCTC's July 7, 2015 letter. Respondent did not provide a response by the July 21, 2015 deadline.

[3] Before and during the trial, Respondent filed the following motions which are denied as moot: 1) motion in limine #1; 2) motion in limine #2; 3) motion to close court proceedings; 4) motion to seal State Bar trial exhibits 1-4. In addition, Respondent's requests for judicial notice, filed January 6, 2016 and February 5, 2016, are denied as moot.

On July 29, 2015, Elen-Morin sent a second email to Respondent at her State Bar membership records email address, reminding her that she was obligated to respond to her letter of July 7, 2015. The email was not returned as undeliverable. Respondent received the email.

On August 4, 2015, Respondent emailed Mark Hartman, an OCTC employee. The email states, "Please forward me the complaint that you want to address with your questions in writing." Respondent did not identify which matter she requested information about. Respondent also attached a prior email she sent to members of the State Bar Board of Trustees, State Bar executives and other State Bar employees, accusing the State Bar of retaliation. The August 4 email was not addressed to Elen-Morin, who was working on the Sisson matter.

On November 9, 2015, Respondent sent Elen-Morin an email indicating that she reread the July 7, 2015 investigation letter, and it was "filled with lies." Respondent stated that she "would need an extension to the eternity of time to answer this." She also acknowledged, "my answer may be coming to you a few months after your letter. . . ." The response did not provide any additional information to OCTC regarding the Sisson matter.

Conclusions

Count One – (§ 6068, subd. (i) [Failure to Cooperate])[3]

OCTC charged Respondent with willfully violating section 6068, subdivision (i), by failing to provide a substantive response to OCTC's July 7 and July 29, 2015 communications. Respondent maintains that she responded to OCTC's letters, and that if her responses were inadequate, OCTC should have informed her that additional information was required. The court finds that Respondent is culpable of failing to cooperate with the disciplinary investigation.

[3] Section 6068, subdivision (i), provides that an attorney has a duty to cooperate and participate in any disciplinary investigation or other regulatory or disciplinary proceeding pending against the attorney.

Respondent had until July 21, 2015, to respond to OCTC's July 7, 2015 investigation letter. On July 29, 2015, OCTC reminded Respondent that she was obligated to respond to the July 7 letter. It was not until August 4, 2015, that Respondent indicated that she intended to cooperate with the disciplinary investigation, which was 13 days after OCTC's deadline. Respondent, however, did not address her August 4 email to Elen-Morin, the investigator on the Sisson matter, but to a different OCTC employee. Moreover, Respondent's email did not reference the specific matter addressed by the email. Finally, Respondent's November 9, 2015, email failed to respond to the allegations raised in the Sissons' complaint. It is immaterial that OCTC did not inform Respondent that her November 9, 2015, email was not a satisfactory response to its July 7, 2015 inquiry because the email was sent over three months late. Respondent's communications with OCTC were insufficient to satisfy Respondent's duty to cooperate. The evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that Respondent willfully violated section 6068, subdivision (i).

Case No. 15-O-11708 – The Koshak Matter

Facts

The Unlawful Detainer Case

On May 14, 2012, 10675 S. Orange Park Boulevard, LLC (Plaintiff) filed an unlawful detainer against Norman and Helen Koshak in Orange County Superior Court (Superior Court), case No. 30-2012- 00568954-CL-UD-CJC. Respondent made her first appearance on behalf of the Koshaks by filing a demurrer on their behalf on May 23, 2012.

On August 23, 2012, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel responses to request for production of documents in the unlawful detainer matter. One day later, on August 24, 2012, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel further responses to form interrogatories and a motion to compel further responses to special interrogatories.

On August 31, 2012, the Superior Court held a hearing on Plaintiff's three discovery motions. Respondent attended the hearing. The court granted all three discovery motions, and imposed sanctions of $2,675.50, $1,242.50, and $1,820, respectively, against both Respondent and her client Helen Koshak. Respondent and her client were jointly and severally obligated to pay the sanctions within 30 days of the order. On August 31, 2012, Plaintiff served notice and a copy of all three discovery sanctions orders on Respondent, which Respondent received. Respondent has not paid any of the monetary sanctions imposed in the Koshak unlawful detainer matter.

Conclusions

Count Two - (§ 6103 [Failure to Obey a Court Order])[4]

OCTC charged Respondent with willfully violating section 6103 by failing to pay the August 31, 2012 discovery sanctions orders. Respondent maintains that she is not culpable because the sanctions orders are void, Helen Koshak discharged the debt in bankruptcy, and Respondent did not have the funds required to comply with the Superior Court's orders. Respondent is culpable of willfully violating section 6103.

To prove failure to obey a court order under section 6103, OCTC must establish that the attorney " 'knew what he was doing or not doing and that he intended either to commit the act or to abstain from committing it.' [Citations.]" (*King v. State Bar* (1990) 52 Cal.3d 307, 314.) Respondent was aware of the three sanctions orders, yet she failed to timely pay any of the sanctions or seek relief from payment. (*In the Matter of Respondent Y* (Review Dept. 1998) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 862, 868 [despite financial hardship, attorney culpable of misconduct for

[4] Section 6103 provides, in pertinent part, that a willful disobedience or violation of a court order requiring an attorney to do or forbear an act connected with or in the course of the attorney's profession, which an attorney ought in good faith to do or forbear, constitutes cause for suspension or disbarment.

failure to pay court-ordered sanctions when attorney fails to seek relief from order].) Respondent was required to pay all three of the sanctions orders within 30 days of August 31, 2012, but there is no evidence that Respondent has done so. Thus, Respondent is culpable of willfully violating section 6103.

The court rejects Respondent's claim that the sanctions orders are void because the commissioner who ordered the sanctions was later disqualified. There is no clear and convincing evidence that the commissioner was disqualified. Further, Respondent's claim that Helen Koshak discharged the sanctions debt in bankruptcy is also rejected because, even if her client had them discharged, Respondent and her client were jointly and severally liable to pay the monetary sanctions. Respondent is not relieved from her obligation. Finally, since "there is no evidence that Respondent ever sought relief from the order in the civil courts because of an inability to pay," her lack of financial resources "would not be a 'defense' to the charged violation of section 6103 in this case." (*In the Matter of Respondent Y*, *supra*, 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. at p. 868.)

The Mortgage Litigation Case

On August 18, 2011, Respondent filed a lawsuit entitled *Norman Koshak v. Neil H. Leventhal* in Orange County Superior Court, case No. 30-2011-00501359-CU-OR-CJC. On December 12, 2012, defendant filed a motion for discovery sanctions against Respondent and her client, Norman Koshak.

On January 18, 2013, the Superior Court held a hearing on the sanctions motion. Respondent was not present at the hearing, but another attorney from her office attended on behalf of Respondent's client. The Superior Court minute order provides that the court heard oral argument and confirmed the tentative ruling. The court imposed discovery sanctions in the amount of $3,015 against Respondent and her client. Respondent and her client were jointly and

severally responsible to pay the sanctions by February 15, 2013. Defendants were ordered to give notice of the order.

The Superior Court filed its discovery sanctions order on January 18, 2013. There is no proof of service attached to the order indicating that the order was served on Respondent. Respondent has not paid any of the sanctions imposed.

Conclusions

Count Three - (§ 6103 [Failure to Obey a Court Order])

Respondent is charged with willfully violating section 6103 by failing to obey the Superior Court's January 18, 2013 sanctions order. Respondent is not culpable of Count Three because there is a lack of clear and convincing evidence establishing that Respondent had notice of the Superior Court's January 18, 2013 order.

To establish a willful violation of section 6103, an attorney must know that a final, binding court order exists. (*In the Matter of Maloney and Virsik* (Review Dept. 2005) 4 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 774, 787 [attorney's knowledge of a final, binding order is essential element of § 6103 violation].) An attorney from Respondent's office attended the January 18, 2013 sanctions motion hearing, Respondent was not present and there is no evidence that Respondent's colleague made her aware of the Superior Court's ruling. Moreover, the opposing party was ordered to give Respondent notice of the sanctions order, but there is no proof of service attached to the order that was signed and filed by the Superior Court judge. As such, there is a lack of clear and convincing evidence demonstrating Respondent is culpable of willfully violating section 6103. (*In the Matter of Respondent P* (Review Dept. 1993) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 622, 631 [all reasonable doubts about culpability must be resolved in the accused attorney's favor and if reasonable inferences may be drawn from the facts, the inference leading to innocence must be chosen].)

Case No. 15-O-12260 – The Spinosi Matter

Facts

In 2012, Respondent was representing Joel and Rose Spinosi regarding a mortgage on their home. On July 26, 2012, Respondent filed a lawsuit in Orange County Superior Court entitled *Spinosi v. Quality Loan Service Corporation, et al.*, case No. 30-2012-00586502-CU-BT-CJC. On December 11, 2012, defendant Nationstar filed an order to show cause regarding sanctions against Respondent based on alleged misrepresentations in pleadings filed by Respondent. On January 23, 2013, the Superior Court held a hearing on Nationstar's motion, which Respondent attended. During the hearing, the court ordered "Plaintiff counsel to pay $1,500 to Defense." The court issued a minute order, which directed the clerk to provide notice. Respondent has not paid the $1,500 in sanctions to defendant's counsel.

Conclusions

Count Four - (§ 6103 [Failure to Obey a Court Order])

OCTC charged Respondent with willfully failing to obey the Superior Court's January 23, 2013 order because she failed to pay the $1,500 in sanctions. Respondent is culpable of the misconduct alleged in Count Four. Respondent was ordered to pay the defense $1,500 in sanctions, she was aware of the order, and she willfully failed to comply with it.

This court rejects Respondent's argument that OCTC failed to prove that she was the "Plaintiff's counsel" ordered to pay the sanctions. The basis for defendant Nationstar's order to show cause regarding sanctions was based on Respondent's pleadings, not those of any other counsel who appeared on the Spinosis' behalf.

The court also rejects Respondent's argument that OCTC failed to prove that the minute order was effective because there is no evidence that the order was served on Respondent.

Under Evidence Code section 664[5] there is a presumption that the superior court clerk properly performed his or her official duty in serving notice of the sanctions order on Respondent as directed by the superior court judge. The effect of a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of proof, including the presumption that an official duty has been performed (Evid.Code, § 664), is to "impose upon the party against whom it operates the burden of proof as to the nonexistence of the presumed fact." (*Gee v. California State Personnel Bd.* (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 713, 718.) Respondent has failed to rebut the presumption of proper service. Moreover, Respondent had notice of the sanctions order because she was present when the Superior Court issued its ruling.

Finally, the court finds no merit to Respondent's claim that OCTC failed to prove that the $1,500 in sanctions were not discharged in her clients' bankruptcy or that Respondent is not culpable based on her inability to pay. The Superior Court ordered Respondent to pay the sanctions, not her client; and Respondent has failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that she sought relief from the superior court order based on her inability to pay.

Aggravation[6]

OCTC must establish aggravating circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. (Std. 1.5.) The court finds two aggravating circumstances.

Multiple Acts (Std. 1.5(b).)

Respondent committed misconduct in three matters; she failed to obey two court orders and failed to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation. Respondent committed multiple acts of wrongdoing, which is an aggravating factor.

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[5] Evidence Code section 664 provides, in relevant part: "It is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed."

[6] All references to standards (Std.) are to the Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, title IV, Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct.

Indifference Toward Rectification/Atonement (Std. 1.5(k).)

Respondent has demonstrated indifference and a lack of insight into the nature and seriousness of her misconduct. "[A]n attorney's lack of insight into the wrongfulness of his actions" may be an aggravating factor. (*Rodgers v. State Bar* (1989) 48 Cal.3d 300, 317.) In her closing brief, Respondent attempts to minimize her wrongdoing by maintaining it "is about things that happened years ago." Instead of accepting responsibility, she asserts that these disciplinary proceedings are "a pre-planned scheme by the State Bar and others to dig for anything to try to attack [her] with." In addition, Respondent has yet to obey the sanctions orders issued against her – $7,238 remains unpaid. The court assigns significant weight to Respondent's lack of insight and indifference because it raises concerns as to whether her misconduct may recur. (See *Blair v. State Bar* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 762, 781-782.)

Mitigation

It is Respondent's burden to prove mitigating circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. (Std. 1.6.) The court finds the following with regard to mitigating circumstances.

No Prior Record (Std. 1.6(a).)

Respondent practiced law for almost 12 years without a prior record of discipline before the current misconduct. (*Hawes v. State Bar* (1990) 51 Cal.3d 587, 596 [attorney's practice of law for more than 10 years worth significant weight in mitigation].) However, the mitigation is undercut by Respondent's indifference, making future misconduct more likely to recur. (*Blair v. State Bar*, *supra*, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 781-782.) Thus, the mitigating weight of Respondent's years of discipline-free practice is moderate. (See std. 1.6(a) [lack of prior discipline record is a mitigating circumstance when "coupled with present misconduct, which is not likely to recur"].)

Good Character (Std. 1.6(f).)

Respondent presented the testimony of 11 witnesses at trial who attested to her good character. They included an attorney, current clients or their family members, and individuals in the real estate industry. Respondent was described as "very honest" and "compassionate." Each client was very satisfied with Respondent's representation. Numerous witnesses testified that Respondent is a "fighter for the little guys," and that she "fights hard for her clients." She was even called the "Erin Brockovich of homeowners." The attorney witness concurred with the other character descriptions, testifying that Respondent has the reputation of being a zealous advocate for her clients. He indicated that she is diligent, intelligent and committed to ascertaining the truth. The attorney has referred clients to Respondent and will continue to do so, notwithstanding her involvement in these disciplinary proceedings. Serious consideration is given to the testimony of attorneys because they have a "strong interest in maintaining the honest administration of justice." (*In the Matter of Brown* (Review Dept. 1993) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 309, 319.) While it is clear that Respondent's clients think highly of her, Respondent's good character evidence is only entitled to moderate weight. Respondent's witnesses do not represent a "wide range of references in the *legal* and general communities" and several witnesses were not "aware of the full extent of the misconduct." (Std. 1.6(f), italics added.)

Discussion

The purpose of attorney discipline is not to punish the attorney, but to protect the public, the courts, and the legal profession; to preserve public confidence in the profession; and to maintain high professional standards for attorneys. (Std. 1.1.) The State Bar contends that the appropriate discipline level for Respondent's misconduct is a 30-day actual suspension, while Respondent argues that the State Bar has failed to establish that she is culpable of any ethical violations and the imposition of discipline is unwarranted.

In determining the level of discipline, the court looks first to the standards for guidance. *(Drociak v. State Bar* (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1085, 1090; *In the Matter of Koehler* (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 615, 628.) While they are guidelines for discipline and are not mandatory, they are given great weight to promote consistency. (*In re Silverton* (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 91-92.) Moreover, the Supreme Court has instructed that the standards should be followed "whenever possible." (*In re Young* (1989) 49 Cal.3d 257, 267, fn. 11.)

Respondent failed to obey superior court sanctions orders in two separate cases. Standard 2.12(a) is the applicable standard for Respondent's misconduct. It provides that the presumed sanction for "disobedience or violation of a court order related to the . . . practice of law" is disbarment or actual suspension. (Std. 2.12(a).)

In addition to the standards, the court considers decisional law relevant to Respondent's misconduct to determine the appropriate level of discipline. The court is guided by *In the Matter of Respondent X* (Review Dept. 1997) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 592; and *In the Matter of Respondent Y, supra*, 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 862. In *In the Matter of Respondent X, supra*, 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 592, the attorney received a private reproval for violating section 6103. Respondent X deliberately violated the confidentiality provision of a court order enforcing a settlement agreement. (*Id.* at pp. 595, 603.) The attorney had practiced law for 18 years without discipline, held a sincere and principled belief that he acted in support of sound public policy by revealing the confidential information, and was under great pressure from his client and co-counsel who disagreed with his approach to the settlement and confidential terms. (*Id.* at p. 605.) The court found that actual suspension or disbarment was "not mandated." (*Ibid.*)

In *In the Matter of Respondent Y, supra*, 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 862, the attorney received a private reproval with conditions for violating section 6103 because he did not obey a court order to pay sanctions imposed as a result of his bad faith tactics and actions while

defending a civil action. In addition, the attorney violated section 6068, subdivision (o)(3), by failing to timely report the sanctions to the State Bar. The attorney had no prior disciplinary record and there was no evidence in aggravation. In determining the degree of discipline to impose, the Review Department did not apply former standard 2.6(a), but instead focused on "the narrow violation before [it]." (*Id.* at p. 869.)

Far from considering the present misconduct as a "narrow violation," this case involves disobedience of court orders in two matters. "Other than outright deceit, it is difficult to imagine conduct in the course of legal representation more unbefitting an attorney." (*Barnum v. State Bar* (1990) 52 Cal.3d 104, 112.) Unlike the attorneys in *In the Matter of Respondent X,* and *In the Matter of Respondent Y,* Respondent lacks insight into the nature of her wrongdoing. Moreover, there were no aggravating factors present in *In the Matter of Respondent Y.* In addition to willfully violating court orders, Respondent's misconduct involved her failure to cooperate in a disciplinary investigation, which is a clear breach of her ethical duties as an attorney. (*In the Matter of Peterson* (Review Dept. 1990) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 73, 80.) Therefore, guided by standard 2.12(a) and the facts and circumstances of this case, this court recommends that the appropriate level of discipline should include a minimum 30-day actual suspension.

Recommendations

It is recommended that Lenore Luann Albert, State Bar Number 210876, be suspended from the practice of law in California for one year, that execution of that period of suspension be stayed, and that Respondent be placed on probation[7] for a period of one year subject to the following conditions:

[7] The probation period will commence on the effective date of the Supreme Court order imposing discipline in this matter. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 9.18.)

1. Respondent is suspended from the practice of law for a minimum of the first 30 days of probation, and Respondent will remain suspended until the following requirements are satisfied:

   i. She pays $2,675.50, $1,242.50, and $1,820 in sanctions to Samuels, Green & Steel, LLP as ordered on August 31, 2012, by the Orange County Superior Court in case No. 30-2012-00568954-CL-UD-CJC and provides satisfactory proof thereof to the State Bar's Office of Probation in Los Angeles.

   ii. She pays $1,500 in sanctions to Severson & Werson as ordered on January 23, 2013, by the Orange County Superior Court in case No. 30-2012-00586502-CU-BT-CJC and provides satisfactory proof thereof to the State Bar's Office of Probation in Los Angeles.

   If Respondent remains suspended for two years or more as a result of not satisfying the preceding requirements, she must also provide satisfactory proof to the State Bar Court of her rehabilitation, fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the general law before her actual suspension will be terminated. (Rules Proc. of State Bar, tit. IV, Stds. for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct, std. 1.2(c)(1).)

2. Respondent must comply with the provisions of the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and all of the conditions of Respondent's probation.

3. Within 10 days of any change in the information required to be maintained on the membership records of the State Bar pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6002.1, subdivision (a), including Respondent's current office address and telephone number, or if no office is maintained, the address to be used for State Bar purposes, Respondent must report such change in writing to the Membership Records Office and the State Bar's Office of Probation.

4. Within 30 days after the effective date of discipline, Respondent must contact the Office of Probation and schedule a meeting with Respondent's assigned probation deputy to discuss these terms and conditions of probation. Upon the direction of the Office of Probation, Respondent must meet with the probation deputy either in person or by telephone. During the period of probation, Respondent must promptly meet with the probation deputy as directed and upon request.

5. Respondent must submit written quarterly reports to the Office of Probation on each January 10, April 10, July 10, and October 10 of the period of probation. Under penalty of perjury, Respondent must state whether Respondent has complied with the State Bar Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct, and all of the conditions of Respondent's probation during the preceding calendar quarter. In addition to all quarterly reports, a final report, containing the same information, is due no earlier than 20 days before the last day of the probation period and no later than the last day of the probation period.

6. Subject to the assertion of applicable privileges, Respondent must answer fully, promptly, and truthfully, any inquiries of the Office of Probation or any probation monitor that are directed to Respondent personally or in writing, relating to whether Respondent is complying or has complied with Respondent's probation conditions.

7. Within one year after the effective date of the discipline herein, Respondent must submit to the Office of Probation satisfactory evidence of completion of the State Bar's Ethics School and passage of the test given at the end of that session. This requirement is separate from any Minimum Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) requirement, and Respondent will not receive MCLE credit for attending Ethics School. (Rules Proc. of State Bar, rule 3201.)

At the expiration of the probation period, if Respondent has complied with all conditions of probation, Respondent will be relieved of the stayed suspension.

Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination

It is recommended that Respondent be ordered to take and pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE) within one year after the effective date of the Supreme Court order imposing discipline in this matter and provide satisfactory proof of such passage to the State Bar's Office of Probation in Los Angeles within the same period.

Costs

It is recommended that costs be awarded to the State Bar in accordance with Business and Professions Code section 6086.10, and are enforceable both as provided in Business and Professions Code section 6140.7 and as a money judgment.

Dated: October 19, 2016

YVETTE D. ROLAND
Judge of the State Bar Court

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

[Rules Proc. of State Bar; Rule 5.27(B); Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Case Administrator of the State Bar Court of California. I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City and County of Los Angeles, on October 19, 2016, I deposited a true copy of the following document(s):

DECISION

in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing on that date as follows:

☒ by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid, through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed as follows:

LENORE L. ALBERT
LAW OFC LENORE ALBERT
7755 CENTER AVE STE 1100
HUNTINGTON BEACH, CA 92647

☒ by interoffice mail through a facility regularly maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

Mia R. Ellis, Enforcement, Los Angeles

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed in Los Angeles, California, on October 19, 2016.

Angela Carpenter
Case Administrator
State Bar Court